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11.0 Introduction
This introduction is in three parts. The first explains the
origins of the project in terms of a history - an autobiogra-
phy - a personal relation to certain discourses. The second
explains the process of focussing the object of the project
and the strategy for preparing a Ph.D. submission. And
the third explains the technics of exposition in terms of a
writing and reading process - the possible relations
between expectation and method - and outlines the
structure of the whole paper.
21.1 Origins of the Project
Biography
My own background, in academic terms, is essentially that
of an outsider. Where I come from bookish pursuits are
frowned upon. In 1973 I turned down the offer of a univer-
sity place to read psychology and mathematics and chose
instead to pursue an education framed in a different
tradition, that of art and design. My interests became
focussed on creative practice - music, architecture,
painting, performance, poetry and design all competed for
my attention and actively engaged my efforts: I became
committed to making and doing as the principal means of
existence and my reading of history, philosophy, psychol-
ogy, poetry and science although consistent became
subservient to that central, all-consuming passion for
practical and visionary self-fulfilment. I took a first degree
in three-dimensional design (interior design) - it could have
been just as easily in fine art or architecture - and on
graduating I launched myself into performance work with a
poet and a musician, and into painting. By 1979 I had lived
below the breadline for as long as I could bear. I felt
trapped and was probably heading for a breakdown. I had
had my first encounter with the bureaucracy and, as far as
I could see, the blindness and corruption of regional arts
administration, and I needed to get out. The opportunity to
change direction was provided, ironically, by a government
department. I was plucked out of provincial poverty by the
Home Civil Service and placed in the central London design
studio of the Department for National Savings. A series of
creative challenges was prepared for me by my great
mentors, Bob Young, at that time one of the most senior
graphics officers in the Civil Service, and Peter North,
3DNS's Exhibition Designer, and a new practical education
in communication, organization and politics began in
earnest. I woke up: I became a designer. After less than two
years I was forced into a sideways move and ended up in
what I now believe to have been one of the most challeng-
ing, intriguing and complex environments in which to work
as a designer during the 1980s, a national museum.
Museum Experience
At the National Maritime Museum, in the idyllic. 'surround-
ings of Greenwich park, I met, and for the first time had to
work very closely with, individuals of the highest intellec-
tual calibre, many of them world-renowned authorities
representing the widest range of academic and museo-
graphical disciplines - archaeology, social and military
history, conservation science, literature, engineering, art
history, astronomy, and computer science amongst others.
Unlike many junior members of the museum establish-
ment, in a relatively short period of time, I worked with
individuals from every part of the museum (this was one of
the privileges of being a designer) and I found myself with
an overview of the museum as an organization for which, I
am sure, the director would have given his back teeth: I
saw the informal structure beneath the mask of formal
hierarchy, the short-circuiting lines of communication
upon which functional effectiveness relied, and the benign
subversions that supported the status quo. I saw the place
from the inside, from the bottom up, and I saw both
curatorial territoriality and conservatorial solidarity tested
by the contingent demands of the exhibition project and
toyed with by the director and certain over-enthusiastic,
some might say 'meddlesome', trustees.
4Lessons of Praxis
I learned some very important lessons: (1) The ability to
use words, to use a powerful vocabulary - the vocabulary of
one privileged academic elite or another - fluently is highly
respected and brings with it influence and authority. (2)
Many highly intelligent and educated experts are unable
to communicate effectively with ordinary people - they
tend to end up with one vocabulary only, the vocabulary of
their peers. (3) These same experts often have no (visual
and practical) imagination - somewhere along the line the
rigours of institutionalized academicism suppress most of
the visionary, experimental, speculative capabilities they
may once have had. And (4) consequently they have little
understanding of, and a poor appreciation, of the value of
'design' in its broadest sense - design as the process of
conceiving, planning and effecting radical change in the
human environment. They seem not to understand the
nature of the complexity that design is best able to tackle.
All privileged vocabularies represent each other's inade-
quacies and they are, in the main, incommensurable. This
condition of uncertainty, of conflicting understandings of a
practical situation, of counteracting forces and contradic-
tory requirements, is exactly the condition in which design
thrives. Design is the process of effecting change, whether
desirable or necessary or not, when there is an incomplete
understanding of, or a dispute about, how and why change
should be effected. Design takes over where engineering,
decision-making ... procedural technique in general,
reaches the limits of practical rationality. (5) The scope for
change in some environments is, in any case, artificially
limited by the nature of certain human organizations.
Mature organizations, institutions like the museum, tend
to become primarily concerned with self-perpetuation and
5only secondarily concerned with their supposedly principal
purposes, even if these are evolving. (6) In a complex
practical situation it is not that difficult, given a designerly
approach, to hammer out enough common ground to be
able to pilot a team, even one made up of antagonistic
intellectual heavyweights, through a process of radical
change, and to do so from, in intellectual, political and
social terms, an inferior position. What seems to matter
most in such situations is not intellect or academic status,
not control of policy making and resource management,
and certainly not age, long service or social achievement -
what matters is the nodal position in a network of commu-
nications that the design process forces upon the designer,
and the ability to organize and manage multiple conversa-
tions by acting as a translating, filtering, conduit.
Interpretation
I learned these lessons in an environment which initially
provided the support necessary for innovations in
procedure and technique but which event-tinily became one
in which creative organizational transformations, powered
from within, were overtaken and subsumed by those who
feared their apparent lack of control over largely
autonomous collection-based departments and non-curato-
rial functions. The formal restructuring of the museum, to
create separate collection management and research
divisions, at one stroke wiped out traditional curatorial
territories and put senior staff firmly back in control of
museum development. The design studio was first reduced
and then swallowed up by a new exhibitions division
headed by a senior curator. Computer systems, formerly a
small section of the printed books and manuscripts depart-
6ment, were similarly restructured and subsumed by a
larger documentation project group which drew in mainly
younger curators from all of the former collection-based
departments. This museum-wide operation was then
headed by another senior curator who reported directly to
the deputy director of the museum. Such 'rationalization'
has continued into the 1990s.
In retrospect, this process can be seen as an 'obvious'
response to the political and economic climate of the times
- the so-called 'enterprise culture' of the Thatcherite 1980s
- and one must admit that positive things came out of the
process as well as some regrettably negative ones.
However, the greatest loss has been to museum design
itself. To a large extent the fledgling discipline was turfed
out of the nest just at the time when it was beginning to
develop museographical credibility and even beginning to
be recognized in some quarters as essential to creative
management and appropriate development in wider
museum terms. Independent museum design consultancy
boomed in the 1980s, fed largely by the exodus of design
talent from the national and larger provincial museums
and by the influx of new graduates from an expanding
higher education sector. But at the cost of a coherent
environment in which to work. A museum generally
cannot afford to hire consultant designers to get under the
skin of the institution, to find out what makes it tick, and
to work from within at a grass-roots level. Such designers
are, therefore, normally limited to superficial involvements
that are carefully structured by 'official' lines of communi-
cation and the strictures concomitant with one-off projects.
Museum directors and the designers themselves have
drawn attention to the positive aspect of this arrangement:
the fresh eye and approach the outsider is able to bring to
the situation. However, the difficulty with this is that the
7consultant designer may only see a snap shot of the organi-
zation which tends to present the illusion of stability and
coherence, and may only be permitted to deal with
'directed' or prescribed change. What has been lost is the
opportunity for a deeper creativity rooted in collective
dynamics which has the potential to deal with the
immanent possibilities of change. This is a more open-
ended process which takes place over an extended period
and requires the organization as a whole to learn from its
mistakes and to learn how to take risks successfully.
Project as Journey
In the views expressed above the language may have
changed and the narrative may be tighter but, as closely as
I can reconstruct them, they are the views I held in 1987. I
left the National Maritime Museum in 1986 to take up a
lecturing post in Museum & Exhibition Design at what is
now the University of Humberside and, with the encourage-
ment of the then Head of School, Brian Brennan, I decided
to pursue the issues raised by my experience through
further research. Therefore, there is a sense in which these
views constitute my project: they represent its origins in
terms of an experience, both professional and emotional,
and an aroused intellectual curiosity. There is a charge that
can be made, that I have decided what the outcome should
be before I have even begun to question the validity of these
views and to explore the alternatives, but I am not worried
by this. I believe it is important to be honest at the
beginning about where one is coming from and to know
what prejudices and preconceptions one is bringing to the
work. It is important, not because the outcome is predeter-
mined but, because they constitute my initial position in
8raw unequivocal terms. They always were open to change,
they have changed, and they remain 'provisional'. In this
project I expected to travel into new territory and I did not
know whether I would pass over the old ground again.
Some of it I did but it looked very different.
91.2 Focus and Strategy
Process
There were three stages in the process of narrowing and
focussing the project. Initially the aim was nothing less
than a 'paradigm shift' - to reframe the Praxis of Science
as 'Design' using the museum as a microcosmic context in
which the complexity of the condition of modernity/
postmodernity was amply reflected. This over-ambitious
scheme narrowed at first to one of exploring the interdisci-
plinary problem of the multidimensionality of design. In
this, incommensurability and theories of space have to be
accommodated in a workable model, and the forms and
transformations of the model have then to be 'proved' in a
praxiological exposition. Finally, it has become clear that
much of the detailed creative work implied in the previous
formulation of the project is, to be realistic, of a post-
doctoral nature. Therefore, the Ph.D. problem has been
focussed even further.
The focus is on the development of a multidimen-
sional expression of museum design in the form of a
theoretical model and an appraisal of its implications for
general theory in organization and design. This involves
(1) Background theory - a survey of concepts and theories
in modelling, (2) Focal theory - a critique of existing
notions of organization and Praxis in museums and in
Design, (3) Model theory - the development and presenta-
tion of a more adequate scheme, and (4) Contribution - the
evaluation of its potential as a generalization.
Background Theory
In the first part of the programme it has been necessary to
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ask a specific question about Philosophy - does any specific
paradigm offer an adequate conceptual scheme and
'language' in which to work? And if not, what do so-called
post-Philosophical approaches - radical pragmatism,
ironism - have to offer in terms of a workable strategy,
perhaps one that is recognizably `designerly' in approach.
In addition the definition and clarification of a wide
range of incommensurable notions of 'space' has had to be
undertaken to be clear that the complexity with which
design, in the generic sense, engages has a particular
character which is quite distinct from that of disciplines
such as Science, History, and Politics which are tradition-
ally inclined towards epochal paradigmatic solidarity and
towards contingent epistemological coherence. The
designer is, arguably, more of a chameleon than is the
scientist or the historian or the politician, more so even
than are the novelist and the ethnographer whom Rorty
cites as latterly more crucial figures.' This 'quixotic' aspect
of the designer's position is crucial to any argument about
personal integrity and social value: this enigmatic journey-
man and traveller follows a lonely path guided by
emotional (instinctual) as much as by intellectual and
practical imperatives.
1. ...it is the disciplines which
specialize in thick description of
the private and the idiosyncratic
which are assigned [the job of
fostering solidarity] ...In partieu -
lar novels and ethnographies
which sensitize one to the pain of
those who do not speak our Ian -
guage must do the job...
RORTY, Richard. Contingency,
Irony, and Solidarity.
Cambridge University Press,
1989. p.94.
Focal Theory
The second part of the programme has involved two opera-
tions: (1) a critical investigation, in some detail, of the
discourses of organization, design and museography/
museology; and (2) an opening up of the intervals between
them, that is, an exploration their three interfaces - organi-
zation-design; design-museum; and museum-organization.
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Model Theory
By proposing a visible constellation of spatial concepts and
exposing the tensions which characterize their performativ-
ity, the second part of the programme is drawn towards the
final part of the programme. In this the adequacy of the
proposed model is evaluated in terms of the specific context
of the museum as an organizational type - a creative-
administrative nexus - and in terms of its potential value
as a generalization. This latter point has involved consider-
ation of the possible `museal' quality of organization in
general and a reappraisal of the values of design above and
beyond the institutionalized, professionally delineated and
administered discipline of Design practice.
Contribution
The conclusions emphasize the difficulty of boundary
crossing enterprizes such as this project. A considerable
effort has gone into deferring the synthetic instinct that all
theory tends, sooner or later, to exemplify. However, not
just for the sake of form, I make clear some specific and
critical points in relation to the 'new' space established by
this investigation of museum-design-organization.
The museum design discipline has good reason to
expound a communication-led collaborative philosophy and
to have the strength to develop its discourse in more
sophisticated intellectual circles.
In general there is a central message that emerges
from the museum-design-organization complex which in one
sense bolsters the ironist/new pragmatist stance in engaged
theory but also reminds us that to be engaged one must
develop skills and capacities that are independent of the
12
logics of language, that are irrational and yet invaluable.
And in future the interdisciplinary (as distinct from
the multidisciplinary) platform must speak its name and
be generous. If one is met with incomprehension, resis-
tance, threat response, or out and out hostility one has
failed to understand the nature of design. One does not
wait to be invited in, neither does one go straight for the
jugular. One makes a home, a communal place, a common
ground. One finds the hearth and kindles in it a new
flame, a new light. One arranges a meeting of minds
prepared to enchant with and to be enchanted by new
visions and new stories. And one helps each soul along its
journey with no more than a gentle nudge in a promising
direction in the certain knowledge that the whole process
will need to be repeated tomorrow and that this will
remain the case for each tomorrow.
13
1.3 On Writing and Reading
1. The activity of writing is
constrained by its practicalities:
proficient keyboard skill has no
logical connection with linguistic
proficiency and neither of these
with the condition of either
having or not having something
worth the writing. The conse-
quence is a paradox: the act of
writing, even in its least inter-
rupted moments, may result in
statements that fail to hang
together as one would wish.
Equally, the most fragmented
process may beget an apparently
seamless text of irresistible
power. In William Burroughs'
The Naked Lunch Hank and
Martin, two young writers,
argue the point over coffee:
H: ... To re-think a flow and a
rhythm, a tumbling out of the
words, is a betrayal. That's a sin
Martin ...
M: I don't accept your catholic
interpretation of my compulsive
necessity to rewrite every single
word at least a hundred times.
Guilt is the key. ... Guilt re not
considering everything from
every possible angle ...
H: Well how about guilt re
censoring your best thoughts,
your most honest, primitive, real
thoughts?
[from the film The Naked Lunch,
David Cronenberg, 1993.]
If only there could be a real
choice between the perfect
conjunction of time, place and
thought and the certain effec-
tiveness of a fragmentary craft
process. The story of The Naked
Lunch proceeds to explore an
extreme dislocation of the
writer's conscious intentions
from the nature of what he is
In the process of writing the flow of words is as certain as
is disjunction in the circumstance of its production.'
Michel Foucault concludes that a principled and essential
conjunction of [poetic forms and psychological structures] is
impossible.2
One can also say that 'disjunction' implies 'conjunction'
and 'flow' implies 'interruption': without such implications
neither is remarkable, neither can be an issue.' In this
paper great play is made in the midst of four peculiar
discourses - philosophy, organization theory, design
theory, and new museology - the writing depends upon
objects whose connections are multiple, layered and ironic,
or even paradoxical, and I would not wish to impose on
this, even if it were possible, a single correct (linear)
process of reading.' However, something must be said
about how the work is written, if only as a preparation for
the kinds of disjunction and conjunction the reader may
expect to find and as a chance to acclimatize to the flow of
the writing and the ways in which it can be interrupted.
These first few sentences are illustrated by some of the
characteristic types of note the reader will encounter in
the thesis. Note 1 is a discursive commentary - an elabora-
tion of a concept which attempts to make a connection that
has specific resonance. In this case three facets of the idea
of a "process of writing" are differentiated - manual skill,
articulacy, and intellectual preparedness. The point is
made that they are not logically connected, that there is a
disjunction between the process of writing and its product.
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able to produce.
2. DERRIDA, Jacques. [1967]
Writing and Difference. Trans.
Alan Bass. Routledge & Regan
Paul, 1978. p.170.
Earlier in the book Derrida says:
[Writing] does not know where it
is going, no knowledge can keep
it from the essential precipitation
toward the meaning that it
constitutes and that is,
primarily, its future. [p.11.)
3. The proposition that
meaning arises out of difference,
that a term is unstable and
defined by that from which it
differs, in an endless play of
differance. See below 2.2
Organization . Difference.
4. See: DERRIDA, Jacques.
"Living On - Border Lines" in
BLOOM, Harold. et al
Deconstruction and Criticism,
New York: The Seabury Press,
1979. pp.76-176.
Derrida uses a single footnote
that extends the full length of
the main text. This parallel text
purportedly addresses the trans-
lator of the work in a text which,
though it must itself be trans-
lated, uncovers the untranslata-
bility of all texts. In fact, Derrida
primarily addresses the reader
even though what is read, if
Derrida is to be taken at his (?)
word, is bound to be, at least in
translation, not quite what he
meant to say.
This thesis presents a
similar paradox in the necessary
relationship between writing
and reading. Reading cannot be
simply a process of playing back
the writing. Reading itself
involves a form of translation.
one which renders differences in,
what Rorty calls, 'final vocabu-
lary' peculiarly potent. As long
That the former carries no guarantee that the latter will
have particular qualities is illustrated with a quote from
William Burroughs (via David Cronenberg) whose existen-
tial insight and creative genius provide a particularly
cogent expression of the central point. The second note is a
straightforward reference to the source of a quote. Often I
might add qualifying commentary to such a reference
particularly if a special use is being made of an idea that
might otherwise look out of place.' Note number 3 is a
cross-reference, in this case forwards in the text, to the
point where an important concept is explicated. To make
too detailed a use of the concepts of 'difference' and
`differance' at this stage would cause a hiatus in one
thread of the argument: elaboration is therefore deferred
and the deferral pointed out. Where links backwards in the
text are made, this is to avoid unnecessary repetition at
the same time as facilitating a reader in recapitulation.
Note 4 is a reference to which a discursive commentary is
added. In this case, a lengthy discussion in the critical
literature, concerning a theoretical difficulty in the
relationship between reading and writing, is called upon to
add credibility to an approach which might otherwise seem
to make unreasonable demands on the reader.
There are sequences in the paper where the notes run on
ahead of the main text. Although the 'main text' is
certainly composed to carry the key elements and thrust of
the argument it is also true that the elaboration of, or
commentary on, the text occasionally necessitates a mass
and momentum of it own and, indeed, may come close to
challenging for the reader's attention as the 'main text'.
Whatever happens to the notes, therefore, it could be said
that the 'main text' always catches up, takes over,
overtakes. The purpose of this conceit is to point up a
15
as what I write is worth the
reading there must be the possi-
bility of 'different' readings.
6. In this instance I might add
that: although Derrida's context
is that of the ironic closeness of
two disjoined discourses -
critical discourse and clinical
discourse - the Foucauldian
point applies more directly here
to a disjunction in the process of
writing between cognitive
processes (the internalized) and
the form of expression (the
externalized).
6. Philosophers who proclaim
the primacy of speech over
writing - "the existentialist
fastens his attention primarily
on the spoken word"
[MAC QUARRIE, John.
Existentialism. New York: World
Publishing, 1972. p.110.] - in so
doing proclaim also the primacy
of action over thought, of
freedom over conformity, of
creativity over interpretation,
and of Being over having. The
speech act happens, has its
impact and is over and lost in
the past before anyone can do
anything about it whereas
whatever foolishness finds itself
committed to paper is also likely
to find itself trapped in a
perpetual present and open to
this and every subsequent
generation's critical attention.
7. LAW SON, Hilary.
Reflexivity: The Post-modern
Predicament. London:
Hutchinson, 1985.
fundamental issue, that of linearity in process.
Writing may be thought of as a process of organiza-
tion - of organizing meaningful statements into extended
exposition. We expect a text to read in a certain way, to
make sense if we start at the beginning and read on
methodically to the end where we expect to find some form
of closure - an end to the story, a conclusion to the
argument, an evaluation of the evidence. We assume that
the structure of a text is the result of an intentional
process of writing and therefore that writing itself is
ideally linear with a beginning, a middle and an end. But
are such expectations always reasonable? Is linearity
inevitable or is it simply a (usimlly useful) artifice?
When posed with the task of investigating
phenomena which inhabit or construct some non-linear
reality, one enters into the realm of non-linear possibili-
ties. In the postmodern frame of praxis the relations in
discourse become reflexive. They turn upon themselves
and lead to circles of reference, which quickly become
littered with paradoxical moments, discontinuities,
indeterminate terms and Gordian knots. Such is the
character of philosophy when it reflects on its own
language. Similarly it is that of organization theory that
reflects on its own organization, of design theory that
reflects on its own design, of museology that reflects on its
own museality. In each case what breaks down, with the
attention to the terms of its own expression, is the
certainty of the a priori in the discourse and, as a conse-
quence, the acceptability of the given in practice.'
Immediately one enters the marketplace of ideas with
an exposition on the idea that theory, organization, design
and museum as processes may all have not merely parallel
attributes and meanings but may be interpretable as held
in some recognizable pattern of being, as facets of a
16
mercurial metatypic process, and as each other's best
model and thus, unavoidably, as each other's best elabora-
tion and commentary, reference and source, then the
process of writing and that of reading are made highly
problematic.' Strict linearity is a poor option and yet one is
constrained by the sequential implications of any
grammar: the initial sequencing of material on the page is
both a temporal analogue - a notation for the musical in
speech - and a spatial analogue - a graphic display.
The episodic character of this paper, therefore, is not,
as it might first appear, a straightforward chain of events:
it is a dry-stone-walling rather than a brick-laying
exercise. In the structure, each partial, unequal and
tenuous course, each `dis-course', touches others to form a
progressively broader interlocked pattern of spaces, a
network that is criss-crossed by interacting diagonal lines
of force each delineating a meaningful tension between
distant material, each relying on counteracting lines for its
place and purpose (Figure 1.3.1). Such a construction is an
assemblage. The dry stone wall does not become uniform
and concrete in the way that the brick wall does: incom-
8. ADORNO, Theodor. [1966]
Negative Dialectics. Trans. E. B.
Ashton. London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1973.
No theory today escapes the
marketplace. Each one is offered
as a possibility among competing
opinions. [p.4.]
Adorno's comment on the
problem of accumulated concep-
tual capital in science applies as
much to organization, design
and museum praxis:
What resembles writing in such
constellations is the conversion
into objectivity, by way of
language, of what has been
subjectively thought and
assembled. [p.165.]
Figure 1.3.1
The partial, unequal and tenuous courses of the dry stone wall.
9. JAY, Martin. Adorno.
Fontana, 1984. p.14-16.
10. ibid.
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mensurable discourses may not be enmeshed in a metadis-
course. Each retains an narrative identity even when put
to allegorical use.
The question of what sort of foundations, if any,
should be established before beginning the 'dry stone wall'
is addressed in section 2 and follows this introduction. It
takes the form of an exegesis of spatial theory. The conclu-
sion I have come to is not quite as extreme as that of the
author's character in The Naked Lunch (William
Burroughs) when he advises his young writer friends to
"exterminate all rational thought!" However, something of
the existential spirit behind it occurs to me: dry stone
walls require no special foundations: the 'ground work' is
very basic. What matters most is a supply of choice
material and a dedicated openness to its possibilities as
the building of the wall proceeds. Getting a feel for such a
selection of material forms the substance of the tract. It
explores the discursive construction and visual modelling
of the conceptions of physical, social, documentary and
paradigmatic space.
Section 3 opens up the three discursive locations -
organization, design and museum. Section 4 makes a
series of excursions between various pairs of these
locations - organization of design, design of museum
design, museality of organization. And section 5 travels
further afield, crossing earlier traces and exploring the
edifice as a whole.
If some pattern emerges in this arrangement of
disparate elements, in time it may become familiar in the
same sense as is a constellation in the night sky.' The
imaginary lines of force threading back and forth through
such a structure are orchestrated to form a memorable
complex. But, there is nothing obvious or automatic about
such 'force fields'.' They are invisible and impermanent:
18
11. SPIVAK, Gayatri Chakra-
vorty. "Explanation and Culture:
Marginalia" in FERGUSON,
Russell. et al (eds.) Out There:
Marginal ization and Contem-
porary Cultures. New York: The
New Museum of Contemporary
Art & Cambridge Mass: MIT
Press, 1990. pp.377-93.
they may be easily disturbed with potentially catastrophic
consequences for the visible and tangible artifices in which
we choose to live.
Voice
The artificiality of the disinterested academic style of
writing is clear enough. The origins of this project include,
among their moments, a period of rage which was
expressed above in a more committed personal style of
writing than one might reasonably expect to find in a
doctoral thesis. I hope the point was made that, although
not about to engage the sympathies or committed support
of those in society at large who are subject to oppressive
and marginalizing powers, in a small way, the experience
of an exclusion and distortion of my identity-defining
competence in a specific institutional context deserves
some recognition. Beyond the autobiographical statement
above, I have tried to resist the temptation to adopt the
kind of 'personal' voice that Spivak was able to justify in
the context of a debate on marginalization. 11 The 'centre'
from which power so definitively emanates and yet which
always remains so hard to pin down is reflected for me, as
it is for Spivak, in the absence of certain voices - the
committed voices that are able to celebrate, and through
celebration to define, cultural difference. Spivak needed to
respond with a refusal of the supposedly neutral and
'objective' discourse of academia. I knowingly refuse such a
refusal: it would not serve the project at hand to dominate
its reading with a 'marginal' matter. It is sufficient to set
out the new ground in a more or less conventional academic
style: the fact that it is 'new ground' is celebration enough.
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2.0 Space and Theory
Introduction
In relation to spatial theory it is necessary to distinguish
between the functions of 'metaphor' and of 'model'. In the
discourses of organization and of design one may observe a
rich metaphorical content which borrows its terms from
the language of spatial relations.
People take up or hold positions in an organization which may
be above or below others. They either fit in or are out of place.
They may have many or few contacts, work alongside others or
in isolation, cover little or a lot of ground, have a large or small
area of responsibility, lead or kg behind the field, feel small or
be too big for their boots, be too concerned with internal or
external matters, fear being squeezed or over-stretched, etc.
1. See: MORGAN, Gareth.
Images of Organization. Sage
Publications, 1986. Morgan has
explored a wide range of such
ruling metaphors as images of
organization and has identified
eight that clearly represent dif-
ferent ways of thinking and see-
ing. They are organization as:
mechanism, organism, brain,
culture, politics, psychic prison,
evolution and domination.
In narrative descriptions of a social situation we often rely
on a sustained spatial metaphor that draws our attention
to the structural and relational aspects of the situation.
This is not the only common type of metaphor: we also
regularly encounter militaristic language - the language of
strategy, tactics, forces, attack and retreat, weapons, cut
and thrust, no-man's-land, entrenchment, canon fodder,
rank and file, etc. - which draws our attention to the
competitive nature of a situation. Neither is it necessarily
always the most useful: in some quarters physiological,
familial and horticultural metaphors hold much greater
sway because their various emphases - on , for example,
health, obligation, and nurture - point to very different
sets of applied values.' But, it does put forward an
important set of ideas to which we are drawn for other
reasons. The spatial metaphor invites us to imagine
'places' filled with 'things'. It proposes a concrete, and
therefore physical, conception of abstract relations which
is not bound to a particular representational image. It is
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not iconic in the way that the image of the army, the body,
the family or the garden are iconic - loaded with a specific
representational history. Metaphor is bound to the differ-
ential rational nature of language. It concerns, is the very
material of, persuasive description. Each borrowed term
enriches meaning and furthers understanding by abstract-
ing qualities from the more familiar phenomena of the
world and, by analogy, applying them to the less familiar.
Such a discursive process of abstraction is, by definition,
selective, rhetorical, and political. Therefore it is unavoid-
ably a value-laden (theory-laden) activity - a form of
Praxis. Metaphor, of this iconic, sort invites us to recall the
image upon which it is based. Spatial metaphor is funda-
mentally different in the sense that it invites us to
construct a new image, a spatial model.
Spatial Models
A spatial model attempts to use a physical entity as the
frame for a system of signs. This system of signs comprises
a conventional graphic language of points, lines and planes
in which can be 'written' a variety of spatial messages. In
modelling, therefore, one must distinguish between the
absolute space, out of which the model carves its place, and
the ideal space that we wish to model which is constructed
through a process of semiosis. A spatial model may be
defined as: an ideal conception of space constructed in the
geometry and possibility of absolute space. What is gained
in moving from the linguistic realm of metaphor to the
visual realm of the model, is simultaneity, a focus on the
holistic, on structure, spatial relations, pattern, form, etc, on
an enfolding moment. What is lost is rationality, a focus on
the sequential, on description, explication, history, ethnog-
2. See: glossary, and 4.1 below.
3. Although I use the terms
`difference', `distance' and `speed
of action' in their more generic
senses they correspond with the
three aspects of any social
account of action and space to
which Benno WERLEN draws
attention:
- the production and preserva-
tion of meaning;
• spatial arrangements; and
- the relative importance of the
mobile and the immobile.
WERLEN, Benno. [1988]
Society, Action and Space: An
Alternative Human Geography.
Trans. Gayna WALLS.
Routledge, 1993.
4. See 3.2 below. Typical of
design process models based on
industrial or professional prac-
tice are: RIBA Architect's Plan
of Work'; the Philips Design
Track; and the project manage-
ment-oriented visualization by
Alan TOPALIAN. And typical of
those developed by academics
are: J C JONES' "Model for a
Method of Systematic Design";
Jane DARKE's "Primary
Generator Model"; George
RZEVSKI's Popperian model;
and Allen HICKLING's
"Extended Whirling Process".
5. The best known are thoes of
the Royal Ontario Museum
[ROYAL ONTARIO MUSEUM.
Communicating with the
Museum Visitor: Guidelines for
Planning. ROM, 1976.] and the
Natural History Museum
(London) [MILES, R S. et al. The
Design of Educational Exhibits.
Unwin Hyman, 1982. and
MILES, R S. "Exhibitions:
Management for a Change" in
COSSONS, Neil. (ed.) The
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raphy, biography, etc, on the unfolding process of narrative.
In this paper 'design' is considered to have four
constitutive aspects: the designed object, the object of
design, the design process, and design rationale. The
designed object generally refers to the end product of the
design process, the thing, place, message, system that
results from implementation of the design. The 'object of
design' generally refers to the 'brief' or 'programme', the
practical situation and the 'idea' or 'problem' circumscribed
by a system of documentary actions. The design process
generally refers to the designer's way of doing design,
either the particular process of designing as experienced or
the ideal or generic process of design as a conceptual tool.
And the design rationale normally refers to the designer's
(or researcher's) way of explaining the what? when? how?
and, most importantly, the why? of designing. I refer to
these four aspects of design as the four 'Ps' - Product,
Programme, Process and Philosophy - and they form an
irreducible cluster. It is their collocation which is the
object of this project in modelling.
In developing a spatial schema to model any particu-
lar phenomenon the question one must ask of its dimen-
sions is how well they cope with the visualizing of that
phenomenon's possible presences, absences, substitutes
and simulations, that is, with the dynamics of spatial
relations which are constituted through difference,
distance and speed of action.'
Although many attempts have been made to provide
an adequate model of design,' and a few specifically of
museum design,' not all aspects of design have been
treated equally. In the discourses of design the designed
object is the most common focus of attention.' On occasion
this is accommodated in the same view as the design
process.' More often, however, the focus on design process
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Management of Change in
Museums. National Maritime
Museum, 1985.]
6. Design histories based on
the academic tradition of art his-
tory and connoisseurship.
7. For example: DORMER,
Peter. Design Since 1945.
Thames & Hudson, 1993; and
SPARKE, Penny. Design in
Context. Quarto Publishing,
1987.
8. For example: JONES, J.
Christopher. Design Methods:
Seeds of Human Futures.
Revised Ed. John Wiley & Sons,
1981; EVANS, Barrie., James
Powell & Reg Talbot (eds.)
Changing Design. John Wiley &
Sons, 1982; and CROSS, Nigel.
(ed.) Developments in Design
Methodology. John Wiley &
Sons, 1984.
9. For example: PYE, David.
The Nature and Aesthetics of
Design. Barrie and Jenkins,
1978 and POTTER, Norman.
Models and Constructs: Margin
Notes to a Design Culture.
Hyphen Press, 1990.
10. For example: ALEXANDER,
Christopher. Notes on the
Synthesis of Form. Cambridge
Mass: Harvard University Press,
1964; JONES, J. Christopher.
Designing Designing.
Architecture Design and
Technology Press, 1991 (previ-
ously published as Essays in
Design. John Wiley & Sons,
1984.); and MITCHELL, C
Thomas. Redefining Designing:
From Form to Experience. New
York: Van Nostrand Reinhold,
1993.
11. LEFEBVRE, Henri. [1974]
is the subject of differently sited and produced discourses.'
Over and above these, design programme and design
philosophy commonly play a subservient role and are
either subsumed in a consideration of designed object' or
design process' or discounted from the discourse entirely.
One can put the first of these strategies down to what
Lefebre has called "the perfect paralogism" by which he
means the crossing from one conception of space to another
without regard for "logical links." The implication here is
that different types of space - physical, mental, social -
may not be collapsed into each other, but equally they may
not be accommodated via some 'vague justification' by the
invoking of "some such notion as coup ure or rupture or
break.'
In Cartographies a different proposition arises: that
the mapping process is more than a description. "Mapping,
as representation, is inextricably caught up in the material
production of what it represents".' This is the light in
which the current project should be seen. In the various
spaces that are represented by the modelling of
museum • design e organization 'objects' are fabricated and
located in the same moment as space itself is defined. This
represents a process of differentiation analogous to the
semiotic notion of meaning as 'difference' and to the birth
of the universe in the 'Big Bang' theory.
The latter may suggest a passing cosmological
parallel, however, cosmology as such has a broader
theoretical range than its use in astronomy.
Cosmologies
Whether or not there is an order to things is irrelevant to a
successful theory of design. Science is founded on the belief
The Production of Space. Trans.
Donald Nicholson-Smith. Basil
Blackwell, 1991. p.b.
12. DIPROSE, Rosalyn & Robyn
Ferrell. (eds.) Cartographies:
Poststructuralism and the
Mapping of Bodies and Spaces.
Allen & Unwin Australia, 1991.
13. See 3.2 below.
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that there is an order to things and that through system-
atic study this order can be revealed. Design, on the hand,
is founded on the belief that, whether or not there is a
definitive order to things, the perceived world can be
purposefully changed. As a radically pragmatic activity
then design does not need to resort to a positivist notion of
order. However, regardless of contingent ontologies of the
positivist and idealist sort, it does require some resort to a
faith in human experience, to the role of an intelligent
application of perception, memory and skill. What place
does this create for the idea of cosmology?
I draw here on the cosmologies proposed by two
theorists whose thinking has direct impact on the way
design theory has been visualized in the past." Karl
Popper supported his theory of scientific progress with a
three-world view that brought into play an evolutionary
metaphysics under which the actual, the experiential and
the liguistic could be made commensurate.
Popper's cosmology"
World I	 the world of things, physical objects
World II the world of subjective experience
World ILE the world of statements
John Warfield also proposes a three-part 'cosmology'
which, although it apparently parallels the Popperian
structure, does not necessarilly entail commensurability.
Warfield's Cosmology'
14. POPPER, Karl R. [1972]
Objective Knowledge: an
Evolutionary Approach. 6th edn.
rev, and expanded. Oxford
University Press, 1981.
Residue
Phaneron
Library
15. WARFIELD, John N.
(George Mason University)
1986?
everything except the Phaneron and the Library
everything present to the mind, thoughts and ideas
everything recorded in some media form
World I is defined by Popper as a straightforward matter of
'physics', material reality. Warfield defines the parallel
realm of the Residue in negative terms: one must refer to
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the definitions of the other two realms in order to mentally
construct what else there may be to the world. Popper's
realism is thus matched by Warfield's indeterminacy which
is at least a deferment, a pragmatic gesture, but may also
represent a radically subjectivist/relativist manoeuvre.
World II Popper defines in straightforward existential
terms which presuppose a direct relation between the
physical world and the existent: experience is subjective
but dependent upon the existence of an objective material
reality. Warfield defines the Phaneron in more open terms,
ones which do not exclude the phantasm and the phantom
from the realm of the 'visible'.
In World III Popper makes the act of speech the defin-
itive condition of knowledge. Warfield, with the idea of the
Library, privileges the written, the recorded. A contradic-
tory tension is set up here. One might have expected
Popper, with his practical orientation, to be most likely to
settle on an externalized notion of language as the semio-
logical, the sign system, and Warfield to be inclined to an
internalized notion of the semantic, the meaningful. I
interpret the apparent mismatch of emphases not as
aberrations on the part of either Popper or War-field, but in
each case as attempts to square their respective circles of
thought. Popper in emphasizing speech attaches an
immediately social dimension to the material of language:
the intersubjective dimension of World III thereby adds
weight to the experiential subjectivity of World II.
Warfield in emphasizing the recorded language presup-
poses the communicable message but insists on a form that
is clearly separable from the realm of 'thoughts and ideas'.
If one addresses the question of what relations to the
idea of order are represented in science and in design in
the light of these two parallel formulations an illuminat-
ing pattern emerges. The scientist believes that there is
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an order in World I / Residue and that this will be
evidenced in World II/ Phaneron and that, as a result, this
will be reflected /created in World III/Library. External
reality, whether conceived in purely materialistic or more
ambiguous terms, has a structure, a pattern to it that
may be experienced, directly or indirectly, through a
mental capacity for cognition, ideation and imagination,
and may be represented, however imperfectly, in language
and communicated.
The designer believes that World I/Residue is open to
change by deliberate intervention in practical situations
and that the required action can be planned in World
II / Phaneron and the plan developed and recorded in
World 111 /Library. A practical situation, whether
conceived of as primarily socio-technical or as socio-
cultural or as both, is an incompletely understood object
that may be freely acted upon. The designer structures
such action by responding to the immanent qualities of
current and past experience and by exercising practical
thought, and makes communicable and effective the
prescription for change through dialogue (negotiation and
persuasion) and documentation (description, instruction
and specification).
Whether or not an order-of-things exists throughout
World I/Residue, the designer believes that local order can
be created, however temporarily. The contingency of this
belief affects the object of design, the practical situation
which is open to designerly intervention, but equally it
affects the subjective aspects of design process (creative
and analytical design thinking) and its intersubjective
aspects (design representation and creative dialogue), and
it affects the ideological dimension of design, the applica-
tion of values and beliefs of both rational (conscious,
theoretical) and irrational (unconscious, cultural) origin.
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Entropy and Relativity
16. Hassard connects this thesis
with the exemplary "generic
social systems approach to orga-
nizational analysis" of KATZ
and KHAN whose management
textbook The Social Psychology
of Organizations (New York:
John Wiley, 1966.) was "the
most influential" during the
1960s and 70s .
[HASSARD, John. Sociology and
Organization Theory. Cambridge
University Press, 1993. pp.45-6.]
The designer's position may seem to be set in opposition to
the law of entropy which states that in a system in which
there is no exchange of matter or energy with its environ-
ment there is an irreversible long-term tendency for
energy (and, therefore, matter) to become randomly and
evenly distributed and, therefore, for an ultimate state of
inert uniformity, an absence of form, pattern and differen-
tiation, a telos of meaninglessness, a heat death. However,
such an opposition is based on a proposition in classical
thermodynamics which fails at the first hurdle: in the
practical situations in which the designer operates matter
and energy are readily exchanged with the environment
and the time frame is relatively short. In design, for this
reason if for no other, the biological metaphor of open
organic systems provides a better starting point than does
the physical metaphor of closed mechanical systems, and it
tends to develop into the ecological metaphor of interde-
pendent complex systems.
In the world of human experience biological and socio-
cultural/sociotechnical systems tend to exhibit negative
entropy: they tend to project towards life in ever richer
forms and towards integration: 8 This proposition is
supported in schemes as widely divergent as psychoana-
lytic theory, Richard Dawkins' revision of evolutionary
theory, and the mathematics of complexity and chaos.
I suggest, therefore, that the designer's position is
opposed to hard systems and mechanistic views, tends to
be ambivalent towards soft systems and organismic views
and, ultimately, is only consistent with ecological and
holistic views of reality in which physical, social, psychical,
documentary and conceptual phenomena inhabit the
parallel, interdependent spaces that constitute complex
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systems.' Even small-scale design, whose objects may be
relatively uncomplicated, deals with complexity in the
sense that those objects inhabit a multidimensional
constellation of spaces. To re-differentiate this multidimen-
sionality is to define the complexity of design qua design. It
is to (re)construct the spaces of design phenomena.
Therefore, in the modelling process, spatial concepts
become the central object of the visualizing activity.
Visualizing Space
17. One area of systems theory
which attracts attention here
because of its transitional or
translational position between
notions of the biological and
social, is Living Sytems Theory
(LST) Its applications are
increasingly in the field of com-
plex systems, systems that com-
bine different levels of living and
non-living complexes. See:
Systems Practice, 8:1, Plenum
Press, 1995.
There is no straightforward correlation between a
perceived reality and a constructed representation, at least
not in absolute spatial terms. The model, as much as the
pictorial or sculptural representation of iconographic art,
is the realization of a particular topological transformation
and through this the abstraction of particular qualities
and relations from the differentiating field of perception.
Pictorial perspective, for example, fixes in a two-dimen-
sional plane an image which preserves selected three-
dimensional spatial relations between the monocular
observer and the observed (perspective is immediately
relativistic). The topological transformation, to follow a
Renaissance model, involves compressing points in three-
dimensional space onto a two-dimensional plane (Figure.
2.0.1). The plane lies at right-angles to the line of sight
and points in three-dimensional space are located on the
plane by projecting a line through the point to the
observer's eye and recording the intersection of the line
and the picture plane.
The problem that needs to be addressed, in relation to
a multifaceted phenomenon such as design, is that the
kinds of 'perception' involved in constructing its spatiality
t	 11R7,7;7,
18. I am using the term 'percep-
tion' here in a way that admits a
large overlap with the tradition-
al psychological notions of 'sen-
sation' at one extreme and 'con-
ceptual recognition' and `compre-
hension' at the other. It has been
admitted for a long time that
"these distinctions are unclear
and arbitrary".
[WILDING, J M. Perception:
from Sense to Object.
Hutchinson, 1982. p.26.]
19. The Special Theory of
Relativity was published as four
papers in the Annalen der
Physik, 1905. The General
Theory was published in 1916.
[BERNSTEIN, Jeremy. Einstein.
Fontana, 1973.]
20. HAWKING, S. A Brief
History of Time From. the Big
Bang to Black Holes, Bantam,
1988. pp.179-81.
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Figure 2.0.1
The artist projecting lines from an object onto the picture plane
to render a perspective drawing. From Albrecht Diirer's text-
book on perspective and proportion, 1525 edition.
are radically different to each other.' They have no
obvious commensurability. For example, the intellect plays
a different role in constructing perspectival space than it
does in constructing any social space.
Relative Dimensionality of Physical Space
The move from absolute to relative conceptions of physical
space was originally spurred by Einstein's theory of relativ-
ity!' It now seems that the dimensionality of physical
space is itself a question of relativity. If I wish to explain
the interactions of snooker balls the classical frame of 3-
dimensional space plus linear time are adequate. If,
however, I wish to explain distance effects at the subatomic
level it seems I may need as many as 10 dimensions."
Attempts to account for relativity in philosophical terms
were immediately inspired by Einstein's work, for example,
the work of the Vienna Circle whose members included
21. Carnap, who became the
best known representative of the
Vienna Circle, studied physics
and in 1921 completed a doctoral
thesis on 'space' subtitled "a con-
tribution to the philosophy of sci-
ence". [AYER, A. J. Philosophy
in the Twentieth Century.
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1982.
p.125.]
22. The standpoint of
'Methodological Solipsism'
formed the basis of Der Logische
Aufbau der Welt [1928] (The log -
ical Construction of the World.)
in which:
he took as his starting-point the
series of elements each constitut -
ing the whole of a person's cur -
rent experiences at a given
moment, and attempted to show
how the entire set of concepts
needed to describe the world
could be constructed stage by
stage.
Carnap's inclusion of the word
'methodological'
was somewhat disingenuous: it
was intended to forestall discus -
sion of the epistemological which
the choice of a solipsistic basis
might be thought to raise.
ibid. p.126.
23. ibid.
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Moritz Schlick, Otto Neurath and Rudolph Carnap.' The
consequence of Carnap's 'methodological solipsism, 22 was
to admit the possibility of a more radically relative concep-
tion of physical space: the dimensionality of physical space
becomes a question of what is necessary to confirm the
principle of 'remembered similarity' as a sufficient basis for
the construction of a world description. The notion of
'remembered similarity' was chosen by Carnap because it
accorded with the most primitive level of the process of
'perception' (in the broader sense referred to above: see
note 18.) Although Carnap's formulation may have been
flawed, subsequent work in the philosophy of science has
strengthened rather than weakened this particular aspect
of 'perceptual' relativity. Popper's elevation of the principle
of Talsffiability' as the criterion for scientific discovery also
opened up a future for conceptions of physical space other
than the Einsteinian space-time continuum. The Popperian
account admits not only 'observable objects' in the
construction of physical space but any conceivable object
embedded in a series of propositions that has withstood the
scientific process of attempted falsification long enough to
gain consensual acceptance.' More recently the proposition
of a radical relativity of spatiality has begun to receive
consensual acceptance. What started as an esoteric concern
amongst physicists has become a widespread 'feeling' for a
multidimensional reality that connects the products of
popular culture, Eastern mysticism, globalization in
economics, and ecological environmentalism.
Modern physics has confirmed most dramatically one of the
basic ideas of Eastern mysticism; that all the concepts we use to
describe nature are limited, that they are not features of reality,
as we tend to believe, but creations of the mind; parts of the map,
not of the territory.24
24. CAPRA, Fritjof. The Tao of
Physics. Wildwood House, 1976.
p.176 ff.	 What are we to make of the counter-intuitive dimensional-
25. ...beyond the world of intel -
lectual distinctions and opposites
...where reality appears as undi -
vided and undifferentiated 'such -
ness' ibid. p.106.
26. LOVELOCK, James. GAIA.
Oxford University Press, 1979.
27. CUPCHIK, Gerald C. &
Janos LASZLO (eds.) Emerging
Visions of the Aesthetic Process:
Psychology, Semiology and
Philosophy. Cambridge
University Press, 1992. p.61.
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ities invoked by such constructions as virtual reality,
acintya,' ... and the Gala hypothesis? 26 Such dimensional-
ities do not construct the visible in the same sense that
spatio-temporal dimensionality constructs the visual
appearance of material objects. Each dimensionality is
mediated by something additional to the apparatus of
looking and seeing. Each is mediated by graphic, three-
dimensional and/or electronic-digital means and in this
mediation a visualizing process is necessarily entailed, a
conscious process of making something visible. It is then
upon the graphic, three-dimensional, televisual, etc.
products that the visual apparatus operates. And in the
process one moves into a realm of spatial exotica.
When looking for what validity visualizations of
exotic spaces may have as signifiers one may contrast
purely representational interpretations of visual imagery,
which would tend to invalidate them, to broader interpre-
tations that allow denotation and analogical reconstruc-
tion, as well as visual similarity, a place in art, in visual
communication in general. In this sense the model is a
simplified, though adequate, analogue that may be visual-
ized. Saint-Martin refers to a
...new form of iconicity, if the term is used in the Piercian sense
of similarity between structural relations and not between super -
ficial attributes?'
Visual appearances only count as superficial attributes:
whereas the structural relations underlying visual appear-
ances, such as those studied by cubists, economists and
cosmologists, count as deeper attributes that may not be
captured in a 'representational' image but may be denoted
or analogically reconstructed in graphic, three-dimensional
or 'digital' form.
In exotic spaces dimensionality is abstracted by the
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means of mediation. The analogic qualities of the visual-
ization are determined by the number and type of the
dimensions used to construct the total space. And, in terms
of dimensionality, the difference or equivalence between
one exotic space and another can be determined with
reference to a scheme enumerating the dimensional
permutations that are possible.'
28. See Appendix A: Notation.
In the modelling of museum design organization three
apparently quite different exotic spaces are of immediate
interest: social space, documentary space, and paradig-
matic space. With the physical space they form a constella-
tion of spaces that holds its pattern only by dint of the
tensions between them. The construction of museum
•designeorganization is embodied in the tensions between
particular contents in these spaces, the specifics of
'location' and 'discourse'. The spaces themselves begin as
empty possibilities: differentiation of Being constructed in
the knowledge and action of social space; visual thinking
and communicative activity constructed in the semiotics
and graphics of documentary space; normativity and
pragmatism constructed in the philosophies and ideologies
of paradigmatic space.
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2.1 Physical Space
Mediation and Construction
In Design the dimensionality of physical space is not an
absolute: it becomes a question of what is adequate to the
process of changing designed objects. Adequacy here is
determined by the criteria of a conceptual-perceptual
scheme informed by experience. The experience underpin-
ning design is of successfully projecting the imaginary into
physical space and this engages an idea of perception
which is mediating and constructive at least in the sense of
informing those products of the design process that make
designs visible. As such, design drawings and design
models embody a contingent knowledge of the designed
object and a contingent model of physical space. In these
terms content and form are interdependent and open to
radical re-conceptualization.
Mediation: Geometry and Possibility
The validity of the graphic visualization is analogous to
that of Cartesian geometry with one crucial difference: it
does not rely on a strict commensuration of numerical
values and geometric loci. Rather it depends upon a
relativistic identification of 'value' with 'place'. Descartes
put all of his eggs in the mathematical basket and with the
mathematics of his day:
1. DESCARTES, Rene.
Discourse on Method and the
Meditations. Trans. F E
Sutcliffe. Penguin, 1968. p.16
(translator's introduction).
... could demonstrate how geometry and algebra dovetail each
other, how an interchange of ideas is possible by the identifica -
tion of algebraic correlation with geometrical locus. Numerical
relationship can be expressed as a spatial one, lines are changed
into numbers and numbers into lines.'
The value of Cartesianism is not that it provides a method
2. ibid. p.22.
3. ibid. p.23
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of arriving at the truth nor that it facilitates progress
towards the unification and control of nature. Its value is
that of a useful tool, that is, of a limited correlative system
of knowledge that we may set in the context of broader
possibilities of communicative, dialogic, freely negotiated
understandings of the world. The key concept in
Cartesianism is that of the attribute of 'extension'. It is this
attribute that all things have in common and therefore that
constructs an homogeneous view of the physical world.'
This drive towards a singular, universal, absolute
conception of the physical world, arrived at by deductive
reasoning, has clearly failed. Even in Descartes own expla-
nation of the scientific method, the 'self-evident' existence
of the sovereign rational subject and a theological
argument are necessary to support the exercise of
'intuition'. The whole edifice sits on the shakiest of founda-
tions: an idealism rather inconsistent with the method's
realist aims. However, in a relativistic framework,
Cartesianism is undoubtedly powerful and productive:
from it we have developed the widest range of techniques
for making the conceptual and the phenomenal visible.
If the system of Descartes was a failure, Cartesianism as an
attitude of mind was both fruitful and enduring.'
In relation to the modelling of the material objects in
design their `ontic' reality is available to us only in the
Cartesian sense of a 'body' external to the thinking subject.
Such objects actually occupy the absolute space that they
appear to the mind to occupy. The effect - visual perception
of an object in physical space - being as real as its cause -
an actual object 'out there'. Kant's account of the
noumenon as the 'thing it itself' which is not directly
knowable and the phenomenon as the sense data that lead
us to believe in the existence of such things, offers an
ELEVATION A
	
ELEVATION B
PLAN SECTION
- • --	 1- • -
Figure 2.1.1 (above)
Orthographic drawing: a
three-dimensional object
described with a combina-
tion of two-dimensional
plan and elevation views.
Figure 2.1.2 (right)
Three-dimensional
constructed model
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idealist parallel to the realist account. In theoretical terms
these views are poles apart, however, the consequences for
visualization are straightforward and not incompatible. In
design, Cartesian coordinate systems underpin the two-
dimensional orthographic projection and the three-dimen-
sional constructed model (Figures 2.1.1 & 2), and, by
Figure 2.1.3
Oblique projection
Figure 2.1.4
Axonometric projection
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various geometrical transformations of the three-dimen-
sional, generate the two-dimensional oblique, axonometric,
isometric and perspective projections (Figures 2.1.3-6.)
36
Figure 2.1.5
Isometric projection
-
Figure 2.1.6
Perspective projection
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When one comes to consider the relation between the
projected object in any visualization and the visualization
itself as a physical object one must resort to a reflexive
moment. The temporal position of the visualizing process
changes the meaning of the image. In a radical sense, the
visualized object is a fiction but one which attempts to
prefigure an existence or an experience - an 'existence' if one
accepts the realist position, an 'experience' if the position
one defers to is idealist. In either case a process of projec-
tion is engaged that is crucial to the act of visual perception.
There may seem to be a paradox here. Consider two
drawings that, to all intents and purposes, appear identical.
One may depict a physical object that already exists and
the other an object which, as a design, does not yet exist.
Are the drawings the same? Is the process of projection in
each case the same? The first is a question of ontological
significance the second of epistemological significance.
To the first question it seems to me that one must
answer a qualified 'yes'. To explain, imagine that one
engages a third party to judge on the evidence of the
drawings alone. I contend that they would be able to
perceive no substantive difference between the drawings as
physical objects nor between the marks on the paper that
comprise the drawn image nor, given that they are
competent to decipher the images, between the objects
depicted. Without supplementary evidence as to the circum-
stance of their production, the two drawings will appear
identical. One may also play a trick to prove a point. If the
two drawings are actually the same drawing seen at
different times and in the interval between the two viewings
the projected design in the 'first' drawing is realized as a
physical object, then if there is anything different about the
drawing it is clearly nothing intrinsic to the drawing as a
physical object nor with the marks one reads as an image
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4. I refer here to the narrower
sense of 'rational' suggested by
the latin root Ratio (to compute,
reckon, account) which implies a
quantitative operation to which
there is a correct outcome.
[The Concise Oxford Dictionary,
Sixth edn. 1976.]
nor with the depicted object. Any difference there may be
can only be within ourselves or within the larger environ-
ment and the result of changed relations therein.
One can say, then, that the quality of analogic recon-
struction in any visualization is at least as important as its
quality of visual similarity even if the superficial attribute
of visual appearance is ostensibly its focus. In the design
drawing this is manifestly the case because the process of
projection and the working through of a drawing system
such as orthographic projection must interactively
construct the image through a consideration of structural
relations. Although a drawing may make visible only
superficial attributes, to accomplish its production a grasp
of deeper attributes, whether by analytic or holistic means,
is necessary. Ultimately, for any model of physical space
embodied in a design drawing to make sense it must be
able to account for changing relations in the perceptual
process: the projection of a physical reality is not a
singular phenomenon.
To the second question: is the process of projection in
each case the same? I am, therefore, more certain that the
answer is 'no'. In depicting a physical object that already
exists, the geometrical transformations of the three-dimen-
sional that one accomplishes are rational.' They depend
upon an approximation of a mechanical process. Once
certain parameters are set concerning the drawing system
to be used - orthographic, isometric, perspective, etc. - and
the orientation of the object to be depicted, the projection
involved is one which is essentially predetermined and
mechanical in character, that is, it is reproductive.
However, in 'depicting' a design, as if it were a physical
object that exists, there is no three-dimensional original to
which one can apply geometrical transformations. The first
systematized drawing one produces of a design, therefore,
5. I refer here to the specifical-
ly visual sense of the word
'imagination': "the mental facul-
ty of forming images of exter-
nal objects not present to the
senses", and qualify it with the
word 'inventive' to explicitly
imply an object "created by
thought" that does not yet exist
as a physical object.
[ibid.]
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strictly speaking is the result of irrational procedures: it is
dependent upon a sustained act of inventive imagination.'
The projection involved is one which is essentially creative
and perceptual in character, that is, it is productive rather
than reproductive.
The concept of 'projection' is clearly central. Max
Velmans has summarized accumulating evidence that:
what we think of as everyday 'physical reality' is, in part, a
mental construction arising from an interaction of energies and
events with human perceptual processing. One aspect of this
processing is the 'perceptual projection' of experienced events to
their judged location in three-dimensional space.'
He describes the relations between the external event of
the physical object, the perceptual process and the process
of projection as cyclical or 'reflexive' (Figure 2.1.7.)
6. VELMANS, Max. 'Physical,
Psychological and Virtual
Realities', from the preprinted
abstract for the Embodied
Knowledge and Virtual Space
conference, Goldsmiths College,
London, 1995.
Figure 2.1.7
A model of perception based on Velmans. (A) the initiating phys-
ical object/event stimulates (B) perceptual processing and (C)
perceptual projection and the latter achieves initial closure of
the perceptual cycle.
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However, if an external physical object/event is
posited as that which initiates the perceptual cycle and a
process of 'perceptual projection' as that which achieves its
initial 'closure', one must question whether or not inventive
imaginative projection, as identified above, is really better
understood as qualitatively different. Even if, in measur-
able neurological terms, it turns out to be the same type of
process, I believe that the difference is worth preserving.
This is not because I think science will come to the conclu-
sion that there are different types of 'perceptual projection',
though it would be neat if it did, but, because in the
construction of a theory of design it facilitates an account
of its ideological basis. Where the initiating moment in the
perceptual cycle is an act of inventive imaginative projec-
tion the possibility of things being other than they are, in
the most radical sense, is admitted (Figure 2.1.8.)
Figure 2.1.8
A development of Velmans' model of perception (see Figure 2.1.7
above) in which (X) the initiating event of inventive imaginative
projection parallels (D) motor coordination of the drawing hand
to produce (Y) the externalized image which stimulates (Z) per-
ceptual processing as an initial closure of the perceptual cycle.
The externalized construction of the design drawing holds out
the possibility of design realization (!)
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7. See above: 2.0 Cosmologies.
And this belief is foundational in design: in general, the
designer believes that whether or not there is an order to
things, whether or not we have an adequate construction
of the world, we can change things for the better.' There is,
therefore, a very concrete sense in which the possibility of
inventive imaginative projection initiates the social and
philosophical construction of design. And it is no accident
that, as part of an explanation of the creative moment in
design, it seems to accord with experience.
If one maintains that the only form of projection that
is legitimate is perceptual projection one is left with a
paradox. Unless suffering severe delusions one does not
mistake things inventively imagined for things that one
perceives to exist in physical space. If, as is the argument
for perceptual projection, a physical object/event is
necessary to initiate the perceptual cycle. Then one is left
to conclude that, without its own type of projection (one
that is able to initiate a perceptual cycle) inventive imagi-
nation is itself a delusion. If it is a memory trick, then
truly there is nothing new under the sun and we are
doomed to endlessly reinvent the wheel - determinism of a
prehistoric kind re-emerges. And if some strangely
displaced dream, then we delude ourselves to believe that
it is possible to distinguish between the perception of
physical reality and the dreams we have in the land of Nod
- solipsism of the purest self-contradictory kind re-
emerges. My conclusion is that we are able to inventively
imagine things and to consciously project their presences
into the world - artists and designers make a living out of
such an ability (in a sense we all do).
The status of the design drawing can now be clarified.
As a physical object the design drawing occupies a boundary
position. The dimensionality of its physical presence is
constructed in much the same way as that of any perceived
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8. See 2.3 below.
object in physical space. The perceptual process is closed by
the projection accomplished as an outcome of perceptual
processing and the drawing occupies its judged location in
three-dimensional space. It takes its place in the world
continually confirmed by the perceptual cycle as it repeats.
Underpinning the success of this procedure is the contin-
gent model of physical space that binds together the learned
experience of seeing things as they are and the intelligent
operation of seeing things as we think they ought to be. It is
the stability of the model and the mechanics of its transfor-
mations that ensure that we retain a grasp on the differ-
ence between reality and illusion.
As a depiction or representation of a projected
physical reality, the drawing embodies an illusion that one
is able to keep separate from the drawing's physical
reality. At the same time it is one that one is able to focus
on by choice. One can consciously suppress the perception
of a drawing, in its physicality, as a piece of paper with a
pattern of marks inscribed on its surface, and instead
bring to the fore the perception of the pattern of marks and
to engage in a 'reading of the illusion they construct as a
projected reality. The design drawing thus establishes a
presence for itself in the instant in which it is transformed
from a piece of marked paper into an interpretable
illusion. The design drawing constructs a virtual object in
a virtual space by engaging the learned experience of
seeing things as they are. Through a mechanical transfor-
mation of our model of physical space it extends the intelli-
gent operation of seeing things as we think they ought to
be into the realm of a 'documentary' space.'
As a physical object the design drawing is 'useful' in
the sense of accomplishing an externalization of the
inventive imagination, making the visualization an object
which is then itself open to interpretation, transformation
9. Habermas has expounded a
whole theory around this idea
([1981] The Theory of
Communicative Action, Trans
Thomas McCarthy, Boston:
Beacon Press, 1987.) summed
up, according to Bernstein, in an
intuition he believed linked him-
self to Rorty:
the conviction that a humane col -
lective life depends on the vulner -
able forms of innovation bear -
ing, reciprocal and unforcedly
egalitarian everyday communi -
cation. [my emphasis]
Jiirgen Habermas "A
Philosophico-Political Profile",
New Left Review, May/June
1986, p.12. quoted in BERN-
STEIN, Richard J. The New
Constellation. Polity Press, 1991.
P-45.
10. HAWKES, Terence.
Structuralism and Semiotics.
Methuen, 1977.
Language ...inheres not in 'the
material substance of words' but
in the larger and abstract `sys -
tern of signs'. [p.24-5, my empha-
sis]
In the symbol the relationship
between signifier and signified is
arbitrary; it requires the active
presence of the interpretant to
make the signifying connection.
And of course, following
Saussure, we can say that the
major systematic manifestation
of signs in this mode occurs in
language. [p.129.]
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and, most importantly, realization. It is 'communicative' in
the sense that it may be passed from one to another, it may
become the object of collaborative interpretation, transfor-
mation and realization - it is the material of a communica-
tive action.' And it is 'symbolic' in the sense of embodying in
a material code, not only values and beliefs, but, an explicit
information content. In the latter we see the rationale of a
boundary position between physical and documentary space.
At this point one can see a symmetrical relation in
the model of physical space that depends upon the state of
perceptual attention to the design drawing. Attention to
the drawing as a physical object constructs a three-dimen-
sional physical space into which is enfolded an
essential/defining documentary space. In each specific case
it is the content of that documentary space that makes the
design drawing into more than just a piece of cleverly
marked paper, that makes it a harbinger. Attention to the
'design' in a design drawing, to the virtual object,
constructs a two-dimensional documentary space into
which is enfolded a defining three-dimensional physical
space. It is the physical form of the drawing that makes it
more than mere information, more than just the abstract
terms of a language communicated by arbitrary signs.' It
connects the 'image' with the sheer physicality of the
exercise of practical artistic skills in the process of exter-
nalizing and constructing an inventive imaginative projec-
tion. In this there is a sense in which design is designed.
One must remember that the design drawing is a 'conven-
tional' embodiment of a contingent knowledge and of a
contingent model of physical space. Conventions may be
superseded: both the physical form of the design drawing
and the deep structures underpinning the image may be
changed. However, even if nothing so radical as, say, the
virtual reality studio supplants the traditional drawing,
44
the relevance of the connection with the physical achieve-
ment of the design process remains. Which ever ways are
found of redesigning the form and deep structures of the
products of the design process, the crucial quality required
of them remains the same: the capacity to 'embody',
literally to physically contain and express, knowledges.
Construction: Absolute and Ideal Conceptions
Any account of the notion of 'physical space' is liable to take
on positivist overtones. Whether one sides with the out and
out realist view point or with those such as Cartesianism
which adopts an idealist element in its genesis, the very
notion of 'physical space' posits a realm of observable
phenomena. The different theoretical orientations then tend
not to disturb a fundamental belief in the perceivable but to
disagree about the process of perception. All may be reduced
to interactions between differently structured material -
molecules, photons, neurones, etc.; a mind-body dualism
may be invoked that separates concept from percept, experi-
ence from actuality; solipsism may be used, as a pragmatic
device, to affirm the primacy of the thinking self - the
conception of physical space then entails the thought that
the existence of an external world is a reasonable or at least
useful assumption even if its reality is unprovable.
For better or for worse the designer is concerned with
a realm of observable phenomena and with the idea that
'things', whether in actuality or in some conceptual space,
can be changed. The spatiality of the designed object - the
design product - becomes immediately multidimensional.
The realist formulation posits an actual physical space in
the form of a space-time continuum into which various
exotic spaces may be admitted as chimera only as long as
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their complex structures resist reduction to simpler
physical material relations (Figure 2.1.9.)
Figure 2.1.9
Realist formulation of physical space - ultimately everything is reducible to the spatio-tempo-
ral terms of material, physical reality.
The Cartesian - neo-Hegelian range of dualisms posits an
actuality in symmetrical opposition to a psycho-social
space of one complexion or another (Figure 2.1.10.)
Figure 2.1.10
Dualist formulation of physical space- spatiality is always a question of shifting between
transformable but incommensurable and irreducible opposites.
t11. AYER, A. J. Philosophy in
the Twentieth Century. Weiden-
feld & Nicolson, 1982. p.6.
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When rationalism is blended with idealism, as in the case of Hegel
and his followers, reality is identified with a coherent system of
judgements rather than with anything outside the system to which
its constituents might be supposed to refer. ... the neo-Hegelians
Bradley and McTaggart were not afraid to maintain that neither
space nor time nor matter were ultimately real."
And the solipsistic turn allows the conception of an
inhabited physical space but permanently defers any
positing of its actuality (Figure 2.1.11.)
A
Figure 2.1.11
Idealist formulation of physical space- the solipsistic turn places the spatio-temporal terms of
material reality in the realm of the conceptual.
By 'extension' dualist accounts of physical space may
be turned into a pluralist one:
pluralism may take the form of denying that there is a single
world, which is waiting there to be captured, with a greater or
lesser degree of truth by our narratives, our scientific theories or
even our artistic representations.12
Construction: Pluralist Conception
If one regards each spatial construct as the realm of a
12. ibid. p.13. 	 different 'possible' world then one may visualize not
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merely 'shifts' between the two incommensurable and
opposed spaces of the physical world and the psycho-social
world but movements between the many worlds:
... we are able to construct by the use of different systems of
concepts, different standards of measurement, different forms of
expression and exemplification.13
The importance of the pluralist account of spatiality is in
its immediate utility in discourse. Within any given
discourse the criteria for legitimating any particular
statement are radically different to those of other
discourses. We may agree with Carnap that to answer
questions of existence, for example, as long as we use
appropriate conceptual frameworks we may answer 'yes'
every time: physical objects exist, as do numbers and
fictional characters. However, if we limit ourselves to:
a universe of discourse where the criterion for existence is actual
location in space and time, then there are no fictional characters
and, for that matter, no numbers either.'
Eco's consideration of the designed object isolates three
qualities each of which would imply an opposed attitude to
spatiality should they be taken in isolation. Of the
designed product he says:
a) First of all the object is meant to be useful ...
a condition which speaks of the necessity of a formal
presence in a physical world of material interactions - the
realist notion of physical space operates here.
b) ... an object should show what its purpose is and how it
should be used. In a word, the object has a communicative
aspect ...
13. ibid.
14. ibid. p.160.	 A symmetry is implied between the linguistic interpreta-
15. ECO, Umberto. "Phenomena
of This Sort Must Also be
Included in Any Panorama of
Italian Design", in ECO,
Umberto. Apocalypse Postponed.
Indiana University Press/British
Film Institute, 1994. pp.186-7.
16. ibid. p.188.
17. ibid. p.186.
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tion of physical attributes and the material realization of
socially determined practical purposes - the dualist notion
of physical space in a reflexive relation to social space
comes into play.
c) ... design has symbolic functions: ... a host of further meanings
that allow the object to be used as a mark of social status, power,
and so on.15
Physical attributes are seen as signs of cultural meaning
that operate independently of any mechanistic notion of
functionality - the underlying assumption here is that any
notion of physical space is purely conceptual, that is, it is
embedded and interpreted in, comes out of a reading of
relations in, a conceptual psycho-social space.
Eco, of course, does not propose that we choose between
these three 'qualities' of the designed object, nor even that
we rank their importance. Rather he suggests that:
• together they represent the necessary dimensions of the
'design' phenomenon,
• "objects that serve their purpose, that declare and
communicate their functions and at the same time
communicate symbolic meanings" 16 are the embodiment
of a certain kind of discourse - design discourse, and
• such correlative qualities are normative in design.
He implies that the betrayal of any of these would consti-
tute a "crisis of the design utopia". Therefore, I suggest,
that the pluralist conception of spatiality is inherent in
design philosophy, and Eco's interpretation of spatiality in
design may be construed, at least in the case of 'Identified
Design' - design which is
the outcome of an expressed theory and of a practice in which the
object aims to exemplify explicitly its author's theory'
- as its 'ideology'.
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This pluralist conceptual scheme for physical space
appears to embrace satisfactorily the constellation of
qualities of the designed object. The scheme centres on the
construction of a conventional space-time continuum in
which, in relativistic fashion, one is able to orientate three
mutually perpendicular dimensions of space in relation to
an 'abstract' observer. The position of this imaginary
spectator is implicit in the space's initial conceptualization
but, when a content is visualized in graphic form, is made
more or less explicit depending upon the drawing system
used. This conceptualization of a three-dimensional
physical space projecting along a time line then has
enfolded into it or is enfolded into a variety of social and
psycho-social spaces of more or less exotic conception that
connect the physical object directly with the arenas of life,
and with the documentary and paradigmatic spaces that
connect with perceptual processes (particularly inventive
imaginative projection) and with epistemological and
ideological positions respectively (Figure 2.1.12.)
Figure 2.1.12
Pluralist formulation of physical space: physical space and many other incommensurable and
more or less exotic spaces coexist as the possibilities we may construct, utilize and explore.
1. AYER, A. J. Philosophy in
the Twentieth Century.
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1982.
p.207.
2. CUPCHIK, Gerald C. &
Janos LASZLO (eds.) Emerging
Visions of the Aesthetic Process:
Psychology, Semiology and
Philosophy. Cambridge
University Press, 1992. pp.56-7.
3. In cosmological terms the
notion of 'absolute' distance has
been rendered redundant. The
relativistic conception of a space-
time continuum in physics, the
differential conception of linguis-
tic space in semiology and decon-
struction, and the organismic,
ecological and open systems con-
ceptions of social space, ensure
that position and sequence of
perceived events are only com-
prehensible in the context of a
posited process of construction
and reconstruction which by
implication determines the val-
ues of perceived distance and
speed amongst other qualities.
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2.2 Social Space
Social Topology
The Greek idea that nature comprises one vast living
organism' connects with the post-industrial, ecological
notions of nature and with social constructionist notions of
system. In both cases the human is not privileged above,
not separated from, nature. All 'actors' have equal
potential in a system and all interactions are of equal
value. The human is de-centred. The peripheral notion of
'boundary' or 'interface' becomes the centre. Interfaces
depend upon difference and speed of action for meaning.
In describing the relations between people and
between people and things, which together comprise the
'actors' in a system, distance in absolute terms is irrele-
vant for all distances are transformable without in any
way affecting spatial relations:
The genetic epistemology of Piaget [1948] has established that in
the evolution of human beings topological relations are the
primary and constant matrix of spatial constructs.2
What does matter is the type and relative force of any
interaction across the space of the system and, in any
system of multiple interactions, the pattern of forces or
(forcefield' that may hold a group of actors in a perceived
set of spatial relations. One should remember that what
matters is the spatial relations as a perceptual construct
and not as an independent `ontic' structure describable in
terms of absolute distances between elements, the terms of
a Cartesian geometry.'
If we consider the nature of various interactions in
any organizational context it is possible to determine in
relativistic, though not absolute, terms speed, force and
4. MEAD, R H. The Philosophy
of the Act. C W Morris (ed.).
Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1972. p.66. quoted in
RICHARDSON, Miles. "The
artefact as abbreviated act: a
social interpretation of material
culture" in HODDER, Ian. (ed.)
The Meanings of Things:
Material Culture and Symbolic
Expression. Harper Collins,
1989. p.173.
6. ibid. [RICHARDSON] p.172.
6. [The Id] ...is the area from
which internal feelings and
desires emerge from the instincts.
BOCOCK, Robert. Sigmund
Freud. Ellis Horwood, 1983.
p.77.
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rapidity of interaction, and, given these notions, to picture
the kind of space in which to visualize these perceived
qualities.
In the anthropological view the 'act' holds a central
position in defining culture. According to R H Mead, a
favourite philosopher of the 'pragmatic' anthropologist,
"the unit of existence is the act Nature acts on us and
we act on nature. Between living organisms this equates to
a conversation of gestures in which "animals respond to
each other's responses". The peculiarly human response, at
least in so far as its complexity and subtlety are concerned,
is the vocal gesture of speech. Thus exteriorized and objec-
tified in language, the gesture becomes subject to reflection
and interpretation, and becomes reflexive: we may
meaningfully gesture to ourselves and make the object of
such reflection the understanding of and construction of a
self, and by extension of the Other.
The material cultural object has been described as a
"collapsed act": an artefact once
embedded and indistinguished from the rest of nature, fixed first
by sight and then by the magic of the hand ...5
is brought into play as the medium of deferred and
distanced gesture, and therefore as the carrier of meaning.
In social terms the act is definitively communicative,
it is a response and it elicits responses. The most direct
relation between actors is one in which the body confronts
the body unmediated by the distancing gestures of either
language or material culture. Through the interplay of
unselfconscious physical responses the carnal realms of
existence serve our most basic physical and emotional
needs. In Freudian terms such action is at the instinctive
level of the Id.' However, even the most 'physical' of social
interactions are normally overlaid and structured by ritual
7. MARCUSE, Herbert. Eros
and Civilisation. Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1956. p.12.
8. Marcuse educes the social
dimension of this 'reality princi-
ple':
The reality principle sustains the
organism in the external world.
In the case of the human organ -
ism, this is an historical world.
The external world faced by the
growing ego is at any stage a spe -
cific socio-historical organization
of reality, affecting the mental
structure through specific soci -
etal agencies or agents.
[ibid. p.34 emphasis in the origi-
nal.]
And on the fate of the rational
says:
...with the progress of civilization
and with the growth of the indi -
viclual, the memory traces of the
unity between freedom and
necessity become submerged in
the acceptance of the necessity of
unfreedom; rational and ratio -
nalized, memory itself bows to
the reality principle.
[ibid. pp.33-4.]
9. The 'reality principle'
defines a contingently bound-
aried region of 'sets' of possibili-
ties between which are con-
structed spatial relations, hence
a 'topology'.
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codes and the rules of 'normal' behaviour, a reality
principle, that governing value system that imposes
delayed satisfaction, restraint of pleasure, toil (work),
productiveness and security' which we adhere to with or
without engaging a conscious (rational) process of making
decisions. Increasing the formality of rituals and rules
narrows the range of responses that may legitimately
constitute the communicative process and increases the
propriety of employing a practical rationality.' Rituals and
rules are symbolically mediated. For example, by the
presence of an ash tray or the absence of a door lock
certain acts are suggested or even definitively legislated
for or against: we may choose to smoke - to be, perhaps
unwittingly, antisocial - we may choose to breakdown a
door and enter a private place - to engage in a premedi-
tated criminal activity. In either case the signs we choose
to follow or to ignore are clear enough to we who are party
to the culture and to its material presences and absences.
The topology here is one of opportunity and
constraint, of the actors' freedom to act, to communicate, to
exchange information, patterned energy, with other actors.'
In a communicative environment, therefore, one can
imagine the in(di)visible conductors and resistors, capaci-
tors and discharge points, transformers and rheostats, that
create the complex forcefields that comprise the aura of a
given system: in nature, the aura that is 'life' itself.
In the social sphere the range of communicative acts,
from the most immediate to the most complexly mediated,
describe the topological possibilities of social construction.
Touch, gesture, tool and symbolic object, speech and
writing and their intermediate (hybrid) forms comprise the
semiotic panoply that internally differentiates social space,
and their speed, force, and rapidity imbue any social
system with peculiar dynamic characteristics.
10. Virilio has related this
notion of speed to the quality of
information flow in unaided and
aided visual perception:
...as with all movement, each die -
placement (human, ocular, optic,
opto-electronic) engages a specific
speed, and this speed affects the
representation under cons idera -
tion and provokes a kind of rup -
ture or severance which, while it
may not be dimensional in the
strict, archaic sense of the word,
certainly has an impact on the
resultant scientific observation.
VIRILIO, Paul. [1984] Lost
Dimension. Trans. Daniel
Moshenberg. New York:
Semiotext(e), 1991. p.64.
11. I am deliberately using the
term 'force' in a pseudo-physical
sense. I do not mean to connote
the associated political and anti-
political terms `power' and `vio-
lence' which Hannah Arendt has
so eloquently explicated. The
idea that comes closest in
Arendt's writing it is that of
`rhetoric':
...speech as a means of persua -
sion rather than the specifically
human way of answering, talk -
ing back and measuring up to
whatever happened or was done.
[ARENDT, Hannah. The Human
Condition. University of Chicago
Press, 1958. p.26.]
What I mean is a quality of per-
suasiveness to a greater or less-
er extent suffusing all forms of
communicative action.
12. GEERTZ, Clifford. The
Interpretation of Cultures. New
York: Basic Books, 1973. p.145.
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'Speed' implies the duration and therefore the
complexity of any communicative act in terms of its differ-
entiated content - if you will, the amount of 'ground'
covered during the 'contact', the quantity of information
exchanged in the transaction.'
'Force' implies the intensity and 'mass' of any
communicative act in terms of its directionality and
potency, its influence on subsequent, concurrent or
contiguous interactions.'
'Rapidity' implies the relative spacing of a number of
communicative acts in terms of a cumulative effect, the
construction of an 'event'.
In any visualization of a differentiated social space,
therefore, its dimensions should represent (re-present) a
variety of topological possibilities, a variety of relational
patterns and qualities that produce a particular system,
and should make visible its transformations.
Social Cosmology:
Hofstede, Bourdieu, Lefebvre, Freud and Jung
Parson's three levels of analysis in social science - culture
system, social system and personality system - suggest not
merely a differentiated social space but rather a kind of
limited cosmology.
Each of the three must be considered to be an independent focus
of the organization of the elements of the action system in the
sense that no one of them is theoretically reducible to terms of
one or a combination of the other two. Each is indispensable to
the other two in the sense that without personalities and culture
there would be no social system and so on around the roster of
logical possibilities.12
In structure this is not dissimilar to Popper's three worlds.
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13. POPPER, K R. Objective
Knowledge: An Evolutionary
Approach. rev. edn, Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1979. p.164.
quoted in WERLEN, Benno.
[1988] Society, Action and Space:
An Alternative Human
Geography. Trans. Gayna
WALLS. Routledge, 1993. p.27.
14. Popper would have had seri-
ous reservations about this par-
ticular parallel:
...all social phenomena, and
especially the functioning of
social institutions, should be
understood as resulting from the
decisions etc. of human individu -
ale ...we should never be satisfied
by explanations in terms of so-
called "collectives".
I include it simply to signify that
amongst social phenomena there
are those that are neither sub-
jective nor just ideas (shared or
otherwise). [POPPER, K R. The
Open Society and its Enemies,
Vol. IL Routledge & Began Paul,
1962. p.98 quoted in BHASKAR,
Roy. Reclaiming Reality. Verso,
1989. p.70.]
15. This is a closer parallel:
World 3, then, is the world of
ideas, art, science, language,
ethics, institutions - the whole
cultural heritage, in short...
[MAGEE, Bryan. Popper.
Fontana, 1973. p.61.]
16. HOFSTEDE, Geert.
Cultures and Organizations:
Intercultural Cooperation and its
Importance for Survival;
Software of the Mind. McGraw-
Hill, 1991.
17. BOURDIEU, Pierre. [1979]
Distinction: A Social Critique of
the Judgement of Taste. Trans.
Richard Nice. Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1984.
The first [World 1] is the physical world or the world of physical
states [and objects]; the second [World 2] is the mental world of
the world of mental states [world of states of consciousness,
dispositions to act]; and the third [World 3] is the world of intel -
ligibles, or of ideas in the objective sense, it is the world of
possible objects of thought: the world of theories in themselves,
and their logical relations; of arguments in themselves; and of
problem situations in themselves.13
World 1, the objective world of physical reality, parallels
the social system, the system of roles and positions,'
World 2, the subjective world of minds, parallels the
personality system of individual actors, and World 3, the
objective world of independent constructs, parallels the
culture system, the system of values and beliefs.' The
parallels are not 'close' in the sense of constructing or
occupying wholly commensurate dimensions, however, in
each 'cosmology' the pattern of dimensionally discreet
conjunctions is similar in one sense, that of generating
productive tensions between realms of description or
construction and, therefore, of realizing the potential in
each pairing for embedding and zeroing (enfolding) one
space within the other.
To elucidate this potential, I will draw on works
which approach the problem of social space with purposes
that broadly reflect the cultural (Hofstede), the social
/structural (Bourdieu and Lefebvre), and the personal
(Freud and Jung).
In Cultures and Organizations Hofstede relates
dimensions of cultural difference, defined through the
interpretation of a mass of empirical data, to social
structure in organizations.16
In Distinction Bourdieu describes a range of
'dependent' and 'independent' social variables which may
be used to generate various social systems of roles,
positions and relations.'
18. LEFEBVRE, Henri. [1974]
The Production of Space. Trans.
Donald Nicholson-Smith. Basil
Blackwell, 1991. pp.80-1.
19. BOCOCK, Robert. Sigmund
Freud. Ellis Horwood, 1983.
20. JUNG, C G. Psychological
Types. Trans. H Godwin Baynes.
Kogan Paul, Trench, Trubner,
1926. pp.671-2.
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Lefebvre, in The Production of Space, shows that in
the attempt to reduce to a common measure (that of
money) a wealth of social phenomena in the modern indus-
trial world, those phenomena cannot "speak the truth
about themselves". But they may still 'speak' in a limited
'dissimulating' language of :
the amount of social labour they contain, not only the productive
labour they embody, but also the social relationships of the
exploitation and domination on which they are founded.18
Freud redifferentiates concepts of the conscious and
the unconscious. In the unconscious, the aspect largely
ignored in other theoretical expositions, he describes a
space of the instinctual, emotional, and sexual drives that
underpin our behaviours. In this view, dimensions relating
the personal to the social are given depth. They escape the
bounds of the rational - the (self)conscious - and take on
new degrees of freedom in the non-rational and irrational -
the (collective) unconscious - and in their emergent possi-
bility - the preconscious.'
Jung animates the depth that Freudian ideas add to
social space by reference to libido - natural psychic energy
- which flows back and forth between the inner and the
outer, the personal and the social.'
These approaches do not exhibit common aims and
are pursued within rather different methodological tradi-
tions. However, their contrasts rather than invalidating
their conjunction provide exactly the kind of productive
tensions that I wish to project as constitutive of social
space: I focus on them not for the consistency of their
respective internal logics but rather for the generative
potential of playing their contents off against each other.
This initial procedure owes more to poetics and rhetoric,
than to analysis and rationale - a choice justified by the
21. LEFEBVRE, [1974] p.81.
22. ibid. p.99.
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essentially creative, `designerly' nature of this modelling
project which requires the appropriation of rich source
materials in advance of their reconfiguration and rational-
ization: rather, as when constructing a map, one first
travels and documents the mass of heterogeneous features
constituting a landscape before attempting to find an order
in them. Lefebvre also points to the open-ended nature of
the problem of modelling social space, and this may also be
cited as a weak rationale for the `designerly' approach.
Ultimately, social reality is "dual, multiple, plural" and the
dimensions, of which its various visualizations may be
constructed, imply some
...terribly concrete abstractions ...(money, commodities, material
exchange) as well as 'pure' forms: exchange, language, signs,
equivalences, reciprocities, contracts, and so on.21
What any dimensionally simple subspace gains in clarity it
necessarily loses in its exclusivity and its dissembling
language. "Any determinate and hence demarcated space
necessarily embraces some things and excludes others ..."
However, in as much as all language relies upon difference
and metaphor in the generation of meaningful exchanges,
the problem of subspace dimensionality versus clarity of
visualization is relative in any case. There is no teleology
of social spatiality, no comprehensive multidimensional
space in which the 'truth' about social phenomena may
actually be spoken. The relationship between space and
language is a question which Lefebvre addresses as a
straightforward 'communicative' issue: what space does is
what it says.
Between the moves of Hofstede, Bourdieu, Lefebvre,
Freud and Jung what one may discern, therefore, is the
necessity of choosing ground within which to operate, of
constructing spaces which, in their constitutive dimension-
ality, bring visible things into being and tend to make
23. ibid. p.83.
24. ibid.
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them 'absolute'. This crystalization of phenomena depends
upon a setting up of systems of relations that are enclosed,
even if by 'soft' boundaries, and energized by the dynamics
they may display in a particular 'language' of visualiza-
tion/description. However, as Lefebvre observes:
...the Thing ...never quite becomes absolute, never quite emanci -
pates itself from activity, from use, from need, from 'social
being'.23
And it is in this deferred presence, therefore, that one
retains the scope for interpretation and avoids an
ultimately nihilistic reductionism. Any object (Lefebvre
cites the peasant dwelling as an example) remains
"...intermediate between work and product, between
nature and labour, between the realm of symbols and the
realm of signs." 24 And it engenders a space which is both
"natural and cultural", both "immediate and mediated",
both "given and artificial". 'Mapping', as a particular
inscription and encryption of spatial events (places), is
thus reinforced as the most potent metaphor for the
process of modelling.
Mapping Social Space
The crucial question is: what ground is it best to choose to
make visible an adequate social mapping of a particular
programme of events? The dimensions enumerated and
qualified by Hofstede, Bourdieu, Lefebvre, Freud and Jung
offer a bewildering range of possibilities. (1) Hofstede's
'ethnographic' cultural dimensions, which are used to place
sets of values and beliefs, include: power distance - a
measure of dependence relationships; individualism-collec
tivism- a measure of the importance of personal and group
identity; masculinity-femininity - a measure of the
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distinctness of gender roles; and uncertainty avoidance - a
measure of the tolerance of ambiguity. (2) Bourdieu's
'Marxist' economic and social dimensions which are used to
place practices and preferences include such dependent
variables as 'political opinion' and so called independent
variables such as sex, age, religion, educational level,
income, and occupation. (3) Lefebvre's 'post-Marxist'
analysis proposes we make visible "encounter, assembly,
simultaneity' via the abstractions of exchange, language,
signs, equivalences, reciprocities, contracts, etc. though
without any clear indication of what such visualizations
might look like. (4) Freud immediately transforms the
dimensions of any Marxist/structuralist model or ethno-
graphic/interpretive model by layering into it non-
rational/irrational aspects which tend to radically recon-
struct patterns of relations. Dimensions of gender/
sexuality, power relations, ideology/religion, and language
each become two-dimensional spaces stretching beyond the
conscious into the realms of the preconscious and the
unconscious. And (5) Jung's animation of these subspaces
is achieved by constructing polarities between which libido
flows. These 'opposites' include: unconscious-conscious;
introversion-extraversion; feeling-thinking; intuition-
sensation; individual-collective; instinct-will; introjection-
projection and; abstract-concrete. In one constellation,
Jung generates a two-dimensional field of basic psychologi-
cal functions (Figure 2.2.1) which transforms any given
social dimension into a three-dimensional space.
26. ibid. p.101.
The scheme that Hofstede develops has a breadth to it that
is remarkable. It touches on emotional, political, behav-
ioural, perceptual and cognitive aspects of the place of the
person in social terms. However, it privileges the larger
collective (for 'person' read 'national type') over other sizes
feeling thinking
Intuition 59
sensation
26. On the basis of "many years
experience" rather than any a
priori reason, Jung distin-
guished four basic functions:
two rational and two irrational -
viz, thinking and feeling, sensa-
tion and intuition.
[JUNG, 1926, p.547.]
...we use [these functions] to on -
entate ourselves in the world
(and also to our own inner
world): sensation, ...is perception
through our senses; thinking,
...gives meaning and under -
standing; feeling' ...weighs and
values; and intuition ...tells us of
future possibilities and gives us
information of the atmosphere
which surrounds all experience.
FORDHAM, Frieda. An
Introduction to Jung's
Psychology. Penguin, 1953.
  
p.35.]
Figure 2.2.1
Jung's four basic psychological functions defuied by the intersec-
tion of two pairs of opposities: feeling-thinking and intuition-
sensation.'
and types of collective. I am aware, for instance, that the
idea of 'virtual community' is of increasing importance not
only in the international (transnational) working environ-
ment and in the academic world but in popular leisure.
This is the result of a coming together of laser disk,
personal computer, and telecommunications technologies
to make generally available real-time access to the
internet. Hofstede's scheme also marginalizes the material
aspects of social relations which, although they may not be
as central as they were once thought to be still have a
pressing relevance. Even the 'wired up' wiz kid has a 'real'
body that may be subjected to control and positioned by the
power relations, both economic and ideological, that fix the
conditions for physical survival. For the poor man or
woman of the 'developing' world the immediate prospect is
an all too 'real' environment of deprivation maintained by
material as much as cultural relations.
In contrast, outright acceptance of the scheme of
Bourdieu would privilege description of material relations
as expressed in Marxist analyses. This is not easy to
accept, given the notions of non-hierarchical social organi-
zation that have been invoked in the critique of modern
industrialization and in the investigation of 'alternative'
27. The following represents a
tiny selection of the literature of
the period:
CALDER, Nigel. Technopolis:
Social control of the uses of sci -
ence. MacGibbon & Kee, 1969.
COUNCIL on ENVIRONMEN-
TAL QUALITY and the
DEPARTMENT of STATE, The
Global 2000 Report to the
President: Entering the Twenty-
First Century. Allen Lane, 1982.
ECOLOGIST, The. A Blueprint
for Survival. Revised edn.
Penguin, 1972.
MEADOWS, Donella H. et al.
The Limits to Growth. New
York: Universe Books, 1972.
28. LASH, Scott. & John URRY.
Economies of Signs & Space.
Sage, 1994. pp.111-44.
29. For example this was thor-
oughly reflected at the 1993
International Design Congress
in Glasgow. A whole section was
devoted to the ethical dilemma':
Victor PAPANEK who developed
the original green design mani-
festo Design for the Real World
between 1963 and 1972 spoke on
"The coining of a new aesthetic:
eco-logic, etho-logic, bio-logic"
and Ezio MANZINI reinforced
the necessary connection
between "Design, environment
and social quality". Significant
contributions to other sections
included: John WORTHINGTON
"Balancing public conscience and
private initiatives"; Katherine
McCOY "Countering the tradi-
tion of the apolitical designer";
Bill MOGGRIDGE "Paradoxes of
the future" and; Derrick de
KERCKHOVE "Design, interac-
tivity and the production of
meaning". MYERSON, Jeremy.
Design Renaissance Selected
papers from the International
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and 'appropriate' technologies. In the 1960s and 1970s the
Marxist analysis of capitalist production, which had estab-
lished the links between the process of fragmenting and
hierarchically structuring labour to facilitate mass produc-
tion and massive economic development, technological
innovation, and social control, was turned on its head. It
achieved this largely through consideration of: the damage
done to the physical and social environment; the
(non)sustainability of economic growth; the decline in
traditional moral values such as cooperation and mutual
respect; and the disintegration of community life and the
attendant problems of alienation, disempowerment, and
the commodification of relations.'
Whilst such analyses have had considerable impact
on political thought, particularly in the socialist and
liberal movements, and in the recent flowering of neo-
romantic, neo-anarchistic tendencies as exemplified in the
Green movement, their impact on industry and the institu-
tions has been limited. In the UK those directly involved in
or supporting manufacturing industry have generally
made only superficial gestures in the direction of decen-
tralized organization and worker participation in develop-
ment. Two areas where greater signs of a radical shift in
principles can be seen is in the 'software' sectors of the
information technology and culture industries. In both,
most companies are relatively small and significant
attempts have been made to integrate the autonomous
creative individual into a network of productive and
decision-making relations, and the 'flat' organization has
become the norm." Models for this have included
'community', 'college', 'family', and 'collective'.
There is an increasing demand for design to embrace a
new, ethical, cooperative, eco-conscious position in the post-
industrial setting. This, similarly, can be traced back to
30. MATTHEWS, Geoff.
"Invasion of the Body Snatchers:
Architecture and Virtual Space",
Culture Theory Criticism
Occasional Papers, University of
Humberside, 1994.
31. MITCHELL, C Thomas.
Redefining Designing: From
Form to Experience. New York:
Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1993.
32. LEFEBVRE, [1974] p.101.
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Design Congress, Glasgow, 1993.
Open Eye/CSD, 1994.
an origin in the 60s and 70s critique of industrialism. This
is no neo-romantic backlash but rather a pragmatic
response to perceived changes in the global industrial
complex and the impact this is having on questions of
economic survival and cultural identity. It has been spurred
on, more recently, by: (1) an invasion of what were
formerly, securely solid and actual realms in the built
environment by the electronic media and their (new) virtual
spaces;" and (2) the demand for a more flexible, responsive,
reliable and accountable design process, one that draws on
the end user's experience, knowledge and skill in the sense
of admitting a far broader and more finely tuned under-
standing of human factors and in the sense of entailing
forms of participation throughout the product cycle.'
Lefebvre's scheme seems underdeveloped for the
current purposes and to be in need of a certain 'concretiza-
tion'. However, it does have a promising quality: that of
openness. The idea of 'exchange', for example: "...does not
determine what is exchanged: it merely stipulates that
something, which has a use, is also an object of exchange.'
This openness enables Lefebvre to include material and
non-material possibilities in his idea of 'exchange' and also
in those of communication, encounter, assembly and simul-
taneity, and to contrast definitively natural space and
social space. The former "...juxtaposes - and thus disperses."
The latter "...implies actual or potential assembly at a
single point, or around that point". This perhaps suggests
that whichever dimensions are proper to the visualization
of social (sub)spaces, they should at least operate/read as
continua of values rather than as ratios of quanta.
In the present context, at least, Freudian and
Jungian notions appear to modify the dimensions
suggested by others rather than offering any new and
independent scheme. However, the modifying properties
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that they have are radical ones. They connect the social
and the personal spheres by crystalizing the qualities that
define individuality and commonality.
Social Dimensions
To characterize the dimensions of social space in one way
rather than another is to choose a particular starting
point, no more than that. Where one may end up, in
mapping the various territories these dimensions reveal, is
an open question. Potentially, one may spend a lifetime
discovering their possibilities. A designerly approach to the
specific problem of the social context of museum-design-
organization suggests that between them Hofstede,
Bourdieu, Lefebvre, Freud and Jung provide an adequate
range of variables from which to select or distil dimensions
describing appropriate subspaces.
At first glance, Hofstede's cultural dimensions seem
to offer a very useful perspective. However, it is important
to note that the context in which these dimensions were
constructed was immediately global and concerned with an
overtly commercial rather than cultural object. The IBM
corporation and the UK museum design community do not
necessarily reflect the same cultural dimensions and, even
if they do, they are unlikely to exhibit the same range of
differences within each one. I will consider each dimension
in turn with these provisos in mind.
• 'Power distance' potentially provides a scale along
which to position the dependence relations of different
groups/individuals in a museum project and to compare
variations in dependence relations for a particular
group/individual as they participate in projects in
different museums. Where, through shear weight of
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statistical evidence, Hofstede was able to characterize
the dependence relations typical of different national
cultures using this dimension, this is neither possible
in the museum-design-organization context nor is it
what is required. Rather a 'placing' of individuals or of
more or less coherent groups is suggested. I believe the
notion of 'power distance' remains perfectly valid,
however, the cultural context in which it must function
is much more local and specific than that of the
national. The proposition is that a relative measure of
dependence relations between different 'culturally'
defined groups/individuals in a local context may still
tend to reveal characteristics common to those types of
group/individual. Given the tendency for the members
of each functional group in a museum to achieve
broadly the same educational level at each particular
stage in the career development characteristic of that
museum function, and therefore for there to be a more
or less characteristic cultural capital for that group, it
does not seem unreasonable to suggest that a qualified
use may be made of the dimension of power-distance in
a model of museum-design-organization.
• 'Individualism-collectivism' potentially represents a
measure of the importance of group and individual
identity amongst various functional groupings - of both
the more coherent professional type and of the more
heterogenous multidisciplinary type - in the context of
a museum design project and in the wider
museum/museum-related community. Similar
arguments pertain here as above for power-distance.
Although no definitive research into the issue of
individualism-collectivism amongst the various
museum functional groups seems to have been under-
taken, there is nevertheless some anecdotal evidence
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from such studies as those undertaken by Kavanagh
that measurable differences do indeed exist. 33 The
curatorial group, in pursuing the profession v profes-
sionalism debate, is developing a collectivist stance
over and above the factional academic allegiances one
has noted in the past from exchanges in the Museums
Journal and at the various Museums Association
conferences. The conservatorial group already has a
strong collectivist stance developed during thirty years
consistent battle to establish specialist credentials in
the museum context. One could argue that the adoption
of an empirical scientific methodology and discourse
has played a significant part in this. In contrast, the
design function in museums is marked by inconsisten-
cies in job descriptions and titles, and in organizational
position. A culture of individualism, which character-
izes most independent design practice, is promoted in
art and design education and tends to carry over into
the institutional context of the museum in spite of the
strong pulls often exerted by multidisciplinary project
teams in the direction of collectivism.
33. KAVANAGH, Gaynor. "The
museums profession and the
articulation of professional self-
consciousness". in KAVANAGH,
Gaynor. (ed.) The Museums
Profession. Leicester University
Press, 1991.
• 'Masculinity-femininity' provides a means of identifying
more and less distinct gender roles in the wider
museum and museum-related community and perhaps
of dissecting complex functions performed by particular
groups/individuals in a particular museum. However,
in some respects the notion of gender role entailed in
this conceptualization of a cultural dimension seems
out of keeping with the radically decentred position of
the subject in postmodernity. One can argue that there
is a creative aspect to gender role, a symbolic
dimension, which is increasingly explored and exploited
by individuals and by social groups in the expression of
'lifestyle' preferences. Examples of this expression
34. REID, Elizabeth. "Virtual
Worlds: Culture and
Imagination". in JONES, Steven
G. (Ed.) CyberSociety: Computer-
Mediated Communication and
Community. Sage Publications,
1995. pp.181 & 183.
35. ibid.
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include: camp and macho behaviourisms, overt
celibacy, power-dressing, the 'we' and the 'one', new
man, and male feminism. In general, ambivalence to
gender role is no longer a problematic attitude and
gender role transformations do not necessarily consti-
tute unacceptable behaviour.
Gender is self-selected. This freedom opens up a wealth of
possibilities. ...The imagination of each user creates the
context in which all others can act. The more willing each
person is to invest his or her imagination in creating objects
and descriptions, the richer and more successfully dramatur -
gical the environment will be.'
Although written about the virtual spaces created by
and for the users of multi-user dimensions (MUDs) on
the Internet, many of the same dynamics and opportu-
nities are available to the creator-users of interactive
exhibits and, if we project forward to the fully collabora-
tive design process (project cycle), of whole exhibitions
and entire communicative environments. Potentially
the temporal separation of participants in the interac-
tive exhibit or in the collaborative design process offers
the same opportunity as that for MUD users. They may
assign to themselves behavioural and personal attrib-
utes that are functional but 'fictional'. Interactive
software and radically participative design protocols
have In common the purpose of facilitating "the sharing
of imagined realities"." The difference between them is
that only design is looking to such imagined realities as
proposals for change in the creator-users' actualities.
What we are already witnessing is that the more these
actualities are shaped by the presence of virtual spaces
the less the traditional rules governing gender roles
matter and the more they are reformulated as one of
the creative variables of 'lifestyle' and `workstyle'.
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• The 'uncertainty avoidance' dimension potentially
provides a measure of the individual/group's tolerance
of ambiguity and its ability to cope with uncertainty
and necessary risk. Those that tolerate ambiguity, cope
with uncertainty and take risks successfully acquire
status in some roles (designer or manager) whilst in
others become identified as unreliable (security guard
or conservator). This duplicity can be an important
factor in the breakdown of relations between creative
and technical members of a project team especially in
the more traditional collection-based/-oriented museum.
Several of the 'independent' variables used by Bourdieu
may be useful. For example, given the scope of designers'
practical interests, which range from the technical to the
stylistic, from the economic to the aesthetic, from the
formal and communicative to the symbolic and 'semantic',
the potential of conjoining economic and cultural dimen-
sions to open up social spaces tuned to the design context
would appear to be high.
• 'Income' and 'educational level', which refer to levels of
acquired economic and cultural capital respectively, are
dimensions of this sort.
• 'Sex', as a variable has already been updated and
contextualized in Hofstede's cultural view of 'gender
roles'. However, the latter could be opened up further
by consideration of alternative gender constructions -
those found, for example, in the various MUDs (Multi-
User Dimensions) on the internet. Taking the broader
view five gender assignments are possible: male,
female, plural, neuter, and hermaphrodite.'
• 'Age' interrelates in complex ways both with 'educa-
tional level' and with 'income' and is potentially useful
36. ibid.	 even if as a 'secondary' variable. It also interrelates
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with 'occupation' or, given the limited context of
museum-design-organization with what is perhaps
better thought of as 'functional role'.
37. All human beings carry
about a set of words which they
employ to justify their actions,
their beliefs, and their lives. ...I
shall call these words a person's
"final vocabulary".
[RORTY, Richard. Contingency,
Irony, and Solidarity.
Cambridge University Press,
1989. p.73.]
The problematic terminology of Lefebvre's 'pure' abstrac-
tions - exchange, language, signs, equivalences, etc. -
points to the need for a contextualizing interpretation.
Lefebvre, it may be argued, intends no such latitude.
However, I take the criticism he levels at some theorists,
that recourse to such concepts as rupture, coupure, or
break is no substitute for an account of the move in
discourse from one kind of spatiality to another, to mean
that some 'accommodation', at very least, is effectively
entailed by any project that models particular possibilities
in radically open (dual, multiple, plural) social space.
Of the terms Lefebvre mentions by name I start with
the following fairly 'concrete' interpretations:
• 'Exchange' I take to imply material exchange between
participants in the museum design process as a
measure of level of involvement - 'involvement' here is
meant in its most practical sense of implicated in and
concerned with a significant range of the complexity of
the museum design context.
• 'Language' I interpret as meaning a measure of the
commonality or difference in what Rorty terms 'final
vocabulary' between the various individuals involved in
a particular museum design project or within specific
heterogeneous functional groupings in the wider
museum design context.'
• 'Signs' I interpret as referring to the level of meaning-
ful products associated with individual roles or with
specific functional groups and, therefore, as a measure
of documentary visibility. Meaningful products, in the
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museum design context, include all recorded forms of
communication (written, drawn, taped, digitized, etc.)
and the designed end products that carry the mark of
their originators' identities (the material culture of
museum design: buildings, exhibitions, publications,
education programmes, collection management
systems, etc.)
• 'Equivalencies' and 'reciprocities', I take to refer to the
qualities of specific functional roles. I interpret them as
a measure of complementarity of function - functions of
low complementarity have a high degree of equivalence
and a low degree of reciprocity and individuals or
groupings encompassing such functions tend to experi-
ence duplications of effort, direct conflicts of interest,
underemployment, internal redundancy, devaluation of
the individual, etc.
• 'Contracts' I interpret as referring to the structure of
working relationships and to be a measure of their
formality or informality. Formal contracts tend to be
highly structured, rule bound, rigid and carry predeter-
mined levels of reward for compliance and penalties for
non-compliance. Informal contracts, on the other hand,
tend to be loosely structured, built on trust, flexible and
represent opportunities for reward and risks of penalty
whose levels are initially indeterminate.
Freud introduces a thickening agent to any discourse of
social spatiality in the form of a reflection: everythmg. that
is in consciousness is merely the visible tip of the social
iceberg. The surface self, the ego, covers over the depth of
the whole self. We are cultural beings and the superego is
most clearly a cultural construct. The ideal self we project
for ourselves is at once a celebration of the perfect embodi-
ment of a system of values and beliefs, and the means by
38. BOCOCK, 1983, p.38.
39. Freud's hypothesis is that in
the distant past the human ani-
mal at some point experienced
some resistance in the human
and natural environment to
his/her achievement of immedi-
ate satisfaction. He/she, there-
fore, learned to
give up, momentary, uncertain,
and destructive pleasure for
delayed, restrained but 'assured'
pleasure.
[MARCUSE, Herbert. Eros and
Civilisation. Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1956. p.13.]
The reality principle having
struck, the human being
represses desire and anger to
allow reason to surface and
action to be directed towards
moderated future goals.
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which we mask our faults and our imperfect lives: we are
often irrational, driven by our desires, obsessions,
sexuality, guilt, fears and hate.
• 'Sexuality', as interpreted in Freudian analysis,
connects with 'Sex' in Bourdieu's scheme and with
'Masculinity-Femininity' in that of Hofstede. However,
it goes beyond the biologic given and the conscious play
of self image. One is reminded that:
Sexual action is action which gives erotic pleasure ...Sexual
objects ...may be either a man or a woman for either gender
...sexual objects may be chosen of any age ...Some people may
even choose animals ...pet dogs, cats, horses, fish, or birds.
Sexual aims vary from stroking, kissing, looking at or being
seen by the sexual object, to genital intercourse, anal inter -
course, and sadistic or masochistic practices.38
Freud delves beneath overt social display, to reveal
unconscious drives that affect the character of the
productive/communicative activities and roles we
construct through our social relations - i.e. the creative,
the manipulative, the controlling, the caring, etc.
• 'Imagination-Reason' connects with Hofstede's notion of
'uncertainty avoidance'. The two basic mental processes
split in the transition from human-animal to human-
being, from a condition determined by the 'pleasure
principle' to one determined by the 'reality principle'."
The alternate exercise of imagination and reason
produces the greater ability to tolerate ambiguity and
cope with uncertainty and necessary risk. Confusing or
inadequate information when addressed by reason alone
which is limited to 'reality testing', tends to produce
inappropriate responses or lead to a catastrophic switch
to extreme irrational behaviour. Equally, when
addressed by the imagination alone which is limited to
uninhibited surfacing of preconscious images and ideas,
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tends to produce 'generic' and therefore inadequately
focussed responses or lead to a catastrophic switch to
excessively rational, rigid and mechanistic behaviour.
• 'Language' connects with the same term in Lefebvre's
scheme. Lefebvre identifies language with two contra-
dictory views - 'a pure formalism' and 'a power of
abstraction'. These neither stand alone nor hang
together. In the former view "the forbidden fruit of
lived experience flees or disappears under the assault
of reductionism". 4° And in the latter the logics of
metaphor and metonymy rule and "a terrible power of
negativity" 41 is admitted: the mesmerizing difference
between signified and sign creates the power to destroy
and to create "a new world different from nature's
initial one".' Freud's centralizing of 'marginal' aspects
of language opens up the rational and conscious views
of language and social relations to the irrational and
unconscious aspects that hold them in productive
tension in an interpretive space. Applying the interpre-
tive notions of dream analysis to the analysis of
slips of the tongue and of the pen (Freudian slips); bungled
actions ...(parapraxes); forgetting words and names;
...misreading words [and] ...wit, jokes and plays on words 43
concerned itself with revealing the unconscious. But:
40. LEFEBVRE, [1974] p.134.
41 ibid. Attributed to Hegel.
42. ibid. p.135.
43. BOCOCK, 1983, p.34-6.
44. ibid. p.36.
It is clear now [that] ...these early texts ...are concerned with
language and meaning. Even in dream interpretation, the
picture of the dream must first be put into a verbal form
before the interpretation can begin."
Freud thus provides depth to the communicative
process that Rorty, Habermas and others have invoked
as central to cultural and political action in general and
(I extrapolate) to design in particular.
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45. FORDHAM, 1953. p.17.
46. ibid. p.18.
47. ibid.
On the question of the 'ideology/religion' dimension Freud
argues carefully for the conjunction or equivalence between
ideology and religion. I would not take issue with the
argument that this dimension is relevant to the development
of the individual, that it is represented as collective belief
and therefore that it is manifest in the social realm.
However, for reasons that will become apparent, I wish to
exempt ideology from the visualization of social space.
Although there is a sense in which all of the 'depth' that
Freudian ideas add to prospective social dimensions is of an
embedded or enfolded nature, that is to say, in social terms
it is below the surface and 'distanced' - to some extent taken
out of time and operating by 'distance effects' - ideology is
perhaps the one dimension which most clearly departs from
the simple notion of social dimensionality. I will argue that it
is better conceived as an independent space of quite distinc-
tive character - a paradigmatic space which is metasocial as
much as metaphysical and, for that matter, metacritical.
Jung develops a wide range of what he terms 'opposites'
and these may be construed as potential dimensions or
modifiers of dimensions in social space. Crucial to under-
standing the Jungian scheme are the concepts 'libido',
'progression' and 'regression'. Libido is general psychic
energy. It does not imply a 'force' as such, "it is simply a
convenient way of describing ...observed phenomena"."
Progression and regression are complementary concepts
relating to the flow of libido. 'Progression' is the forward
movement "which satisfies the demands of the conscious"
and "is concerned with the active adaptation to one's
environment"." 'Regression' is the backward movement
which satisfies "the demands of the unconscious" and is
concerned with "adaptation to one's inner needs".47 For
Jung an important aspect of libido is that it may flow to an
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48. This is taken from a 1993
The Late Show broadcast. It
immediately followed the series
Culture Clash (BBC 2, 1993)
which investigated the persis-
tence of the two cultures' debate
initiated by C P Snow in the
1959 Reds Lecture at the
University of Cambridge. The
Late Show participants were:
Professor Lewis Wolpert, biolo-
gist; Jonathan Miller, polymath;
Mary Midgley, philosopher; and
Robert Young, academic and edi-
tor of Science as Culture.
Lewis Wolpert put an
uncompromising reductionist
argument about the primacy of
Science. Jonathan Miller coun-
tered the implication that:
...there is no difference in kind
between the complexities of
human affairs and the complexi -
ties of bio-chemical affairs and
that ultimately the one will
reduce to the other ...
by drawing attention to the fact
that the reductionist pro-
gramme:
...takes so little account of what
in fact is distinctive about the
complexity of human affairs ...we
are not complex merely by virtue
of the fact that there are more
factors involved which we can't
as yet introduce sufficiently
sophisticated mathematics to
deal with, but ...by virtue of
something which doesn't occur in
the rest of nature, which is the
fact that "there is something it is
like to be us"...
[quote attributed to the philoso-
pher Thomas Nagel.]
extreme and instantaneously pass over into its opposite.
The possibility of such a switch of polarity is an important
feature of a balanced individual and may be so also of a
group or larger collective. The opposites between which
libido flows in turns by progression and regression form
the central thread of Jung's most important work
Psychological Types: the following dualities are all
developed from the definitions included in that work.
• 'unconscious-conscious', by introducing the opposing
concept of the unconscious as what is not conscious,
admits a whole realm of hitherto unrevealed possibili-
ties. In design, the play of both rational and irrational
processes, in addressing complex practical situations, is
a methodological prerequisite. And in museographical
practices, certainly since the postmodern deconstruc-
tion of traditional curatorship, the play of both analyti-
cal and narrative, broadly deconstructive and recon-
structive processes, is similarly definitive. The
character of these processes can be given much greater
clarity by reference to the part the unconscious plays in
surfacing cultural, instinctual and personal material in
the (re)creative process. In Jonathan Miller's words:
"there is something that it is like to be" of which
science - analytical, conscious thought in general - can
tell us little." However, in poetry (poiesis) one is 'in
touch' with the collective unconscious, the emotional
and experiential inheritance, and has the chance, if one
is finely tuned, to produce something, because of its
powerfully deep resonances, of lasting value.
• 'introversion-extraversion' focusses on the directionality
of libido as the determining characteristic. Introversion
is broadly associated with regression and extraversion
with progression. These movements may be related to
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the phases of complex functions in the museum context.
The predominantly regressive movement of introver-
sion is `dis-played' in the subjective interest towards the
subject in, for example, the designer's focus on personal
satisfaction and with aesthetic integrity in the process
of designing when it is experienced primarily as welling
up out of the self, or the parallel focus of the curator as
a narrative scheme develops from conceptual outline to
'final' text. In each case, what matters to the subject is
the satisfaction of psychic needs through an essentially
erotic (rather than sexual) dynamic, that is, one charac-
terized as primarily emotional rather than sensual.
The predominantly progressive movement of extra-
version, on the other hand, is `dis-closed' in the subjec-
tive investment in the object. For example, the
designer's focus on the object of design or the curator's
on the object of a museum project entails a shaping of
events as well as a shaping of the material content of a
practical situation. All of which aims at a conscious
identification with the world, an involvement that
seeks not merely accommodation but union. Here the
dynamic projects beyond phantasy into a physical
consummation, beyond emotion into the sensual.
• 'feeling-thinking' and 'intuition-sensation', as the
rational and irrational dualities, construct the sub-
space of psychological functions. This has potential as a
way of visualizing the dynamics of certain behaviours
in the museum design process. The 'moments' in a
creative or decision-making process can be associated
with movement between psychological functions. This
could be as an adjunct or possibly an alternative to the
characterization of such moments in terms of the
psychological types, i.e. introverted and extraverted.
The movement from sensation to thinking for example
intuition
strong
1
IRRATIONAL
weak
1
strong
RATIONAL
1
weak
sensation
feeling
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describes a rational thought process informed by direct
sense experience: the reverse movement of a directed
physical action informed by prior 'abstract' thought.
The description of the dualities as straightforwardly
'rational' and 'irrational' is a simplification which, in
considering the combination, Jung qualifies on several
counts. For example, although feeling is the psychologi-
cal function that 'weighs and values' and is therefore, in
that sense, 'rational', undirected passive feeling, which
Jung calls 'feeling-intuition', is, he says, definitely
irrational." I interpret the space of psychological
functions as being divided by the feeling-thinking axis
with the 'passive' intuition-dominated regions being
irrational in character and the more strongly so the
further one moves away from the axis. The other
regions have sensation at their base and are more
strongly rational in character as one moves away from
this base towards the axis (Figure 2.2.2.)
thinking
Figure 2.2.2
The 'rational' duality feeling-thinking and the 'irrational' duality
intuition-sensation construct a sub-space of psychological func-
tions in which the irrational quality dominates the feeling-intu-
ition and thinking-intuition regions and the rational dominates
the feeling-sensation and the thinking-sensation regions.
• 'individual-collective' links with the similarly named
49. JUNG, 1926, p.646.	 dimension in Hofstede's scheme. The psychological
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50. It should be noted also that
existential thinking has a prob-
lem with these notions of the
'individual' and the 'collective'.
They may seem to imply a
bridgeable dichotomy. If 'collec-
tivism' is taken to imply the col-
lection of separate individuals
then it "really misses the mean-
ing of community" that is
intended. And although there is
an essentially lonely aspect to
individual existence, there is no
real alone-ness. The self is not
"pre-existent and self-sufficient"
but emerges from and is always
with a world of others. For this
reason an alternative psycho-
social formulation would be 'pri-
vacy-community'.
[MACQUARRIE, John.
Existentialism. New York: World
Publishing, 1972. pp.76-7.]
individual only comes into being in consciousness and
then it is the complex formations of psychic elements
peculiar to the individual, and not the elements
themselves which are common to many, that character-
ize individuality. The collective has both conscious and
unconscious contents. In Hofstede's cultural scheme the
individual-collective dimension is employed as a
measure of personal and group identity: Jung's psycho-
logical scheme offers another twist to this by suggest-
ing that, unless set off against the unconscious-
conscious dimension, it is immediately ambiguous.'
Although individual unconscious as a region has no
real 'place', in that, before conscious development of a
self, identification entirely with the object represents
an immature condition one would not expect to find
'involved' in a social context, collective unconscious
plays as significant a role as does the collective
conscious. Hofstede's category of the collective is really
only a measure of conscious group identification: the
unconscious remains hidden or, more properly,
`unrecovered' (Figure 2.2.3.)
conscious
self social
Individual	 	
Identity
object
identity
(group)
identity
psychic
heritage
collective
unconscious
Figure 2.2.3
The Jungian individual-collective and unconscious-conscious
dimensions construct a sub-space in which the region of the 'col-
lective unconscious' is made visible. In Hofstede's cultural
scheme the collective aspect only constructs a space for con-
scious group identity (See this section, above).
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In the museum design context the collective uncon-
scious clearly plays an important part in the construc-
tion of narrative. The playing out of the creative and
administrative groups' mythic relations and the deep
structures of the products of the planning and design
processes both draw on an archaic psychic heritage
which is 'cultural' in a far broader sense than is the
conscious contents intentionally projected by specific
individuals and groups in the 'limited' local context of
the museum organization.
61. ibid. p.617.
• The 'instinct-will' dimension embraces forms of psychic
energy: 'instinct' that of the unconscious, what we experi-
ence as primitive impulses, and 'will' that of the consc-
ious, what we develop as conscious motivations which
"owe [their] ... existence to culture and moral education”.51
In museum design the role of conscious motivations is
a very large one: the broader aspects derive from the
importance of material culture as a vehicle for projecting
values and beliefs. The continuum of material culture is
broken only by the will of differentiated individuals and
groups. The more 'conservative' element attempts to
preserve or to re-embody values consistent with an
actual (or imagined) past state of things whereas the
more 'innovative' element attempts to establish or to
transfer values that reflect the actual (or desired)
present condition in the light of current interests and
concerns. Neither element can be exclusively identified
with the designer or with the curator, but, in the context
of the particular museum community, one has the oppor-
tunity to place successful individuals and groups
according to the wilfulness of their activities.
I suggest that there is a tendency for the experienced
and more coherent group to 'automate' its conscious
motivations, to adopt familiar patterns of collective
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will, to become unquestioning: this process should not
be confused with a coincidence of instinctual motiva-
tions. The group dynamic that is hard-won by a collec-
tive conscious effort and a bringing together of the will
is thereafter vulnerable to a decadent complacency, a
decline into unthinking routine, a progressive collective
blindness to changing circumstance, and ultimately to
a potentially catastrophic disfunctionality. On the other
hand, I suggest that the happy accident of coincident
instincts in a group tends to engender a collective
creativity, an openness to the changing world and
growth into coherent conscious motivations. Of course,
the former dynamic may trigger a radical switch into
the latter and the latter dynamic may be carried over
into the former: in this sense the 'dynamic' that heads
towards automated motivations and potential catastro-
phe is the social expression of a 'collective regression'
and that which heads towards group creativity and
'growth' is one of 'collective progression'.
• `introjection-projection', the complementary flows of
psychic contents between subject and object, relates
closely to introversion-extraversion.
52. ibid. p.667.
Introjection is an extraverting process, since for this adjust -
ment to the object a feeling into, or possession of the object is
necessary. 52
The object is assimilated by the self and an identity
with the object is formed. Projection, however, is an
introverting process. It animates and separates the
object through the transfer to it of psychic contents.
This dimension has the potential to illuminate those
moments in the museum design process when identifi-
cation with the object of design changes. A prerequisite
for successful evaluation of a design is the ability to
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'step back' from one's immersion in the work and to
take a broader conscious view of what has been going
on and what state of things has been reached. This
movement from an introjecting to a projecting flow of
conscious and unconscious contents is the achievement
of the individual, in terms of psychological functions, in
gravitating towards the feeling-thinking axis: as one
leaves the realm of pure sensation the rational quality
becomes stronger and as one leaves that of the
intuitions the irrational quality becomes weaker.
• 'abstract-concrete' relates to the individual treatment
of the meaning or general character of psychological
contents. 'Abstraction' literally means 'differentiating
out' or 'separating from'. Abstract thinking draws out a
particular content for its intellectual or logical valities
and, therefore, suppresses other elements as irrelevant.
'Concrete' literally means 'grown together'. Concrete
thinking sees a more or less undifferentiated whole in
which thought, feeling and sensation are mixed up
together and it is, therefore, wedded to the primacy of
'facts' as witnessed by sense-perception.
In the museum design context, the orientation of
particular participants in a project tends to make use of
a pattern of abstract and concrete psychological
functions peculiar to a specific practice or museum
function. Concretism emerges in moments that rely on
what one thinks of as 'common sense'. And in environ-
ments as thoroughly infused with intellectual and
aesthetic concerns as is the museum it can be a 'rare'
and, therefore, a very valuable commodity. It represents
that ability to ignore complex disputes and conflicts of
interest and to get to the heart of the practical
situation, to be decisive and to act with mind, body and
soul together. Jung puts a less positive tone on this:
79
With civilized man, concretism of thought consists in the
inability to conceive of anything which differs from the
immediately obvious external facts, or in the inability to
discriminate subjective feeling from the sense-given object.53
Abstraction, as abstract thinking, sensation and
feeling, surfaces wherever intellectual aesthetic or
moral concerns are focussed. It allows different
concerns and interests to be differentiated and articu-
lated and creates the arena in which contradiction and
counteraction can be consciously worked on by the
intellect, the imagination and the higher emotions.
+
The range of variables used by Hofstede, Bourdieu,
Lefebvre, Freud and Jung in the construction of social and
psycho-social dimensions immediately suggests overlaps,
interactions and graphic juxtapositions potentially produc-
tive of significant subspaces - indeed, some are unavoid-
ably entailed in the original material and have already
been illustrated. It is now possible to consider whether
some distillation of these ingredients may generate a 'root'
scheme of just a few dimensions - ideally no more than
three - that is both clear in its visualization and yet
suitable for recovering specific distinctions uncovered in
the larger heterogeneous 'scheme' outlined above. I believe
that existentialist ideas offer a method of accommodating
the broad sweep and the recoverable depth required.
Involvement and Location
The range of dimensions explored above suggests a complex
differentiation of Being and an emphasis on being-in-the-
world. Heidegger's approach to resolving such confusion
53. ibid. p.534.	 was through the adoption of the Da-sein (the `being-there').
64. AYER, A. J. Philosophy in
the Twentieth Century.
Weidenfeld Nicolson, 1982.
p.227.
65. FEATHERSTONE, Mike
Consume;-	 Culture
Postmodernism. Sage, 1991
p.20.
66. ibid. p.84.
•
•
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It is in the world, but not in the way that physical objects are in
the world. What puts it in the world is the complex of its interests
and attitudes.54
Given the object of the current project, this insight
suggests an approach to the visualization of psycho-social
dimensions which is both simple and appropriate. To
account for "interests and attitudes" and related ideas of
'concerns' and 'demeanour' is both to embrace the dynamic
and static qualities that signal involvement and position
(or posture) and to indicate recoverable depths of the social
and the psychological. Featherstone draws attention to the
behavioural interpretation of this requirement:
...if one 'descends' to the everyday practices of embodied persons
held together in webs of interdependencies and power balances
with other people, it can be argued that the need to glean clues and
information about the other's power potential, status and social
standing by reading the other person's demeanour will continue.55
and makes the connection with the notion of a society at
once stratified by differences in 'lifestyle' and to some
extent freed of the rigid rules that reinforce social
hierarchy: what is sometimes called the 'no rules only
choices' view:
(...the acknowledgement of the right of individuals to enjoy
whatever popular pleasures they desire without encountering
prudery or moral censure) does not signify anything as dramatic
as the implosion of the social space but should be regarded
merely as a new move within it."
One may ask to what extent the conception of 'lifestyle', as
constructed by an "expanding class fraction centrally
concerned with the production and dissemination of
consumer imagery and information" carries over into the
limited field of museum organization and design where
this 'new petite bourgeoisie's' views are resisted and
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contested in ways which may parallel or counteract those
operating in the larger social space.
The leisured academic 'elite', which formerly held a
controlling interest and position in museums, has been, to
a large extent, supplanted by a section of the new adminis-
trative class of 'middle managers' and 'information
workers'. Concomitant with this move from academic to
administrative values is that the aspirations and
demeanour of the visiting public now more closely coincide
with those of senior museum staff. One may suggest then
that in social space the boundary between the museum
organization and its immediate social context has been
softened. On the other side of this coin is the spread of the
culture of consumerism to embrace leisure, education, and
cultural products. In the museum these are clearly visible
as manifestations of a larger process of symbolic produc-
tion and material consumerism which has been largely
constructed in the post-War, post-industrial period. This
process may be seen in part as a reconstruction or
extension of the capitalist logic of mass production and in
part as a simulation of material exchange or as its substi-
tution by symbolic exchange.
If one accepts the notion that a complex of interests
and attitudes is what puts the individual in the world,
what we are presented with is the requirement for an
existential dimension to social space which facilitates the
mapping of personal investments and concerns in the world
that range from the symbolic to the material (Figure 2.2.4.)
symbolic	 material
interests	 Interests
Figure 2.2.4
Symbolic-material dimension of social interests.
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In this dimension we can visualize the tensions involved in
the museum activities of acquisition, documentation,
conservation, research, exhibition, and interpretation. In
general, traditional museographic practices tend to focus on
the 'material' whilst the 'new museology' tends to set these
off against interests focussed on the symbolic (Figure 2.2.5.)
symbolic interests	 material interests
ACQUISITION •	 authenticity
•	 cultural value
•	 position in narrative
•	 uniqueness
•	 monetary value
•	 position in taxonomy
DOCUMENTATION •	 associations: events, persons, places
•	 iconicity
•	 provenance
•	 material composition & condition
•	 physical size, location & appearance
CONSERVATION •	 preserving function and meaning •	 preventing physical deterioration
RESEARCH •	 narrative potential •	 factual certainty
EXHIBITION •	 subject communication •	 object display
INTERPRETATION •	 narrative exposition
•	 cultural exploitation
•	 identification
•	 taxonomic placement
Figure 2.2.5
Symbolic-material interests dimension of museum practices.
The parallel with design emphasizes the former
predominance of material interests, in both the larger
industrial sphere and in the museum, and in the post-
industrial context the more openly and continuously
contested material and symbolic interests. In relation to
the modernism/postmodernism debate, therefore, the
theoretical proposition to which I am inclined is that
whereas modernism entails choosing between opposing
terms, between counteracting demands on our attention,
and is therefore concerned with questions of Either, / Or,
the postmodern condition is characterized by the need to
time
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cope with the tensions between the contradictory and the
counteracting which are themselves shifting and
changing, by the need to deal with questions of accommo-
dation, of Both / And.
The process of resolving questions of conflicting social
interests, which once involved a search for truth and for
stability, can be pictured as a to and fro response to the
pull of the material and of the symbolic, as a sequence of
defined positions along a scale of possibilities that edge
towards some acceptable common ground, as a conversa-
tion of gestures (Figure 2.2.6.)
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Figure 2.2.6
The contest of symbolic and material interests played out as a
search for common ground.
This dialogic or dialectical process has been radically
altered by postmodern conditions. The contingency of our
knowledges and interests is now instantaneously recogniz-
able as the mutual accommodation of contradictory and
counteracting positions which subtly shift in response to
each other's movements creating a pattern of dynamic
tensions (Figure 2.2.7.) The trajectory of 'action' has been
replaced by the web of interaction and, for your average
organized worker, excitement by stress.
symbolic
Interests
material
Interests
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57. Featherstone also draws
attention to the postmodern con-
fusion of this idea. Where the
culture of consumption invites
the individual to "regard their
dress and consumer goods as
communicators". [FEATHER-
STONE, 1991, p.26-7.] In this
the question of 'demeanour' is
brought into the realm of self-
conscious conduct. These ges-
tures may be orchestrated to
alternately communicate both a
'regard for others' and a 'pleas-
ing of oneself. The latter may be
regarded by others as an unco-
operative and, therefore, compet-
itive display.
Figure 2.2.7
The mutual accommodation of symbolic and material interests
played out as a pattern of shifting tensions.
Interests and Concerns in Social Space
The terms 'demeanour', 'attitudes', 'interests' and
'concerns' tend to be used as generalizations and to some
extent interchangeably. However, in constructing models
of social space, their dimensional implications may be
subtly different and therefore, for heuristic reasons at
least, perhaps they should be differentiated.
'Demeanour' implies a manner of conducting oneself
in social situations, a typical behaviour that is itself the
outward sign of status, position, power. It relies not on
conscious thought for its expression nor even on conscious
action but rather on habit and routine - on posture rather
than position and reflex rather than response. We best
observe a person's demeanour through the conversation of
gesture entailed in unselfconscious social interaction.
Through demeanour one constructs the 'other' as a social
entity and one possible scale of demeanour would be
cooperative-competitive (Figure 2.2.8)"
cooperative	 competitive
demeanour	 demeanour
Figure 2.2.8
Cooperative-competitive social dimension of demeanour.
68. SARTRE, Jean-Paul. [1943]
Being and Nothingness. Trans.
Hazel E. Barnes. Methuen,
1968. pp.364-412.
Undoubtedly I have not done
justice to the detailed and subtle
exposition of the original.
However, I believe the central
point to be unequivocal: 'atti-
tude' forms a closed circuit in
the personal realm and, there-
fore, although it may offer a cer-
tain clarity, is not really open to
further differentiation in spatial
terms.
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'Attitudes' implies expressed predisposition, an
ideology (rather than conversation) of gesture that reveals
itself in the style, as much as in the content, of our trans-
missions. Through readings of our demeanour attitudes
'represent' (pre-present) the positions we will assume in
acting out any part in social processes. Such expressed pre-
dis-positions need not be reasonable, rational nor even
serendipitous, though there is a recent strain in the myth of
the anti-hero which posits 'bad attitude' as a saving quality.
There is a clue in this as to why the concept of attitude is
ultimately the least productive of the variables under
consideration for a root scheme. Sartre explores the two
'attitudes' constitutive of the 'private' and contrasts these
with the 'communal'. The individual can either seek confir-
mation of its existence by being predisposed to the other's
attentions - the attitude of love-language-masochism - or it
can do so by subjecting the other to its own attentions - the
attitude of indifference-desire-hate-sadism. No choice
between these attitudes is possible because in practice each
eventually fails and motivates the adoption of the other:
through attitude one constructs oneself as a social entity,
but, as a personal gambit it is circular (Figure 2.2.9.)'
community
(value-network)
privacy
(attitudes)
Figure 2.2.9
Community-privacy social dimension.
Having characterized the personal sphere as a
construction of conflict with the other, Sartre goes on to
discuss the communal sphere as a construction of being (in
community) with the other, a construction always
dependent upon the appearance of an external other. The
experience of community is that of being the object of
someone elses attentions.
59. ibid. p.418.
60. ibid. p.419.
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...what I experience is a being-outside in which I am organized
with the Other in an indissoluble, objective whole, a whole in
which I am fundamentally no longer distinct from the Other but
which I agree in solidarity with the Other to constitute."
In the museum context the very fact that the products of
the design process are worked on by oneself with others
and that they are apprehended by third parties constitutes
the community at work as an objective entity, as an Us. It
is a fact of organizational life, even at its most cooperative,
therefore, that what is felt to be 'outside' the practical
situation is what constructs the experience of solidarity. At
the same time it reinforces the individual alienation,
which is objectification by others, entailed in the 'internal'
conflict of working with others.
the one who experiences himself as constituting an Us with
other men feels himself trapped among an infinity of strange
existences; he is alienated radically and without recourse."
The efficacy of material and symbolic interests and
concerns is always related to this dynamic of communal
experience. In those moments when one attempts to
reclaim the object (the design as object) from its embedded-
ness in symbolic structures in order to work on it in its
materiality what one is also doing is breaking that experi-
ence of solidarity and reinstating the primacy of the
subjectivity, of the private realm. Conversely, to the extent
that the object is released to communal visibility, its
materiality is submerged in order to construct its meaning
for others (Figure 2.2.10.) And when one engages such
symbolic interests and concerns one is also admitting
oneself to the organizational objectivity that the attentions
of others construct.
Just as a community is objectified by the attentions of
others outside, it constitutes itself as a 'subject' the moment
community
A privacy
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material
interests
symbolic
Interests
Figure 2.2.10
The movement to recapture the materiality of the object (A)
entails a resort to attitudinal play wherein the subject arrests
the Other's (shared) symbolic interest in the object by alternate-
ly seeking attention from and giving it to the Other. The move-
ment to release the object to communal visibility (B) reverses the
flow of interests and promotes the (re)construction of meaning.
a cooperative action is engaged. Such action is acquisitive,
subsuming, attention-giving in which one unselfconsciously
participates and it immediately objectifies what is 'outside',
that is, other than the We in which one is participating. In
so far as the We is against what is outside the community it
only admits the objectified and digested body of the world
into its work: the We is imperialistic. The Us responds to the
attentions of the world as an object of what is outside itself.
Its work, therefore, is subsumed by the world: whether
compliantly or defiantly the Us is bound into slavery.
Moving on from the circularity of attitudes in the
personal sphere, it seems that in the communal sphere
'attitude' is no longer the appropriate question: it is simply
not possible for the collectivity to adopt an attitude in the
sense in which the individuality must. From amongst an
unlimited range of possible interests, a particular configu-
61. MACQUARRIE, 1972, p.77.
62. HEIDEGGER, Martin.
Being and Time. Trans. John
Macquarrie & Edward Robinson.
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962.
p.153.
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ration defines the community's objective boundary.
Nothing in the experience of community melds this
together into a static predisposition, rather it comes into
being contingently and is dynamic.
The social world is constituted by a network of
interests that places us in relation to others.
The everyday world, then, is already a world that implies an
indefinite number of people engaged in interlocking and
mutually supportive tasks.'
'Interests' implies a normative condition of values: within
a group, common interests and the interests of the
individual may be defined and may coincide or may
conflict to a greater or lesser degree. Interests are a reflec-
tion of possible direct influence on status, performance,
confidence, reward, etc. as in statements of the type: "this
is not in your interests: your interests would be better
served by ...". Involvement in a practical situation implies
'interests' in the 'concrete' sense of a binding set of assign-
ments and references to others which is embodied in the
work that we do.
In our 'description' of that environment which is closest to us -
the work-world of the craftsman, for example - the outcome was
that along with the equipment to be found when one is at work
[in Arbeit], these Others for whom the 'work' ["Werle] is destined
are encountered too."
Through the embodied quality of interests the aesthetic
enters our works.
Involvement also implies 'concerns' in the 'abstract'
sense of particular conscious objects which are the product
of 'concrete relations with others' and that one is bound to
pursue in respect of the contingent experiences of being-for
and being-with others. Unlike interests, concerns tend to
be contingently driven by ideological or by practical
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rational thought. They are a reflection of what occupies
thought, what motivates, what one consciously pursues or
avoids in life, what one cares about for whatever reason, as
in expressions such as: "but I am very concerned about
this: I am involved whether you like it or not!" The
everyday world of the community: "is an a priori condition
of all my practical concerns".83
If 'interests' are assigned to the individual or collec-
tive as object then 'concerns' are expressed by them as
subject. They are the two sides of the coin of social
dynamics. In the same sense demeanour and attitude are
the object and subject sides of the social status
(statics/stasis) coin. To visually cue the notion that it is in
interests and concerns that the real 'freedom' of movement
is realized, I shall use the graphic short-hand of a triangle
on a wide base to indicate generic social space of this type
of construction (Figure 2.2.11.)
social dynamics
63. MAC QUARRIE, 1972, p.77.
Figure 2.2.11
The generic social space constructed by a dimension of social
dynamics and one of social status ('status' here is used to denote
outward signs or expressions of power, position, condition, etc.)
The space becomes activated on addition of a linear dimension
of time
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64. GASPARSKI, W. "On the
General Theory (Praxiology) of
Design", Department of
Praxiology, Polish Academy of
Sciences, 1985?
+
It may be possible to generalize that certain types of
symbolic structure are typical of the phases of conserva-
tive, cosmetic and radical change in an organization such
as a museum - one may expect that the demands made
upon participants in design in these different change
contexts will be such as to favour certain individuals and
particular groupings (heterogeneous and/or homogenous in
character). These individuals/groupings will, by definition,
exhibit specific combinations of interests and concerns
which may be mapped in various socio-culturall-technical/
-economic subspaces of the social space. In Gasparski's
terms, the requirements for 'prophylactic', 'therapeutic',
and 'innovational' design approaches to complex socio-
technical systems may be predictable to some degree.'
Whether or not this is the case for a 'system' such as a
museum remains to be seen. I would argue that cultural
and economic content is inherent and inextricable in the
large-scale socio-technical system, that museums collec-
tively embody socio-technical as much as socio-economic
and socio-cultural processes, and therefore that equations
of process and structure are as likely to be found in
museums as they are in any other 'complex' socio-cultural/-
economickechnical system.
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2.3 Documentary Space
Physics and Physiology
1. The retina ... is a specialized
part of the surface of the brain ...
it retains typical brain cells lying
between the receptors and the
optic nerve ... Some of the data
processing for perception takes
place in the eye which is thus an
integral part of the brain.
GREGORY, Richard L. Eye and
Brain. Weidenfeld and Nicolson,
1966. p.45-6.
... eyes require intelligence to
identify and locate objects in
space, but intelligent brains
could hardly have developed
without eyes.
GREGORY, Richard L. The
Intelligent Eye. Weidenfeld and
Nicolson, 1970. p.13.
The physical quality of the written word and of the
drawing is identical: it is material inscription, a mark on
paper, a substantial object which, as icon, is the analogue
of an image. It is able to reflect light in such a way as to
cause a pattern of variations in light intensity to be
focussed on the retina. The image so created always
remains in a simple relation to the original: it may
undergo only a limited number of types of two-dimen-
sional distortion - trapezoidal (e.g. perspective),
elastic/stretching, magnifying, and reflection (e.g. via a
mirror). To maintain readability, visual accessibility of
information content, these distortions and their combina-
tion may not be extreme.
The eye is intelligent, part of the being, part of the
brain.' In physical terms, the visual process is continuous
with cognitive, neurological and physiological processes in
general. A seamless organic whole of such complexity is,
and probably will remain, beyond the scope of an atomistic
analytical understanding. Therefore one cannot elaborate
profitably an organismic space of the document, a physical
space of energetics that encompasses reader and read in a
single physio-logical (natural and rational) system. Such a
space appears to be closed to perception, a 'black box', a
'Chinese room', an impenetrable realm of indeterminate
internal structure and dimensionality that operates in the
unfathomable interstices between phenomena.
What one may understand of the physics of the
seeing/hearing - thinking/remembering - writing/drawing
process is of no immediate practical use: it does not help
one to see/hear - think/remember - write/draw any differ-
ently or any better.
2. POTTER, Norman. Models
and Constructs: Margin Notes to
a Design Culture. Hyphen Press,
1990.
3. BRYSON, Norman., Michael
Aim Holly & Keith Moxey (eds.)
Visual Theory. Polity Press,
1991. p.246?
4. BIJKER, Weibe E., Thomas
P. Hughes & Trevor Pinch. The
Social Construction of
Technological Systems. MIT
Press, 1987.
5. BRYSON, 1991. p.246-7.
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Subjunctive Constructs
Certain of the products of the design process are referred to
by Potter as 'design constructs'. 2 When considering the space
in which they are situated, we must make a careful distinc-
tion between the putative three-dimensionality of the
designed object, which 'exists' in the physical space of its
practical use - the Breuer Chair in the executive lounge - and
the subjunctive space in which the object of design as
metaphor may stand in for any of a wide range of possible
relations in the world. "A subjunctive space is a qualified
region within which certain rules hold - the space, say, of play
or ritual"! The design construct is not being put to 'end use':
the chair is used to sit on, the chair design to allow the chair
to be created. Rather it plays a part in a specific ritualized
process - industrial production - which has been characterized
as the realm of 'socially constructed technological systems'.4
In such systems social space meets geography and 'physics'
head on: we enter a world defined multidimensionally.
In this sense the space of the museum collection is a
model for the space of the design construct. This is the
subjunctive space in which one Roman vase may stand in
for many, in which the variety of relations between collec-
tion items stands in for the world as a whole. What is
more, physical spatial relations in the museum exhibition
may stand in for a variety of types of space in the world at
large - taxonomic, social, cultural, economic, temporal, etc.
'Subjunctive space' is the space in which real things may be
substituted for the absent. It is the space of 'real metaphor':
Where the hobbyhorse stands in for the horse, the reproduction
for the artefact and "Substitutes are effective in the space in
which they are put because they are only 'real' in that space"... In
most of the traditions of world art (only Western modernism
seems to offer an alternative) images have served to correct the
'defect of distance' ... to transform the present in such a way as to
make the absent present.5
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Whereas in this 'traditional' formulation what is absent is
in the past - either something or someone is lost in the
past or is known to be physically at a distance and,
therefore, to have been experienced in another place/time -
in the current context, that of design, what is absent is
that which may come to be. The design is a thing/message/
place/system which is projected into an as yet undecided
future. In this, the notion of physical distance is rendered
ambiguous and the experience of a substitution rendered
only in a virtual sense. This is the simulation of substitu-
tion, the creation of virtual subjunctive space, the space of
the design as a proposition. This refers, therefore, to the
products of the design process, to design documents,
drawings and models, to design constructs.
In the subjunctive space of traditional art, the space
of 'real' metaphor, what is enfolded in the act of substitu-
tion, the process of replacement, is that distant, past thing
that is absent, that is, the object of our nostalgic desires.
In illusionistic art we imagine, visualize and invoke the
absent thing, that which used to be. In the equivalent
virtual subjunctive space of the design construct in
contrast, though it may also have an artistic 'mortal'
content, what is enfolded is that imagined future thing
which is virtually present, that deferred presence which
creates the possibility of meaning in the material of the
world. In the design construct we imagine, visualize and
invoke the possible, the thing which has yet to be.
Semiosis: Substitution, Simulation, Simulacrum
When one talks of a `semiosis' in relation to the design
construct one has to qualify what is meant by terms such
as 'substitution', 'simulation', and the 'simulacrum'.
6. BAUDRILLARD, Jean.
"Simulacra and Simulations", in
Selected Writings, introduced
and edited by Mark POSTER
Polity Press, 1988. p.166.
7. ibid. p.171.
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In the documentary space of the design construct the
substitution is for a thing virtually present as a negotiable
project and therefore not yet present. The substitution is
for a mere possibility, not for an absent actuality.
We tend to think of 'simulation', as conceived by
Baudrillard, as a realized model that stands in for the real,
as one reality, a hyperreality, standing in for another, a lost
actuality. "It is the generation by models of a real without
origin or reality: a hyperreal". 8 This lost actuality is the
'home' for which the term 'nostalgia' implies we long. "When
the real is no longer what it used to be, nostalgia assumes
its full meaning".7 Simulation implies not merely substitu-
tion, that one thing may stand in for another thing, but an
identification, at an emotional level, at the level of the self,
with a world known or imagined as a place to which we
ideally belong. In the design construct nostalgia is itself a
simulation. It is not an ideal world for which we long but
rather a metaphysical reality, the hyperreality of the
cultural. In the documentary space the designer does not
engage a semioses of physical form, of the monumental or of
the ephemeral for that matter, the artist does. In documen-
tary space the art object may be an object of linguistic and
visual speculation, but it is primarily a physical object.
Rather, the designer engages a semiosis of the metaphysical
form, the imaginal which is at one remove from the physical
and, therefore, only an object of linguistic and visual specu-
lation. The physicality of the documentary form in design
gives rise to a trivial semiotics in comparison to that of its
content. In the design process it is the design that matters
not the design drawing as a work of art. The design is first a
mental construct, a perceptual and cognitive construct,
rather than a physical, a material and sensual one.
The simulacrum, as image, representation and
semblance is the object of this latter notion of design as a
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mental construct, a perceptual and cognitive construct.
What is created in the simulacrum is pure image which may
embody the fulfilment of wishes and dreams, phantasy and
desire, rather more certainly than it may the quality of the
absent (or present) material of the world. The simulacrum is
not merely a substitution it transcends substitution,
becomes a parallel reality literally 'in the image of' that
which we desire. Neither is the simulacrum concerned with
simulation in the primary sense of realizing a virtual object
that is constructed in the spatiality of an 'original' object. It
maintains its own spatiality, proclaims its separate identity
and holds forth the possibility of an equality of status in the
material culture. Where the substitution is a taking-the-
place-of the absent, its `dis-placement', and the simulation is
its reproduction, its 're-placement', the simulacrum is the
doubling of the place of the object (present or absent), its 're-
presentation':
an operation to deter every real process by its operational double,
a metastable, programmatic, perfect descriptive machine which
provides all the signs of the real and short-circuits all its vicissi -
tudes.8
8. ibid. p.167.
The simulacra of design are the products of the design
process, the documents, drawings and records that consti-
tute the design as a projected reality. They re-present what
is cognitively projected in the design process by making it
visible. They construct their own spatiality - a documentary
spatiality - and proclaim their identity in the material
culture. Documentary space is subjunctive to the physical
space of the designed object but also to the social/psycho-
social space of the design programme. The content of the
documentary space is only 'real' in that space: to call it a
'substitution' for or a 'simulation' of another reality is, as we
have seen, only possible in carefully qualified senses.
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9. ECO, Umberto. A Theory of
Semiotics. Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1979.
Eco starts with the Peircian
notion of semiosis:
'By semiosis I mean an action,
an influence, which is, or
involves, a cooperation of three
subjects, such as a sign, its object
and its interpretant, this tri-rela -
live influence not being in any
way resolvable into actions
between pairs." [PEIRCE, C S.
Collected Papers. Harvard
University Press, 1931-58. vol 6,
p.484. quoted on p.16.]
The connectedness of everything
within the system of signs which
semiosis as action entails is
made clear in a later explana-
tion of the term "interpretant'
(Peirce was apparently inconsis-
tent in its use):
The interpretant is not the inter -
preter... The interpretant is that
which guarantees the validity of
the sign, even in the absence of
the interpreter.., in order to
establish what the interpretant of
a sign is, it is necessary to name
it by means of another sign
which in turn has another inter -
pretant to be named by another
sign and so on. At this point
there begins a process of unlimit -
ed semiosis ...[p.68.]
10. All media of representation
can rely on isomorphic and on
non-isomorphic references. They
are partly analogues, partly
signs. In principle, this is no dif -
Terence in this respect between
verbal and non-verbal lan -
guages.
ARNHEIM, Rudolf. Visual
Thinking. Faber & Faber, 1969.
p.251.
11. LEFEBVRE, Henri. [1974]
The Production of Space. Trans.
Donald Nicholson-Smith. Basil
Blackwell, 1991. pp.27-30.
Semiosis: Content and Form
The social or psychosocial space of language may
encompass the verbal and the imaginal. A visual language
of signs and symbols, howsoever formed, is developed and
operates within some framework of a grammar, a syntax, a
semantics, a vocabulary, that is, it entails a semiosis. 9 The
construct of abstract graphic elements (point, line, square,
circle, triangle, etc.), that of alphabetic, numeric or picto-
graphic characters, the diagrammatic analogue (pie chart,
graph, histogram, bubble diagram, etc.), the iconography,
and the systems of impressionistic, expressionistic and
naturalistic pictorial representation all construct/present a
range of 'documentary' forms that is continuous with the
linguistic/communicative possibilities of material culture,
ritual, gesture and speech.'
The dimensions that these documentary forms may
have in common is of interest here. In design one can see
the issue clearly. The products of the design process,
including documentary evidence of the design programme
and design ideology, are diverse in physical form -
computer disks, technical drawings, manuscript and
printed texts, 3-dimensional (and virtual) models. What
they have in common is their relation to the object of
design. This connection is cognitive and perceptual in that
the relation between the document and the object of design
may vary in cognitive style and in perceptual compass.
This suggests that in the documentary space of design
one constructs the interface between a naturalist simplic-
ity, a belief in the 'substantial reality' of the elements of
signification and evocation, an argument about documen-
tary form, and an 'idealist transparency', a belief that
what is present to the mind is indeed present, an
argument about documentary content.' Therefore, as a
1	
C
a)
P
V
a)
To
V
g
V
a)
E
8
80.
97
minimum, the dimensions of documentary space should
allow a mapping of form and content (Figure 2.3.1.)
content
form
Figure 2.3.1
Documentary space constructed by a generic dimension of form
and one of content.
In each dimension this mapping may either involve a
'taxonomy', a differentiated range of possibilities, or a
'measure', a scale, a differentiable continuum of values.
In the case of documentary form, an approach
concerned with the 'measure' of forms seems inappropri-
ate: it suggests a value system of marginal interest -
literally, the size or scale of the documentary form - how
many pages in a report, the area of drawings in a
technical package, the amount of ink/pencil used, etc.! A
taxonomy, on the other hand, can differentiate between
the products of different kinds of skilled/communicative
activity in the design context, i.e. the various types of
written, drawn, three-dimensionally modelled, and
electronically and audiovisually recorded products of the
design process (Figure 2.3.2.)
Figure 2.3.2
Differentiated range of possible generic outputs of skilled/
communicative activity.
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12. 'Acquired' is used here in the
ergonomic sense of 'what may be
located and attended to in a sin-
gle act of perception.'
There are no watertight comport -
ments of detection, recognition
and identification, but rather a
continuum.
[OVERINGTON, Ian. Vision and
Acquisition, Pentech Press,
1976, p.2.]
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In the case of documentary content, either approach
seems possible. One might construct a taxonomy of content
by making reference to broad categories of information in a
design project, i.e. the conceptual, the programmatic, the
contextual, the ideological and the contractual (Figure 2.3.3.)
Figure 2.3.3
Differentiated range of possible generic information categories.
Equally one might construct a measure of the scope of the
documentary content in relation to the maximum and
minimum that may be 'acquired' in a given practical
situation:2 At one extreme a document may refer to the
design holistically and therefore have a global scope, and
at the other extreme to the most specific aspect or the
smallest detail that remains relevant, and therefore have a
local scope (Figure 2.3.4.)
detail	 global
Figure 2.3.4
Differentiable scale of possible scopes of documentary content.
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2.4 Paradigmatic Space: ideology and philosophy
Design Theory and Theory in Design
As a design researcher the author takes on the role of
theorist. This is a very different kind of statement to that
which the designer as a reflective practitioner might
make: as an agent of change the designer takes on the role
of auteur.
In the former statement the implications are that some
systematic study of or through design is involved with the
intention of knowledge creation, that writing is an
important productive activity and therefore that the possi-
bilities and limitations of language are of central concern,
and perhaps that one literary genre or another is to be
mastered, that in creating and forwarding knowledge the
work must deal with epistemological issues and that this
ultimately entails a philosophical position.
In the latter statement the immediate implications are
rather different: that some preparation for the productive
actions of others is involved with the intention of changing
a practical situation, that the subject is associated with a
particular class of practitioners whose skills, knowledge,
experience and standards of conduct conventionally match
certain expectations in relation to a type of practical
situation, that a central, nodal, in some sense, 'crucial'
creative and communicative role is being claimed that
involves the production of realizable plans.
In the case of the researcher, theory is ultimately made
explicit. In the case of the designer, theory tends to remain
implicit. These conclusions may appear straightforward:
their significance, however, is pivotal. The designer qua
designer is not primarily involved with the language of
sovereign rationality, the language of theoretical exposi-
1. FOUCAULT, Michel. [1966]
The Order of Things: An
Archaeology of the Human
Sciences. Tavistock, 1970.
FOUCAULT, Michel. [1969] The
Archaeology of Knowledge Trans.
A M Sheridan Smith. Tavistock,
1972.
KUHN, Thomas S. The
Structure of Scientific
Revolutions. 2nd Ed. (enlarged)
University of Chicago Press,
1970.
POPPER, Karl R. [1963]
Conjectures and Refutations: The
Growth of Scientific Knowledge.
Fifth edn. Routledge, 1989.
2. FEYERABEND, Paul.
[1976] Against Method. Revised
Ed. London: Verso, 1988. p.266.
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tion, with a philosophical language. The language of which
the designer makes most powerful use is an everyday
language in the sense of exploiting the common narrative
properties of the news story, biography, history, and
fiction, the language of engaged experience, with an
ideological language. What must be remembered, however,
is that this linguistic performance is not in itself the most
important aspect of the designer's communicative practice:
it is merely the necessary supplement to a larger realm of
visual communication and material culture.
Feyerabend's argument concerning the historical
separability of the way a 'scientific' result is arrived at,
which is "idiosyncratic and culture dependent", from the
result itself, which reflects an actuality that exists, always
did exist and always will exist, he calls the 'separability
assumption'. Given that our methods of arriving at scien-
tific results are not infallible, as evidenced by the constant
improvement, revision and substitution of older findings
by new ones, we constantly layer more reasonable beliefs
over those that are less so. This idea, that only "entities
postulated by reasonable beliefs can be separated from
their history" he calls the 'modified separability assump-
tion'. However, what it is 'reasonable' to believe clearly
changes. Given the various accounts of the pattern of
scientific development/change,' it seems reasonable to
assume that what seems reasonable in 1996 will not so
seem in 2996. Feyerabend's conclusion is that:
Scientific entities (and for that matter, all entities) are projec -
tions and thus tied to the theory, the ideology, the culture that
postulates and projects them.'
In effect he is arguing that 'theory' is not independent of
its history either, that in any articulated position there is
an ideological dimension that is culturally embedded. The
3. LAWSON,	 Hilary.
Reflexivity: The Post-modern
Predicament.	 London:
Hutchinson, 1985.
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consequences of this 'reasonable' proposition are, of
course, paradoxical and infinitely regressive if treated
reflexively.' However, at 'face value' the implications for
the modelling of museum-design-organization (or any other
formulation of Praxis for that matter) are that the social
space (how-so-ever delineated) and the paradigmatic space
may only be visualized as actively enfolded in each other.
Reflexivity then simply implies a looping succession of
enfoldings that progressively spiral the existent away from
a simply mediated sense of 'Being' towards the distantly
and multiply mediated ideas, possessions, memories,
values, etc. of synthetic or inauthentic experience.
Social and cultural activity
which is underpinned by contingent values and beliefs
is itself dependent upon
social and cultural activity
which is underpinned by contingent values and beliefs
that are dependent upon
social and cultural activity
which ...
Accepting the possibility of articulating successive layers
of discourse upon discourse, a theory of ideologies in
design philosophy would constitute an 'opening up' of the
ideological space embedded in the ideological space of
design. Be that as it may, what concerns us more immedi-
ately, in developing a model of museum design organiza-
tion, is the possibility of a study that visualizes the
radically different spaces of 'design' that may be enfolded
in each other to generate not only first and second level
(descriptive and discursive) accounts of design philosophy
(design ideology) but also of mediated (second level)
accounts of the designed object, design programme (the
object of design), and design process.
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Ideology
4. Strictly speaking, for
Althusser, theoretical knowledge
is the only kind there is. See:
EAGLETON, Terry. Ideology: an
introduction. Verso, 1991, p.21.
In his introduction to ideology, Terry Eagleton points up
some crucial questions about the nature of grounded action
and of affective beliefs. Although, as he shows early in his
discussion, there is no definition of 'ideology' to which all
others may be reduced, the various notions of ideology
nevertheless share certain attributes. With respect to the
ontological and epistemological views of Althusser, for
instance, there is no question that ideology is based on
some kind of knowledge. What is ironic is that this
knowledge is pragmatic, that is, subjective and experien-
tial, rather than primarily cognitive and ideal.' So far as
questions of truth or falsity are concerned the basis of this
knowledge is an ontological one. Certain events, condi-
tions, objects are 'real', that is, they have an `ontic' truth
which is realized in the subject's experience. To say that
theory underpins every action, including every speech act,
is therefore not strictly speaking a question of ideology.
The implied rationality, or practical reason, of theory may
be missing from the ideological stance. This insight then is
of central interest in areas of human activity in which the
subject pushes beyond the limits of practical rationality.
The creative practitioner, in the present context specifi-
cally the designer, is engaged in practical situations in
which the absence of adequate information precludes
strictly analytical approaches to decision making and
problem solving. An epistemological complexity precludes
coherent practical reasoning in that the subject must act to
change situations that are characterized by incompatible
interests, understandings and qualities, and, even if these
two factors could be overcome (which in the design context,
by definition, they cannot), the shortage of time and/or the
impossibility of comprehensive instrumental means forces
5. CZARNIAWSKA-
JOERGES, B. "Narration or
Science? Collapsing the Division
in Organization Studies",
Organization, 2:1, Sage, 1996,
pp.11-33.
Czarniawska-Joerges has sum-
marized the case for researchers
to adopt narrative forms in
transmitting knowledge by argu-
ing that, in the humanities and
the social sciences in particular,
an adequate legitimizing move
has already been made. The evi-
dence for this includes:
LYOTARD, Jean-Francois.
[1979] The Postmodern
Condition: A Report on
Knowledge. Trans. Geoff
Bennington & Brian Massumi.
Manchester University Press,
1984.
and the development of interpre-
tive approaches in the work of:
Jerome BRUNER (cognitive psy-
chology); Donald McCLOSKEY
(economics ); Clifford GEERTZ
(anthropology); and Richard H
BROWN, Bruno LATOUR,
Michael MULKAY, and Sharon
TRAVEEK (sociology).
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the subject to act and to intervene without the comfort of a
calculable probability of success and in the 'knowledge'
that the actions/interventions undertaken will constitute a
test of the subject's claim to be a designer. It is often said
that 'a designer is only as good as his or her last job'.
Where cognitively based knowledge is the prime
characteristic of a principled stance one may argue that
'theory', of an essentially epistemological (philosophical)
kind, is the product. Whether or not the subject makes
explicit all or any of this philosophy in practice (in praxis)
is not the central point. What is the point is that the
working out of a coherent theoretical position is not
'implied' in those kinds of practice that deal with radical
indeterminacy and radical complexity. Neither is 'theoreti-
cal' underpinning ruled out: it is merely made contingent,
that is, it becomes able to make only weak claims to truth.
One may say then that when the creative practitioner, the
designer, speaks what comes out may be 'philosophical' but
must be 'ideological'.
Irony and space
Such statements as designers make may be characterised
as (1) making ontological propositions, both through the
design itself in the form of drawings, models, specifica-
tions, etc., which are presented together to communicate
the realizability of a 'product', and through forms of speech
which seek to make coherent, reinforce and add 'invisible'
dimensions of psycho-social and physical actuality to the
design, and (2) representing a 'world view', an embodied
set of values and beliefs about the nature of physical,
social and mental 'reality'. The ironic quality of such world
views is that they invariably take a narrative form.' The
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narrative form of design presentation, of the design
programme, of designers' discourse in general, is 'ironic' in
the sense that the values and beliefs embedded in what is
said may often be contrary to those implicit in the norma-
tivity of the narrative transmission of knowledge.
Therefore one must be clear about the source of this ironic
potential: it is spatial.
In design the ideological/philosophical space of values
and beliefs, however it is constructed or visualized, may be
deferred, distorted and distanced and thereby enfolded
into other quite distinctive and incommensurable spaces.
The design product, as a physical entity, has extension in
the dimensions of physical space and in time. In the space-
time continuum its changing position, relative to other
objects and to the observer, is its `ontic' track - the
actuality of the product. The design programme, as an
heterogeneous body of documentary information, a mass of
verbal, visual and material 'texts', a complex of 'signs' in
the semiological sense, has both semantic and symbolic
scope in a generic space of language. In this semiotic space
the processes of signification and interpretation to which
the 'document' is subjected constitute the ontological trace
of the design. The design process, as a nexus of cognitive,
practical and communicative activities, occupies a complex
psycho-social space in which states of consciousness,
affective behaviours, and social and material relations
combine to construct a socially mediated view of design. In
this psycho-social space complex patterns of interactivity
constitute the design.
In the case of a documentary design product, such as a
set of technical drawings and written specifications, the
form and the content are physical and linguistic respec-
tively, that is, they are logically unconnected. The space-
time continuum in which the physical object is constructed
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and the semiotic or narrative space in which the
'document' is constructed are incommensurable: they have
no common dimensionality in which commensuration could
be effected. This lack of logical connection is what permits
irony - stable contradiction where we might reasonably
expect coherent relation. Contradiction, however, implies
speech and a range of opposing terms within a coherent
language. This possibility of uncovering the irony is
created in the process of reflecting on features and events
in each of the other characteristic spaces of design in a
common space of values and beliefs, of philosophy. A
symmetrical relation thus emerges between the ideological
and the philosophical. Theorising, an overtly epistemologi-
cal and philosophical activity, engages in a process of
abstracting the general from the particular, rules about
what counts as knowledge from the myriad specific cases
that are known. This is the process of deferring, distorting
and distancing particular physical, social, or mental
instances and of assimilating such qualities as emerge
from them in a single 'place' within the reflective space of
philosophy. This describes the effect of 'enfolding' one
space in another. In theoretical work a variety of physical,
social, mental and more exotic spaces are enfolded in philo-
sophical space. In design the effect is reversed: any partic-
ular set of values and beliefs are deferred, distorted and
distanced in the process of constructing the products,
programme and process of a design. In physical space the
track of the designed object is likely to make concrete
different values and beliefs, than those that are embedded
in the narrative, the semiotic trace, of a design document.
And the values and beliefs implicit in a design process are
likely to be different again as the dynamics of social inter-
activity, with all of the implications this has for emotional,
practical, and rational effects on behaviour, construct the
6. HASSARD, John. Sociology
and Organization Theory.
Cambridge University Press,
1993. p.49.
7. PARSONS, T. The Social
System, Chicago: Free Press,
1951. and "An Outline of the
Social System", in PARSONS, T.
Theories of Society, New York:
Free Press, 1965.
BUCKLEY, W. "Social
Stratification and the Functional
Theory of Differentiation",
American Sociological Review,
23: pp.369-75.
COHEN, P. Modern Social
Theory. Heinemann, 1968.
GOULDNER, A W. 'Reciprocity
and Autonomy in Functional
Theory", in GROSS, L. (Ed.)
Symposium on Social Theory,
New York: Row Peterson, 1959.
ALLEN, V L. Social Analysis: a
Marxist	 Critique	 and
Alternative. Longmans, 1975.
8. HASSARD, 1993. p.50.
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cultural and political connotations of each specific act. The
space of ideology, therefore, is enfolded in the physical,
social and mental spaces in which design is constructed.
The proposition is that an active space of values and
beliefs, one in which work is being done, can be labelled
the space of philosophy. But an enfolded space of values
and beliefs, one which is thus inactive, can be labelled the
space of ideology. The difference between the two spatial
conditions 'active' and 'inactive' is one which can be
accounted for by the constant dimension required for the
activation of space: linear time.
Mapping ideology/philosophy
A number of different schemes for mapping the space of
ideology/philosophy have been proposed in recent times by
social and organization theorists. Each of these schemes
has attempted to identify a set of paradigms, each
paradigm amounting to an exclusive realm of methodology,
a realm of applied values and beliefs incommensurable
with all others. Wearing distinctly pluralist shades
Hassard summarizes these
...attempts to define the theory communities of social and organi -
zation theory as paradigm structures. 6
The development of paradigm models was stimulated by
the criticism of 'orthodox' functionalism particularly in the
work of Parsons, Buckley, Cohen, Gouldner and Allen.'
The main substantive criticism is that, in emphasizing equilib -
rium, integration and interdependence, functionalism fails to
take account of two basic elements of social action - change and
conflict.8
Parsons argues that 'change' is the dynamics of response to
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10. ibid.
11. ibid.
12. ibid. p.52.
13. ibid.
14. ibid. pp.52-3.
15. ibid. p.53.
16. ibid. p.54.
17. HASSARD attributes this
to ALLEN, 1975.
external and internal factors - "movements in the central
value system" of the system's environment and "tensions
or strains in the system itself" respectively.' Parsons
therefore modifies the older 'static' notion of equilibrium
into a 'dynamic' one, but equilibrium remains the goal. He
does not account for the idea that "change may be driven
by conflict and contradiction rather than by the incorpora-
tion of expressions of dissent". 1°He does not tell us
why particular organizations, directed as they are towards
certain goals, arise at particular times and in particular
places.11
or why "deviant organizations emerge and develop" . 12 And
in his structural functionalism there is a failure to realize
that "organizations can survive and even flourish without
a common value-orientation among their members". 13
 The
inevitability of stratification and the emphasis on "harmo-
nious relations between system parts" have also been criti-
cized by Buckley and Cohen as ignoring the operation of
privilege and equal importance of "the superordinate and
subordinate" in complex productive systems!'
The criticism of generic social systems theory continu-
ous with that of functionalism extends the theme. Gouldner
not only highlights variations in degrees of interdependence
[between subsystems], but also the fact that some ... can survive
even if separated from others.'
Autonomy thus becomes a live issue as does the process of
generating and reproducing an organization's goal!' And
one conclusion of this line of thought is that neither an
organization's goals nor its boundaries may be taken as
given - that the generic systems approach fails to recognize
that "there is no logic in [the] ... arbitrary division" of
problem areas into independent systems.'
18. Jacksorun and Carter have
suggested that arguably the
Kuhnian 'normal' and 'revolu-
tionary' sciences are both func-
tional. I am not sure that this is
the case, rather, I suggest that
there is a kind of paramnesis
involved in the Kuhnian scheme:
in the new paradigm a substi-
tute for the old is invented, one
which gives the passing comfort
of apparent continuity as well as
an apparent confirmation of the
superiority of the new, but, the
original remains unrecovered: in
the terms of the new paradigm it
remains unrecoverable.
See: JACKSON, N. & P.
CARTER "In Defence of
Paradigm Incommensurability",
School of Management Working
Paper HUSM/PC/2, University
of Hull.
19. See Appendix A.1 Type A.
20. GOULDNER, A W. The
Coming Crisis of Western
Sociology. Heinemann, 1970.
(See: HASSARD, 1993, p.57.)
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Implicit in these criticisms of functionalism and generic
social systems theory is the possibility of alternative models
and methodologies that approach the whole problem of
social organization from radically different perspectives.
Kuhn has suggested that science does not 'progress' as
such but rather it suffers periodic intellectual upheavals in
which one conceptual world view is replaced by another -
the so-called 'paradigm shift'. The mapping of conceptual
world views in terms of an abstract paradigmatic space is
therefore something those social/organization theorists
taking up Kuhn's idea have had to address.
Paradigm Models
Implicit in the notion of 'paradigm' is that the upheaval
overturns and replaces a prior world view, that the
outgoing and incoming world views are, at root, different
in kind and in construction and that the new cannot be
reduced to the old by any means - narrative or analytic.'
Radical incommensurability immediately gives a clue as to
the expected character of a paradigmatic space of
ideology/philosophy: every dimension constructive of
paradigmatic space must present a limited and differenti-
ated range of possibilities.' Any other type of dimension
will not add any defining possibility of paradigms, it will
simply add depth to existing paradigmatic regions.
Gouldner, like most other contemporaries, focussed on
methodologies.' As a defining dimension, however, the
problem is that, although differentiated, the range of possi-
bilities is not limited and some possibilities may be divided
or merged almost at will. Although 'methodology' implies a
theoretical base, the difference between one practice and
another may be in its preferences as to technique,
21. ATKINSON, D. Orthodox
Consensus and Radical
Alternative. Heinemann, 1972.
(See: HASSARD, 1993, p.67.)
22. FRIEDRICHS, R. A
Sociology of Sociology. New
York: Free Press, 1970. (See:
HASSARD, 1993, pp.57-8.)
23. HASSARD, 1993, p.68
24. ibid.
25. DENISOFF, R. et al
Theories and Paradigms in
Contemporary Sociology. New
York: Peacock, 1974. (See: HAS-
SARD, 1993, p.69.)
26. HASSARD. 1993. D.59
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procedure, or exposition rather than in their underlying
conceptual world view.
Atkinson suggested 'micro' and 'macro' approaches to
sociology as a defining dimension?' Unfortunately this
leads to a false dichotomy particularly in modernism
where the tensions between the individual and the collec-
tive, the private and the communal, generate its defining
dialectic character - the 'movement'. Modernism is not the
conflict of paradigms, rather it is the paradigm of conflict
and as such it holds a specific if rather special place in any
metaphysical scheme.
Friedrichs attempted a more adequate Kuhnian model
in terms of producing a differentiated space.' He used two
orders of two paradigms each.
First-order paradigms referred to the images sociologists held of
themselves ... Second-order paradigms concerned the image they
held of the subject matter.°
In first-order paradigms an opposed pair (or mutually
opposed set) of defining characters is posited. To describe
pre- and post-World War II sociologists he defined two
paradigms: sociologist-as-priest "...committed to value-free
analysis of social phenomena" and sociologist-as-prophet
"...social critic and agent of social change"?' The problem
with Friedrichs' scheme is that it only works as a continu-
ous unfolding of second-order paradigms from within those
of the first order. As it becomes clear that any scheme of
'orders' implies the possibility of commensuration, at least
in the limited sense of a differentiation within, this is a
structural fault that leads to the breakdown or corruption
of the paradigm concept.
Denisoff et al 25 suggested
five main paradigm rivals in sociology ...functionalism, conflict
theory, micro-sociology, nominalism-voluntarism and social
evolutionism.26
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27. EFFRAT, A. "Power to the
Paradigms" in EFFRAT, A. (ed.)
Perspectives in Political
Sociology. New York: Bobbs-
Merrill, 1973. (See: HASSARD,
1993, pp.69-60.)
28. BURRELL, Gibson. &
Gareth MORGAN. Sociological
Paradigms and Organisational
Analysis. Heinemann
Educational Books, 1979. The
purpose in this book is broader
than the title suggests. It pro-
vides a "way of seeing" the philo-
sophical space associated with
the various social theories and
practices. And although I am not
suggesting that "social
theory/practice" is necessarily an
adequate way of referring to
design, there is certainly a large
overlap and it seems reasonable
to start with a view that at least
promises to connect design with
other theories and practices.
29. PINDER, C. & V BOUR-
GEOIS. "Borrowing and the
Effectiveness of Administrative
Science". Working paper No.
848, University of British
Columbia, 1982. quoted in HAS-
SARD, 1993, pp.68.
30. At least one of the criti-
cisms levelled at Burrell and
Morgan is misrepresented by
Hassard.
Silverman's work on the action
frame of reference could be better
located within the interpretive
paradigm, despite the arguments
Burrell and Morgan make for the
metatheoretical assumptions
being characteristic of the subjec -
tivist region of the functionalist
paradigm. [p.68. my emphasis]
In Burrell and Morgan's scheme
Whilst unequivocal this scheme is reached via the 'trick' of
re(de)fining the notion of paradigm in such a way as to
upset its holistic character. As a "belief matrix" it becomes
synthetic and, therefore, by implication composed of
"paradigmatic assumptions" of a prior order: we return to
the problem of Friedrichs' scheme.
Ultimately, if the problem of 'orders' is to be circum-
vented, an approach must be taken that plots 'philosophi-
cal' indices that are constitutive of a possibility and that
resist further reduction. Even Effrat's resort to the two-
dimensional, based on level of analysis (micro-macro) and
substantive-component-emphasized (material, affective,
interactional, and ideal/symbolic), breaks down at the
point at which defined paradigmatic regions are seen to
overlap and to be inexhaustive.'
The best attempt, that starts from what I would call a
notion of 'irreducible philosophical indices', appears to be
that of Burrell and Morgan.' Although criticized for
misappropriating the philosophical question of ontology by
taking it to imply beliefs about the nature of the existence
of an external social world rather than "the study of
existence in general, independent of any particular
existing things"," Burrell and Morgan define a clear-cut
scheme based on independent pairs of indices in which the
value of paradigm as location is maximized.'
The Burrell and Morgan scheme is a two-dimensional
`map' of sociological paradigms. Each dimension derives
from a set of metatheoretical assumptions. The first, the
subjectivism-objectivism dimension, concerns assumptions
about the nature of social science (Figure 2.4.1), the
second, the regulation-radical change dimension, concerns
assumptions about the nature of society (Figure 2.4.2.)
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the functionalist paradigm is
defined by an objectivist stance
in the subjectivism-objectivism
dimension. Although in their
analysis Silverman's work, and
the use of the action frame of
reference in general, may
address questions of the subjec-
tive they do so in a way that
seeks objective knowledge about
such things. The belief underly-
ing the approach is that subjec-
tive orientations exist and can
be studied, described, explained
by an objective researcher.
Burrell and Morgan actually
place Silverman and the action
frame of reference at the "subjec-
tive boundary of the paradigm"
[p.122.] for the above reasons.
The position of the Hermeneutic
tradition at the objective bound-
ary of the interpretive paradigm
and that of the action frame of
reference at the subjective
boundary of the functionalist
paradigm does not in any way
conflate the two perspectives:
they remain subjectivist and
objectivist respectively and,
therefore, part of incommensu-
rable paradigms whose only
commonality is that of a regula-
tory orientation.
31. Notes
* By `consensus' we mean vol -
untary and `spontaneous' agree -
ment of opinion.
f The term `need satisfaction'
is used to refer to the focus upon
satisfaction of individual or sys -
tern needs. The sociology of regu -
lation tends W presume that var -
ious social characteristics can be
explained in relation to these
needs. ...
BURRELL & MORGAN, 1979,
p.18.
The SUBJECTIVIST	 The OBJECTIVIST
approach to social	 approach to social
science	 science
Nominalism	 ontology	 Realism
Anti-positivism -4-- epistemology	 Positivism
IVoluntarism -of-- human nature 	 Determinism
IIdeographic -4— methodology	 Nomothetic
Figure 2.4.1
"A scheme for analysing assumptions about the nature of social
science." From Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p.3.
The sociology of REGULATION
is concerned with
The sociology of RADICAL CHANGE
is concerned with
(a) The status quo (a) Radical change
(b) Social order (b) Structural conflict
(c) Consensus* (c) Modes of domination
(d) Social integration and cohesion (d) Contradiction
(0) Solidarity (e) Emancipation
(f) Need satisfactiont (f) Deprivation
(9) Actuality (g) Potentiality
Figure 2.4.2
Table showing the seven elements that construct "ideal-typical
formulations" of the notions of 'regulation' and 'radical change'.
From Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p.18. (*t Both of these ele-
ments have qualifying notes in the ori gilla1.31)
In so far as museum-design-organization is the object and
the arena of a praxis which is socially defined - it is
socially constructed, it forms a system which is in large
part social, it relates a particular experience to the social,
its motivation is visionary in respect of social change -
such a paradigmatic scheme applies directly. However,
there is the broader implication that any form of praxis
reveals its location in such a space simply by expressing its
underlying metatheoretical assumptions. Furthermore,
32. RORTY, Richard. [1982]
Consequences of Pragmatism.
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991.
p.idv-xv.
... "philosophy" can mean simply
what Sellars calls "an attempt
to see how things, in the broadest
possible sense of the term, hang
together, in the broadest possible
sense of the term"... But the word
can also denote something more
specialized, and very dubious
indeed ... it can mean following
Plato's and Irant's lead, asking
questions about the nature of cer -
tamn normative notions (e.g.,
"truth," "rationality," "goodness")
in the hope of better obeying such
norms. I shall capitalize the term
"philosophy" when used in this
second sense.
33. BURRELL & MORGAN,
1979. pp.1-37.
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there is the implication that any form of praxis that is
open to the variety of metatheoretical assumptions
constructs an identical paradigmatic space. In the museum
design organization context specific practices, such as
collection documentation and conservation, tend to follow a
conventional set of theoretical beliefs and, therefore, to
occupy relatively stable locations in paradigmatic space.
All museum practice used to be of this sort - a museogra-
phy bound into a classically functionalist paradigm - and
to develop largely on the basis of this received wisdom.
Received Wisdoms
Once upon a time it would have been relatively straightfor-
ward to frame a theoretical project of this sort by rational-
izing in the area of philosophical discourse by which the
discipline was contingently defined. This possibility has
been effectively eliminated by a combination of (1) the
development of post-philosophical discourses, (2) the
ambiguous nature of the design discipline, and (3) the late
development of design discourses and the new museology
which are both immediately conditioned by postmodern
thought. Most practices - design amongst them - shift their
theoretical ground depending upon the individual practi-
tioner, the specific organizational context, the influence of
the wider environment and/or on the dynamics of specific
projects and social interactions.
In the absence of any safe-haven "Philosophy" this
project thus becomes substantially philosophical.' This is
not to say that there is nothing to be learned by a study of
Philosophy: knowing where one is coining from is part of
knowing that one is going somewhere. So a map is useful
and, for the reasons outlined above, the one I have used is
that developed by Burrell and Morgan." (Figure 2.4.3.)
Anarchic individualism
Existentialism
Critical Theory
Social Ecology
Marxist Praxiology
Phenomenology
Hermeneutics
Ethnography
Social Construction Theory
F-
0
2
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Radical Humanism
	 RADICAL CHANGE Radical Structuralism
34. RORTY, Richard.
Contingency, Irony, and
Solidarity.	 Cambridge
University Press, 1989. In con-
sidering the contingency of lan-
guage Rorty suggests, in good
pragmatist form, that philoso-
phy should involve asking ques-
tions of the type:
'Does our use of these words get
in the way of our use of those
other words?" This is a question
about whether our use of tools is
inefficient, not a question about
whether our beliefs are contra-
dictory.
35. Thales of Miletus (alive in
585BC) is credited as "The first
Greek enquirer into the nature
of things as a whole." FLEW,
Antony. (Consultant ed.) A
Dictionary of Philosophy. Pan
Books, 1979. p.351. Although, in
the Theogony (written about
700BC) Hesiod prefigures
Thales efforts in one respect at
least, "the gods and the universe
were described by him as a mat-
ter of private interest." FRANK-
FORT, Henri. et al. Before
Philosophy. (First published as
The Intellectual Adventure of
Ancient Man. University of
Chicago, 1946.) Pelican, 1949.
pp.249-50.
Interpretive Theory	 REGULATION Functionalist Theory
Figure 2.4.3
BURRELL & MORGAN's map of sociological paradigms.
However, having found ones way around, a map becomes
essentially redundant unless one's purpose is, not simply
to explore Philosophy but, to build something - to do some
philosophy - then what one needs is a tool box.' Before
looking at the contents of the tool box I intend to use, it is
necessary first to comment on how a multiplication of
discourses reflects a postmodern condition in design, in
science and, in general, in knowledge.
A Plurality of Discourses
Since the earliest Greek philosophers, the philosophical
enterprise has concerned itself with determining the truth
of beliefs about the nature of the universe and of the world
of human affairs." This has generated the various
discourses of ethics, politics, metaphysics, epistemology,
ontology, and logic, and latterly of language itself. For each
discourse there is a [speech] context in which it makes
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some sense, and by implication, other [speech] contexts in
which it makes little sense. For example, we can use a
Newtonian understanding of physics to help us cope with
almost all everyday occurrences of material interactions.
The local human scale of observable phenomena - the ones
that we are able, or feel able, to mechanically interfere
with or control - all appear to coincide with the predictions
of Newtonian physics. However, phenomena related to the
subatomic and the near-light-speed, which are beyond our
powers of direct observation, fail to follow the predictions
of Newtonian mechanics. To help us to cope with these we
must use a different understanding - Einsteinian relativ-
ity. To any snooker player, who cares to study the matter,
Newton provides good explanation of how the balls will
react and Einstein, with his completely counter-intuitive
explanations, just confuses the issues. Equally, to any
astronomer Einstein provides good predictions for time-
space phenomena which Newton, with his mechanical view
of the universe, makes look impossible.
There are many forms of received wisdom. Just as
within Science there are distinct discourses that appear to
be at variance with, or operate on different levels to, each
other, in Philosophy also there is a multiplicity of contra-
dictory discourses that nevertheless help us to cope in
different ways and in different contexts. It is uncommon to
make use of more than a few such discourses which, in
Philosophy, are normally worked through to achieve, as far
as is possible, consistency and coherence. However, we are
all prone to making strong claims to truth for some
bundles of these discourses, and as we have seen, this can
be a big mistake. Not only can contradictory discourses be
equally effective in different contexts, but some (some
would say, ultimately all) discourses contain within them
irreducible contradictions or paradoxes that make their
36. RORTY, 1989, op cit.
37. LONGMAN DICTIONARY
OF THE ENGLISH LAN -
GUAGE, Longman, 1984.
p.1064. See: Paradox 2b.
38. LAWSON, Hilary.
Reflexivity: The Post-modern
Predicament. London:
Hutchinson, 1986. p.20.
39. RORTY, [1982] p.xxix.
115
use in any context ironic, contingent and most likely
collusive.' In the case of linguistic philosophy, which is at
the level of a discourse on discourses, the problem of
reflexivity - having to apply its own methods or rules of
investigation to itself - quickly results in a disintegration
of all universal foundations. Put most simply, statements
of the form "all generalizations are false" abound.' For
example:
Previous arguments asserting the context-dependent character of
our beliefs or our observations are no longer so threatening since
the theory of that context-dependence turns out to be context-free.
And if that theory is context-free then others can be also.38
But, it turns out that our beliefs and our observations are
context dependent after all. And we can also see that, in
pronouncing on different discourses, the difference
between "it works because it's true" and "it's true because
it works" is purely conventional." The rule seems to be:
the weaker the claim to truth, the less problem we have in
accepting each of these studies as viable and valuable - the
stronger the claim to truth the greater our difficulties
become, and of course, the question of whether this
statement is itself making a strong or a weak claim to
truth stands as further evidence of unavoidable reflexivity.
Every systematic knowledge has been built-up only to
be partially, sometimes largely, demolished by subsequent
and often incommensurable systematic knowledges.
Although Newton's laws may not be the latest word in
physics, they are, as we have seen, still useful. We live
amongst the ruins of the past and the half-built edifices of
the future, and not contentedly within the houses of the
present. Our reality is a landscape full of variety and
change. We do not, never have and almost certainly never
will, live in one single and perfect house. Which is the
same as saying that we are not, never have been and
40. HEIDEGGER, Martin.
Being and Time. Trans. John
Macquarrie & Edward Robinson.
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962.
According to Heidegger exis-
tence is a matter which can only
be understood through phenome-
nological investigation of our
participation and involvement in
the world, and the goal of such
understanding is the realization
of an 'authentic' self, a self char-
acterized by identity, autonomy,
care and openness to future pos-
sibility.
41. FRANKFORT, Henri. op.
cit. pp.267-8.
42. MILLER, Jonathan.
Madness, final part. BBC
Television, 1991.
43. POPKIN. Richard H. &
Avrum Stroll. Philosophy Made
Simple. W. H. Allan, 1969. p.xiv.
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probably never will be, one single and perfect kind of
'Being in the world'. 4° The rationalist-empiricist and the
relativist-idealist worlds turn together, recalling the
Heraclitian thesis that the universe is an intelligible whole
which is a perpetual flux of change marked by the continu-
ous transition of everything into its opposite.'
Take, for example, Jonathan Miller's conclusion from
the end of his television series Madness, where he seems to
concur with the view that though there have been, and
should continue to be, attempts to understand and deal
with the human condition, the world we live in is a many
faceted place with no certain true reflection of our own, or
of any other, nature in any of its mirror-surfaces whether
they be called philosophy, science, art, religion, morals or
intuition. He also entreats us to act as though this multi-
valent uncertainty is likely to remain the way things are;
we should act with as full a knowledge as we can but also
always in the knowledge that we have no fundamental
knowledge at all.
Meanwhile, and by meanwhile I mean forever, being human,
what ever that is, is something we have to survive, as there is no
prospect of rescue, and since madness and misery seem to be an
inescapable 'risk' of having our particular sort of constitution,
the measures which we take to deal with it had better take
account of the fact that we don't, and perhaps never will, know
exactly what sort of thing we are."
Given the 2500-year time span of the philosophical enter-
prise and the vast space of knowledges about "the nature
of the universe and of the world of human affairs" it has
opened up,' it may be surprising to find that certain
rather important human traits have not been much of a
concern to philosophers and therefore that certain
practices have a poor theoretical literature.
44. Clearly I am not including
that quite different idea of
Design invoked in the teleologi-
cal argument for the existence of
God, an idea which does a dis-
service to the study of design by
focussing our attention on the
evidence appearances and end
products provide of "contrivance"
and fixed patterns of order.
45. A great number of defini-
tions of design have been pro-
posed. The more encompassing
ones are generally process ori-
ented and refer to a fundamen-
tal human capability, for exam-
ple:
Everyone designs who devises
courses of action aimed at chang -
ing existing situations into pre -
[erred ones. [Herbert Simon
quoted in MARGOLIN, Victor.
Design Discourse: History •
Theory • Criticism. University of
Chicago Press, 1989. p.3.]
46. The exceptions are works
such as: HARRISON, Andrew.
Making & Thinking: A Study of
Intelligent Activities. Harvester
Press, 1978. And; EHREN-
ZWEIG, Anton. The Hidden
Order of Art. Weidenfeld &
Nicolson, 1967.
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The Absence of a Discourse
Few philosophers have mentioned design." Creative
engagement with the material of the world in the pursuit
of desirable change is a topic which has not interested
many, other than in respect of an account of practical
rationality and value judgement." Philosophical interest
in art has a history which is as long as that of philosophy
itself. But even here the aspects deemed to be proper to
philosophical investigation, with rare exceptions, have not
included all of those known in practice. Philosophers have
devoted great efforts to the aesthetic dimension of artistic
endeavour, and to that of practical reasoning, but little or
none to the crucial dimension of practical creative activity.
In considering the subject's thinking about creative
activity, philosophers have tended, thereby, to limit
themselves to fields in which language dominates. This
has been, if you like, the criterion by which Philosophy has
always judged itself; Philosophy uses the spoken and
written word exclusively, even if the abstract symbolic
language of logic is imposed upon some kinds of analytic
philosophizing, and therefore can only effectively deal with
what falls within the scope of such language." It is no
surprise, therefore, that, in not being obviously dominated
by linguistic operations, practical creative activity has
\been neglected by Philosophy. To be aggressive about this,
one could suggest that the ideology of Philosophy is to
subsume all understanding under linguistic formulations.
And therefore that Philosophy presumes that what is not
so formulated cannot be understood.
This negativity might seem to be the worst possible
finding in a thesis which is itself borne out of a substan-
tially philosophical project. However, the limitations of the
past are as much to do with historical contingencies -
47. BAYNES, Kenneth., James
Bohman & Thomas McCarthy.
(eds.) After Philosophy: End or
Transformation? MIT Press,
1987.
48. FLEW, Antony. (Consultant
ed.) A Dictionary of Philosophy.
Pan Books, 1979. p.249.
49 ibid. pp.376-6.
60. ADORNO, Theodor. [1966]
Negative Dialectics. Trans. E. B.
Ashton. London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1973. p.4.
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social norms and professional taboos or incapacities - as
with any presupposed boundaries in philosophy per se.
And it is one of my contentions that the current condition -
historically, socially and professionally - of the milieu in
which individuals, such as myself, find themselves is one
in which philosophy is suitably transformed.'
The philosophy which comes after Philosophy has its
roots in the work of those philosophers who in the late 19th
and early 20th centuries had the most thoroughgoing
doubts and engaged most earnestly with the nihilistic
tendency towards Philosophy - Neitzsche and Wittgenstein.
In the sense that Neitzsche "conceives reality as a kind
of ineffable flux that can be trapped within the categorical
net of language only at the expense of fatal distortion" he
points to the nagging doubts about the functional aspects
of human communicativity with which Wittgenstein so
perilously struggled." Wittgenstein admits in the
Tractatus, the major work of his early career, that the
propositions upon which it is based have him
...trying to say what can only be shown, to stand outside
language and the world and describe the relationship between
them ... Hence what he says is strictly 'nonsensical' ...49
Where interdisciplinary academics and practitioners,
amongst whom I must include myself, now find themselves
is thus in the midst of an intellectual upheaval, a burgeon-
ing field of world views, a plurality of engaged ventures in
which theory and practice are deliberately and variously
mixed, fused, or collapsed into each other. As such we find
ourselves competing, or struggling not to compete, in a
consumerist environment in which information and knowl-
edges are the most volatile and valuable of commodities. In
Theodor Adorno's words: "No theory today escapes the
marketplace".' We must also reconsider what has been
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51. The pattern of art and
design education in Britain had
been dominated by the indepen-
dent Regional Colleges of Art
originally founded during the
late-19th and early-20th cen-
turies. In the 1960s these had
tended to amalgamate with
independent regional colleges,
associated with other areas of
vocational training, to form
Colleges of Higher Education or,
if broad enough in their result-
ing curricula and large enough
in student numbers,
Polytechnics. Until the Higher
Education Act of 1992
Polytechnics and Colleges of
Higher Education remained the
responsibility of Local Education
Authorities. After incorporation
they found themselves on the
same legal and financial footing
as the Universities and the
Government soon agreed, sub-
ject to their meeting certain cri-
teria including proportion of
degree-level work and full-time
student numbers, to allow those
institutions that wished to do so
to change their names to include
the University title.
52. For example:
AGNEW, Kenneth. "The
Spitfire: Legend or History? An
Argument for a New Research
Culture in Design". Journal of
Design History, 6:2, pp.121 -30.
FRAYLING, C. "Artefacts
Rather than Arty Facts". The
Times Higher Education
Supplement, 10 May 1994.
and papers by BILLETT, E H.,
CLIPSON, C., DAVIES COOP-
ER, R., and PRESS, M. in Co-
Design, 01-02-03:95.
63. In Fine Art, a subject repre-
sented also in a few of the older
universities, the principle had
been long established that the
said about language both in philosophy and in practical
arenas to see how some, previously unperceived, opportu-
nity has arisen to account for practices such as design.
In Britain, the former Polytechnics adopted the univer-
sity title in 1993 and, as a result, a largely separate
academic tradition in the field of art and design was
suddenly brought into the mainstream of higher
education.' This has had immediate consequences, partic-
ularly in the area of research. Some research outcomes in
art and design are similar in format and purpose to those
of other areas of academic endeavour. However, most
practitioners would argue that the most important ones
are quite distinctive.' It comes down to this question of
language - the domination of academic endeavour by the
requirement for exposition, discourse, and critical thought
to be expressed in words. In the past, in research-oriented
art and design practice exposition, discourse, and critical
thought have been expressed primarily in practical works,
that is, the substance of the research has been embodied in
the products of the creative process, even if supported by
spoken and/or written adthesis." In the postmodern
doubts and deconstructivist tendencies that have found
expression in recent art and design, we have evidence that
broader interdisciplinary approaches to practice are
emerging.' They borrow ideas from an ever wider range of
disciplines in the quest to develop effective design and to
advance persuasive rationale.
Whereas in high modernism it was sufficient to express
the relatively coherent ideas of minimal form, pure
function, economy of materials, absence of decoration,
technical innovation, universal appeal, etc. in postmod-
ernism expression involves layering some or all of these
with incommensurable ideas such as complexity, opacity,
contradiction, historical reference, fashion image, surplus
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work of staff displayed and cata-
logued in public exhibitions, par-
ticularly if accompanied by an
exposition of the artist's ideas in
essay form, counted as a legiti-
mate forwarding of knowledge.
Architecture also has a long tra-
dition of 'paper architecture' -
projects executed primarily to
explore problems of philosophy,
technique or visual language,
and published or exhibited
rather than built. In other areas
of design neither precedent was
well established. Instead, imple-
mented designs, properly docu-
mented, were deemed to count
as research. This seems accept-
able as long as the product
demonstrably communicates
something original. However,
the worry, particularly amongst
those academic researchers that
'publish', is that many designed
objects, like most museum
objects, communicate very little
without expert interpretation.
54. There are a few examples of
practicing designers and archi-
tects who have always had an
ambivalent relationship to pro-
fessional norms in respect of the
place of research in practice.
Ettore Sottsass has made a
career out of departing from the
requirement for normatively
grounded rationale. Instead, he
offers his work as a designer as
'a series of efforts in research'
which, with the help of his
writer partner, Barbara
Raddicci, generate their own
peculiarly innovative and per-
suasive text.
Frank Duffy, in contrast,
stepped out of his professional
milieu as an architect to com-
plete a social science doctorate
only to assimilate and subsume
a continuing research practice
wholly within the frame of pro-
narrative, individuality and whim." As a consequence
rationale has become idiosyncratic, layered and multiple -
tribal babble, marketing ploy, cultural play, political
critique, material psychonarrative, etc. - and is therefore
as likely to involve a vocabulary drawn from anthropology
as one drawn from economics, aesthetics, critical theory,
ecology, or psychotherapy. Design discourse therefore finds
itself not much further on than a beginning just at the
time when more established discourses have reached a
crisis of identity, foundations, and purpose. It is at this
point that the design theorist enters the "market place" - a
moment which is both opportune and inauspicious.
Entering the Market Place
Within the project of philosophy certain paradigmatic
dimensions are outlined by Burrell and Morgan and
summarised in their map of sociological paradigms. This
study begins with certain inclinations - nominalist, anti-
positivist, voluntarist and ideographic - which need expla-
nation. Later, the debate will be opened up and the need for
clear cut paradigmatic posturing questioned; a process
which reflects the end-of-philosophy debates represented by
post-modernist thought and is pointed towards resolution
by efforts to rebuild the project of knowledge by, for
example, reconstituting Science and elaborating ecological
norms." The precedents to which the study turns for
critical reference and to borrow can be seen, using a
developed version of Burrell & Morgan's map, to subjoin
the space of postmodernism. Although one should note that,
in effect, this 'zone' only exists in the sense that, as the
classical dualities - objectivism-v-relativism and radical-
change-v-regulation - are transcended, its internal divisions
Anarchic individualism
Existentialism
Critical Theory
Social Ecology
Marxist Praxiology \.......
Phenomenology
Social Construction Theory
Hermeneutics
Ethnography
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fessional architectural knowl-
	are dissolved. The theoretical standpoint developed in this
edge and practice.
The Centre for Research in Art thesis, if it has to be named, is Ironic Activism which works
and Design (CRiAD) at the within the reconstituted paradigm of Design (Figure 2.4.4.)
Radical Humanism
	 RADICAL CHANGE Radical Structuralism
Interpretive Theory	 R E G U LA TI ON 
	 Functionalist Theory
Figure 2.4.4
The space of Ironic Activism unfolded from BURRELL & MORGAN's map of sociological paradigms.
Grays School of Art (The Robert
Gordon University) in 1996
boasts a sizable research com-
munity which includes graphic
designers lain Burt and Heather
Delday both of whom conduct
and present their research as
design practitioners.
55. Charles Jencks is responsi-
ble for the idea that postmod-
ernism in architecture can be
recognized by its:
double coding: the combination
of Modern techniques and some -
thing else (usually traditional
building) in order for arch itec -
lure to communicate with the
public and a concerned minority,
usually other architects.
[JENCKS, Charles. What is
Post-Modernism? Academy
Editions, 1986. p.14.]
In the ontological debate (as framed by Burrell and
Morgan) I am naturally inclined towards the nominalist
position. The structuring of reality is essentially a human
process, dependent upon language in the broad sense.'
The nominalist position within Philosophy is ultimately
inadequate, not because the idea of nominalism is weak
but because the philosophical tradition privileges the
'word' above other modes in any analysis. The argument is
therefore elaborated that the useful concepts in language
are those that encompass aspects normally differentiated
from philosophy. In short, to the categories of 'name',
'concept' and 'label' must be added 'artefact' and 'act' if a
workable theory of reality construction is to be generated,
and the question of whether or not to continue to refer to
the position as a nominalist one must be addressed.
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"Layering" is specifically men-
tioned by Nigel Coates in his
explanation of Narrative
Architecture.
The practice of architecture
needs to drop its production-line
thinking - to adopt layering and
random access. ... Narrative
architecture never obliterates the
existing world, but exploits and
overlays it. [COATES, Nigel.
"Street Signs" in THACKARA,
John. (ed.) Design After
Modernism. Thames & Hudson,
1988. p.99 & 103.]
56. The notion of reconstituting
Science is a venture which has
been under way since Einstein's
theory of relativity effectively
erased the objective view point
in physical systems: Heisen-
berg's uncertainty principle and
the proposition of distance
effects incorporated into recent
multidimensional theories are
specific examples of the fallout
from this exploding of the sover-
eign subject in classical science.
the scientist cannot play the
role of a detached objective
observer, but becomes involved in
the world he observes to the
extent that he influences the
properties of the observed objects.
[CAPRA, Fritjof. [1975] The Tao
of Physics. revised edition,
Fontana Paperbacks, 1983.
p.153.]
Minimally, therefore, we must
expect a reconstituted Science to
be participatory and to make
only weak claims to truth. And,
accepting the deep level of inter-
relation and interactivity
between micro- and macro-
worlds, we must expect that we
will be able to propose useful
ecological principles, at least as
useful as those explaining the
uncertainty of subatomic events.
Bohr expressed it thus: Physics
My natural inclination in the epistemological debate is
towards an anti-positivist position. The idea of needing to
occupy "the frame of reference of the participant in action"
in order to "understand", represents the basic tenet.'
However, the objective-subjective dichotomy with which
this and the contrapuntal positivist notion of seeking the
power to "explain and predict ... regularities and causal
relationships" in a differentiated world, are normally
associated, is ultimately flawed and throws a bad light on
the anti-positivist position within philosophy." The reflex-
ivity of the human condition most clearly illustrates the
weakness of the linguistic division of the objective from the
subjective. Such reliance on language represents an
anxiety that ought to be, and can be, countered. By
admitting "actions" and "productions" into the argument
there is an opportunity to reverse the withdrawal from
material involvement, that an overemphasis on the power
of language often represents, with a reaffirmation of the
larger human potential for becoming knowledgeable and
competent." Whether or not, after this, one should
continue to call the position "anti-positivist" again is a
question to be addressed.
Almost thematic in the notion of design is that the
individual is free to counteract environmental signs and
motions.' In the human nature debate, therefore, I have a
natural inclination towards the voluntarist position.
However, the separation of subject and environment, figure
and ground, upon which the voluntarist-determinist
dichotomy is founded must be seriously questioned in the
radically decentred and therefore de-differentiated
condition postmodern theory describes.' In the ecological
sense no particular type of actor in an open system can be
be privileged above any other.' Global behaviour displays
its image-form, if at all, in a syncretism and betrays its
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is not about how the world is, it
is about what we can say about
the world. [DAVIES, Paul &
,John Gribbin. [1991] The Matter
Myth: Beyond Chaos and
Complexity. Penguin, 1992.
p.21.]
67. If language can be thought
of as the defining human trait,
this implies an underlying
humanism. The endlessly renew-
able language games can only
serve human ends. Even a con-
cern for the radically 'other' or
the 'undifferentiated whole' or
the 'disembodied essence' is
nonetheless a concern expressed
in language and therefore, in
general terms, humanistic.
Clearly, in this formulation,
humanism is being somewhat
dissociated from its past, but this
can be justified, though only
weakly, in the sense that post-
modern doubts throw us back on
ourselves - if there are no univer-
sal foundations to which we can
appeal, we only have the option
of continuing conversations.
Bernstein's defence of his notion
of a "non-foundational pragmatic
humanism" is important here, as
are Rorty's notions of "projects of
self creation", "imaginative iden-
tification", and "free and open
encounters". All that is said by
postmodernist critics against this
humanism, that is the life blood
of modernism, is worthy stuff,
but, in the end, it does not clear
the world of humanism per se
only of a chimera. To be human is
the only foundation upon which
we can build. Whatever razor
edges we use to separate off a
previous way of thinking, of talk-
ing, of being, from what we
believe the next stage will be, it
cannot separate off the "being"
itself even though it may change
its ways. What postmodernism
possibilities in a synergy. The irony of the situation is that,
even in the partial systems we may care to visualize, we
can never escape our own inclusion in the pattern of things.
As participant the dimension of speed becomes crucial."
Change exerts a reciprocal effect which increases with
time. Design is the acceleration of change and therefore the
multiplication of perceived effects. Every intervention
creates the opportunities for, perhaps the necessity of,
increasingly widespread and intensive interventions.
Furthermore, this multiplication takes effect at the instant
of intervention not at its forever-deferred ending, and
therefore there is no recognizable chain reaction, no
predictable pattern of event explosion, but rather a inter-
penetrative force-field in which the world (including the
designer) is forming." The reflexivity of praxis, which
implies a determining force of relations in the dimension of
speed, is thus as inescapable as is the undecidable nature
of the system and whether or not one can continue to refer
to the position as voluntarist is questionable.
The methodological debate presents problems peculiar
to design. Although, to accept Burrell and Morgan's terms,
I am naturally inclined towards an ideographic approach.
In design this hardly does justice to the divergent possibili-
ties this represents. Generally there is an interventionist
conception of methodology in design, the goal of the design
process being, not merely to study and to understand a
situation, but, even when these remain incomplete (they
normally do), to change things for the better by replacing
or modifying specific objects/elements/subsystems within
the practical context to which the designer has been intro-
duced." However, this instrumental description, although
common, is not universal, and furthermore, almost every
clause in its composition is, in practice, open to modifying,
even counteracting, qualification. The design process only
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really signifies is a radical
humanism. No world that we can
think, say or be in can be any-
thing other than a humanistic
one for the act of thinking-say-
ing-being creates the only world
we can know, and, no matter how
we try to change our ways, the
new will always be human at
heart BERNSTEIN, Richard J.
The New Constellation. Polity
Press, 1991. and RORTY, 1989,
pp.118, 93 & 68.
68. BURRELL & MORGAN,
1979, p.6.
59. ibid.
60. See: BERNSTEIN, 1991.
The ethical-political horizons
that are of concern to Bernstein
mark the reentry of praxis into
discourse via the Stimmung of
"modernity/postmodernity". In
their later writings he sees
Heidegger, Derrida, Foucault
and Rorty beginning to
...gravitate more and more to con -
fronting the ethical-political con -
sequences of their own thinking.
[p.11.]
61. See: JONES, J.
Christopher. Design Methods:
Seeds of Human Futures.
Revised Ed. John Wiley & Sons,
1981. p.3-4.
MAYALL, W. H. Principles in
Design. Design Council, 1979.
P.9.
POTTER, Norman. What is a
Designer: things.places.mes -
sages. Revised Ed. Hyphen
Press, 1980. p.13.
Jones quotes many of the better
known definitions of design pro-
posed in the 1960s including:
-Finding the right physical corn -
ponents of a physical system.
-A goal-directed problem-solving
activity.
makes sense within the context of a notion of 'professional
practice', a set of recognized protocols and techniques
which although not 'scientific', in the sense of according
with the procedures of testing hypotheses by quantitative
techniques and data analysis, are rigorous in terms of
procedure, administration, and documentary production,
and comply with the notion of set rules as the guarantor of
success. At the same time, the professional practice of
design only makes sense in the context of a design process
which is contingent, variable, unpredictable in its detailed
content and dynamics, and therefore highly idiosyncratic.
The ability to work with an incomplete understanding of
the situation and too little time for the exercise of practical
rationality alone, are fundamental characteristics of the
design process. It is its moments of irrationality that make
it reasonable. If design were not a social activity one could
propose to reconcile this apparent division by recourse to
Rorty's notion that between the personal and social, the
ethical and the political, one does not require a "synthesis"
merely an "accommodation". 87 However, it is not that
simple. In the vast proportion of situations, the design
process encompasses a collaborative creativity, and profes-
sional practice includes the dimension of existential
experience - the moment about which action depends upon
inalienable individual conscience and responsibility. Given
the necessity to be both involved in the materiality of the
practical situation and its social context, and to be
independent of its thought-world and professionally
detached, whether or not one can continue to refer to the
theoretical position on methodology as ideographic is
questionable. The possibility of clear-cut allegiance, as in
all of the key debates that define the subjective-objective
dimension, is at least compromised, but I believe the
problem is deeper than that.
By starting with the Burrell and Morgan model the
problems posed by recent philosophical debate can be
clearly visualized. The boundaries of such opposed terms
as: 'nominalism' and 'realism', 'anti-positivism' and
'positivism'; 'voluntarism' and 'determinism'; and
'ideographic' and `nomothetic', have become blurred in a
metaphysics of the incommensurable and fragmentary, a
meta-relativism which is self-reflexive, self-contradictory,
irreducibly paradoxical, at least in Philosophical terms,
and is the real substance of post-Philosophical philosophy.
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-Decision making, in the face of
uncertainty, with high penalties
for error.
-The imaginative jump from pre -
sent facts to future possibilities.
-A creative activity - it involves
bringing into being something
new and useful that has not
existed previously.
Jones offered his own "simple
but universal definition" of
design:
-to initiate change in man-made
things
Although, several years earlier,
he had offered a definition which
openly questioned the need to
have a dosed definition:
-The performing of a very compli -
cated act of faith
The first sentence of Mayall's
chapter 1 reads:
-Design conceives and defines all
the means we employ to satisfy
our many and increasingly intri -
cate needs.
In explaining the focus of his
book, Potter contributes:
-to give form and order to the
amenities of life, whether in the
context of manufacture, or of
place and occasion.
62. BANNET, Eve Tavor.
Structural-ism and the Logic of
Dissent. Macmillan, 1989.
Barthes idea of the systima -
tiques, which are "open, infinite,
uncentred, disseminated, perfor-
mative and capable of endless
permutations", is useful here,
with it he suggests that
society and human life could be
like his books ... which fragment
the subject into decentred ele -
ments which can be contrasted,
combined and varied in inn umer -
able ways. . [pp.82-3.]
The contradiction with which
this deals is between Foucault's
suggestion that the only way out
of the division between subject
and environment, which is
...a result of man making his
cogito the condition and himself
the centre of all things ... is to
erase man, to turn the page and
to start thinking from somewhere
else, [p.160.]
and the insight that there is a
radical humanism from which
we cannot escape - the non-foun-
dational pragmatic in Bernstein
and the engaged liberal ironist
in Rorty.
63. The idea of the "actor net-
work" is useful here,
...it is composed of a series of het -
erogeneous elements, animate
and inanimate, that have been
linked one to another for a cer -
tamn period of time ... But the
actor network should not ... be
confused with a network linking
in some predictable fashion ele -
ments that are perfectly well
defined and stable, for the enti -
ties it is composed of, whether
natural or social, could at any
moment redefine their identity
and mutual relationships in
some new way and bring new de -
merits into the network.
CALL ON, Michel. "Society in the
Making: The Study of
Technology as a Tool for
Sociological Analysis" in BIJK-
ER, Weibe E., Thomas P.
Hughes & Trevor Pinch. (eds.)
The Social Construction of
Technological Systems. MIT
Press, 1987. p.93.
64. VIRELIO, Paul. [1984] Lost
Dimension. Trans. Daniel
Moshenberg. New York:
Semiotext(e), 1991.
Virilio proposes that:
The crisis of physical dimen
sions, just as the crisis of mea
surement, is tied up with the cri -
sis of determinism and affects
today the whole ensemble of rep -
resentations of the world [pp.50-
1.] not only at the micro-level of
the subatomic but at every
macro-level. He uses
Mandelbrot's explanation of the
problem of measuring the coast
of Brittany to illustrate the
point:
a dimension is a matter of the
degree of resolution, and ... the
numerical result depends on the
relations between the object and
the observer, [p.55.]
but more than this, what is
missing in this is
the temporal aspect of all acts of
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measuring and all acts of sight -
ing ... The figures of the man, the
mouse, and the fly who survey
the Breton coastline are only the
anthropomorphic and zoomor -
phic aspects of a specific speed of
displacement. [p.5'7.]
Slow down the act of measuring
and the distance tends to infini-
ty, speed it up and it tends to
zero.
65. "Force-field": Bernstein
	 66. See 29. above. The third
(1991, p.9.) appropriates
	 definition of design quoted from
Adorno's metaphor which
	 Jones (1981), and also the sec-
Martin Jay defines as a
	 ond quoted of Jones' own defini-
relational interplay of attrac - tions.
tions and aversions that consti -
tute the dynamic transmutation - 67. RORTY , 1989, p.68.
al structure of a complex phe -
nomerwn.
JAY, Martin. Adorno. Fontana,
1984. p.14.
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3.0 Locations and Discourse
Ephemeral Presences
Four generic spatialities have been explored in the
previous chapter - physical, social, documentary and
paradigmatic. The possibilities for modelling the space of
museum-design-organization have been indicated in
critical perspective and it is now the task of the project to
move from the generic notion of space to the generated
notions of location and discourse. Each of the engaged
elements that make up the museum-design-organization
complex has a history, an ethnography, and a genealogy or
archaeology. In this chapter an attempt will be made to
uncover each element taking the last first, the broad before
the narrow, the abstract before the concrete, in the hope
that their loci in the physical, social, documentary and
paradigmatic may be recovered. The seeds of despair in
this little venture are sown at the beginning: the organiza-
tional question itself is one of doubt about the indepen-
dence of any 'component' element constitutive of the multi-
dimensional and, therefore, interminably interactive,
complex. As none of the elements exists alone, the objects
of location and discourse immediately point to their inter-
relations, but, and this is important, consideration of the
differences or interfaces, the boundaries between, must be
deferred long enough for some presence to be generated
however unstable and ephemeral it may later prove to be.
1. MORGAN, Gareth. Images
of Organization. Sage
Publications, 1986. p.11.
2. ibid. p.13.
In this the social spatiality and
the 'humanistic' motivation are
paramount even when realized
through a fragmentation of the
'man', a suppression of freedom,
and a glorification of process and
function.
3. BERGER, Peter. & Thomas
Luckmann. The Social
Construction of Reality. Penguin,
1967.
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3.1 Organization
Models in Analysis and Design
In Images of Organization Gareth Morgan presents a
series of metaphors upon which can be built powerful
mythic explanations of organization. The model which
Morgan proposes takes the form of a series of abstract
images which have a dual purpose - as tools in analysis
and as heuristic devices or templates in design. The model
is not arrived at from any general theoretical approach to
the idea of organization, rather, it starts from the specific
connection between organization and the kinds of work
situations in which "business executives, public adminis-
trators, organizational consultants, politicians or trade
unionists" find themselves.' The central (privileged) role of
the human actor in such a view of organization is explicit:
throughout, Morgan uses the language of human action
and relations, even commenting that when gripped by the
machine metaphor of organizations "we often attempt to
organize and manage them in a mechanistic way, forcing
their human qualities into a background role". 2 The philo-
sophical problems that this centred subject gives rise to
are now well known and cannot be ignored. In the section
above on Philosophy, I have argued that although to be
human, in all that we do and say, is existentially
inescapable, the position that the human occupies in the
world can no longer be regarded as privileged. So that,
although we may speak of socially constructed reality,
what is constructed encompasses more than the social.' It
extends to the whole of perception, both the rational and
the natural. It is necessary, therefore, to take a step back
from Morgan's constellation of metaphors and the powerful
mythic explanations that they are able to generate and
Figure 3.1.1.
Rubin's double profiles
4. COOPER, Robert.
"Organization/Disorganization"
Social Science Information.
SAGE, 25, 2, 1986, pp.299-335
(p.332).
5. ibid. p.306.
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look to other more general notions of organization. We
must dispense with the idea that organization is limited to
a particular realm, as determined by a past or present
discourse, whether of Philosophy, museology, anthropol-
ogy, history, or natural science, and instead we must look
to generic concepts in organization and systems such as
'boundary', 'difference' and 'space'.
Boundary
Cooper notes that the concept of 'boundary' receives scant
attention even in General Systems Theory, "a discipline
reputed to have laid bare the lineaments of a general
theory of systems of any and every kind" 4 and proceeds,
with reference to the work of theorists such as Parsons
and Blau who, in common with the "dominant mode of
perception among system theorists", place "emphasis on
the two separate terms" of any binary divide and fail to
focus "on division or boundary between terms", and
Gouldner, Bateson, Saussure and Derrida who make the
crucial move in this direction, to develop the idea that
division itself is "of fundamental significance in under-
standing the nature of information or structure".5 He uses
Rubin's double profiles, an old favourite with theorists of
art and of perception, to graphically illustrate the funda-
mental undecidability of figure and ground (Figure 3.1.1.)
In differentiating modes of perception, one side of the
dividing line must be suppressed in order to see the other
as the figure. To see the opposite side as figure we must
switch to suppressing the first side of the line. In a non-
differentiating mode of perception we may focus on the
boundary itself but only by suppressing the normal
tendency to seek a Gestalt, an order that precedes
6. EHRENZWEIG, Anton. The
Hidden Order of Art. Weidenfeld
& Nicolson, 1967. p.36.
To illustrate the point
Ehrenzweig paraphrases Klee:
... the artist can either emphasize
the boundary contrast produced
by the bisection of the picture
plane; in which case he will keep
his attention on one (endotopic or
exotopic) side of the line he
draws; or else he can scatter his
attention and watch the simulta -
neous shaping of inside and out -
side areas on either side of the
line, a feat which the gestalt psy -
chologists would consider impos -
Bible. ... Somehow - as Paul Klee
postulates - a good artist must be
able to hold the entire picture
plane in a single undivided
focus.
7. op cit. p.310.
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meaning in the image. Ehrenzweig, in constructing an
account of Cezanne's and Klee's visual achievement,
proposes that there is also the possibility of a de-differen-
tiating mode of perception through which one can,
perhaps only fleetingly, see Rubin's double profiles as two
figures kissing.' Although Cooper makes the observation
that "it is the act of separation which, paradoxically,
creates the perception of something that is also whole and
unitary" he is not proposing this last, and I will argue
necessary, step of de-differentiation, a point to which I
will return later in this thesis. Even though Cooper's
analysis may not go far enough there are still a number of
useful points to pick up in relation to the approach to
organization in the current study.
Difference
Initially, the figure is seen as a positive sign and it is
possible to conceive of it, in a commonsensical way, as the
"carrier of meaning". But, because later the figure can only
be understood as a positive figure if it is also seen as the
negative of that which surrounds it, we have a formulation
for the idea of meaning which depends upon the sign as the
"effect of difference". Saussure makes the first of these
moves when considering the individual sign in language and
the second when considering the language as a system.
Cooper interprets this duality in a way which suggests that
"action is prompted by a negation", that "the action of differ-
ence" is motivated by "the lack or absence of the 'preferred'
state". 7 However, for reasons which relate to the possibility
of a de-differentiating mode of perception, I find it difficult to
agree with this argument as the general case. The notion of
'choice' between states - and we should perhaps recall those
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8. See section 2.4 note 60.
9. COOPER, Robert.
"Information, Communication
and Organization: A Post-
Structural Revision" The
Journal of Mind and Behaviour.
The Institute of Mind and
Behaviour, Summer 1987, Vol.8,
No.3. pp.395-416.
Cooper uses Freud's analysis of
the unconscious [Beyond the
Pleasure Principle], which is
'characterised by a 'compulsion
to repeat' itself, to argue that
information can be thought of as
"a reversible whole that vacil-
lates between two terms". He
then defines two forms of action:
(1) a primary process which is a
conflation and negation of the
individual terms ... and (2) a sec -
ondary process which suppresses
primary activity by accenting the
individual terms.
This is still potentially ambigu-
ous, the difference between the
undifferentiated and the de-dif-
ferentiated is important, as is
the difference between differen-
tiation and re-differentiation. To
the ancient Greeks the undiffer-
entiated pharmakon had a sin-
gle, if broad, meaning. To us the
word's direct descendant "phar-
macy" has a more specific mean-
ing from which have become dif-
ferentiated, by other terms, the
meanings "poison", "drug",
"cure", and "magic spell".
Although we cannot recapture
the original pharmakon we can,
with the help of Derrida and oth-
ers, de-differentiate this cluster
to glimpse, even if only fleeting-
ly, a multivalence which a cur-
rent reading of pharmakon
requires in interpretation. The
re-differentiation of pharmakon,
if we were to find this a useful
action, holds the potential for
altogether different terms and
definitions which propose that design is about intiating
change towards a more desirable state of things' - even if not
taken to imply some form of practical reasoning, neverthe-
less implies a form of determinism or givenness, whereas, in
most cases, possibilities are numerous and precise future
states impossible to predict.' They come into being, that is,
become real, only in the process of action. Difference,
therefore, is not necessarily a question of what is between
the commensurate, in the sense that the "a priori for the
subject" are commensurate, it is rather a question of
potential and therefore of energy, which may be released
only through action, through movement, and the speed of
that release and its patterning are what the process brings
into being.'" Hence, to bring the notion of 'creativity' into the
argument, creativity is the automatic non-rational quality of
realizing difference. Derrida's contribution is to point out
that the problem of choice between given terms disappears.
In these terms, creativity is the play of differance, the
continual movement that chases after the always deferred
presence. In this formulation we can see the importance of
Ehrenzweig's ideographic standpoint, in design the
argument is not primarily about interpreting a given system
of signs but rather it is about participating in its transforma-
tion (or, in some presupposed past, its formation). Foucault
makes a parallel point in respect of historical analyses:
the problem is no longer one of tradition, of tracing a line, but
one of division, of limits; it is no longer one of lasting founda -
tions, but one of transformations that serve as new foundations!'
Space
The value of the metaphor of space needs to be made
explicit. When talking of 'possibility', the 'play' of
associated meanings, why not
the neologisms: "pharmatech"
for medicine based on western
science and technology, and
"pharmagic" for that based on
faith and ritual? See: BROGAN,
Walter. "Plato's Pharmakon:
between two repetitions", in SIL-
VERMAN, H J. (ed.) Derrida
and Deconstruction. Routledge,
1989. pp.7-23.
10. See: 2.1, note 32.
11. FOUCAULT, Michel. [1969]
The Archaeology of Knowledge
Trans. A M Sheridan Smith.
Tavistock, 1972. p.5.
12. The zero dimension or zero
degree arises out of two related
differential factors, (1) the oscil-
lation of dimensional value
involved in observation at differ-
ent degrees of resolution. This is
a phenomenon Virilio illustrates
by describing a ball of thread at
the 10-meter degree of resolu-
tion (DoR) where it appears as a
point and is thus zero-dimen-
sional, through, 10-centimetre
DoR where it is a ball and thus
three-dimensional, 10-millimetre
DoR where it is a construction of
threads and thus one-dimension-
al, 0.1 millimetre DoR where
each thread is a column and
thus three-dimensional again,
and 0.01mm DoR where each
column dissolves into a construc-
tion of fibres and thus again one-
dimensional. In any system
there is a certain degree of reso-
lution above which everything
becomes zero-dimensional, and
at and below the degree of reso-
lution associated with sub-atom-
ic distances the same zero-
dimensionality pervades. And (2)
the levels of order and detail in
any organization. Simple divi-
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differance, and 'presence', even if perpetually deferred, we
invoke a visualization of space which is primevally a point,
the zero dimension or zero degree,' undifferentiated and
infinite in potential, and which, as an inevitable response
to that potential, succumbs to an endless and unpre-
dictable process of differentiation and expansion without a
centre. Possibility' thus crystallizes out of potential. 'Play'
is thus two-sided, both free variation and room for
manoeuvre - the micro-space of indeterminacy. And
'presence', or identity, is that which is realized only at the
expense of perceiving movement, or difference. We need
look no further than theoretical physics to see the same
invocation at work: from the big-bang theory to the in-
folded multi-dimensionality of the ultra-microscopic and
the sub-atomic uncertainties of position and speed." Space
provides the generic organizational metaphor.
As space becomes differentiated into zones, spatial
relationships are created. These relationships are defined
by boundaries or, as any boundary is inevitably a defining
aspect of two zones, by interfaces.' The interval which an
interface occupies is not fixed, rather, it is dependent
upon speed of interaction,' information, the play of
differance. In the term 'interval' is expressed that uncer-
tainty which is temporal at the expense of spatial and vice
versa." Complexity of organization is a function of interac-
tivity, the greater the interactivity the greater the
number of interfaces between actors and therefore the
finer the differentiation of detail within the space. Cooper
makes an important point here about the perception of
interactional structure:
a conception of 'social system' ... must dispense with the percep -
tion of an interactional structure that is fully given to us in the
present; social structure can only become 'present' to us through
diffórance."
sion into two represents the first
degree of order, the one-dimen-
sionality of opposing polarity,
division into three either contin-
ues the first degree of order by
creating an intermediate
between poles or creates a sec-
ond degree of order, the two-
dimensionality of a choice of
choices, and so on into the multi-
dimensionality of complex possi-
bility. Within complexity there
always exists a micro-level of
lower degrees of order and, at
the lowest level, an absolute
limit, the zero degree of order,
the zero-dimensionality of undif-
ferentiated space, non-direction-
ality, disorganization, infinite
potential, which becomes the
site of action, difference, creativ-
ity.
See: VIRILIO, Paul. [1984] Lost
Dimension. Trans. Daniel
Moshenberg. New York:
Autonomedia (Semiotext(e)),
1991. pp.53-4. and COOPER,
1986, pp.316ff.
13. DAVIES, Paul & John
GRIBBIN. The Matter Myth:
Beyond Chaos and Complexity.
(first published by Viking, 1991.)
Penguin, 1992.
Big bang, pp.114-18. Microscopic
virtual wormholes, pp.269-73 &
276-6. Heisenberg's uncertainty
principle p.213. and also
CAPRA, Fritjof. The Tao of
Physics. Wildwood House, 1975.
pp .171-3.
14. COOPER, 1986, p.300. The
problem with the implication of
Gouldner's idea that organiza-
tional activity is focused on the
boundaries between system
parts is that it suggests too hard
a notion of system - "system
parts" suggests fixed elements,
like the parts of a machine, in
the same way "boundaries" sug-
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And this applies not only to social system but to any
socially constructed system or space. The generic idea of
space privileges neither the human nor the non-human
actor. An interface may be between any pairing of types of
actor, and, in principle, an actor may have interfaces with
an unlimited number of other actors. In this view of
organization, the actor is not the generator, indeed, the
actor is not even a fixed entity. The actor will tend to
change in role, type and/or position as the pattern of inter-
activity within the space continues. The concept of 'actor
network' captures some of this dynamism quite clearly.'
Information, and different classes of actor - human and
non-human, natural and artificial, etc. - have equal status.
Indeed, precisely what one sees depends upon what one
sets out to find. If one looks for the fixed structure it will be
at the expense of finding the interactive dynamics, and vice
versa. Foucault raises this point in relation to the history
of science at the microscopic and macroscopic scales:
...events and their consequences are not arranged in the same way:
thus a discovery, the development of a method, the achievements,
and the failures, of a particular scientist, do not have the same
incidence, and cannot be described in the same way at both levels.19
A particular class of phenomena, 'distance effects',
radically affects both interactive dynamics and the percep-
tion of structure. Distance effects, which have been
predicted in physics to effect the micro-level of organiza-
tion,' are already very real at the macro-level of social
organization. They are the telematic effects of the global
net and the telemedia. Within these is a multi-dimensional
virtual space able to instantaneously connect distant
places and times: an invasive virtual space that provides
an ever denser and more mutable fabric to organization.'
In organization, therefore: we find ourselves in a
space which is without definite boundary and subject to
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gests fixed edges. I want to sug-
gest something altogether more
fluid and dynamic.
15. What is meant by "interac-
tion" here is the mutual
exchange of information, materi-
al, energy. There are some sens-
es in which everything reduces
to energy. Matter is just a par-
ticularly dense form of energy
and information is simply pat-
terns of energy.
16. What Derrida posits is "a
world that is continually
deferred, postponed in space and
time" [COOPER, 1986, p.313.],
that is, a world of intervals.
An interval must separate the
present from what it is not in
order for the present to be itself
... [ibid. quotation from DERRI-
DA] Through the play of dif -
firance, the interval is thus also
that which divides the present in
and of itself, and leads to a
dynamic concept of spacing,
intervals upon and within inter-
vals.
17. COOPER, 1986, p.313.
18. See: 2.1, note 31.
19. FOUCAULT [1969], pp.4-5.
20. The "microscopic virtual
wormholes" referred to above
(13).
21. MATTHEWS, Geoff.
"Invasion of the Body Snatchers:
Architecture and Virtual Space"
Culture Theory Criticism
Occasional Papers, University of
Humberside, 1994.
22. FOUCAULT [1969], p.11.
23. In deconstructing the works
of great thinkers and writers
unpredictable processes of differentiation in which the
interface is a volatile element; we are never simply
observers but always, to some degree, participants in
transformations which are without centre; and we are
faced with the uncertainty of structure and change - one
can only be focused at the expense of blurring the other -
not simply as a limitation of observation but because
organization possesses neither certain structure nor
certain change, the interval is bivalently indeterminate.
What we face, to paraphrase Foucault, is an epistemologi-
cal mutation of organization which is not yet complete.22
Interstitial Knowledges
Although, in these terms, the possibility of a general
theory reduces to a paradox, this does not mean the end of
organization, far from it, as Foucault suggests in relation
to history the situation has entered a phase of (apparently
continual) transformations. In this we are liberated from
the prospect of a totalizing closure: the only big idea left is
that there are no big ideas left. This is the message of
deconstruction,' of post-structuralism, 24 of postmod-
ernism,' and of the interpretive theory (hermeneutics)
revitalized by such as Gadamer and Ricoeur." Although,
in the negative, global knowledge may be irredeemably
fractured, in the positive, there is a growing necessity of
what Geertz calls 'local knowledge'.' This is the necessity
of working within the irruptive field of discontinuous
knowledges - Bernstein's 'new constellation' - or more
properly, the interstices that are, in our generic spatial
terms, 'intervals'.
... rather than face an array of natural kinds, fixed types divided
by sharp qualitative differences, we more and more see ourselves
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Derrida aimed:
...to refute the author with argu -
ments derived from the latter's
own writings, to demonstrate -
successfully in many cases - that
the very pre misses on which the
author bases his case will, if pur -
sued to their logical conclusions,
defeat the original arguments.
GLUSBERG, Jorge. (ed.)
Deconstruction: A Student
Guide. Journal of Architectural
Theory and Criticism, 1:2:91.
Academy Editions, 1991. p.31.
24. For post-structuralists, unity
and universality are inherently
oppressive and any move which
promotes their disintegration is
to be approved.
SARUP,
	 Madan.	 Post-
Structuralism and
Postmodernism. Harvester
Wheatsheaf, 1988.
Of course, to go along with this,
one has to regard the idea that
there is a "right to difference" as
the only 'big' idea left.
25. Simplifying to the extreme, I
define postmodern as increduli -
ty towards metanarratives.
LYOTARD, Jean-Francois.
[1979]	 The Postmodern
Condition: A Report on
Knowledge. Trans. Geoff
Bennington & Brian Massumi.
Manchester University Press,
1984. p.xxiv.
26. Tradition, part of whose
nature is the handing-on of tradi -
tional material, must have
become questionable for an
explicit consciousness of the
hermeneutic task of appropriat -
ing tradition to have been formed.
GADAMER, Hans-Georg. Truth
and Method. Sheed & Ward,
1975. p.xxi.
surrounded by a vast, almost continuous field of variously
intended and diversely constructed works we can order only
practically, relationally, and as our purposes prompt us. It is not
that we no longer have conventions of interpretation; we have
more than ever, built ... to accommodate a situation at once fluid,
plural, uncentred, and ineradicably untidy.28
The composition of intervals, which this idea of praxis
promotes, is a pragmatic, ironic, creative business, and
follows on from the philosophical standpoint outlined above.
Not only are knowledges discontinuous, they are also
contingent and incommensurable, that is, their proximity is
visible in a model but not measurable in actuality.
Model space
As an example of the composition of intervals in modelling,
Hofstede's use of the map series to present a picture of
cultural differences in attitudes to social organization -
each map defined by pairs of dimensions: four dimensions
in all - neatly raises the question of what kind of space it is
that is being created in an organizational model of this
type.' The four dimensions of his model, each derived from
the analysis of a vast quantity of data collected through
questionnaire-based surveys, are shown in figure 3.1.2.
Label Scale
1. Power distance small 	 large
2. Uncertainty avoidance weak 	 strong
3. Individualism collectivist 	 individualist
4. Masculinity feminine 	 masculine
Figure 3.1.2
Hofstede's four dimensions of national culture
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In Gadamer's notion of the
hermeneutic, one has to accept
that the only big idea is that one
has to take things for what they
are: if the competition between
big ideas is dead then they all
become rather small.
27. GEERTZ, Clifford. Local
Knowledge. New York: Basic
Books, 1983. p.16. To conclude
his introduction Geertz offers
this thought on what he means
by the importance of local knowl-
edge:
To see ourselves as others see us
can be eye-opening. To see others
as sharing a nature with our -
selves is the merest decency. But
it is from the far more difficult
achievement of seeing ourselves
amongst others, as a local exam -
ple of the forms human life has
locally taken, a case amongst
cases, a world among worlds,
that the largeness of mind, with -
out which objectivity is self-con -
gratulation and tolerance a
sham, comes.
28. ibid. pp.20-1.
29. HOFSTEDE, G. "Motivation,
Leadership and Organization:
Do American Theories Apply
Abroad" in PUGH, D S. (ed)
Organization Theory. Penguin,
1971. pp.473-99.
30. Work such as that carried
out by Judith Blau (1984) and
Dana Cuff (1991) on the nature
of architectural practice in the
USA is rare, and work such as
Maria Brunelli's on design and
museum management is unique.
The kinds of questions which
need to be asked of exhibition
planners, designers, developers
and managers for example, are: -
Where does the design process
begin and end? How does an
There is no doubt that the same principles of series
mapping can be used to make visible any organized
comparative space. And one could suggest a dozen
empirical studies that could be initiated in the area of
museums and design." However, it is not the specific
pattern that might result from such studies that interests
us here, but rather the legitimate scope for such mapping
projects in the context of this project. What are the appro-
priate dimensions of such mapping models? And how does
the mapping model per se relate to the generic spatiality of
organization and, in particular, to its indeterminacy at the
level of the interval?
In series mapping presentations such as Hofstede's,
there is no easy process of commensuration - such as the
process of scaling and Mollweide Equal Area Projection we
find in popular world atlases - between the two-dimen-
sional maps and a physical space in the geographical
sense.' Yet, at the same time, the maps describe a four-
dimensional space in which national cultures are precisely
placed in relation to each other, and in which, through
visual interpretation, cultural regions can be seen rather
in the same way that constellations of stars can be seen in
the night sky. Geographical or, in the physical sense,
spatial proximity is irrelevant to this notion of retinal
proximity. The linguistic formulation of concepts, such as
'power distance', 'uncertainty avoidance', 'individualism',
and 'masculinity', and their quantification in statistical
and probabilistic terms, defines them as qualitatively
different to concepts such as 'geographical distance',
'Cartesian plane', and 'Euclidean space' which are quanti-
fied in physical comparative terms." In a spatial model of
the latter we compare like with like - distance with
distance, area with area, etc. - whereas in the former a
systematic process of abstracting, transforming, interpret-
exhibition team organize? Are
there defining characteristics of
the 'good' curator, designer, con-
servator, etc.
BLAU, Judith R. Architects and
Firms: A Sociological Perspective
on Architectural Practice. MIT
Press, 1984.
BRUNELLI, Maria Teresa. "The
Role of Design in the
Management of Museums" (PhD
thesis, Institute of Advanced
Studies, Manchester
Metropolitan University, 1993.
CUFF, Dana. Architecture: The
Story of Practice. MIT Press,
1991.
31. For example, maps showing
the whole surface of the globe in
"Section Three: The World as we
Know it" The Reader's Digest
Great World Atlas, Reader's
Digest Association, 1962.
Mollweide's Equal Area
Projection translates the spheri-
cal surface onto an ellipse whose
major axis is twice the length of
the minor axis and, although it
distorts shape, preserves area
relationships.
32. I am aware that quantum
effects can only be described in
probabilistic terms. However, at
macroscopic levels, the incalcu-
lably large ratios involved in the
probability of mechanical events
may be reasonably interpreted
as either certainty (00 :1) or
impossibility (1:00).
33. Map-graph-matrix. I am
suggesting here a particular
composite which is not fully pre-
sent in any of the separate
terms:
Map: a representation on a
reduced scale and usu a flat sur
face of (part of) the earth's stir
face, showing geographical fea
tures, political divisions, popula
tion distribution, etc. ...a repre
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ing and visualizing must take place to turn the linguistic
formulation of the original concept into the visual formula-
tion of the map-graph-matrix."
The space of such models is used to render visible
rather exotic, and otherwise invisible, virtual spaces. Such
virtual spaces encompass all of the possible connecting and
dislocating spaces of the multidimensionality that lies
behind the socially constructed actual space of architec-
ture, society, the body and geography - the worldly realm.'
But, paradoxically, they also encompass an ambivalence
towards the virtual spaces of the global net and the
telemedia - the virtual spaces that have already invaded
actual space - which, via computer and televisual screen,
are vital to the construction, storage, transmission and
presentation of the most complex models. The space
created by a model is thus multidimensional and virtual. It
invokes this through limited means - the two-dimensional
graphic image and the three-dimensional construct - which,
in phenomenological terms, put a limit on the complexity of
objects that may be rendered visible and sensible.
Simplification and adequacy
In this sense - of encompassing both connecting and dislo-
cating virtual spaces - organizational modelling always
operates at a distance, across an interval in organization
(this describes the ideographic, reflexive condition of the
embedded subject), and is always associated with the
attenuation of information in making the process
amenable to intervention. Between the linguistic and
visual fields there is both an interval and a parallel. "The
attenuating function of myth" is a mirror of, and an accom-
paniment to, the attenuating function of the model - where
myth makes legible/readable, the model makes visible/
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sentation of something in map-
like form.
Graph: a diagram ...expressing
a relation between quantities or
variables, usu having two (or
more) straight lines (AXES) with
reference to which points or lines
are located on the diagram.
Matrix: a substance, environ -
rnent, etc. within which some -
thing else originates or develops
...a rectangular array of numbers
or other mathematical elements
that can be manipulated and
transformed according to special
mathematical rules ...something
resembling a mathematical
matrix...
LONGMAN DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE,
Longman, 1984.
34. The parallel here is that dis-
cussed above "Space" para 1, for
references see note 13.
35. JACKSON, N V & P
CARTER. "The Attenuating
Function of Myth in Human
Understanding", Human
Relations, Vol.37, No.7, 1984,
pp.515-33.
The simplicity or complexity of
the required explanation ...
relates to the state of complexity
of the environment existent at a
given time. ... the low-variety
individual can only cope with the
high-variety external world via
an attenuating device which reg -
ulates the complexity to an extent
that it can be comprehended by
the individual ... the description
and function ... ascribed to myth
is precisely that of an attenuat -
ing device. [pp.523 & 628.]
36. Saussure tends to focus on
the relationship between the sig-
nifier and the signified and to
underplay the dynamics of the
semiotic process, Eco admits a
tangible - and each performs a constructive cognitive role
in understanding which is narrative and spatial respec-
tively." Clearly I am not suggesting that myth and model
are, in a mathematical sense, similar - the relationship
between them is poetic - and that translation is a mechani-
cal process - it is a poesis. Neither am I suggesting that
"socially constructed actual space" provides a definitive
reality beyond which lie unreal supplements necessary for
meaning - socially constructed reality is immanently
multidimensional. In stnicturalist terms the signified is a
fuzzy edged, shifting zone of possibility, and the signifier a
designed object which is visible, contingent, conventional,
and mutable. Between them, therefore, they constitute a
sign which is profoundly undecidable. Our concern with
the interval and the dynamics of organization, justified by
the profound uncertainties of objective and subjective
presence, makes the play of differance - information -
central to the creative activity of modelling, and the
partiality and plurality of metaphor crucial to the poesis
this represents. A semiotic schema would imply clearly
boundaried realms for the form of notation, the objective
denotation, and the subjective connotation (Figure 3.1.3)."
NOTATION DENOTATION CONNOTATION
graphic or
material
construct
organizational
object
metaphorical
image
Fig. 3.1.3
Semiotic schemata for organizational modelling (after ECO, 1979.)
Even though, in Saussurian terms, the arbitrary nature of
"a particular combination of signifier and signified" is the
central problematic, the status of the sign as an entity
implies a singularity which is equally problematic." By
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notion of 'unlimited semiosis' in
which
the interpretant may turn out to
be of no use at all and since it is
able to define any semiotic act,
may in the last analysis become
purely tautological. Yet its
vagueness is at the same time its
force...
ECO, Umberto. A Theory of
Semiotics. Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1979. p.71.
The unresolvable tension
between the coherence of the
interpretant in the instant of a
single semiotic act and its ten-
dency to evaporate in any longer
retrospective view is crucial.
37. CULLER,	 Jonathan.
Saussure. Fontana, 1976. p.19.
38. ibid. pp.37-8.
39. It should be noted that
although Saussure concentrated
on the synchronic perspective in
relation to signifiers, in principle
his argument applies also to sig-
nifieds and Culler does argue
this proposition through.
ibid. pp.44-5.
insisting, in clear-cut either-or terms, that the synchronic
must be privileged over the diachronic in analysis
Saussure perhaps, his interpreters certainly, conveniently
skirt around some of the more paradoxical aspects of the
system of language. The notions of the purely synchronic
and the purely diachronic are in fact both "methodological
fictions"." The linguistic system of English, even more so
than that of French, is not a definite reality. Definitive
English is a myth, we need only think for a moment about
the variety of speech groups, native speakers all, who do
not understand each other. This is not merely a question of
regional accents - a problem of parole - which admittedly
can be quite extreme in their differences, it also involves
dialect, substantial areas of vocabulary and variations in
syntax and grammar, particularly in more complex struc-
tures - all problems of la langue. Some areas of vocabulary
travel in time from one speech community to another, and
from the small community to the larger. For example, the
first users of neologisms related to information technology
in the 1960s were systems designers and scientists: the
general population today would understand much more of
what they said to each other than did the wider
community at the time."
Taking into account this temporal blur in any idea of
the synchronic state, to be methodologically sound, any
slice through the continuum of a language system's devel-
opment should not be strictly synchronic - not the system
frozen in a moment of time (Figure 3.1.4) - but rather
should be an oblique and fuzzy edged section cut across a
diachronically viewed system (Figure 3.1.5.) The former
may be a conceptual possibility, perhaps, but not only
would it involve a distortion of existential and social reality,
which are deemed by Saussure to be irrelevant 'diachronic'
concerns, it would prove a practical impossibility.
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language system frozen
in one moment of time
•	 time continuum
Figure 3.1.4
The impossible synchronic moment
-411(	  time continuum
Figure 3.1.5
The pseudo-synchronic slice
This excursion into Saussure's ideas on the language
system has highlighted the point of departure from struc-
turalism with which the notions of system and model must
deal in this project. The arbitrariness of signifier +
signified, of notation + denotation + connotation, in a
dynamic pseudo-synchronic view is overtaken by the uncer-
tainty of the sign which is a function of speed. The language
has no real existence outside of our participation in its
transformation. The slower the process the more multidi-
mensional and dynamic it will appear, too slow and its
apparent complexity will overwhelm our ability to perceive
or construct order, the faster the process the closer it will
approach the zero dimensionality and invisibility of stasis.
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The museum-design-organization complex, which is
the focus of this modelling exercise, presents the possibil-
ity of bringing into view exotic life in the strange space
that is defined by dimensions that are extraordinarily
divergent in their properties.
1. DAWKINS, Richard. The
Blind Watchmaker. Longman,
1986. p.xiii.
2. PAPANEK, Victor. [1972]
Design for the Real World.
Paladin, 1974. p.18.
This view is a contemporary
humanist counter to the theolog-
ical Argument to Design and, in
Papanek's case, an entirely com-
patible, indeed unavoidable,
complement to his main thesis:
that industrial design as the
slave of run-away free-market
capitalism is despicable and that
designers should turn away from
its reliance on gimmickry and
greed and turn instead towards
the imaginative understanding
and satisfaction of genuine
human needs.
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3.2 Design
The difgrance of 'design'
'Design' is a most ambiguous term.
The complexity of living organisms is matched by the elegant
efficiency of their apparent design ... this amount of complex
design cries out for explanation -.1
The word 'design' can be used to explain anything that
appears to have some organized structure and purpose.
But this is not very helpful. Clearly there is a difference
between the human agent planning and participating in
the process of organizing and structuring things and ratio-
nalizing their purposes, and the 'blind processes' which we
either unconsciously try to mimic or reconstruct, or which
we believe parallel, in some ill-understood way, a particu-
lar and distinctive form of human behaviour. To see a
connection between 'nature' and 'human nature' in one of
these ways is unremarkable enough. But this is not to say
that the phenomena are one and the same.
The reason we enjoy things in nature is that we see an economy
of means, simplicity, elegance and an essential rightness in them.
But they are not design. Though they have pattern, order, and
beauty, they lack conscious intention. If we call them design, we
artificially ascribe our own values to an accidental side issue.2
Human organization can be framed as a questioning of the
design impulse. If, on the one hand, the best organizations,
'ideal' organizations, develop as self-regulating and
spontaneously metamorphosing systems perhaps the
notion of 'organizational design' is anathema. If, on the
other hand, it is only when the values and intentions of the
human element in any system are consciously projected
through its internal relations and workings (almost
inevitably they must be) that we realize 'organization' at
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all, then human organizations are, by definition, designed.
It takes vision and skill at working the material of
any design object to realize complex goals. If those goals
include, as they might in an organizational design context,
the goal of 'evolutionary form', of the ability of the end
product to survive through self-adjustment to a changing
environment, does success mean the end of 'design'? I
mean the question not in the trivial sense of the rational
production of the final design, the design to end all
designs, but, in the ethical and aesthetic senses of ending
the dominion of the human, of finally dissolving the object-
subject dichotomy, of returning the consciousness and the
being to 'nature'. Perhaps it would if design were not
infinitely regressive. But it is. Design is not about the
closure of practical situations - their 'resolution' - it is
about their projection towards a desired future. The
complexity with which design deals is such that only a
limited period of success is possible before the myriad
forces entailed generate further practical situations in
which direction is desirable. Even evolutionary form is
susceptible to disadvantageous mutations and possible
extinction. Design merely nudges such forms in the
direction of beneficial 'genetic' change, towards the next
'moment' in its evolution as though loading the material
cultural dice before they are next thrown into our future.
However, the 'material' of the design object in organiza-
tional design is, or at least begins as, human.
What kind of design is it that abstracts the individual
from its being, fashions the collective in the image some
constructed object of knowledge - machine, organism, brain
••• 3 body, family, garden - that treats the living, thinking,
feeling 'us' as a transmutable material, a 'them', at the
service of an 'other'? What kind of design is it that only
exists on the borderline between the un-organized and the
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dis-organized, between the natural 'order' and our
changing projections of ourselves, between the ends of
science and the process of culture?
In the end, the design of organizations is no different
to any other 'design'. Whatever objects are differentiated
out of the material reality by design are, by the very
process of that differentiation, implicated in the human
understanding of the world, in its shaping and in the
human relations which are its matrix. Perhaps we should
say that no organizational design should ignore the impli-
cated material culture. Material culture precipitates
human organization which forever hangs above a
sedimented past continuously settling out as the chemistry
of design does its work. This is not evolution so long as
material culture is implicated, although it may be a design
that mimics evolution. In nature evolution does not mimic
design: we simply see some of our values reflected back at
us: it is in our nature to desire meaning and, therefore, to
perceive pattern and to construct order in things.
The idea of explaining things in terms of design is
different to the idea of designing things. Although, in order
to initiate and progress the process of designing, there is
clearly a need to engage in a parallel and interacting
process of analysis which uses the language of design in
generating understandings.
The scope of analysis may take in the widest range of
phenomena that appear to have some organised structure
and purpose. Our ability to recognise pattern in things, to
impose, by linguistic and visual means, an order on things,
tells us something about a relationship between subject and
object. It does not necessarily tell us much either about the
object or the subject in themselves. In analysis, therefore,
'design' is a question of differences, differences which are
not merely open to reinterpretation but different in each
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moment of perception. Any resolution of pattern, any defini-
tive form and meaning, is thus perpetually deferred. Design
is also the play of differance, an undecidable state, a state of
becoming. Design only exists in the interval between the
subject and the object. In design the relationship between
subject and object is the interval structure of a matrix
which is its space, its reality; the subject no more has an
independent reality than does the object.
We can talk of the 'subjective world' and the 'objective
world' only in the sense that design is experienced in
certain ways, for, although we cannot step outside of the
matrix without losing an aspect that generates its space,
we work within that space with a feeling for the potential,
the possibility, which the aspects of subject and object
together create.
The beauty of the word "design" is that it refers to two
completely different sets of meanings which are neverthe-
less inseparable: the epitome of a conceptual constellation.
The philosophical faces of this duality are ontological and
epistemological. Design ontology regards design as the
things of order, and from this we get the dominant theme in
design history - a material culture, a system of real things
that embodies and carries forward complex meanings,
beliefs and values. Design epistemology, on the other hand,
regards design as knowledge in practice, which defines the
dominant theme in the design studies tradition of humanis-
tic and methodological investigation, by turns a functional,
psychoanalytical, existential and praxiological project.'
'design' and 'Design'
It will be useful here to make a distinction between uses of
the word 'design'. This device will serve a similar purpose
5. See above: 2.4 Paradigmatic
Space, note 31.
6. PAPANEK, 1972, p.17.
7. NEUTRA, Richard. Survival
Through Design. Oxford
University Press, 1954. pp.vi-vii.
8. PAPANEK, 1972, p.9.
9. MARGOLIN, Victor (ed.)
Design Discourse: History Theory
Criticism. University of Chicago,
1989. p.8.
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to that which Rorty achieved by his distinction between
'philosophy' with a small `p' and 'Philosophy' with a capital
`13'. 5 There is a sense in which design is a central human
trait, related to the idea of understanding, but primarily
concerned with our being in the world, which involves the
perception and imposition of pattern in things.
All that we do, almost all the time, is design, for design is basic
to all human activity. The planning and patterning of any act
towards a desired, foreseeable end constitutes the design process.
... Design is the conscious effort to impose meaningful order.'
In as much as we all shape the world around us to serve
our needs, we all design and from this point on I will refer
to this as 'design'. But there is an altogether different, and
to some a quite dubious, realm of design which is under-
taken on our behalf by trained specialists. Professional
designers plan, devise, specify and supervise changes in
the socially constructed world and they do so by working
on the less stable fringes of some of the most stable institu-
tions. Professional designers are involved in a perpetua-
tion of the capitalist consumerist enterprise - this is the
idea that many sceptics so distrust.
... humanity all over the globe, ever more artificially supplied
and thus often victimized, appears now at the mercy of a
rampant, over-advertised industrial technology which is flooding
us off our physiological bearings ...7
There are professions more harmful than industrial design, but
only a very few of them. And possibly only one profession is
phonier. Advertising design, in persuading people to buy things
they don't need, with money they don't have, in order to impress
others who don't care, is probably the phoniest field in existence
today. Industrial design, by concocting the tawdry idiocies
hawked by advertisers, comes a close second.'
Equally, they are involved in a "distinct sphere of cultural
transformation", 9 an interpretation put forward, for
10. BUCHANAN in MAR-
GOLIN, 1989, p.17.
11. VITTA in MARGOLIN,
1989, p.11.
12. SPARBE, Penny. An
Introduction to Design & Culture
in the Twentieth Century. Unwin
Hyman, 1986. ppaix & xxi
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example, by Margolin, Buchanan, Vitta, Sparke, and
others: "...design involves the vivid expression of
competing ideas about social life", 10 the problem of the
symbolic identity of designed objects "requires that it be
continually transformed while it remains faithful in
substance to its original function", 11 and, in general, this
transformation involves the shaping and transmission of
meaning, beliefs and values through the socially
constructed material culture of designed objects, such that,
at the end of the day, "designed artefacts act as cultural
ciphers" and "design simply becomes one of the forms of
mass communication in modern society.. • 12
What I will refer to by 'Design' then will be that insti-
tutionalized human activity which defines and solves
complex problems by visual and other cognitive means;
exercises a range of mental and physical skills in the
organisation, interpretation and communication of infor-
mation related to the content as well as the process; and
develops formal and technical understandings appropriate
to each context.
The importance of the general term 'design' lies in the
essential, central place given to the practical use of human
faculties in approaching complex, that is, epistemologically
inconsistent, practical situations. Design treats objects
that do not satisfactorily succumb to a purely technical
treatment. So that, in so far as engineering design
suppresses or delegates ideological issues, it is on the
fringes of Design. Design treats objects that pose a
problem beyond the purely personal - whose outcomes
must additionally satisfy social and technical criteria. So
that, in so far as art and craft-based design delegate socio-
technical issues to managers and engineers or simply
suppress them, they are also on the periphery of Design.
13. WALKER, John A. Design
History and the History of
Design. Pluto Press, 1989. pp.4-7.
14. ibid. pp.60-1.
16. ibid. p.58.
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Ontological Object
Arguments about the proper subject matter of design
history tend to put the greatest emphasis on the evidence
of the designed artefact. In empirical research the
rationale for such activities as consulting archives and
interviewing designers and clients is that such sources
may help to reveal the wealth of connections between the
design, production and consumption of artefacts which
constitute design's historical and social importance. This is
the view emphasized by Walker:
Theoretical work: design historians categorize, classify, compare,
interpret and evaluate designed artefacts. ... Normally, empirical
research is undertaken in respect of a predefined body or corpus
of material, usually artefacts of some kind.ls
Even though later in his book "the conventional wisdom
that the designed object is the main focus of design
history" is questioned, first, by dismantling the myth of the
designer as "auteur". Much, perhaps most, designing is
carried out as a group activity in which the influence of the
individual on the resulting product is not clearly differen-
tiable. But, according to Walker, even "when designing is
undertaken by a single person alone in a studio it can be
regarded as social" for five good reasons: (1)
education/training, (2) the influence of peer group, trends
and fashion, (3) tradition and precedent (4) the social
character of design "languages", codes and styles, and (5)
dependence on client and consumer "without whom any
large-scale production would be impossible".'
Secondly this focus is challenged by pointing up the
fetishistic fallacy which tends to isolate the artefact and
suppress the wider object of design.' In practice, there are
four counters to narrow artefactual obsession: (1) study that
extends beyond the artefact itself "to the design process of
16. ibid. pp.58-60.
17. FORTY, Adrian. Objects of
Desire: Design and Society Since
1750. Thames & Hudson, 1986.
pp.6-7.
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which the object is the end result", (2) phenomena such as
styles which "cut across the autonomy of individual items",
(3) types and series of objects that reveal "the relations
between those objects and the people who make, use and
profit from them", and (4) the idea of change in particular
periods or social contexts: the moments of invention, the
varying "populations" of objects, their dispersal, gradual
improvement, variation in form or periodic revision or
combination with other types which may give rise to a new
type, are all important in diminishing the relevance of the
'classic' artefact as the object of study.'
Yet despite these powerful arguments against an idea
of design history that owes much to the art history of
creative individuals and autonomous works, its drive
remains towards connecting the all-important material
culture of designed artefacts with the broad sweep of social
understandings as exemplified by the social sciences -
sociology, economics, anthropology, etc. The connection
which arguably remains peripheral in all of this is that
between the social understandings and what designers
actually produce as they design. This suggests that too
great an emphasis has been placed on design as "a quality
of designed objects", not just in the simple sense of referring
to "the look of things" but in the broader sense of what the
artefact represents as an articulation of and solution to a
problem, as part of an economic system, and as a transmit-
ter of ideas, a cultural object. And that not enough
emphasis has been placed on design as 'what designers do',
again, not just in the simple 'mechanistic' sense of
preparing "instructions for the production of manufactured
goods" but in the broader sense of what designing repre-
sents in terms of problem shaping and solving, economic
(and political) activity, and the everyday discourses of
various social, cultural and technical practices.'
18. The attempt to modify the
essentially linear model of
design process with ever more
comprehensive 'feedback' loops
was taken to extremes by some.
For example, see:
HICKLING, Allen. "Beyond a
linear iterative process?" in
EVANS, Barrie., James Powell
& Reg Talbot (Eds.) Changing
Design. John Wiley & Sons,
1982. pp.275-293.
19. BEAVEN, L and D. DRY,
The Architect's Job Book 4th edi-
tion, London: RIBA Publications,
1983.
Also explored in ALLINSON,
Kenneth. The Wild Card of
Design: a perspective on arch itec -
ture in a project management
environment. Butterworth
Architecture, 1993. pp.372-88.
20. DORMER, Peter. Design
Since 1945. Thames & Hudson,
1993. p.21. (Quoted directly from
Philips Corporate Industrial
Design.)
21. TOPALIAN, Alan. The
Management of Design Projects.
Associated Business Press, 1980.
from Fig. 1.1, p.7.
22. JONES, J C. "A Method of
Systematic Design" in JONES, J
C. & D THORNLEY. (eds.)
Conference on Design Methods
Pergamon, 1963.
23. DARKE, Jane. "The Primary
Generator and the Design
Process" Design Studies Vol 1,
No 1, 1979. pp.36-44.
24. RZEVSKI, George. "On the
Design of a Design Methodology"
in JACQUES & POWELL, 1981,
pp.6-17.
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Epistemological Object
There are many models of the industrial/architectural
design process in which an essentially linear progression
through various stages from inception to evaluation is
proposed, usually with the proviso that the ends of the
process can be joined to imply a cycle of activity.' These
models have originated both from professional and indus-
trial contexts as a result of the accumulated traditions of
practice and management, and from various theorists who
have focussed on the problem of explicit methodology. For
example, the former category includes the RIBA
Architect's "Plan of Work" (Figure 3.2.1)," the Philips
Design Track (Figure 3.2.2), 20 and Alan Topalian's 1979
version of the design process (Figure 3.2.3),21 and the latter
category includes J Christopher Jones' 1963 model for a
method of systematic design (Figure 3.2.4), Jane Darke's
1979 Kuhnian model (adapted from Hillier, W. 1972.)
(Figure 3.2.5), 22 and George Rzevski's 1981 Popperian
"Evolutionary Design Methodology" (Figure 3.2.6)24
INCEPTION
FEASIBILITY
OUTLINE PROPOSALS
SCHEME DESIGN
DETAIL DESIGN
PRODUCTION INFORMATION
BILLS OF QUANTITIES
TENDER ACTION
PROJECT PLANNING
OPERATIONS ON SITE
COMPLETION
Figure 3.2.1
The RIBA Architect's 'Plan of Work' (adapted from BEAVAN &
DRY, 1983.)
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AIMS
REGULATIONS
BRIEFING
CHARACTERISTICS
SPECIFICATIONS
1),
2
RESEARCH
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CREATING
STUDIES
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1),
3
SKETCHES
RENDERINGS
DESIGNING
DIALOGUES
PRECALCULATIONS
4	 5	 6
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PRESENTING DRAWING FOLLOW-UP
PREFERENCES	 DELJVERY	 DOCUMENTATION
MODIFICATIONS	 TESTING	 PROMOTION
Figure 3.2.2
The Philips Design Track
Figure 3.2.3 (right)
Design process: Alan
Topalian, Design and
Project Management
Consultant (1979)
Further
Informationti  Inputs
—..
Analysis
1 Analysis
Listing of all design require-
ments and the reduction of
these to a complete set of logi-
cally related performance speci-
fications.
1.1 Random list of factors
1.2 Classification of factors
1.3 Sources of information
1.4 Interactions between factors
1.6 Performance specifications
1.6 Obtaining agreement
Synthesis
2 Synthesis
Finding possible solutions for
each individual performance
specification and building up
complete designs from these
with least possible compromise.
2.1 Creative thinking
2.2 Partial solutions
2.3 Limits
2.4 Combined solutions
2.5 Solution Plotting
Evaluation
3 Evaluation
Evaluating the accuracy with
which alternative designs fulfil
performance requirements for
operation, manufacture and
sales before the final design is
selected.
3.1 Methods of evaluation
3.2 Evaluation for operation
for manufacture
for sales
n0II.
Figure 3.2.4
Design process for a method of systematic design, J Christopher Jones (1963)
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Generator .1nn1111..	 Conjecture	 •nn1111n Analysis
1 Generator
"The concept or objective that gener-
ates a solution is here called the pri -
mary generator. It can in fact be a
group of related concepts rather than
a single idea. These objectives form a
starting point for the architect, a way
in to the problem; he does not start
by listing all the constraints. Any
particular primary generator may be
capable of justification on rational
grounds, but at the point when it
enters the design process it is usually
more of an article of faith on the part
of the architect."
2 Conjecture
The first conceptualizing image,
the conjecture is put forward
from the designer's fund of
experience and knowledge. She
has been aware all along that
there are several detailed
requirements to be met by the
design, but performance on
these parameters is not speci-
fied in advance. The conjecture
is put forward without the need
to separate out different factors;
process and product are seen in
a holistic way.
3 Analysis
Requirements are now made
explicit and the conjecture
evaluated against them, the
design concept modified and
worked up in detail by ever
deeper analysis of and evalua-
tion against detailed require-
ments, constraints and other
factors.
Figure 3.2.5
Design process: Jane Parke (1979) Kuhnian model
131 TS EE	 nnj111111.
131 
is a current problem, that is, an
aspect of the world assumed by a
problem solver to be deficient in
some way. A `problem solver', in
this context, may be an individ-
ual, a social group, or even a
species.
is a tentative solution to the
TS 
problem Pi. It may take the
form of a random mutation, a
new scientific theory, an inven-
tion, a conspiracy, etc.
EE is the process of error elimina-
tion from the proposed solu-
tion TS by means of repeated
testing and modifications.
Error elimination may be car-
ried out, for example, by expo-
sure to the real world where
only a `correct' solution sur-
vives (survival of the fittest),
by experimentation with real
or abstract models, or by
analysis.
P2 is a solution to the current problem
Pi which inevitably represents a new
problem. This new problem is in gen-
eral, not created intentionally. It
emerges, rather, as a result of new
relationships which are brought into
existence with every change. The
real world is so complex that it is
practically impossible to foresee all
changes in relationships and all con-
sequences of these changes, which
are found to be generated by any
problem solving activity.
Figure 3.2.6
Design process: George Rzevski (1981) Popperian model.
Even in Design history there tends to be an implicit accep-
tance of the linearity of the socio-economic space of which
Design is a part. In describing a Production-consumption
model of design history's field of research, which owes its
conceptual base to the Grundrisse of Marx, Walker depicts
a two-dimensional space defined by a horizontal time
continuum divided into repeated cycles, and a vertical
25. WALKER, 1989, pp.68-73.
26. See: Glossary.
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range of social phenomena. The space of the design process
is placed before that of the manufacturing process which
itself is succeeded by processes of circulation/distribution
and then consuming/customizing (Figure 3.2.7).25
Accepting for the moment the succession of synchronies
implied in the vertical bands of the model, this highly
simplified schema indicates the products of each process
(apart from the last) as coinciding with, or marking the
boundary between, one process and the next. The
manufacturing and subsequent circulation/distribution
processes include in their products "designed goods",
however, the design process itself does not normally result,
in any immediate sense, in designed goods. Its products
are "designs and prototypes": the former I would take to
include visualizations of various types, from concept
sketches, mood boards and development drawings to
rendered perspectives, design specifications and computer
animations; and the latter, scale models as well as full-size
mock-ups.' In practice, as is admitted in Walker's exposi-
tion, the linearity of the model is a myth. The heuristic
purpose it serves here is to point up the conceptual differ-
ence between the designed artefact as an embodiment of
design concerns, or a centre around which they may be
organized, and several other possible objects of design
study. The design process may be construed as an organi-
zational centre and its products as primary evidence.
However, to complete the cycle some transformation must
occur between the notion that the final process "consumes"
the end products of the sequence of earlier ones and that
the chain of processes begins without material inputs from
past cycles. Consumption, rather than being a "using up"
of things is, to an increasing extent, their accumulation
and transfer. And the design process, rather than
expecting in large part to process fresh material and infor-
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Figure 3.2.7
Design History's Field of Research:
Production-consumption Model (from WALKER, 1989)
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27. CHECKLAND, Peter.
Systems Thinking, Systems
Practice. John Wiley, 1981.
pp.190-1.
mation, and to develop and specify new techniques, is more
and more commonly largely concerned with recycling
material and ideas, and with integrating and transforming
the increasing complexity of the obsolete.
A parallel to this linearity may be found in the devel-
opment of hard systems methods. Checkland compares
Jenkins (1969) methodology and the RAND Corporation
methodology, both of which are of the 'hard' systems
variety, with the 'soft' systems methodology developed
during the 1970s at Lancaster University. Starting with
"a relatively well-defined problem which the analyst may,
to a large extent, take as 'given', once the client requiring
help is identified" the two example 'hard' systems method-
ologies are able to proceed in an ideally linear fashion.
Progress is through: analysis of decision-makers' objectives,
placing of the system in a hierarchy of systems and its
performance specification; the identification and compari-
son of alternative systems and then the selection of the one
which best meets the need and is feasible, or, following
analysis, design of the system by quantitative methods,
simulation, and optimization; and finally implementation
of the designed system. We can see direct parallels with the
implied linear rationality of the design process models
noted above (Figures 3.2.1-6.) In every case but one the
design process follows a general pattern. To summarise, it
is deemed to start with a process of identifying a more or
less definitive 'brief' which describes specific problems, sets
out specific objectives, and/or defines specific performance
criteria. This brief, once documented, is in principle the
'given' definition of the design project and is followed
through in: the development of design concepts; their
visualization, transformation and formative evaluation; the
synthesis or selection of an outline solution; its aesthetic
and technical development and detailed design and specifi-
a.	 Start with a client defined
problem which the design-
er accepts largely as
given.
Start: an urge to solve a relatively well-defined problem
which the analyst may, to a large extent, take as 'given',
one for which the client requiring help is identified.
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cation to meet an array of resource constraints and regula-
tions; and its implementation through production, installa-
tion/distribution, maintenance and summative evaluation.
The parallel is summarised in Figure 3.2.8.
Simple linear model of the
design process
Jenkins (1969) example of 	 RAND Corporation (1950s) 	 Checkiand (1981) 'soft'
'hard' systems methodology	 'hard' systems methodology	 systems methodology
Implement the designed system
b.	 Identify definitive brief,
specific problems, objec-
tives, and/or performance
criteria.
c.	 Develop design concepts,
visualize, transform, and
evaluate.
d.	 Synthesize or select out-
line solution, develop,
detail and specify for pro-
duction.
1.	 Implement design and
evaluate product.
Analysis by naming the
system, its objectives, etc.,
and its place In a hierarchy
of systems.
Design the system by
quantitative model building
and simulation.
Optimize the design, using
the defined (economic)
performance criterion.
Analysis by examining the
decision-maker's objec-
tives as expressed In the
stated need for the
required system with spec-
ified performance.
Identify alternative sys-
tems for meeting the
defined need and compare
them by modelling using
the performance criteria.
Select the alternative
which best meets the need
and is feasible.
Start: an urge to bring
about Improvement In a
social system in which
there is felt to be an ill-
defined problem situation.
Express by examining ele-
ments of 'structure' and
'process' and their mutual
relationship. Tentative def-
inition of systems relevant
to improving the problem
situation.
Formulate root definitions
of relevant systems and
build conceptual models of
those systems.
Improve the conceptual
models using the formal
system model and other
system thinking.
Compare the conceptual
models with 'what is' in
the real situation, and use
the comparison to define
desirable, feasible
changes in the real world.
Implement the agreed
changes.
e.	 Design process of the linear systematic type and hard systems approaches know from
the start what change is needed.
Figure 3.2.8
The parallel between linear models of the design process, and 'hard' and 'soft' systems
methodologies. (Adapted from CHECKLAND, 1981.)
Jane Darke's Kuhnian model of the design process (Figure
3.2.5) exhibits an interesting variation in which the
elements of a definitive brief are not made explicit until
after a design 'conjecture' has been visualized at which
point an iterative process of increasingly detailed evalua-
tion and modification is engaged which 'develops' the
initial concept to a satisfactory conclusion. The reversal of
logic, represented by replacing the problem-solution formu-
lation with one of conjecture-refutation, parallels the 'soft'
systems reversal of 'hard' systems strategy in which
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tentative system definition is followed by comparison with
the real world and a cycle of better and better 'expressions'
and 'improvements'.
Soft systems methodology came about through an
attempt to extend, what has come to be known as 'hard',
systems analysis, that had proved "demonstrably success-
ful within its own field" of engineering, to social systems
and civilian problems. The methodology very quickly
departed from earlier forms, initially for one crucial reason,
"Hard' systems thinking is goal-directed" and in social
systems "goals are often obscure".' In the context of a
"rationalized" explanation, soft systems methodology was
described in a "chronological ...logical sequence ...most
suitable for describing it but which does not have to be
followed in using it!" and later it is also described as a
methodology which embraces the principle of 'iteration', in
the sense of a repeated refining or revising procedure. This,
along with the principle of including a dialogical procedure
of comparison between conceptual model and actual
situation, allows the process to begin with a problematic
situation in which there are ill-defined problems, if there
are 'problems' at all, rather than with a well-defined
problem, and to proceed towards a 'change' in the situation
rather than towards a well-understood solution type.
I have already argued that design is characterized by
its relevance to epistemologically complex situations in the
social construction of material culture, situations in which
neither purely technical nor purely artistic treatments are
adequate to the production of 'material' objects whether
they be things, places, messages or systems. We may
expect therefore that Design, as actually practiced, will
bear comparison with soft systems methodology rather
better than with either hard systems methodology or insti-
tutionally prescribed models of the design process.
158
The now somewhat discredited 'design methods
movement' of the 1960s arrived at this watershed just at a
time when hard systems was becoming established and
proving its power. With nowhere to go but into the ghettos
of engineering and architecture, where it was still possible
to contemplate the reduction of design to essentially
technical issues, it floundered. This history is well
documented through a well known series of early design
methods conferences and symposia - "Imperial College
London in 1962 (Jones and Thornley, 1963) ... Birmingham
in 1966 (Gregory, 1966)" and Portsmouth in 1967. Thirteen
years after the critical 1967 symposium Geoffrey
Broadbent, in his review of progress in design methods
study, recounted that it:
... had been set up by Tony Ward to include a specific confronta -
tion between those whom he saw as Behaviourists, representing a
mechanised, quantified view of design and those (including
himself) he saw as Existentialist IPhenomenologists (Former
Marxists) concerned, above all, with the "human-ness" of human
beings.29
29. BROADBENT, Geoffrey.
"The Morality of Designing" in
JACQUES & POWELL, 1981,
p.309.
An inevitable split occurred which effectively ruled out the
kind of development that, according to Checkland,
occurred in systems analysis in the early 1970s.
Consequently a broader view of design process, within a
unified discipline of design studies, has not developed out
of earlier generalized design methods. The engineering
and architecture ghettos still persist, represented by the
journal Design Studies (UK) and Design Methods and
Theories (USA), and interest in design modelling has all
but disappeared in relation to the broader (and softer)
areas of design. The only significant departures from the
'hard' core of design methods, occurred in the mid-1970s
when an attempt to 'reduce' design to a principle of
universal participation succeeded only in alienating a
30. CROSS, Nigel. (Ed.) Design
Participation. Academy
Editions, 1972.
31. JONES, J. Christopher.
Design Methods: Seeds of
Human Futures. Revised Ed.
John Wiley & Sons, 1981.
32. JONES, J. Christopher.
Designing Designing. Architec-
ture Design and Technology
Press, 1991 (previously pub-
lished as Essays in Design. John
Wiley & Sons, 1984.)
33. Interesting though these
developments were - Design
Participation reflected the fash-
ionable politics of the time but
also seriously investigated
opportunities and methods for
participative planning and
design processes some of which
have influenced the work of
leading practitioners. However,
the ideal of the designer as 'facil-
itator' has not succeeded in any
but the most limited circum-
stances. Broadbent's criticism of
J C Jones' more recent work is
thoroughgoing, accusing him
also of attempting to 'reduce'
design to a game of chance oper-
ations, a procedure which is nei-
ther original nor adequate. He
cites the work of both artists and
musicians in the first half of this
century - Stravinsky Poetics of
Music (1942), Han Arp's paper
collage Rectangles arranged
according to the laws of chance
(1916), and Marcel Duchamp's
Large Glass The Bride and the
Bachelors (1915-23) - and con-
cludes that although the artist
may experiment and please him-
self in this way, in design "This
whole resort to the random
seems to me a profound denial of
man's creative spirit..."
[ibid. pp.311-12 & 313-25.]
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significant portion of the 'professional' design audience,"
and J Christopher Jones, one of the founding fathers of
design methods and author of a seminal collection of
design methods organized into a working manual for
designers,' switched his interests and approach to one of
speculating on and playing with the irrational and chance
aspects of design;" a move which has brought considerable
criticism from those who admired his earlier academic
seriousness and sense of responsibility."
Cross (1984) has suggested that the emergence of a
mature discipline of design methodology has followed a
thematic movement from the 1960s preoccupation with
"prescription of an ideal process" through subsequent
concern with "description of the intrinsic nature of design
problems" and "observation of the reality of design activity"
to more recent 'reflection on the fundamental concepts of
design"." Rittel considers the interest in methodology to be
a sign of crisis in the design field. In his analysis:
Important design problems have changed their character from
almost professional problems to the type of problem where this
approach does not seem satisfactory any more, and therefore they
have begun to talk about methodology. The main purpose of
design methodology seems to be to clarify the nature of the design
activity and of the structure of its problems. This role of design
methodology seems to me to be much more important than its
practical use in dealing with concrete problems.'
The crisis we can see here is in the sharp division that has
developed between design practice and design methodol-
ogy. The kind of venture in which Checkland has been a
leading figure, of progressing two fronts through action
research, on the one hand, advancing theoretical
knowledge in systems analysis, and on the other, success-
fully intervening in complex real-world situations, is one
which has not happened in quite the same way in design
methodology. In architecture and engineering the sites of
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34. CROSS, Nigel. (ed.)
Developments in Design
Methodology, Wiley, 1984. p.x.
RITTEL, Horst W J.
"Second-generation Design
Methods", interviewed by
Donald P GRANT & Jean-Pierre
PROTZEN, in CROSS, 1984,
pp.317-27.
36. About 10% of articles in
Design Studies are of pedagogi-
cal research, for example, see:
DINHAM, S. M. "Teaching
as design: theory, research and
implications for design teach-
ing." pp. 80-8 and,
KENDALL, Stephen. "On
design reasoning: lessons from
teaching architectural technolo-
gy." pp. 89-95, Design Studies
Vol 10 No 2 (April 1989)
LEE, T. Y. & D. F. Radcliffe,
"Innate design abilities of first
year engineering and industrial
design students." Design Studies
Vol 11 No 2 (April 1990) pp. 96-
106.
CROSS, Nigel. "The nature
and nurture of design ability."
Design Studies Vol 11 No 3
(July 1990) pp. 127-40.
37. CROSS, 1984, op cit.
methodological research of this type have almost exclu-
sively concerned the student designer, and have had
overtly pedagogical aims." It may be that design, if it can
be methodologically circumscribed, ultimately involves
softer than the softest systems thinking, that no amount of
subtle reversal in logics will ever be enough, and that the
very notion of the path through a design activity as the
proper focus of methodological study is mistaken. In 1984
design methodology seemed to Nigel Cross to be, "in a
much stronger condition to return to its origins, to the
prescription of realistic ideals".' Yet this appears to have
been over-optimistic. It has its own specialists, few of
whom are designers, who follow their researches wherever
they may lead which is often a long way from the practices
of design. Whilst the practice of Design has arguably
shifted its contextual understanding from the socio-cultural
and socio-technical towards one at once more pluralistic
and accepting of the incommensurable nature of the
personal and the social, and more dynamic and holistic -
the psycho-ecological, if you will - design methodology lags
behind in only recently shifting its epistemological ground
from the pseudo-scientific to the socio-cultural and pseudo-
linguistic in which notions of social construction (cultural
and technological) and communicative practice (phenome-
nological/hermeneutic praxis) have come to the fore.
Design, Post-Design
These 'paradigmatic' shifts have been interpreted by some
as paralleling the post-War onset of post-industrialism and
postmodernism, at least across the so-called 'developed'
nations of the world. But whether or not we accept such
labels, radical shifts in the scope and practice of design
38. DORMER, 1993, p.7.
39. ibid. p.12. Dormer cites
Raymond Loewy (1893-1986) as
a fine example of:
The first generation of designers
who came to maturity in the late
1930s in the USA [and] saw
themselves as capable of turning
a hand to anything, irrespective
of whether it was a casing for a
locomotive or a box for an iced
cake.
Penny Sparke notes that during
the intense competition of the
Depression years "manufactur-
ers with the aid of advertising
agencies" located individuals,
who "although visually trained,
also had first-hand knowledge of
the commercial world". A "fully
fledged industrial design profes-
sion" emerged within a decade.
In addition to Loewy, she lists
Walter Dorwin Teague, Norman
Be! Geddes, Henry Dreyfuss,
Donald Deskey, Russel Wright,
John Vassos, Egmont Arens,
Lurelle Guild, Joseph Sinel and
George Sakier as examples of
the new "consultant" industrial
designer.
SPARKE, 1986, pp.94 & 98.
40. James Gardner (1907-96)
first set up in independent prac-
tice in 1947; until the outbreak
of war he had worked as a com-
mercial artist with the London-
based Carlton Studios. During
World War II he was the Chief
Deception Officer responsible for
the Invasion Deception Plan. A
versatile and prolific indepen-
dent designer, he is universally
regarded as the father of 'mod-
ern' exhibition design.
[MacCARTHY, Fiona & Patrick
NUTTGENS. Eye for Industry:
Royal Designers for Industry
1936-1986. Lund Humphries &
the Royal Society of Arts, 1986.
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have certainly taken place. As Dormer has noted,
designers have proved remarkably adaptable to the roles
demanded of them in the changing economic and cultural
environment.
Whenever the market place changes - as it has in Europe, for
example, from black austerity to green concern - then the
designer changes with it. The designer is a chameleon: he or she
can, as needed, be a stylist, a corporate image strategist, an
ergonomist or an environmentalist."
Having regard for the pseudo-synchrony which is necessar-
ily created by (or is the subject of) any modelling project, it
is as well to point out that what we now regard as the post-
War, and also as the post-industrial/postmodern, period
coincides with Dormer's dating of the beginnings of
`professionalized' Design in 1945. He makes the general
point that, US precursors natwithstandirg, wag i&i the
immediate post-War period that the design 'consultant' -
initially a generalist - became established.' To this we can
add that disciplines such as exhibition design and graphic
design can identify their separation from the general area
of commercial art and their formalization with the same
period.' Certain aspects of these origins are still with us
even if accompanied by more recent and more powerful
elements in the constellation of contemporary design. For
example, it was James Gardner who transformed the
traditional focus, in exhibition design, on display technique
into a concern for the visitor's experience. This process was
visible even in his first post-War commission, the Britain
Can Make It exhibition, organized by the Council of
Industrial Design (CoID) and held in the still empty
galleries of the Victoria and Albert Museum in 1946.4'
Although, at that time, an intuitive response to practical
difficulties, the concern has since become a foundational
principle supported by systematized methods of research,
p.80. and GARDNER, James.
The Artful Designer: Ideas off the
Drawing Board, 1993, pp.59.ff1
41. "Instead of presenting goods
to the eye, as one would in an
open market - and that is how
exhibitions have evolved - I
tucked them round corners,
behind screens and in little
enclaves, so at first the visitor
would see lots of 'decor' but no
goods - wouldn't even notice if
there were no goods at all. This
introduced a surprise element."
[GARDNER, 1993, pp.129-30.]
42. DORMER, Peter. The
Meanings of Modern Design.
Thames & Hudson, 1990. p.10.
43. See (8) above.
44. WALKER, 1989, p.81. cites
Michael Farr's Design in British
Industry: a Mid-Century Survey.
Cambridge University Press,
1955. as a rare example of a syn-
chronic design study.
In, BERGER, Peter. &
Thomas Luckmann. The Social
Construction of Reality. Penguin,
1967, a sociological perspective
on the notion of social construc-
tion is established.
BIJKER, Weibe E., Thomas
P. Hughes & Trevor Pinch. The
Social Construction of
Technological Systems. MIT
Press, 1987, reports a number of
studies which show the impor-
tance of accounting for change
phenomena without resorting to
teleological devices in historical
narrative, and without privileg-
ing the human actor in any
process of change.
VIRILIO, Paul. [1984] Lost
Dimension. Trans. Daniel
Moshenberg. New York:
Semiotext(e), 1991, in talking
about the new sense of dimen-
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planning and design evaluation. And the grounding of
these methods in education, communication and
marketing theory (ideology) now far outweighs any moral
or pragmatic stance the designer may profess as a question
of 'professional' approach.
Dormer has suggested that the designer can be seen as:
a broker of ideas and values, a middle personage between
manufacturers, engineers and applied scientists on the one hand
and the consumer on the other.'
(The former group should also include, in a usually less
direct relation, artists, curators, critics and educators.) If
taken in broader terms, terms which do not privilege the
individual 'stylist' in the way that Dormer implies in the
thesis of his book, such a proposition can be reflected in a
recasting of the Production-consumption model discussed
by Walker.' In this revision the relatively hard boundaries
between the design and manufacturing processes and
between the manufacturing and circulation/distribution
processes can be softened to account for the smearing of
design activity across the three processes. Looser bound-
aries also more easily accommodate the interpenetration of
other elements which set up both the dynamic space of
intervals and the different speeds of action which the
broader spectrum of, what might be called, the social
construction of material culture entails. Following the
example of such as Michael Farr, Peter Berger and
Thomas Luclunann, Weibe Bijker, Thomas Hughes, and
Trevor Pinch, and Paul Virilio, amongst others," the
differentiation of a variety of 'actors' in the system of
socially constructed material culture is an analytical phase
which should present us with a pseudo-synchronic picture
that arbitrarily shifts its frame to keep Design at its
centre. In this picture, society, consumer society specifi-
cally, becomes the surrounding context to which Design
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sionality brought to the experi-
ence of architectural/urban
space via the televisual media,
demonstrates the pseudo-syn-
chronicity which must character-
ize such thick description if
explanation is not to reduce to
the banality of journalistic sur-
face - the zero degree of narra-
tive.
relates through its diverse manifestations - architecture,
systems design, engineering, product design, graphic
design, media and advertising, etc. Each site is an interval,
a range of possibility, which gains its specific character,
form and meaning, from its contingent elements and the
speeds of their interactions.
+
As the next section argues, the museum presents the
widest range of phenomena in microcosm and, therefore,
represents a site which is ideally suited to the exploration
of socially constructed material culture and the problem-
atic of multidimensionality, of complexity, in organiza-
tional and design modelling.
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3.3 Museum
Ideology
1. HOOPER-GREENHILL,
Eilean. Museums and the
Shaping of Knowledge. London:
Routledge, 1992. p.l.
2. See: RIPLEY, Dillon. The
Sacred Grove. Simon &
Schuster, 1969. pp.24-7, and
ALEXANDER, Edward P.
Museums in Motion. Nashville:
American Association for State
and Local History, 1979, pp.6-7.
3. Like the original Greek mou
seion many of these are collec-
tions of material used only in
teaching and research, and the
emphasis is on the scholarly
activity of the community not on
the collection, care and display
of artefacts. See: LEWIS,
Geoffrey. "Museums and their
precursors: a brief world sur-
vey", p.6, and WARHURST,
Alan. "University Museums",
p.93, in THOMPSON, John. M.
A. (ed.) Manual of Curatorship.
Butterworth/Museums
Association, second edition 1992.
pp.5-21. & 93-100.
4. For example, the treasury of
Saint Paul's Cathedral in
London, the monuments of the
Hoby family chapel Bisham
(Berkshire), and paintings and
decorative art of the Vatican col-
lections.
5. Alexander, 1979, p.8.
6. PEARCE, S M. Museums,
Objects and Collections: A
Cultural Study. Leicester
University Press, 1992. p.49.
There is a sense in which the entire history of museum
forms and ideologies is present to us in the 1990s. The
temple of the muses, the cabinet of curiosities, the freak
show, the gallery, the archive, the depository, the research
establishment, and the cultural and educational institu-
tion all exist today in forms reminiscent of those of the
past even if the social forces that now sustain them are
quite different.
...it is a mistake to assume that there is only one form of reality
for museums, only one fixed mode of operating ...Museums, in
common with all other social institutions, serve many masters,
and must play many tunes accordingly.1
Philosophical and religious collections, which were charac-
teristic of the first recorded museums,' have their latter
day equivalents in University departments' and in a wide
variety of religious buildings, including cathedrals, monas-
teries, and temples.'
The gentleman's cabinet of curiosities, a small room
or specially constructed piece of furniture in which "stuffed
animals, botanical rarities, small works of art ... artefacts,
and curios" were assembled into dense mixed displays, is
often regarded as the precursor of the modern museum.'
However, the modern equivalent is the most common of all
types of 'museum', the personal collection related to family,
travels, hobby or obsession. Most people collect something;
many collect particular kinds of things with a passion and
curiosity that makes the result different in kind to aimless
accumulation or utilitarian but excessive hoarding and
more than mere assemblages of ornaments.'
7. ibid. p.51. Pearce goes on to
say that:
The kind of object collected is not
important: what matters is the
reframing of the object within the
collection, as an act of formal
admission from one state to
another. In a certain sense,
objects have rites of passage as
do we, and for them this comes
when they enter the classification
system, the dividing, comparing
and contrasting of whatever kind
which for each collection consti
tute the rules of the game. The
nature of the rules are [sic]
equally unimportant - they can
be rational or idiosyncratic - for
all of them truly contribute a
transformation, and the result
ing collection runs beside the
world of everyday life but does
not reflect it in a direct way.
[p.52.]
In this notion of collection as
"artist's play", essentially an
existential and psychological
insight, we have the basis of a
view of museum process as a cre-
ative activity. See below 4.3 for a
discussion of this `museality' in
organizations in general
8. BENNETT, Tony. "The
Exhibitionary Complex." New
Formations. 1988/4, pp. 73-102.
In the earlier 19th century, fol-
lowing the lesson of the British
Museum, the opening of public
museums was being encouraged
and traditional popular fairs dis-
couraged:
... owing to their association with
riot, carnival, and, in their side-
shows, the display of rnonstrosi
ties and curiosities which, no
longer enjoying elite patronage,
were now perceived as impedi
ments to the rationalizing influ -
ence of the restructured exhibi -
tionary complex.
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Collections lend themselves to make-believe and the construction
of fantasies: adults who collect teddy bears (and many do) are
presumably playing out a dream of golden Edwardian
childhood, while those who collect Japanese swords are preoccu -
pied with rather different images.'
The freak show and the collection of natural curiosities,
once familiar features of the fairground, and popular
spectacles amongst the commercial entertainments that
assembled outside the official sites of international exposi-
tions or world fairs, remind us that we are drawn to the
shocking and the alien and all too easily entertained by
our own discomfort and fear.' Although the freak show as
such is rightly very much out of favour, the modern
waxworks, in its more gory and mythical moments, plays
on similar responses and remains as popular as ever.'
The public gallery (from the Italian galleria) persists
in two principal forms: the modern art gallery or art
museum, and the shopping mall and its antecedents - the
department store and the shopping arcade.' The spatial
archetypes of the art museum owe their origins to the
galleria (1) the long side-lit room hung with paintings and
(2) the enfilade of rooms arranged off a central space which
was often top-lit (a feature later extended to all rooms to
maximise hanging wall space)."
The archive remains an essential modern form that
differs from its original only in the technology that has
become integral to the process of documentation and
retrieval. It also exists in a radically new form, the
computer database, a virtual form that relies wholly on the
electronic reality of cyberspace and the interface provided
by the computer screen and keyboard and the modem.'
The depository, as treasury, cellar, granary and
warehouse, is perhaps the most ancient of all forms. It
provides the model for the great reference and resource
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Yet, by the end of the century,
fairs were to be actively promoted
as an aid rather than a threat to
public order. ... The primary site
for this transformation of fairs
and the conduct of their publics
... was supplied by the fair zones
of the late-nineteenth-century
expositions. ... The product of the
initiative of popular showmen
and private traders eager to
exploit the market the expositions
supplied, they consisted largely
of an ad hoc mélange of both new
(mechanical rides) and tradition -
al popular entertainments (freak
shows, etc.) ... [p.86]
9. For example, London shows
such as the London Dungeon,
Royal Britain, and the Tower
Pageant.
10. MacKEITH, Margaret. The
History and Conservation of
Shopping Arcades. Mansell
Publishing, 1986. The renais-
sance model for the arcade was
probably	 provided	 by
Brunelle s chi' s Foundling
Hospital of 1419 in Florence.
The central court with galleried
upper floors was a later develop-
ment of the Italian and French
form of apartments above arcad-
ed shops. The original Royal
Exchange of 1568 in London and
its competitor to the west, the
New Exchange of 1609, provided
a model for a wide variety of
merchant's exchanges in Britain
for the next 300 years.
11. See BRAWNE, M. The Muse-
um Interior. Thames and
Hudson, 1982 And the discussion
of the ideal form of a museum in
the development of the National
Archaeological Museum, Amman,
Jordan in BRAWNE, M. From
Idea to Building. Butterworth
Architecture, 1992, pp.174-90.
collections.' Today the bulk of most museum collections
remains in storage, a fact which is not entirely accounted
for by lack of exhibition space." Many collections contain
material which, though unsuitable for display, is deliber-
ately acquired to further an encyclopaedic purpose. Such
ambitions characterize the museum as depository and
survive enshrined in collecting policies of institutions such
as the British Museum, and the Natural History
Museum.' The largest proportion of these vast 'hidden'
collections receive only the minimum attention required to
ensure their survival - documentation, secure storage,
stable environment and periodic inspection.'
As in the case of the Royal Institution, systematic
study based on the collection of comprehensive material
evidence provided a central object to many of the museums
that were founded in response to the Enlightenment
revision of knowledge.' Amongst more recently estab-
lished museums it is often those whose collections are the
most representative of the encyclopaedic ambition that are
also the most committedly engaged in or most active in
supporting research.' Since the 1980s emphasis has
shifted from the former to the latter method of pursuing
research in British national museums but the image of the
museum as research establishment remains a powerful
one particularly to the academic community.'
The explicitly educational purpose of many museums
founded in the 19th century was often combined with aims
focussed on national identity and improvement.' In many
European countries museums of national culture were
created whilst in the UK the larger regional museums
already housed the collections able to support such a
mission and collectively served a similar purpose.' The
museum as cultural and educational institution now rarely
seeks to serve such an explicit nationalistic purpose as
12. The Museum Documentation
Association aims:
to promote excellence in all
aspects of documentation by: the
development of documentation
standards; the provision of
encouragement and advice, to
increase the pool of documenta -
Lion knowledge, expertise and
resources within the museum
community as a whole: and to
facilitate best practice, especially
in small museums ...
Museums Association, Muse-
ums Yearbook, 1993-94, p.279.
The technologies used to achieve
these aims are invariably com-
puter-based, and the possibili-
ties they introduce for facilitat-
ing direct public access to collec-
tion information in exhibitions
are being explored, for example:
the Micro Gallery in the new
Sainsbury wing of the National
Gallery in London.
13. HOOPER-GREENHILL,
1992. In Ch.6. 'The Repository of
the Royal Society" Hooper-
Greenhill discusses the
Foucaulclian notion of the classi-
cal episteme in relation to the
collecting activities of the Royal
Society (founded in 1660).
Resemblance as a primary func -
tion of empirical knowledge was
now perceived to be muddled,
confused and disordered. [p.134]
Comparison, a methodical order-
ing observation and measure-
ment of phenomena, was to pro-
vide the basis for a reform of
knowledge:
Representation of the empirical
world was to be effected by Ian -
guage which bore a transparent
relationship to things. At this
time, words, rather than repre -
senting thought, were understood
to represent material things.
Thus it was thought that it
would be possible to form a `uni -
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industrial improvement. It is more likely to pursue a
popular cultural object, such as the media,' or a broader
educational mission such as the public understanding of
science," or simply to serve as a focus for cultural events."
If we focus on the institution that we now formally identify
as the museum, and if each form persists in some more or
less expected place, we may also recognize a collectivity of
qualities drawn from these forms and also the tensions
between them that arise out of their contradictory
discourses. We should then be wary of any proposition that
appears to synthesize the museum in systemic terms.
Whenever we look at a social institution as complex
and as difficult to pin down as the museum perhaps we
should recall the arguments Miunford used in The Conduct
of Life to expose the fallacy of 'systems' - by which he
meant primarily philosophical and political systems that
are characterized by their prescription of ideology that
artificially reduces the complexities and uncertainties of
life - and expound the need for "organic syncretism"."
Alexander described the museum pluralistically:
... we may think of the museum as collection, the museum as
conservation, the museum as research, the museum as exhibi -
tion, the museum as interpretation, the museum as cultural
centre, and the museum as social instrument.'
and captured in the title of his seminal work - Museums in
Motion - their purposeful, responsive, and changing
nature. Following the developments of the 1980s, both in
the field of museum planning, organization and design,
and of museology, Alexander's attempt at an encompassing
statement may now seem too narrow and orthodox. We
may now also think of the museum as enterprise,' the
museum as development,' the museum as media,' the
museum as event," the museum as disciplinary
versal' collection of material
things that would be identical in
classification to the 'universal'
language. [p.145]
The Royal Society became a pub-
lic institution and its Repository
the object of experimental sci-
ence conceived as a communal
pursuit of knowledge following
Baconian ideals, and a collection
that was to become "a complete
system of solid philosophy"
ORNSTEIN, M. The Role of
Scientific Societies in the
Seventeenth Century Chicago,
1938, p.109. quoted by Hooper-
Greenhill, p147.
14. On average a little over 65%
of space in museums is devoted
to permanent and temporary
exhibitions, whilst a little under
15% is devoted to storage.
See: Figure 2.18 in PRINCE,
David R. & Bernadette Higgins-
McLoughlin. Museums UK: The
Findings of the Museums Data-
Base Project. Museums
Association, 1987. pp.43-4.
However, on average only about
20% of collections are on perma-
nent display with 80% in store.
See: Figure 2 in LORD, Barry.,
Gail Dexter LORD & John
NICKS. The Cost of Collecting.
HMSO, 1989. pp.18-20.
Clearly collection items are on
average about 15 times more
densely packed into storage
spaces than into exhibition
spaces. The size of this differen-
tial is a recent phenomenon.
Since the 1960s the proportion of
exhibition space devoted to inter-
pretive material and supporting
structure has dramatically
increased and as a consequence
the density of collection material
diminished. The change has been
most marked in natural history
museums where many systemat-
ic specimen displays have been
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mechanism,' the museum as virtual realities" and, as if
to reflexively invalidate the whole notion of a museum, the
museum as ideology." Many of these typifications can be
traced back to particular institutions, projects or
movements some of which predate Alexander's observa-
tions. It is simply that we look at them with eyes condi-
tioned by our changed understandings of the world. If the
notion of pluralism seemed quite novel in relation to such
institutions as museums in 1979 when the bulk of the
museums professional community were still desperately
seeking a unifying definition of "museum"," and a coordi-
nating national (in some quarters, supranational) cultural
policy,' fifteen years on, it seems unavoidable. After as
many years administration in the UK under a single
political party, after economic boom followed by the most
severe recession since the 1930s, after the effective
removal of philosophical foundations and the working
through of many of the implications for praxis (including
museum practice), after the general crisis of identity in
many of the ex-communist countries of eastern Europe, ex-
colonial countries of Africa and East Asia, and the war-
torn Middle-East ... after the possibility of complacency
has been replaced by the alternatives of cultural anaesthe-
sia or psychosis, and that of ideological certainty by a
profound sense of uncertainty and difference, the need to
develop a radical pluralism and to accommodate the
incommensurable through open and continuing conversa-
tion has become a priority.'
Museums have responded to this need. They have
changed by moving simultaneously in a variety of direc-
tions, without losing their sense of 'community' and, ironi-
cally perhaps, without losing the ability to voice common
purposes when politically and socially necessary. If there is
an ideology of museum it is one that operates on a meta-
replaced by multi-media educa-
tional environments in which a
combination of models, diorama,
graphic communications, audio-
visual presentations, and inter-
active information technology,
are the norm and 'real' collection
items a rarity.
16. The British Museum's collec-
tions have a world-wide scope
and once acquired an item is
held in perpetuity.
In most museums there is an
assumption that no parts of the
collections can be disposed of- in
the British Museum this
assumption is backed by Act of
Parliament.
WILSON, David M. The British
Museum: Purpose and Politics.
Trustees of the British Museum,
1989. p.24.
16. It should be noted however
that the first of these require-
ments, documentation, by which
a museum may know (minimal-
ly) what it has, where it is, and
who owns it, is not fulfilled by
every museum. In 1987 the pro-
portion of museums with docu-
mentation for over 90% of their
collections was relatively small:
about half of museums had
accession records; about a third
had adequate catalogue records;
and about a quarter had indexes
or some other information
retrieval facility. See: Figures:
3.12, 3.13, & 3.14. in PRINCE &
HIGGINS-MCLOUGHLIN,
1987. pp.70-3.
17. In the UK the British
Museum, founded in 1753, is the
most famous example. During
the 19th century it was split to
form separate departments, one
of which has since gained some
autonomy - the Museum of
Mankind (Department of
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level, able to survive in the liberal capitalist as easily as in
the social democratic, the nationalist or the plutocratic
environment. It is an ideology that doesn't appear "closed,
dogmatic and inflexible" or as "teleological, 'totalitarian'
and metaphysically grounded". 3' It has responded to
postmodern critique and been strengthened by it in a
surprising way. It has allowed the museum to (re)discover
its basic creativity.
Meanings are not constant, the construction of meaning can
always be undertaken again, in new contexts and with new
functions. The radical potential of museums lies in precisely this.
As long as museums and galleries remain the repositories of
artefacts and specimens, new relationships can always be built,
new meanings can always be discovered, new interpretations
with new relevances can be found, new codes and new rules can
be written!'
Institution
If the designer has been a 'chameleon' in post-War times so
too has the museum and specifically the museum curator.
The creativity that each has shown in responding to
political, economic, cultural and technological change shows
certain parallels. Demand for consolidation creates the
archivist and connoisseur, for expansion and collection, the
planner and entrepreneur, for economic stringency and
consumer satisfaction, the business manager and
marketing executive, for cultural divergence and democrati-
zation, the artist, educator and facilitator. The proposition
is that the museum is a model creative organization with as
much in common with the design company, the systems
consultancy, the university, and the film production
company as with the warehouse, the shop, the library, and
the cinema. Every output of a museum is the result of
creative communicative processes and not merely those of
Ethnography, 1970) • and two
others independence - the
Natural History Musetun (1881)
which includes the Geological
Museum, and the British
Library (of which the British
Museum Library was only one of
several contributing national
libraries, 1973). See: MILLER,
Edward. That Noble Cabinet: a
history of the British Museum.
Ohio University Press, 1974.
18. For example, the National
Maritime Museum, founded in
1934, is a designated repository
for many forms of maritime
archival material such as ships
plans. It has an excellent library,
extensive archives, a large collec -
tion of prints and historic pho -
to graphs and considerable
reserve collections, [it is] an
international centre for historical
research, and is the largest and
finest institution of its kind any -
where in the world.
DANIEL, C St J H. "Introduc-
tion" in GREENHILL, Basil
(Ed.) The National Maritime
Museum. Philip Wilson, 1982,
pp.5-10.]
However, in respect of research
other than for exhibition projects
and collection management pur-
poses, the museum's staff now
concentrates its efforts on pro-
viding access to and facilitating
the research of visiting scholars,
independent programme makers
and researchers from industry
and government departments
rather than on conducting
research programmes of their
own. (This had already become
policy in the year I left the
Museum, 1986.)
19. PARR, A. E. Mostly About
Museums. The American
Museum of Natural History,
1959. Parr discusses the
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ordering and display. In the dynamic situation in which the
museum finds itself, it must continually change, in social
and physical terms, in relation to its 'environment', and this
defines a wide range of possible organizational arrange-
ments and images whilst requiring that these adapt easily
without jeopardizing longer term or central purposes.
Given Checkland's rationale for soft systems method-
ology, the muse= would seem to be an ideal subject for
this approach to organizational design - it is a social
system that has purposes, a perceived need for change,
and represents a problem situation in which many
different ways of defining 'problems' coexist and precise
outputs are difficult to prescribe." However, it is also true
that the procedure of developing a root definition, one that
appears relevant in some representational or analogical
sense for any specific museum, and of treating this as an
hypothesis concerning improvement of the problem
situation, raises the issue of what kind of simplification of
the situation is acceptable in practice. The myth and the
model each have an attenuating function in understanding
and praxis.' The metaphorical role of any image in initiat-
ing the creative process is, in theory, arbitrary and
temporary, a jumping off point which does not necessarily
need to serve as a reference point, but then there need not
be a formal (fixed) reference point at all. The proposition,
in soft systems methodology, that a coherent and
functional conceptual model should develop with reference
to the formal system concept and/or with admired
examples, constrains the entire process to one of reinter-
pretation and simulation, and I doubt that this can be
adequate to the situation of multifaceted change, of plural
image, such as we fmd in 'chameleon' organizations such
as the museum, the design company and the film produc-
tion company. Perhaps Mumford's organic syncretism
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research function of natural his-
tory museums before any other.
In relation to research the muse -
urn of natural history has a dual
set of functions to perform. It
serves as an archive for the
preservation of the evidence of
conclusions already arrived at. It
is also expected to form the center
of active research towards new
conclusions. These dual purposes
are not in harmony but in corn -
petition, each being a burden
upon the other. [p.10]
At the Natural History Museum
in London, long established pri-
marily as a research institution,
the public services department,
uniquely amongst Britain's
national museums, is wholly
responsible for the planning and
development of exhibitions and
the provision of education ser-
vices. In a quite separate opera-
tion ...behind the scenes scien -
tists work on the 67 million spec -
imens which make up the
nation's natural history collec -
tions. Museums Association,
Museums Yearbook, 1993-94,
pp.152-3.
20. For example, even before
Birmingham City Museums and
Art Galleries came into exis-
tence collections were being
assembled to
... be the means of educating the
tastes of those upon whom the
reputation of Birmingham man -
ufactures chiefly depends.
contemporary source quoted in
DAVIES, Stuart. By the Gains of
Industry: Birmingham Museums
and Art Gallery 1885-1985
Birmingham Museums and Art
Gallery, 1985, p.15.
Following the opening of the
gallery the Purchase Committee
continued to use the limited
funds at its disposal:
to secure such works and Art
interpreted as process would come closer to the mark. The
problem we might foresee with an iterative process that
works at first at high speed and low resolution and later,
after comparisons with the real world situation and, in the
case of a museum, with institutional expectations, at
slower speed and higher resolution, is that the site of the
slowing action would inevitably find itself diverging from
the dynamic museum/design interval and, therefore, intro-
ducing 'adequate' detail to a model no longer based on an
appropriate root definition.
Milieux
When we talk of museum organization it is as well to
remember that one third of all museums in the UK have no
full-time staff, that the average number of staff (full-time,
part-time and volunteer) in a museum is just 20, and that
the average number of full-time curatorial staff can be
estimated at about 1.25 (6.23% of all museum workers).41A
very large number (possibly the majority) of museums run
with only one qualified curator and in a significant number
of these museums that person may be employed and paid by
a museum service to which the museum subscribes rather
than by the museum itself. The role of enthusiasts and
volunteers is therefore of crucial interest in very many
museums. The tenuousness of funding arrangements and
institutional status are also major concerns. And the
looseness and lack of formal power relations in the structure
of the workforce, and the impact this may have on the devel-
opment and use of collections and their subsequent formal
organization and care, are by no means unproblematic.
It would be a mistake to believe that museum profes-
sionals, even those not involved on a consultancy basis
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Collections as they considered
likely to prove valuable for edu
cational purposes and which
they were able to obtain at rea
sonable cost.
contemporary source, ibid, p.29.
21. The Hungarian National
Museum is
...one of the most remarkable
examples ... 'founded ... as part of
the movement to preserve
Hungarian historic traditions
and to instil greater appreciation
of the Hungarian language and
culture'. The architectural style of
the National Museum in Helsinki
served to emphasize Finish cal -
tural autonomy during the period
of Russian control. The National
Museum of Ireland is one
amongst a few that celebrates the
'struggle to freedom with the dis -
play of personal effects of hems of
revolutions, risings or rebellions'.
WILSON, Sir David M.
"National Museums" in THOMP-
SON, 1992, pp.82-3.
It is no accident that England
contains no national museum of
antiquities, history or natural
history in the continental
European style: rather, attention
was paid to an Empire and fur -
ther afield. The result is a lack of
nationalistic expression in the
national museums. It is this,
however, that provides such
strength to the predominantly
regional museums centred on
such major centres as Bristol,
Leicester and Sheffield. Much of
the country's national heritage is
in the provinces and this
accounts for the richness of many
of the provincial collections.
LEWIS, Geoffrey. "Introduc-
tion", ibid, p.1.
22. For example, The Museum
of the Moving Image, in London
and the National Museum of
through a museum service, but employed part or full time by
the museum, are automatically able to exercise the expert
curatorial skills for which they are ostensibly employed." A
hands-on intimacy with large parts of a collection over an
extended period of time, intensive and detailed research and
documentation activity, the writing of exhibition planning
proposals, scripts and outline design briefs/programmes, and
the selection of collection material, organization of loans and
transport and handling of items for display, these are activi-
ties in which the curator will be rarely, if ever, engaged. The
curator in such situations is largely involved in a creative
organizational function, which involves information broking,
training, liaison with governing and funding bodies and
statutory authorities, and the direction of technical
programmes. What is true in the majority, small, indepen-
dent, museums is, for a variety of reasons, also true in many
larger, publicly run museums. The curator is no longer the
privileged, leisurely, connoisseur that many once were but
rather has become an administrator, an advocate, and a
coordinator, and is increasingly in competition with a
variety of others from specialist backgrounds for this
executive role in any museum organization.
As a direct result of the Hale Report on training and
career structure in museums an independent body, the
Museum Training Institute (MTI), was set up in 1989 to
develop training standards for all museum workers. Until
this point the Museums Diploma, run by the Museums
Association, and the Master of Arts degrees offered by the
Universities of Leicester and Manchester were the only
recognised professional qualifications and were specifically
aimed at curators.' A number of specialist courses were
also available in conservation, and one course at
Humberside offered an undergraduate museum design
qualification." The first director of the MTI, Simon
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Photography, Film and
Television in Bradford.
23. COPUS (the Committee for
the Public Understanding of
Science) is associated with a
wide variety of museum-based
programmes, and particularly
with initiatives taken by the
Science museum in London
which include the joint funding
with Imperial College London of
a Professorship in the public
understanding of science, and
the running of all-night science
events for school parties at the
Science Museum. Several inde-
pendent museums put education
at the centre of all that they do,
for example, Eureka!, the chil-
dren's museum in Halifax,
Catalyst, the museum of the
Chemical Industry in Widnes,
and ARC, the Archaeological
Resource Centre in York.
24. Although it is quite common
for museums to run lecture, con-
cert, and film series as an
adjunct to the 'central' public
activity of exhibition, some pro-
mote a broader cultural pro-
gramme as their raison d'etre.
Probably the best example of
this approach is the Pompidou
Centre in Paris. On one of his
earliest drawings the architect
Richard Rogers called it:
'a building for culture, informa -
tion and entertainment' ...By
keeping this transparent, flexi -
ble, and welcoming space open
late into the evening and filling
it with life, food, and drink, as
well as books, art, film, and lec -
tures, the museum's leaders ...
were indeed providing 'entertain -
ment' that matched anything
currently available in Paris or
perhaps in the world.
DAVIS, Douglas. The Museum
Transformed. New York:
Abbeville Press. 1990. p.41.
Roodhouse, made it clear that the ambition of the new
training framework was to facilitate the development of an
integrated museum career structure - he saw no reason
why, in the future, a museum attendant should not be able
to rise to the post of museum director."
The diversification of specialists involved in museum
work has changed the nature of museum organization in
one particular sense. The reflection of collection structure
in functional structure, a one-dimensional construct that
previously almost guaranteed the curator a leadership
role, has begun to disappear. The Rains Report of 1972
observed that Local Authority museum structure in the
1960s "consisted essentially of a 'vertical' structure of
separate professional departments" in this arrangement
the majority of collection-based disciplines effectively ran
their own show with "no horizontal co-ordination of policy-
making or implementation; no 'corporate identity' " (Figure
3.3.1.) Much the same was true in the National Museums
(Figure 3.3.2).
Director
II I I I I
Archaeology Fine Art
1
Natural History Exhibition
1
Administration
Local History	 Applied Art	 Technology	 Education	 Pub icity
Figure 3.3.1
Local Authority Museum staff structure (adapted from Diamond
in THOMPSON, 1992.)
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& Design
	 Relations
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Figure 3.3.2
National Maritime Museum staff structure c1980.
Navi
Astr
25. MUMFORD, Lewis. The
Conduct of Life. Martin Seeker &
Warburg, 1962. p.176-180 & 232-
235. Mumford warns against the
fallacy of over-simplification that
is involved in the very conception
and application of a system
[p.176] And notes that:
Actual historic institutions, for -
tunately, have been modified by
anomalies, discrepancies, contra -
dictions, compromises: the older
they are, the richer the organic
compost ... it is their weakness
that is their saving strength.
[p.176-7]
The organic syncretism he pro-
motes requires a balance to be
achieved between the scope for
human initiative and the princi-
ples of 'natural' organization
which allow for growth, dynamic
responsiveness, and solidarity.
This view is based on a reassess-
ment of Romanticism which
"sought to undermine the whole
mechanical conception of human
improvement". [p.233]
26. ALEXANDER, 1979, p.14-5.
27. The Jorvik Viking Centre in
York opened in 1984 having
organized the archaeological pro-
ject centred on Coppergate in
such a way as make the original
excavation a public spectacle.
The success of this approach
resulted in a purpose-built muse-
um completely enclosing the site
and incorporating it as a perma-
nent feature of the exhibition.
The exhibition itself pioneered
the 'dark ride' concept (an up-
market version of the traditional
ghost-ride or tunnel-of-love fair-
ground attractions) - a method of
attracting a large audience, of
managing a rapid throughput of
visitors, and of providing a high-
quality, entertaining and educa-
tional experience. Through
Academic Services	 Museum Services
I
I I I I I
Fine Art Archaeology Natural History Exhibition Administration Security
Applied Art	 Folk Life	 Technology	 Education	 Publicity
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During the 1980$ some authorities adopted the Bains
model which created a coordinating head for all 'academic'
services (the collection-based departments) and another for
'museum' services (administration, exhibitions, education,
security) (Figure 3.3.3.)
Director
I 
I	 I
Figure 3.3.3
Post-Bains museum staff structure (adapted from Diamond in
THOMPSON, 1992.)
Independent museums meanwhile provided another model
which has since been adapted by some national museums
to suit their size and trustee status. Independent charitable
trusts usually associated administration with the director's
office and created a single curatorial department on the
same level as commercial, finance, and volunteer/project
departments each with a head who was part of the policy-
making and coordinating team (Figure 3.3.4.)
Director
1
	  Administration
I	 I	 I	 I
Curatorial Services Commercial Activities 	 Finance &	 Government Agency Schemes
Sponsorship	 & Volunteer co-ordination
Figure 3.3.4
Charitable trust museum staff structure (adapted from
Diamond in THOMPSON, 1992.)
The National Maritime Museum in Greenwich first began
radical reorganization in 1984 and by 1987 had developed
'enterprise', (an example of
Thatcherite jargon) a combina-
tion of business orientation and
innovation, the unpromising
subject of rescue archaeology
was turned into a high-profile
and profitable (almost unheard
of before the mid-1980s) inde-
pendent museum.
28. The Manchester Museum of
Science and Industry (founded
1983) developed on the site of
five semi-derelict buildings,
including the world's oldest rail-
way station, near central
Manchester - an area in which
property and land values were
depressed, infrastructure decay-
ing, and businesses long moved
to other areas of the city. The
museum development has
become an attractor for more
widespread regeneration.
29. In 1993 the Liverpool
Museum became the focus of an
international media event: the
Jason IV Project involved live
satellite link up with an under-
water exploration project in the
Sea of Cortes off Baja California,
Mexico. A succession of school,
college and invited audiences
were able to talk directly to
divers and workers on the project
and to see live television pictures
of the work. The project was also
featured on broadcast television.
In the museum exhibitions visi-
tors can also use two-way closed
circuit television to observe and
quiz conservators and techni-
cians working in the museum's
laboratories and studios.
30. The Museum of the Moving
Image (1988) introduced into its
exhibitions actors whose brief
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a structure in which there was a single collections depart-
ment, a museum-wide technical services department, a
marketing department responsible for all commercial
activities, fund-raising and public relations, and an admin-
istration department. Added to this was the facility for a
special projects group to which staff from anywhere in the
museum could be seconded and whose head reported
directly to the museum director (Figure 3•3•5•)"
Director
r 	
 I I	 I' 	 I1
Special Projects 	  Collections	 Conservation &	 Marketing	 Administration
(Information	 (management, Technical SenAces 	 (commercial	 (personnel,
Project Group)	 research &	 activities,	 finance &
exhibitions	 sponsorship,	 security
public relations
& education
Figure 3.3.5
National Maritime Museum staff structure c1986.
The past 25 years has seen a development and profession-
alization not only of curatorship, but also of management,
education, public relations, marketing, conservation and
design. This means that in effect we must consider
museum organization as increasingly multidimensional. It
is as if 'curator' no longer denotes the job title of a particu-
lar kind of qualified individual, but rather denotes a
professional nexus, one which embraces a specific range of
specialist functions at the same time as implying their
coordinated expression in praxis. This raises the possibil-
ity of structures that are more contingent upon the stage of
an institution's development, the nature of its projects, the
dominant cultural and political influences, and the
different communicative processes that are necessarily
emphasized in changing circumstances.
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included involving the visitor in
dramatic set pieces. Although
the notion of the docent (an edu-
cational guide), the costumed
interpreter, and other versions
of the 'human label' have been
used in museums since their
beginnings - the British Museum
first used guides on its opening
to the public in 1759:
No more than ten tickets were
ever to be delivered for each hour
of admittance, and parties, limit -
ed to five in number, were con -
ducted round each department in
turn...
MILLER, Edward. That Noble
Cabinet: A History of the British
Museum. Ohio University Press,
1974. p.63.
"The first true outdoor museum,"
Skansen (Stockholm) used "cost-
umed craftsmen, musicians, dan-
cers and interpreters" from 1891.
ALEXANDER, 1979, pp.10-11.
31. The Foucauldian analysis of
the "exhibitionary complex"
(Bennett, 1988) and of the muse-
um (Hooper-Greenhill, 1992) both
expose the senses in which the
exhibition can be understood as a
complex of disciplinary technolo-
gies that "survey, classify, and
control time, space, bodies, and
things" [Hooper-Greenhill,
p.170.] and as systems that in the
same moment allow the public:
to see and be seen, to survey yet
always be under surveillance, the
object of an unknown but con -
trolling look: in these ways, as
micro-worlds rendered constant -
ly visible to themselves, exposi -
tions [and museums and depart -
ment stores] realized some of the
ideals of panopticism in trans -
forming the crowd into a con -
stonily surveyed, self-watching,
self-regulating ... consistently
orderly public - a society watch -
ing over itself. [Bennett, p.81.]
Manifestations
In the museum, at one and the same site, we encounter
designed objects (socially constructed material culture) at
all stages of the production-consumption process.
Museums are not just where selected objects end up at the
end of the process. They are responsible for the design and
production of certain kinds of products - buildings, exhibi-
tions, systems (documentation, conservation, loans admin-
istration, etc.), information (databases, books, reports,
articles and letters), and institutional organization. They
are the site of distribution-consumption of: 'experiences' -
exhibition visits, audiovisual shows, lectures, events and
activities; publicity and promotional material; educational
packages and programmes; and souvenirs, reproductions,
books, pamphlets, videos, records and posters. And they
are involved in selecting, preserving and recycling certain
kinds of material culture and associated information in the
form of museum collections and archives. This latter
process justifies the position given to the museum institu-
tion in the Production-consumption model of the design
history field but clearly,' if our focus rather than being on
the object of design history (the ontological focus) was to be
on the institution itself as a site of design-based activity
(an epistemological focus), the museum would serve as a
model of the whole process in microcosm (Figure 3.3.6.)
Discourses
The Rortian idea of 'conversation' is what might be
regarded as a liberal, academic ideal that comes close to
realization only in those kinds of practical situations in
which practitioners of epistemologically diverse disciplines
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The field of museum design -(developed from the Prockiction-cons-mnp	 ion Model in WALKER,
1989)
178
32. The theatre of the Blitz
Experience and the simulation of
Operation Jerico at the Imperial
War Museum, the virtual collec-
tion of the Micro Gallery at the
National Gallery, and Carrier at
the Fleet Air Arm Museum
which incorporates a simulated
helicopter flight to the deck of an
aircraft carrier.
33. See: MERRIMAN, Nick.
Beyond the Glass Case. Leicester
University Press, 1991. pp.13-
16. The value-laden nature of
interpretation is a recent redis-
covery in museology. Since the
1920s, when the discipline of
historiography was first intro-
duced, historians and archaeolo-
gists had broadly accepted that
interpretation reflects the social
conditions in which it is pro-
duced. However, the archaeology
which so definitively influenced
other areas of material cultural
study in the 1960s and 70s was
one which attempted:
to formulate a general cultural
science and an objective, value-
free approach to the writing of
the past [p.13]
but which failed. Museologists
such as Pearce and Hooper-
Greenhill, who engaged with
structuralism and Foucauldian
genealogy, replaced the 'neutral
conception' of ideology implicit in
earlier thinking with a 'critical
conception' that:
sees ideology as acting to main -
tamn domination through asym -
metrical power relations, by rep -
resenting sectional interests as
universal by denying contradic -
tions, and by naturalising the
present. [p.14]
Museums, through their produc-
tions of knowledge and presenta-
tions - exhibitions in particular,
"select certain material" and
structure particular messages
are required to accommodate each other's views and
projects in the process of achieving a common (group or
social) project. In the museum the exhibition project repre-
sents a good example of the requirement for radical multi-
disciplinarity. To simplify and give an artificially hard
edge to the description of the project team, the conservator
(as project technician), the designer (as project inter-
preter), and the curator (as project director) each begin
with a professional object - a mode of understanding,
specific skills and a strategy for intervening in practical
situations - that differs in kind from the those of other two.
The conservator's allegiance is to empirical scientific
method coupled with precise manual technique. Museum
conservation is like a modern surgical practice in 'treating'
its object and progressing technique through: the careful
testing of procedures and materials; the development of
technologies; and the publication of findings in specialist
journals dealing with conservation science and practice.
The designer's allegiance is to creative visual practice
in the context of project management and wide ranging
communication skills. Design combines, at different
moments in the process, the imaginative and expressive
dimensions of artistic endeavour and the methodical,
analytical and diplomatic dimensions of business practice,
treating its object by turns as an exercise in visionary
conjecture and as a problem-defining and problem-solving
process associated with analyses of a problem situation.
Design develops, largely as an incommunicable personal
achievement, through the accommodation of contradictory
stimuli and experiences, and the repeated risk of trusting
to untested responses and the unpredictable procedure of
resolving their implications. Traditionally design
knowledge is largely tacit and embedded in its visual
documents and the evidence of designed objects.
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which, in their attenuation of
undifferentiated detail and
focussing of dominant mytholo-
gies, tend to perpetuate the val-
ues and power of the established
institutions, of industrial culture
and politics.
34. Although the rather cumber-
some (in English translation)
International Council of
Museums' definition was pro-
mulgated in 1974, the Museums
Association in the UK did not
agree its universal definition of a
museum until ten years later:
A museum is an institution
which collects, documents, pre -
serves, exhibits and interprets
material evidence and associated
information for the public benefit.
Museums Association, 1984.
35. In 1977 most British muse-
um curators watched enviously
the development of SAMDOK,
the Swedish national policy on
national heritage, which set an
explicit agenda and resolved a
wide range of issues concerning
the collecting, documentation,
and preservation responsibilities
of a wide range of institutions
including museums. It was only
in 1993 that the Department for
National Heritage was formed
and in 1994 that the intention to
review the need for cultural poli-
cy was announced. This has
been necessitated by the launch
of a National Lottery rather
than by any transformation in
the political climate.
36. The achievement of "solidar-
ity" through the mutual "accom-
modation" of difference is the
meta-ideology	 of	 both
Bernstein's "new constellation"
and Rorty's "liberal ironism".
BERNSTEIN, Richard J. The
New Constellation. Polity Press,
The curator's allegiances are two-fold: (1) to an
academic discipline such as anthropology, history, archae-
ology, biology, engineering, art history, etc., particularly to
an aspect of such a discipline that takes as its epistemolog-
ical object 'material culture' - the world of 'things' and the
documentary evidence we associate with the life and
organization of things; and (2) to a professional ethos,
which holds that an holistic, socially responsible, histori-
cally informed approach is required to the selection,
preservation and institutionalized exploitation of material
culture, and requires practice to be governed by an ideally
universal ethical code that overrides all contingent
commercial and political interests."
Although, in practice, individuals normally contend
with more than one of these praxio-logics - there is a bit of
the conservator and the designer and the curator in almost
every museum person - it would be rare indeed (if not
psychologically risky) not to have a dominant mode of
thinking and acting. Having set up a typology, which to
some degree caricatures reality, it may also serve to clarify
the nature of some of the discourses that have been elabo-
rated in recent times. In one view, the curator, as a type,
has given birth to the conservator and the designer. They
practice specialisms which have developed and expanded
aspects of curatorship. An alternative view is that the
curator has expanded the boundary of the museum to
include scientific, managerial and creative practices that
previously existed only outside its normal domain.
Curatorship has thereby expanded by the accumulation of
new practices rather than by a fragmentation and elabora-
tion of an existing practice. Neither point of view is 'wrong'
as each reveals a positive discourse that is important to
the museum process and to the relationship between the
museum and its environment.
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1991.
RORTY, Richard. Contingency,
Irony, and Solidarity.
Cambridge University Press,
1989.
37. EAGLETON, Terry.
Ideology: an introduction. Verso,
1991. p.xii.
38. HOOPER-GREENHILL,
1992, p.215. Pearce makes this
point in respect of the museum's
principal means of embodying
and expressing its activity, the
exhibition:
It is the opus which demon -
strates the work of collection and
curation, and the creation of the
lattice of reference and interrela -
tionship, which requires con -
trolled space for its exposition.
... the curatorial work of selection
and description and the design
work of presentation play the
crucial creative role. Exhibi-
tions are works of imagination
operating within an understood
tradition of knowledge and inter -
pretation, and contributing their
share towards both the mainte -
nance and the development of
this tradition. [my emphases]
PEARCE, 1992, pp.139 & 141.
39. CHECKLAND, Peter.
Systems Thinking, Systems
Practice. John Wiley, 1981.
... its aim ... was to ascertain to
what extent systems concepts
could be used in a helpful and
coherent way to tackle problems
which reside in social systems
and are of their nature difficult
to define. [p.150]
The contents of such systems are
so multivarious, and the influ -
ences to which they are subject so
numerous that the passage of
time always modifies the percep -
tion of the problem ... It became
clear that the ... research was to
There have been many examples of museum develop-
ments, that bear out the nurturing view of curatorship,
that started as solitary visionary projects and grew out of
the curator's practice in an organic manner." However, at
some point such projects generally reach a critical stage of
development where the increasing scale of operations
demands a dramatic change in approach to finance,
functional organization, accommodation, public access,
etc., demands a vastly increased interaction with the
social, commercial and political environment and the
formalization of certain relationships. This might involve
for instance meeting the requirements for MGC registra-
tion so that the museum may become eligible for various
grants, awards, technical support schemes, etc.' At such a
turning point in a museum development a team of diverse
specialists with the right spread of experience gained
outside the museum can transform the situation from one
of vulnerable stagnation into one of robust dynamism.
Equally there have been many examples of museums
that, having reached a kind of maturity, became vulnera-
ble because of their size and complexity. The confident
multidisciplinarity of which the accumulative view of
curatorship speaks may be threatened and disrupted by
external forces as easily as by an internal breakdown. At
such times the visionary lead of the curator may serve as a
reintegrating force and as a seed from which a new
dynamism may grow."
The key change of the 1980s in the nature of these curator-
ial positions is the degree to which they have become
characterized by self-aware critical practice. It may no
longer be true, as it was into the first half of this century,
that the curator is typically an old and highly conservative
man trapped in museum service by very low levels of pay
2.51 p.29.
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be concerned not with problems
as such but with problem situa -
tions in which there are felt to be
unstructured problems, ones in
which the designation of objec -
tives is itself problematic. [p.1551
40. See above: 3.1 Organization:
Simplification and Adequacy,
also note 36.
41. Statistics based on "Staffing
Profiles - Overview" in PRINCE
& HIGGINS-MCLOUGHLIN,
1987. pp.78-80. and Figure 4.2.
"Proportion of total full-time
staff employed in each activity,
by type of museum", p.81. For
analysis see: Appendix 2a.
42. The primary functions one
might expect a curator to per-
form, the management and
research of collections, turn out
to be minor or extremely frag-
mented activities. This is espe-
cially the case in smaller muse-
ums, but even in the relatively
small number of large museums,
where specialization has
increased, only a minority of
curators are concerned with
'core' curatorial work.
Curators in the smaller museum
services all indicated that they
had little or no direct contact with
collections on a day-to-day basis,
or were only able to do so by
insisting on setting apart blocks
of time for collections work.
LORD, LORD & NICKS, 1989.
p.51.
43. HALE, Prof. Sir John. et al.
Museum Professional Training
and Career Structure. Report by
a Working Party. Museums &
Galleries Commission, 1987.
30% of junior curatorial post
were taken by graduates of these
two universities, see:
or else the son or nephew of a curator with the private
means to support a life of connoisseurship and academic
study and the social status that eases access to public
office,' but in the sense that the curator has benefitted
from an academic higher education, most likely in an older
university, has been able to afford the time (probably
unpaid) to accumulate practical experience, and has been
able to stay in or return to higher education to study for a
higher degree, he or she is already a member of an
academic and cultural elite, committed to an intellectual
and non-industrial working mode, and imbued with the
values and ideologies of an educated 'class', regardless of
the social milieu of his or her formative years.
An older museology (more properly a `museography')
allowed the curator to concentrate on perfecting methods
without questioning the way that the purposes which they
served were shaped by the prejudices, preconceptions,
values and agendas of the privileged class to which he or
she belonged.
The new museology has brought into question
formerly foundational notions about curatorial practice -
that it could be objective, neutral, value-free, etc.
Reflective practice now requires the curator to ask not only
questions of what? and how? and when? but of who for?
and why? The new museology is less about "museum
methods" and more about "the purposes of museums" and
it addresses not just an audience of 'curators', in the older
generalist sense of the term, but an audience of 'curatorial'
specialists including: director, curator, scholar, conserva-
tor, designer, educator and marketer, as well as a wider
audience of academics and students of media and cultural
studies, sociology and history."
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44. Conservation has the best pre-
entry training provision - several
specialist courses in each area:
archaeological material, easel paint-
ings, works of art on paper, textiles,
social/industrial history, decorative
and applied arts, and sculpture.
Exhibition design training began
in Hull in 1947, since 1981 this has
formally included museum design
studies. It remains the only such
course in Europe.
45. Speaking at a meeting of the
Yorkshire and Humberside
Federation of Museums and Art
Galleries, October 26, The Old
Grammar School, Hull.
46. See: DIAMOND, Michael.
"Personnel management" in
THOMPSON, 1992, pp.159-62.
47. See above: 3.2 Design:
Epistemological Object, note 25 and
Figure 3.2.7.
48. The Museums Association (UK)
maintains an ethics committee, in
1993-4 convened by Fellow of the
Association David T-D Clarke, and
has a published Code of Conduct for
Museum Professionals (Museums
Year-book 1993-4, pp - 395 & 398-
402.) Professional museum associa-
tions in other countries follow broad-
ly similar principles as does the
International Council of Museums
(ICOM) which is a supranational
museums association with member-
ship open to both museums and indi-
vidual museum professionals.
49. Frank Atkinson and the develop-
ment of the North of England Open
Air Museum at Beamish, Co.
Durham, is a particularly notable
example.
Frank Atkinson had to develop a
completely new kind of folk-life
museum, one in which industrial
buildings were moved to the museum
site. it was to be, he said, 'a museum
dealing much more in social history
than folk-life'.
HUDSON, Kenneth. Museums of
Influence. Cambridge University
Press, 1987. p.127.
50. This is a national scheme intro-
duced in 1991 and operated by Area
Museum Councils in conjunction
with the Museums and Galleries
Commission.
51. Between 1990 and 1993 the
Natural History Museum in London
underwent major restructuring; a
corporate identity review, redesign
and associated staff training for a
new ethos of 'customer care'; a revi-
talization of exhibitions policy, and
the cutting of in-house design capa-
bility in favour of the commissioning
of 'top' independent design consul-
tancies; and a change in research
priorities that involved the loss of
fifty scientific curatorial posts.
Although the rapid and extensive
changes have been a response to a
wide range of external pressures -
financial, political and social - a
clear vision of what a national muse-
um should be in the 1990s has also
been brought to the situation by the
museum's director, Neal Chalmers.
Ref: The Terracotta Time Machine,
Horizon, BBC2, 1991.
52. As an example of this conser-
vatism which was exemplified in the
devotion to connoisseurship E E
Lowe, Curator of Leicester Museum,
is recorded as having said at a meet-
ing with the Permanent Secretary
for the Board of Education in 1919:
when we long for a rare or beautiful
or typical thing, we are desiring it for
its own sake primarily, and not
chiefly because it will educate person
or persons unknown.
Museums Journal 19, 1920 pp123-9
quoted by KAVANAGH, Gaynor.
"The Museums Profession and the
Articulation of Professional Self-con-
sciousness" in KAVANAGH, Gaynor.
(ed.) The Museums Profession.
Leicester University Press, 1991. pp.
In 1946 Parr reflected that:
The still predominant amateur con -
cept of museum research has had
some very unfortunate effects upon
the economic and social status of
museum workers.
PARR, A. E. Mostly About Museums.
The American Museum of Natural
History, 1959. p.27.
In 1987 Tait could still write:
Curators were still being seen, and
often seeing themselves, as enlight -
ened dilettantes, experts who did the
job for the love of it rather than any
career expectation. ...in terms of pay
among the professional classes they
were one from the bottom, above pro -
fessional dancers, in 1987.
TAIT, Simon. Palaces of Discovery:
The Changing World of Britain's
Museums. Quiller Press, 1989. p.159.
62. VERGO, P. (ed.) The New Museo-
logy. Reaktion Books, 1989. p.3.
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4.0 Intervals and Excursions
The Three-Game Plan: a Play of Diffgrance
The three rather tenuous discourses opened up in the
previous chapter already include their own reliance upon
relations with the others. Differences of material focus, of
linguistic surface, cannot mask the interfaces they
construct and which, as the meeting of boundaries between
disciplines, present the possibility of productive dialogue.
If museum, design and organization, in reverse or any
other order, immediately suggest ways of growing over and
around and through each other's constructions it is
because each, in its own way, is a voracious conception
always looking to account for and to intervene in ever
larger realms of experience, in more and more comprehen-
sive collections of phenomena. Perhaps the only counter to
this implicit imperialism lies in the play of their implied
circularity - a kind of three-game plan of appliance to
application or, if one prefers, of analyst to analysand.
Between organization and design one involves a
constructive interest in spatialities: the organization of
design is immediately a question of a constellation of
differently expressed phenomena - physical, social,
documentary and paradigmatic.
Between design and museum one is immediately
engaged in the problematic of change and of communica-
tive activity - a dynamics of process. The museum process
designs - creatively produces - the museum: the design of
museum process, therefore, is a design of museum design.
Between museum and organization a context emerges
over conceptions of (material) culture and over what it is to
sustain something which by definition is concerned with
the possibilities of communication and change. The organi-
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zation subtracts from the world that constructs the
everyday meaning of things, an actor network that never-
theless remains in contact, connected by its reconstructed
difference, its power to signify through it play of differance:
this is a `museality' - the museality of organization.
1. FOUCAULT, Michel.
[1963] The Birth of the Clinic.
Trans. A M Sheridan.
Tavistock, 1973, p.9.
2. ibid. p.10.
3. ibid. p.16.
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4.1 Organization of Design
Foucault's Spatial Framework
In the Birth of the Clinic Foucault introduces the archaeol-
ogy of medical perception with a discussion of the types of
spatiality involved in the definition of disease. We learn
that, at the first level, the clinician's gaze is directed
towards the differentiated minutiae of conditions,
symptoms, states, and properties of the diverse visible
aspects the patient presents. The configuration of these
alone is the material of the proper classification and recog-
nition of a species of disease. And ironically this process of
classification "reaches the truth of the disease only by
allowing it to win the struggle and to fulfil, in all its
phenomena, its true nature.' The space here is that of
abstracted 'homologies' - a system of signs independent of
the individual.
At the second level of spatialization disease is mapped
out in the concrete space of the body: "... disease undergoes
metastases and metamorphoses" and causes qualitative
changes in the organs and tissues of the body which
become a recognisable pathology.' The practitioner's gaze
becomes a highly focussed investigation of the individual.
The third level occupies the social space. At this
larger scale "a disease is circumscribed, medically invested,
isolated, divided up into closed privileged regions, or
distributed throughout cure centres, arranged in the most
favourable way". 3 The political and the economic come into
play through the power plays of the larger professional
group, its immediate administrative relatives and its more
distant legislative and cultural counterparts. The hospital
becomes an artificial site which alongside other institu-
tions - prison, school, museum, etc. - facilitates the admin-
istration of society. By this means medicine is "bound up
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with the state" in a "general but differentiated policy of
assistance", "a certain supervision ...[is] exercised over the
doctors themselves", and to a large extent "abuses ...[are]
prevented and quacks forbidden to practise".4
4. ibid. p.19.
In the material object, systemic process, and social
condition one may perceive a group of epistemological
objects that could be just as well conceived for design as for
disease, for the museum artefact as for the body: Foucault's
approach to spatiality has resonances. Such ideas of the
spaces which different means of defining or understanding
occupy create an organizational framework which encom-
passes at first sight different orders of concepts - objective,
systemic, social - which are not in any obvious way logically
connected. Each has a rationality that can be characterized
in relation to ideas of the epistemological and of the
ontological, and in general to philosophical standpoints.
In Foucault's scheme, relating to disease in the 18th
century, the first level points to an overarching scheme of
classifications which is free of the subjective both in the
picture that it provides of a realm of identifiable diseases
and in the process of observing the differentiable specifics
of objective phenomena. To be simplistic, this describes an
underlying positivist epistemology and realist ontology.
And we might ask how such a material objectivity relates
to the classification of design phenomena, what proper
limits the approach defines.
In the second level the epistemology remains
positivistic in tenor in that the system of knowledge
ultimately relies upon the assumption of causes and effects
at play in creating the observable qualitative changes in
the organs and tissues of the body. However, the ontology
becomes increasingly nominalist in tenor. Disease is never
"confined to a particular course" and the organs of the body
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provide no observable structure for the disease itself but
only of its transformations and transportations: the
process of mapping is one of naming the traces of disease
rather than of fixing its sites. Such an approach provokes
the question of how relations of programme/context to
process in design may be delineated and circumscribed.
The third level of spatiality emphasizes another
dimension. In the endlessly played out debates that
accompany the social regulation of disease there is a
constant level of confrontation between the forms of social
space presented by its institutions and the orders
presented by individual practitioners and their subjects.
The always latent potentialities for new configurations to
emerge and the radically different views obtained by
different participants in the debates, tends to push this
third spatiality towards the relativistic end of epistemol-
ogy whilst preserving something of the ontologically realist
perception that certain underlying social forces perpetuate
the process of change. In design the political and ethical
aspects may be highlighted in such an approach - the twin
relations between programme and ideology/Philosophy and
between process and ideology/Philosophy.
Spatiality in Discourse
Lefebvre offers a critique of the tendency in philosophy,
semiology, deconstruction, and critical theory to move,
without regard for logical consistency or apology, from one
species of space to another - to move from linguistic space
to social space, from cognitive space to physical space, etc.
- without proper consideration of the positions, relations
and movements that are being invoked or transgressed. In
particular he criticizes the readiness to invoke "as the need
5. LEFEBVRE,	 Henri.
[1974/84] The Production of
Space	 Trans.	 Donald
Nicholson-Smith.	 Basil
Blackwell, 1991. p.5.
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arises, some such notion as coup ure or rupture or break"
and to avoid an account of the gap in terms of a spatial
theory in which rhetorical and logical turns (transforma-
tions/translations) are explicated.'
Physical space, when mathematicized, becomes
conceptually and minimally three-dimensional. However
inadequate such a schema may be to the accommodation of
wider experience, absolute concepts of position, distance,
area, direction, volume, etc., proper to an idealized,
mathematicized three-dimensional realm, make
unambiguous and definitive sense. 'Wider experience'
implies, minimally, the playing out of spatial relations in
the perceived or imagined passage of time. In this experi-
ential notion of three-dimensional space the measure of all
other relations becomes 'speed' - speed of the actions of
movement, perception, envisioning between which three-
dimensional space is transformed and all phenomena,
defined within its realm, translated from the objective and
concrete, to the subjective and sensational, and to the
subjective and abstract. That is, a higher dimensionality is
the key to accounting for the paradoxical discontinuities of
phenomena apparently all three-dimensional' in character.
In general one may expect dimensionality to play a
crucial role in accounting for the apparent (cognitively real)
discontinuities of similar spatial phenomena, regardless of
the constitutive dimensions of the spaces. Even the most
exotic psycho-social spaces will have one or more dimen-
sions in common with other more or less imaginable realms.
In Foucault's explanation of the space of the body, as
contrived by medical practice, certain apparent rifts exist
between one realm of the medical gaze and another.
However, we are aware that one or more of these modes of
perceiving and constituting the body may coexist in
discourse and in practice although they may never be
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collapsed into one another. The physical siting of disease
in the material structures of the body may form a constel-
lation of pointers with the systemic, the institutional, and
the social explications of disease. Although their incom-
mensurate language prohibits meaningful synthesis a
common purpose permits their mutual accommodation.
The body of locations is a physically three-dimen-
sional conception. With the addition of a temporal scale
this transforms into a systemic conception of the space of
disease. By allowing a multiplication of the body the
systemic conception is expanded to a scale of possibilities
from two bodies to an entire population: a further
dimension is added which transforms the conception into
one that is social. And finally, by zeroing the physical
space of the body and multiplying the dimensions of social
space, the space of disease becomes institutionally
contrived and controlled.
The object of knowledge is transformed by stages
from the concrete and tangible to the abstract and linguis-
tic, and modes of thought from that immanent in acting to
practical and then analytical and abstract reasoning.
We might expect patterns of spatiality such as this one to
be repeated in other areas of practice, particularly ones
dependent upon the legislation and administration of
professional forms of 'gaze' and the interpretation and
definition of problematic objects whether they be construed
as personal or social, specific or general, in nature. Design
is one such area of practice.
Spatiality in Design
Foucault's spatiality of disease, when translated directly to
design, becomes confused at levels two and three.
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6. Designing is about plan
ning and making ideas explic
it: if the product is to be made
to the designer's specifications,
then the designer must
ensure that the factory has the
tools and the intelligence and
that each element specified is
practicable.
DORMER, Peter. Design Since
1945. Thames & Hudson,
1993. p.9.
7. ... it is convenient to group
the work [of designers] into
three simple categories, though
the distinctions are in no way
absolute, nor are they always
so described: product design
(things), environmental design
(places) and communication
design (messages).
POITER, Norman. What is a
Designer: things.places.mes -
sages. Revised Ed. Hyphen
Press, 1980. p.14.
I add to this inventory the con-
cept of 'systems' to accommo-
date the notion that increasing-
ly designers deal with objects
which are interrelated and not
in all their aspects tangible.
8. For example, Hugh
Aldersey-Willams tried in vain
to get straight answers out of
Perry King and Santiago
Miranda about who did what in
their remarkable partnership.
King and Miranda gently steer
conversation away from any
investigation of their individ -
ual creative characters [p.9]
The studio itself seems
designed to sustain a certain
myth regarding the principals'
creative process. In the middle
of the space, sandwiched
between the open studio on one
side and the reception and con -
ference areas on the other, is an
inner sanctum. It is here,
Relations between programme/context and process and
between both of these and ideology/Philosophy, imply a
complex dimensionality which it would be sensible to try to
reduce, at least in the first analysis. Following on from the
designed object (product), the design specific terms
'programme', 'process' and 'philosophy' suggest that a
clearer scheme of spatiality may be possible if four, rather
than three, levels are defined. And we may expect that in
the analysis of constitutive dimensionality the spaces of
design will exhibit transformations that similarly define a
constellation of pointers, in this case in design discourse
and practice. It will also be argued that the idea of 'repre-
sentation' or 'social reconstruction' may not be easily
separated from that of 'social construction'.
Product: the designed object
In talking about the designed object, generally speaking
the focus of attention is on the end product of an invisible
process. In design history, as much as in the popular press,
there is a long tradition of taking the object at face value.
This has the effect of reducing the topics of conversation to
those based on the immanent aspects of the object's
materiality and on socio-cultural discourse. In this sphere
'design' is a quality which attaches itself to the products of
human forethought in industry,' in particular, the
manufacture of 'things, places, ...messages' and systems.'
The option of delving deeper into the nature of the
designed object is usually precluded by the equally long
tradition on the part of designers of maintaining a fearful
silence about the means by which these products actually
came into the world.' The glossy magazines, with their
star profiles and product reviews, rarely do anything to
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behind closed doors, that King
and Miranda generate their
ideas. ... [p.22]
ALDERSEY-WILLAMS, Hugh.
King and Miranda: The Poetry
of the Machine. Fourth Estate,
1991.
9. Two examples from the
many hundreds that could
have been cited. First from:
MELHUISH, Clare. "Light
Snacks", Design Week, 3 June
1994, pp.16-7.
With most architects and
designers struggling to do the
best they can on minimal bud
gets, the power of lighting to
transform what might other -
wise be fairly unexceptional
spaces has become all the more
important.
The unwarranted assumptions
made in such a statement
glosses over the most interest-
ing aspects of such projects:
the creativity released by
financially (or otherwise) con-
strained programmes, and the
dynamics of a design process
that generates richly reward-
ing results from minimized (in
terms of time) and cleverly
managed design effort.
Second from: MURRAY,
Callum. "Ark de Triomphe",
Designers' Journal No.78,
June 1992. pp.32-8.
'I'm not quite clear what a
trading floor is' he [Ralph
Erskine] says, `but I get the
feeling that this is a large
space where people are just
moved into a fairly anonymous
environment.' At his age, [78]
he knows no one is going to
challenge him is he pretends
not to know what a trading
floor is. [p.32]
Erskine has done all he can to
suggest a new approach to
working practices. Now its up
enlighten us as to the connectedness of the invisibles of
design to the visible end product. Almost inevitably, the
gloss we are likely to read will be based upon hearsay,
post-rationalizations of the most outrageous neatness,
marketing circumspection and advertising hype.' As a
space in which design may be defined, the designed object,
or product, presents a paper-thin first level - the three-
dimensional materiality of Figure 4.1.1.
A
Figure 4.1.1
The 'real' space of the designed object, which may be thought of
as a three-dimensional region, defined by the height (h), width
(w) and depth (d) of the designed object, within an open and
indefinitely differentiable Cartesian space.
However, its gloss is based upon mediated relations
between manufacturer and consumer, between product
and material culture, and between various interpreters
and their audiences. The consumer's gaze and the inter-
preter's gaze - a gaze continuous with the operation of all
the senses - work in consort on the visible surface and
physical presence of the object each separating out the
aspects of image and materiality of significance to their
respective practices - semblance and resemblance, function
and evocation, economy and effectiveness, narrative and
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to the tenants. 'Dreams are
very important for people and
for societies', he explains. 'If
architects can find a common
dream and make it known,
then it would be a very good
thing. If they can't, then it will
be the same kind of fragmented
situation we've got today.
[p.38.]
In this lengthy article (for such
a newsy journal) nothing about
the extraordinary concept
behind this building is chal-
lenged. A prime target could
have been the process which
allowed so much early indul-
gence in social ideas to have
gone untested against the prac-
tical situation represented by
the location (temporal as well
as geographical) of the project.
What we are presented with is
little more than a letting
agent's advertisement. Which,
incidentally, failed: two years
after the article was written
the building remained unlet.
identity, form and signification, pleasure and purpose, etc.
The space here is actual and three-dimensional but
passes into the social realm via the cumulative acts of
perception and the motions of economic activity. However,
the individual consumer plays no part in the orientation of
the whole space. Consumer acts of discrimination are
statistical, meaningful only as an analysable mass. In this
sense, each tiny aspect of the consumer's practice is disso-
ciated from every other to be recombined with those
identical to itself in the creation of a system of latent
marketing and marketable knowledge. Equally, inter-
preters' acts of discrimination are symbolic, meaningful
only as constructions after the fact in a discourse in which
a design determinism holds sway: the object as design may
only be realized as a process which has already been
played out, which, in Foucault's words, has been allowed to
"win the struggle and to fulfil, in all its phenomena, its
true nature." When one focusses on the end product that
results from implementing the design communicated by
the designer's drawings, models, specifications, etc. the
designed object is a fait accompli.
We may visualize the transformation between the
designed object and the 'object as design' as an enfolding of
the three-dimensional physical space of the designed object
in the extended socio-temporal space described in Figure
4.1.2 which is defined by the dimensions that accommo-
date, amongst others, the motions of perception and
consumption: the dimension of time, in its simplest guise,
is linear and directional, and the simplest space of social
relations is two-dimensional, that is, planar and differen-
tiable. Only through this higher dimensionality do we gain
the space in which to talk about and act upon the material
possibilities of the designed object. But this must not be
taken to imply that the first level of spatiality in design,
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time
enfolded
three-dimensional space
10. I cite my own experience of
writing for an international
English-speaking market.
Butterworth-Heinemann (for-
merly Architectural Press
Books) advised me early on in
the writing of Museums and
Art Galleries: Design and
Development Guide (1991) to
adopt American terminology.
11. Often a design process ends
with the thought "if we had
known at the start what we
know now we'd never have
designed it like this". ... I think
of the [design process] as a spe -
cially designed 'education; or
'course', which one devises, and
undertakes, in order to com -
plete the design.
JONES, J Christopher. Design
Methods: seeds of human
futures. 1980 edition. John
Wiley & Sons, 1981. p.xix-xx.
Nigel Cross took this notion
further to consider the implica-
tions of the idea that
people differ in the basic cogni -
a ye styles that they bring to
any learning task.
CROSS, Nigel. "Styles of learn-
ing, designing and computing".
Design Studies, Vol.6, No.3,
July 1985.
social dynamics
Figure 4.1.2
The 'social' space of the object as design which may be thought
of as a two-dimensional region, defined by dynamic and static
dimensions of society into which is enfolded the physical space
of the object and which, as an activated space, is projected for-
ward in a dimension of time.
that of the individuated 'physical body', is in any way
deficient. What it does imply is that the designed object
may only be represented or reconstructed through socially
mediated actions and therefore is always interpreted.
Programme: the object of design
The second level in design takes its epistemological status
from the notion that a design 'idea', as a pre-visual concept,
can be constituted by a system of circumscribing documen-
tary actions. The word 'programme', which is the common
American term for the design brief,' is a useful one to
adopt for its other connotations. There is an educational
use of the term 'programme' which implies a course of
learning shaped to some extent by the learner. And design
has been characterized as a learning process,' one which is
reinvented in each design situation to meet specific goals,
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12.For example, sources
which are likely to be familiar
to exhibition designers include:
Checklists and specimen let-
ters in "Part Three: Essential
Information" in ALLWOOD,
John & Bryan MONT-
GOMERY. Exhibition
Planning and Design: A Guide
for Exhibitors, Designers and
Contractors. Batsford, 1989.
pp. 133-62.
CHAPPELL, David. Report
Writing for Architects 2nd Edn,
Legal Studies & Services Ltd.,
1989.
GOSLETT, Dorothy. The
Professional Practice of Design.
Revised Ed. Batsford, 1971.
LYDIATE,	 Liz.	 (ed.)
Professional Practice in Design
Consultancy. Design Council,
1992.
13.ALLINSON, Kenneth. The
Wild Card of Design: a per -
spective on architecture in a
project management environ -
ment. Butterworth
Architecture, 1993. Although
ostensibly concerned with
architectural practice Allinson
uses ideas of team building
and management and organi-
zational dynamics common to
all areas of corporate creativity
and specifically design activity.
14.For example, the inade-
quacy of extant documentation
encountered by Kenneth
Agnew formed a central ele-
ment in his proposals for a
new research culture in
design, amongst his recom-
mendations were:
• Teaching the documenta -
tion of the innovation point as
a routine of design work in any
environment ...
• Encouraging designers in
academic environments to pub -
goals which generally relate in the first instance to the
opening up of creative opportunity and subsequently to
closure in the process of visualization and specification.
'Program', in the computing sense, can also mean a
protocol, a system of instructions which directs particular
kinds of operations. And in Design - the professional
practice of design - certain conventions of procedure and
behaviour are regulated by more or less common systems of
documentation which include: design contracts, project
briefs, surveys, project plans and schedules, tendering
packages, production contracts, work logs and diaries,
formal correspondence, accounts, etc.' In the performing
arts 'programme' refers to a document setting out a list of
features or acts to be presented and the people (performers)
participating in the event, perhaps with subsidiary infor-
mation that establishes narrative, interpretive or circum-
stantial purpose and the credentials of the company or
prestige of the production. And in Design key communica-
tions at several points in the performance of the design
take the form of formal documents: at the beginning, a
credentials presentation, an initial brief and a contract
which makes an offer of services and sets out fees; at design
concept stage, a presentation that describes the interpreta-
tion of the brief, the main features of the design proposal,
and the implications of the design for production.
Programme' may also refer to the performance itself, in the
sense that a performance characterized by some feature
that gives it a sense of coherence and continuity, such as
the presenter in a radio broadcast, is a 'programme'.
Similarly, in Design there is a process of lending continuity
to the communicative interaction between the client 'group',
the design 'team' and the production 'community' which
takes the form of an, often rather informal, performative
sequence of mutual understanding, professional trust,
lish or at least deposit in the
institution library a (very)
short report of the innovation
point as a condition of credit
for any professional design
work.
• Pressing museums, gently,
for correspondingly more pene -
trating curation of products
wherever they are exhibited.
• Offering graduate his tori
ans related research stu
dentships in design and engi -
neering schools and then inter
facing them with enthusiastic
designers and technologists ...
• Submitting products which
have received such study, sup -
ported by the research materi -
al, for curation in national col -
lections wherever possible.
AGNEW, Kenneth. "The
Spitfire: Legend or History?
An Argument for a New
Research Culture in Design",
Journal of Design History.
Vol.6, No.2, 1993. pp.121-30.
15. The National Art Library
at the Victoria and Albert
Museum, contains the extant
documentary material of most
of the leading decorators,
applied artists, craftspeople
and designers from the period
1850-1950. Archives at the
Science Museum, London and
its branch museum, the
National Railway Museum,
York contain vast collections of
engineering drawings and
associated documentation. The
National Maritime Museum,
Greenwich, is the national
repository for ships plans and
the ship models collection and
supporting archives contain a
wealth of information on admi-
ralty commissions and many
other ship buildings.
Ironically, the Design Museum
in London was set up without
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working relationship.' Design programme, as the object of
design, therefore encompasses a primary space of documen-
tation and an interpretive space of social performance.
In talking about the design programme, generally
speaking the focus of attention is on the documentary
products continuous with a visible process of design. The
participant and the researcher, who are present in the
time of the design process, perceive the design programme
quite differently to the design historian who is involved
with the documentary evidence of a design process which is
past. Continuity in the dimension of time enfolds the
documentary space of the design programme into its
performative social space. The temporal discontinuity
which the design historian experiences prevents the
realization of design programme proper, what may be
reconstructed is limited by the lower dimensionality of the
space of the surviving documentary evidence. It is
generally an incomplete body of information, it is
separated from the context of its production, and therefore
it refers to a process which is invisible. This invisibility
tends to turn the design historian to the ontological focus,
to steer them clear of the more speculative areas grounded
in subjectivist interpretation and towards the more 'secure'
ground of empirical study.' The object, in this ontology,
becomes the autographic product, the drawing and the
letter 'by the hand of' the designer, and it is assigned a
material cultural status that allows it, for instance, to live
happily in a museum archive along side the designed object
with which it may be associated.' To the participant, the
programmatic aspects of the design have a performative
function, and the focus therefore is an epistemological one.
It is not the materiality of the document that counts but its
place in a system of communicative acts.
Therefore, we may picture the design programme as
global
local
abstract concrete
enfolded
two-dimensional
documentary space
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permanent collections (neither
designed objects nor support-
ing archive material) and with
only a library of printed books
to support exhibition and
research projects.
an asymmetrical construction. In the first instance, the
documentary space of the autographic product (Figure
4.1.3) is enfolded in the performative social space of the
design programme (Figure 4.1.4.)
Figure 4.1.3
The 'documentary' space of the autographic product, which may
be thought of as a two-dimensional region defined by a formal
abstract-concrete dimension that places the type of signifier
(semiotic form) and a conceptual local-global dimension that
places the scope of signification (content quality).
social dynamics
Figure 4.1.4
The performative 'social' space of the design programme which
dimensionally identical to the social space of the object as design
(see Figure 4.1.2 above.) though, in practice, not differentiated
in the same ways.
enfolded
three-dimensional space
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And in the second instance, the three-dimensional physical
space of the autographic product is enfolded in a documen-
tary space thus mirroring the spatiality of the designed
object (Figure 4.1.5.)
abstract	 concrete
Figure 4.1.5
global
local
The 'documentary' space of the autographic product as material
cultural object.
In this second construction, however, the performative
social space is reduced to a zero point by its dislocation in
time. Certainly, it is the autographic product that connects
the worlds of the participant in the design situation and
the design historian, but, in a reversal of the case with the
designed object, on this occasion the higher dimensionality
rests not with the design historian's object but with that of
the design participant. As before, this does not imply that
the object of lower dimensionality is deficient. What it does
imply is that it is only in the case of the higher dimension-
ality that we gain the space in which to talk about and act
upon the design programme, and that it may only be repre-
sented or reconstructed through socially mediated actions
and therefore is always interpreted.
16.For example:
CHERMAYEFF, Serge &
Christopher ALEXANDER.
Community and Privacy. USA:
Doubleday, 1963.
NEUTRA, Richard. Survival
Through Design. Oxford
University Press, 1954.
PAPANEK, Victor. Design for
the Real World. Thames &
Hudson, 1972.
WRIGHT, Frank Lloyd. The
Future of Architecture. Horizon
Press, 1953.
17. For example:
BLAU, Judith R. Architects
and Firms: A Sociological
Perspective on Architectural
Practice. MIT, 1984.
CUFF, Dana. Architecture: The
Story of Practice. MIT, 1991.
SHOSHKES, Ellen. The
Design Process: Case Studies
in Project Development.
Architecture Design and
Technology Press, 1990.
18. See the examples quoted
above in 3.2 Design: Epistem-
ological Object.
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Design Process
Two alternative foci have been provided in the discourse
on design process. The first is the process of designing as
experienced. This provides a biographical or ethnographi-
cal narrative of the type familiar to the existentialist and
to the anthropologist or ethnographer. Its epistemological
framework is subjectivist and, depending upon whether it
is the existent or the participative researcher doing the
talking, ranges from the most liberal, anarchistic and
humanist to the most cautious, conservative, phenomeno-
logical and interpretive accounts of design process. Such
accounts tend to avoid the idea of modelling except en
passant. The goal of humanist accounts tends to be a,
usually utopian, normativity grounded in a critique of
industrial, capitalist, Eurocentric, culture.' And interpre-
tive accounts tend towards a normalizing pluralism
grounded in an assimilative, tolerant, cultural competence;
a kind of apolitical eclecticism that skims off the surface of
post-modernism but lacks the deeper ironic reflexivity of
its sharper forms.'
The second focus is on models of the design process
that provide ideal visualizations of or prescriptions for the
process of designing. The epistemological framework here is
objectivist and ranges from the strictly analytic, empiricist
and functionalist to the more synthetic, idealist and
constructivist models of design process. Such models tend to
marginalize the messiness of experience and propose
instead a generalization of simple structure, usually of
underlying linearity, to which modifying elements may be
added to account for the contingencies of practical situations
and the imperfections of human activity in the 'real' world."
Not all theorists have satisfied themselves with the
limitations of these alternatives. For example, in a flawed
19. AKIN, Omer. "An
Exploration of the Design
Process" in CROSS, Nigel (Ed.)
Developments in Design
Methodology. John Wiley,
1984. pp.189-207.
20. ibid. pp.191-2.
21. ibid. p.205.
22. ibid.
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but nevertheless interesting attempt at behaviourist
relativism, Omer Akin developed a version of protocol
analysis to look at the behaviour of professional designers
in relatively controlled experimental conditions!' Although
Akin was being too optimistic in hoping to generate:
(I) a catalogue of operations that can be applied in a task
environment, (2) the circumstances under which such applica -
tions are made, and (3) the paths developed during the 'search'
for a solution.2°
He nevertheless reached forward-pointing conclusions.
From the evidence of protocol analysis he was able to make
observations that contradict the familiar simple linear
models of design process and specifically that proposed by
Jones (1963): 'Analysis' it turns out "is part of virtually all
phases of design", 21 and what he calls the search process
may start "from any point in the problem space". Other
observations included: the fact that no single issue
occupied the designer's attention for very long; that the
focus of attention at any one time was largely dependent
upon the material of the design, initially programme
documentation and, later, increasingly, the stimulus to
thinking provided by design drawings, models, diagrams
etc; and that very regularly (in the four-hour experimental
situation, an average of every 14 minutes) the attention of
the designer opens out to undertake an evaluation of the
success of the process to date. What we learn from efforts
such as Akins' is that so-called 'intuitive' processes hold a
key to understanding human designing behaviour, that the
range of techniques in which the designer has competence
will be brought to bear in a design situation in complex
and messy ways, ways that follow practical reasoning
discontinuously and rely just as heavily on the stimulus of
the work in progress, and sometimes take irrational leaps
that can only be justified by the results they produce.
23. ibid. p.206.
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The only seemingly contradictory conclusion Akin
suggests is that "The process of design is primarily a top-
down, breadth-first process". 23 To impose such an interpre-
tation requires too much confidence in the directionality of
the specific protocol analysed. The implication that
different aspects of the design activity are hierarchically
dependent on one another attempts to generalize on the
basis of theoretically unsound assumptions. One cannot
assume that dimensions of freedom in the design process
that are less frequently explored than others are therefore
secondary in importance. One could argue that the
moments, however infrequent, in which bottom-up detail-
first possibilities are explored are in fact the primary
moments, the moments that give the design process its
defining characteristics, the moments which clearly
separate strategies which are first and foremost problem-
solving strategies from those which leave open the
question of whether the task in design is of exploring
creative opportunities, opening up the possibilities of
change, or of contriving accommodating coincidences
between problem and solution definitions.
To picture the design process in such a way as to
accommodate the freedom of movement revealed by Akin's
protocol analysis at the same time as avoiding the tamp of
crystallizing too solidly synchronic 'states' of the problem-
solution complex requires that an open space be visualized
that may be blurred across a slice of time. In retrospect we
do reconstruct, quite successfully, stages in the process of
arriving at a design. The mistake is to believe that these can
be characterized as actually synchronic. The speed of action
in design varies across the process in relation to the infor-
mation available to be acted upon. In this respect differance
in design is no different to that in language. Where Akin
states that: "Attention also seems to depend on the amount
enfolded
two-dimensional
social space
local
global
time
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of information gathered about certain issues at that point in
time" he is rather clumsily admitting an instance of the
general point about speed of action. What he fails to
recognize is that slow action, action that encounters the
local and the detailed, can also occur in the earlier moments
of the design process as easily as in later ones such as, in
his own example, when "the overall context of the design is
adequately understood". The picture we settle on must be
able to encompass the moment of the de-differentiation of a
complex programme at an early stage in the design process
as easily as the moment which loosens up a design that has
developed an inhibiting rigidity at a later stage.
Minimally three dimensions are necessary to provide
such a picture (Figure 4.1.6.).
abstract	 concrete
Figure 4.1.6
The 'pseudo-synchronic' space of the design process, which may
be thought of as a two-dimensional region defined by an
abstract-concrete dimension that places design technique in
terms of its quality of form and a local-global dimension that
places the scope of attention in terms of content quality, which
is projected forward in a dimension of time.
24. This general comment is
not untypical:
Designers themselves have
ideas about what is involved in
the design process. These views
are subjective - often ideologi -
cal, and sometimes idiosyn -
cratic ... [p.223, my emphasis]
THOMAS, John C. & John M
Carroll "The Psychological
Study of Design", in CROSS,
Nigel (ed.) Developments in
Design Methodology. John
Wiley, 1984. pp.221-35.
In trying to explain (or per-
haps avoid explaining) an
apparently capricious but actu-
ally essential and distinguish-
ing design feature of the other-
wise very 'formal' Concept
range of tableware, the swan-
shaped knob of the tea pot,
Martin Hunt, the designer
admitted to nothing but "post-
rationalisations".
I rationalise it by comparing
the curves to the ripple formed
by a pebble in a pond, and all
those post-rationalisations did
seem to fit - there is a sort of
logic to the swan. [p.321
WALKER, Susannah.
Queensbury Hunt: Creativity
and Industry. Fourth Estate,
1992.
25. Professional architects not
only bring conviction to design,
but in attempting to manage
the uncertainties of practice,
they establish priorities on the
basis of conviction. Convictions
of practice, however, differ
from convictions of design in
that the former are more prag -
matic, rooted in the economic
realities as well as the social
relations of the firm. [BLAU,
1984, p.15.]
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However, it bears a certain symmetrical relation to the
performative social space of the design programme. The
two-dimensional space of the autographic product (Figure
4.1.3 above) is stretched out on a time line and into this is
enfolded the performative social space of design practice.
In this construction the three-dimensional physical
space of the designed object is projected as a zero point:
during the design process it clearly lies in the future, that
is, it is enfolded, in a virtual sense, at a point along the
time line which the design process has yet to reach. This is
its dislocation in time. Therefore, once again it is the
autographic product that connects the worlds of the partic-
ipant in the design situation and of the design historian,
and, in symmetry with the case of the design programme,
the higher dimensionality rests not with the design
historian's object but with that of the design participant.
As before, this location of higher dimensionality implies
that the participant gains the space in which to talk about
and act upon the design process and that it may only be
represented or reconstructed through socially mediated
actions and therefore is always interpreted.
Design Philosophy
Many researchers have observed that designers generally
have implicit ideas about the underlying rationale of
design activity which may or may not be made explicit.'
Those designers whose primary contact is with other
designers in a team are likely to express the values and
beliefs that they hold, if at all, as a component of the
ideological and political negotiation of programmatic
space; 25 and those who write about what they do and
whose contacts perhaps include opinion makers and policy
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26. For example:
OLINS, Wally. Corporate
Identity: Making business
strategy visible through design.
Thames and Hudson, 1989.
... identity management in
major corporations must be the
job of the Chief Executive or
senior board member, support -
ed by an in-house team and
where appropriate by outside
consultants. [p.9 my empha-
sis]
By its erudition and powerful
rhetoric, the book in effect goes
on to make the case that noth-
ing is more important than the
role of design in corporate
identity and that expert inde-
pendent intervention produces
the best results. Olins has
proved himself one of the great
shapers of this high-profile
socially constructed object of
design:
Wally Olins is Co-founder and
Chairman of Wolff-Olins - 'the
doyen of the corporate identity
business' (The Observer). He is
Visiting Professor at the
Management School, Imperial
College of Science ex
Technology, London and
Visiting Lecturer on Design
Management at the London
Business School. He is also a
trustee of the Design Museum.
[Flyleaf notes]
27. Canadian museum and
exhibition designers such as
Jerry Krause at the Ontario
Science Centre, Jacques
Guillon and associates Laurent
Marquart and Morely Smith in
Montreal, Rudy Kovach,
Gordon Robinson, Dick Lott
and Bill McLennan associated
with the Museum of
Anthropology, University of
British Columbia, Amy
Forman and the Royal Ontario
makers as well as clients are likely to broaden the scope of
this rhetorical function to the social space of an entire field
of design.' In both cases one can see the designer attempt-
ing to play a role in shaping the context of design. In the
former case the shaping activity has a local focus in the
latter it expands and occasionally may be global in intent.
In the UK, and to a large extent in North America, it
tends to be the case that designers direct their statements
about the nature and practice of design to the furtherance
of the institution of Design rather than to the extension of
knowledge about design phenomena. This orientation is
perhaps a consequence of educational background: tradi-
tionally design education is primarily concerned with
learning to design and, only as an adjunct to this, with
learning about design. In mainland Europe traditions vary,
but an extended education and training that encompasses
the humanities, arts and technology, and culminates in an
architectural qualification is more common: British archi-
tectural education, at seven years, is one of the shortest.
British designers, other than a minority of architects,
typically know little of Philosophy, have little time and a
relatively poor vocabulary for theoretical debate, and have
difficulty in relating design to other aspects of social,
historical and cultural experience. But, and this is a big
'but', they are respected around the world as effective
practitioners. For example, in the past 20 years the work
of British exhibition designers has had a greater influence
than that of any other group' and currently they tend to
attract a higher proportion of international work than
those of any other nation.'
This is not to say that design philosophy, design
ideology, is unimportant, quite the contrary. Whether one
focusses on theory specific to the design process in hand,
that is, on 'rationale', or on theory providing a set of under-
Museum's Communi-cation
Design Team, and David
Youngson, Louise St. Pierre
and Celina Ducceschi at the
Vancouver Science World
British Columbia made an
international impact in the
early and mid-1980's.
However, the work of James
Gardner, Margaret Hall and
Robin Wade was already well
known by this time through
such high profile projects as
Pilkington Glass Museum
(Gardner, 1964), Evoluon
(Gardner, 1975) Tutankhamun
(Hall, 1972), Coalbrookedale
Museum of Iron and Furnace
(Wade, 1979) Throughout the
1980's a wealth of innovative
work came from the studios of
several companies including
Furneaux-Stewart and
Gardiner & Tome, and since
the mid-1980s from: Brennan
& Whalley, Compleat Works,
Event Communications,
Haley-Sharpe, Hall &
Redman, Heritage Projects,
Imagination, Met Studios,
Neal Potter, and many others.
28. Event Communications,
Imagination, Met Studios,
Neal Potter and John
Sunderland amongst others
have been reported in Design
Week as winning international
work on a regular basis.
29. The term was first coined
by C S Pierce in 1878: he
defined a theory of meaning:
Consider what effects, which
might conceivably have practi -
cal bearings, we conceive the
object of our conception. to
have. Then our conception of
these effects is the whole of our
conception of the object.' The
term was soon borrowed by
William James, F CS Schiller,
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pinning ideas and beliefs, that is, on 'general theory',
guiding principles may be discerned in such utterances as
are made by designers. And one must also respect the
tradition of pragmatism in design in which there is a tacit
belief that the work will speak for itself through its
physical and social impact, that 'words' are to a large
extent superfluous, that the interpretations put upon
design by theorists, historians and critics, even if necessary
to the cultural and economic spheres of practice, are
secondary to the visual, formal and socially active commu-
nication mediated by design itself. This pragmatism is
itself ideological and has a Philosophical pedigree. Whilst
respecting the underlying suspicion of logocentric culture
apparent in pragmatism of this sort, one must also note
that the invisibility of much of Design is cause for suspicion
from other quarters." Although there is nothing mysteri-
ous about design, it is a basic human ability - some would
say, along with language, it is the characteristic trait of the
human' - Design (with a capital 'D') is quite regularly the
subject of obfuscation particularly in the theory-laden texts
of certain architectural journals: translation from Italian or
German does not help, but even the Architectural Review,
AA Files, and Architectural Design are not immune. Not
only do we consciously and purposefully shape the environ-
ment around us, we use the process and the products of the
process to embody and transmit systems of meanings and
values." If design philosophy has a space, therefore, it is as
a bridge between the language of design discourse and the
process of design, a bridge which refuses to separate off, as
a foreign land, the institutionalized zone of Design.
To picture the space of design philosophy two types of
space must be linked: (1) a social space of design discourse
which accommodates essentially a pragmatic conception of
communicative activity (Figure 4.1.7),
RADICAL CHANGE
Radical
Humanism
Radical
Structuralism
Interpretive
Theory
Functionalist
Theory
REGULATION
time
co
CO
0
205
and John Dewey, who all in
their different ways made
pragmatism a theory of truth.
FLEW, Antony. (Consultant
ed.) A Dictionary of
Philosophy. Pan Books, 1979.
p.284.
Pragmatism represents a per -
fectly familiar attitude in phi -
losophy, the empiricist atti -
tude, but ... in both a more rad -
ical and in a less objectionable
form that it has ever yet
assumed. ... It means the open
air and possibilities of nature,
as against dogma, artificiality,
and the pretence of finality of
truth.
JAMES, William. [1907]
Pragmatism. Edited by Bruce
Kuklick. Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing, 1981. p.28.
Ideas become true just so far as
they help us to get into satisfac -
tory relations with other parts
of our experience ... This is the
'instrumental' view of truth.
[ibid. p.30]
More recently Richard Rorty
has considered the implica-
tions of pragmatism for a post-
Philosophical culture:
... in the process of playing
vocabularies and cultures off
against each other, we produce
new and better ways of talking
and acting - not better by refer
ence to a previously known
standard, but just better in the
sense that they come to seem
better than their predecessors.
RORTY, Richard. [1982]
Consequences of Pragmatism.
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991.
p.xxxvii.
...professionalized philosophy
may or may not join transcen -
dentalist culture, but ...it
should not try to beat it.
[ibid. p.69.]
In comparing the recent writ-
ings of Ian Richie, the British
hi-tech (late modern in Jencks'
social dynamics
Figure 4.1.7
The 'social' space of design ideology becomes dimensionally iden-
tical to the social spaces of the object as design and of the design
programme (see Figures 4.1.2 & 4.1.4 above) when given a
dimension of time in which to play out its differences in commu-
nicative activity, although, in practice, the resulting space will
not be differentiated in the same ways as either of these models.
and; (2) a paradigmatic space of design ideology of the sort
made familiar by Burrell and Morgan (See Figure 2.4.3).
In the context of design discourse paradigmatic possibili-
ties are played out in ideologically committed communica-
tive activity which means that a dimension of time must
be added to the paradigmatic model (Figure 4.1.8).
Figure 4.1.8
The 'paradigmatic' space of design ideology (see: Figure 2.1.1.)
becomes a performative 'discursive' space when given a dimen-
sion of time in which to play out its differences in communica-
tive activity.
terms) architect, and Bernard
Tschumi, the European, decon-
structivist (in Jencks' terms,
postmodern) architect, Richard
Weston had this to say:
Richie ...is a natural designer
more at home with crafting
materials than words. He has
much to say ...but his writing
is less elegant than his projects
and is rooted in that empirical
Anglo-Saxon tradition to which
theorising such as Tschumi's is
alien.
Weston himself a British
architect, writer, and teacher,
and typically modern and
pragmatic in outlook, con-
cludes:
Tschumi impresses with his
erudition but leaves me
unmoved, whereas Richie
excites.
WESTON, Richard. "Theory
and practice as the century
closes" (Book reviews of:
TSCHUMI, Bernard.
Architecture and Disjunction.
MIT, 1994. and RICHIE, Ian.
(Well) Connected Architecture.
Academy, 1994.), The
Architects' Journal, 27 July
1994, p.50.
30. This example is from a for-
mer University Vice-
Chancellor, and at the time of
writing the President of the
Design Industries Association
who admitted to not being and
never having been a designer
and expressed the desire "to
redefine design and design
education", as best one can
tell, as an academic, technical-
ly oriented, general education.
... being a widely spread mix -
tare of other disciplines, design
in its verb form appears mar -
ginal or superficial when corn -
pared with the main subject
disciplines which are focused,
206
In this we can see the pragmatic aspect as a resort which
is particularly of relevance to an instrumentalized paradig-
matic field. In this sense, the social space of design
ideology may take one of two alternative relations to the
whole in a symmetrical construction. (1) In the case of
ideologically committed communicative action it may be
enfolded in the paradigmatic space at the point of action
on the time line and be carried forward as the actor's
socially defined identity (Figure 4.1.9.)
enfolded
two-dimensional
social space
RADICAL CHANGE
Radical
Structuralism
0
LU
Interpretive	 Functionalist
	 co
Theory	 Theory	 0
REGULATION
Figure 4.1.9
The 'paradigmatic' space of ideologically committed communica-
tive action: a performative 'discursive' space in which is enfolded
a social space of design ideology.
(2) In pragmatic communicative action, on the other hand,
the social space is open and active; the time line carries it
forward along with an enfolded paradigmatic space in
which a series of traces may be inscribed as the (retro-
spective) defining characteristics of any communicative
action (Figure 4.1.10.)
LU
Radical
Humanism
time
coherent, lead to degrees and
are supported by considerable
bodies of research. The phrase
'Jack-of-all-trades, master of
none' fits design like a glove.
Moreover, as with drama, art
and architecture, the inspira
tional character of design is
difficult to measure or exam -
inc. In its hand-waving form, it
looks a soft option. For all
these reasons and more, design
is not a regular, respectable
discipline of higher education.
TELLS, Sir Graham. "A renais-
sance in design education" in
MYERSON, Jeremy. (ed.)
Design Renaissance Selected
papers from the International
Design Congress, Glasgow,
1993. Open Eye/CSD, 1994.
pp.87-93.
31. See 2.3, Note 6.
32. See 2.3, Note 12.
207
-
enfolded
two-dimensional
paradigmatic space
time
	 1111.-
social dynamics
Figure 4.1.10
The 'social' space of pragmatic communicative action: a perfor-
mative social space in which is enfolded a paradigmatic space of
design ideology.
In this construction neither the three-dimensional
physical space of the designed object nor the two-dimen-
sional documentary space of the autographic product are
located. Their dislocation is partly a matter of absolute
dimensionality - no overlap occurs between, for example,
three-dimensional physical space and two-dimensional
paradigmatic space - and partly a matter of the process of
generalizing schemata at this stage in the project, a process
which tends to mask the potential for a bridging between
incommensurate spaces that may be achieved by defining a
common space of interpretation, practical discourse, of
communicative action in general. However, certain written
statements by the hand of the designer, as well as those
composed by the journalist, critic or historian, that quote
the designer, do concern design philosophy. Indeed, outside
of a direct experience of the practical context of any ideolog-
ical mediation, the text, whether visionary or revisionary in
intent, is the principal source of information upon which to
base the study of design philosophy.
enfolded	 enfolded
two-dimensional
	 Iwo-dimensional
social space	 paradigmatic space
abstract	 concrete
Figure 4.1.11
The 'documentary' space of the text as evidence of design ideology.
global
local
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In the case of the text, a spatial relationship, which
parallels that between the three-dimensional physical
space of the autographic product and its documentary
space in forming an object for the design historian (see
Figure 4.1.5), can be defined which encompasses the text
as an object of study. The social space of pragmatic commu-
nicative activity and/or the paradigmatic space of ideologi-
cally committed communicative activity are enfolded in the
documentary space of the text (Figure 4.1.11.)
In those cases where the text in question forms part of the
design programme some link may be forged by the design
historian between the representation or reconstruction of
design process and the interpretation of ideology. However,
texts that stand in a more general relation to the output,
circumstances and creative activity of the designer are, by
their very nature, only open to broader socio-cultural (or
socio-technical) interpretation - in this sense, they are
dislocated from the active spaces of design.
209
Summary Schemata
The spatial framework outlined above for design provides
a conceptual starting point and is summarized in Figure
4.1.12. In the following section the specific intervals and
movements of museum design will be used: to explore the
animation of the spaces described here; to highlight where
deficiencies may exist in the developing model; and to
point to possible enhancements and additions that may be
necessary in order to consider the broadest range of
design phenomena.
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Figure 4.1.12
Spatial framework for design (Figure references in brackets)
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4.2 The Design of Museum Design
Contingency and Social Construction
1. The whole purpose of
Museums and Art Galleries:
Design and Development Guide
[Butterworth Architecture,
1991] was:
to provide all those involved in
the initial stages of the building
process - clients, users and mem -
bers of the design team - with a
set of tools. These tools, or
resources, will help them to com -
municate more effectively so that
they are able to work together to
develop rich design programmes
which will, it is hoped, culminate
in the best solutions to their par -
ticular problems. [p.1.]
The object of museum design,
which broadly refers to the
range of information that the
design team must be competent
to deal with relates to:
1. Interpretive approach or die -
cipline.
2. Size.
3. Content/ character of collec -
tions.
4. Pattern of use (access and
communications).
5. Geographical location.
6. Source(s) of funding.
7. Style of management ... (type
of client organization)
[p.4-5.]
Each of these categories itself
outlines a complex of descriptive
detail and practical implications,
for example, pattern of use in
terms of access and communica-
tions:
attitudes to such debates as those
on: heritage and commercialism;
entertainment and education;
and natural and artificial light -
ing of works of art ... become the
foundation for statements of poli -
cy on research, exhibitions, edu -
Museum design is a multidisciplinary area of activity that
brings together the expertise of a wide range of museum
specialists. Fundamental to the professional practice of
museum design is the notion that the unique context that
a museum provides - through its aims and objectives,
policies, collections, research and communication activi-
ties, geographical location, form of accommodation, visitor
population and pattern of use - requires of the Design team
a particular competence in dealing with complex project
information, rigorous conservation and security require-
ments, and a wide range of possibilities for creative inter-
pretation and communication.'
Anyone expecting a straightforward explanation of
what design is will always be disappointed: the question
easily draws us into the most heated areas of philosophical
debate. To some design is the essentially technical practice
of optimizing structures and the use of resources, or it is
the art of creating form and meaning in things, to others it
is a strategic organizational practice in developing and
interpreting complex systems, or it is the fundamental
human activity of bringing order into the environment.'
There are many intermediate positions combining or
falling between instrumental science and pragmatic art,
between functionalist determinacy and humanist
expectancy. However, as was noted earlier in this paper,
few practising designers outside of the architectural
profession have bothered themselves with these debates:
why should museum designers?
One argument, which perhaps should be considered,
is that, as the socio-cultural/socio-technical context in
which any design appears to operate is constructed by the
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cation, marketing, etc., and/or
for a museum-wide communica -
tions strategy. [p.5]
Michael Belcher also expends
considerable effort in outlining
the contextual depth relevant to
museum design in Exhibitions in
Museums [Leicester University
Press, 1991.]
This book ... is not a design
grammar, nor a survey of design
solutions to exhibitions. [It]
attempts ... to provide an intro -
duction to the various factors
which relate to exhibitions ...
which might be considered
'essential knowledge'.
[`Introduction", p.1.]
And half of the book is devoted
to policy issues, organizational
implications, project planning
and the design brief.
2. ... a collection of attitudes,
which we will call here philoso -
phies, ... must be seen to have
their effect on the design process
itself In particular the view that
a designer takes of his role in
society and the function and rea -
son for his work are crucial to
any real understanding of the
process he employs.
LAWSON, Bryan. How
Designers Think. Architectural
Press, 1980. p.119.
See above 2.3 Design, the discus-
sion of differance, and the onto-
logical and epistemological
objects of design.
3. ... the sociocultural and
political situation of a social
group shapes its norms and val -
ues, which in turn influence the
meaning given to an artifact.
PINCH, Trevor & Wiebe E.
BIJKER	 "The	 Social
Construction of Facts and
Artifacts: Or How the Sociology
of Science and the Sociology of
Technology Might Benefit Each
beliefs and actions of the participants, the way that we
comprehend design is fundamental to the uses to which it
may be put and the outcomes that we may expect it to
achieve.' A functionalist approach to design will not easily
serve liberatory ends and vice versa.
In the museum context we can clearly see how this
proposition may be tested. If we analyse the statements
that a museum makes about its identity and purpose, and
the processes that it employs in pursuing its aims, we may
determine in what mould it is formed. A museum that
takes a mechanistic view of the structure and advance of
knowledge in any particular field and concerns itself with
the classification and ordering of things will not easily be
served by a Design practice that develops radical interdis-
ciplinary narrative interpretations however unambiguous
and persuasive they may be. Equally, a museum that
takes a more holistic view of the condition of human
understanding and primarily explores the relationship
between distant (in time or place) and present cultures
interactively with its local community will be poorly served
by a Design practice that separates and displays artefacts
and facts however correct and beautiful the result may be.'
These examples exaggerate what we are more likely
to find in reality, but they make a point: if one wishes to
determine what to do and how to do it one needs to decide
why anything should be done at all. Using such ideas as
analytical tools, when we look at any museum's state-
ments of policy we are likely to find a blend of functional-
ist, structuralist, liberatory and interpretive objects which
together help to define the unique character of the institu-
tion, to signal its peculiar needs, and ultimately to direct
the appropriate means and methods of satisfying them.'
There are different ways of understanding what
museum Design is and what it is for, in addition there is
Other" pp.17-60 in BIJKER,
Weibe E., Thomas P. Hughes &
Trevor Pinch. The Social
Construction of Technological
Systems. MIT Press, 1987. p.46.
4. We should consider, for
example, how the British
Museum will deal with the
return of the ethnographic col-
lections to the main buildings in
1997. The classical departments
hold to a traditional object-cen-
tred view of the purpose of exhi-
bition and engages a design
devoted to ordered display - an
ontological emphasis - which
makes few concessions to an
'audience'-serving narrative con-
struction of communications.
Whereas the ethnographic
department operates from an
opposing position in which the
exposition and celebration of cul-
tural diversity engages a design
devoted to often theatrical story
telling - an epistemological
emphasis. In future will ethno-
graphic approaches be sup-
pressed? Or will new gallery
spaces, in prime locations in the
restructured building, be used to
establish a high-capacity core of
crowd-pulling 'shows' rather like
those on the ground floor of the
Natural History Museum? The
former approach may preserve
the institution's traditional
reserve but at the risk of alienat-
ing a disciplinary culture and
the audience it serves. The latter
course would undoubtedly radi-
cally alter the nature, identity
and constituency of the institu-
tion as a whole.
6. In the past, the British
Museum has managed the 'dif-
ference' primarily by institution-
alizing a clear distinction
between the 'permanent gallery'
approach and the 'temporary
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always the question of what museum Design ought to be
about. One cannot prescribe in general: the function of
Design in any particular museum can only be determined
by consideration of the local, historical, contingent context.
What one can say is that historical accident and ill-consid-
ered imposition are not the processes likely to produce a
Design that suits the organization's needs. If you like,
museum Design must itself be designed or at very least
selected according to deliberately and carefully thought
through criteria.'
Although it is common to think of Design in terms of
its products and its end products, as a practitioner or a
member of the wider creative team, it is equally important
to think of Design in terms of its processes and its philoso-
phies. It is only through developing this understanding
that we can hope to relate our activity to the practical
situations in which we are expected to intervene and in the
process to define problems worth solving and a comprehen-
sive range of criteria by which solutions may be evaluated.
Ideology, Programme and Differance
The dimensions peculiar to each aspect of museum
designing open up the spaces of interaction, the intervals
of differance. 7 A group of people situated with a complex of
material and intellectual effects begins as a more or less
open field of possibilities - an actor network capable of
redefining the identities, extents and interrelationships of
its actors, and in which neither human nor non-human
actors are privileged in the process.' But not all possibili-
ties are equally probable for two key reasons. (1) A
dynamic is implicit in any specific network of actors -
propensities may be uncovered, a nascent force field
activated. (2) Before a programme begins certain possibili-
exhibition' approach. The former
one could call an 'architectonics'
of material culture and the lat-
ter a (rather conservative) 'the-
matics' of material culture. The
former Director, Sir David
Wilson, made it very clear that
he disagrees with the view that:
In a period of greater sophistica
tion in the entertainment indus
try, of high investment in the
arts, ... the customer must be
appeased with 'exciting' and
'more relevant' museums - closer
perhaps to theme parks ...
and considers that:
A museum is not a business nor
is it primarily a pedagogical
institution, nor a part of the
entertainment industry ...
Business ability, educational
prowess and public relations
experience must all be subordi
nated to this: ... protectlingf the
collections and presentfingl them
to the public.
WILSON, Sir David M. The
British Museum: Purpose and
Politics, Trustees of the British
Museum, 1989. pp.118-9.
6. It is no accident that in their
respective books Margaret Hall,
Head of Design at the British
Museum, promotes a normative,
display grammar for museum
exhibition design whilst Roger
Miles et al at the Natural
History Museum promote an
educational empiricism. See:
HALL, Margaret. On Display.
Lund Humphries, 1987, and
MILES, Roger S. et al. The
Design of Educational Exhibits.
Unwin Hyman, 1982.
7. These defining dimensions
are:
1. time
2. social dynamics
3. social status
4. local-global
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ties are proscribed and others favoured by the prejudices,
preconceptions, diverse projects and allegiances of the
human actors, and by the preconfigurations of energy and
material in the non-human actors. Potentiality, therefore,
is there to be negotiated, shaped, liberated. However, there
_ is always the danger that not only may potentiality and
possibility be too tightly circumscribed but that
programme and process may be prescribed in such a way
as to prefigure or predetermine the product. If the latter is
allowed to happen, complexity is artificially diminished,
the visionary and the analytical aspects of Design are
dissociated, and the whole operation reduced to one of
artistic indulgence and/or technical treatments. The point
of design is to envision the widest field of possibilities
genuinely available to the group in a specific practical
situation, to open up and to empower the design process.
The actor network contains and continually redefines
heterogeneous actors. Therefore, in attempting to account
for the non-human, as much as for the human, aspects of
dynamic activity one encounters a self-reflexive difficulty.
In retrospective analysis, even if not obviously in the
immediate experience of the participant, the various
phenomena uncovered are potentially the outcome of two
layers of social construction. The first refers to the 'real'
substance of the design - philosophy, programme, process,
product - to its actuality, its social and material context, and
the second refers to the 'ideal' design which is presented in
such evidence as reaches the analyst, in the actuality of that
presentation, the social and material context of analysis.
This layering blurs any distinction that one might hope to
make between the social construction of a design and the
social construction of its reconstruction (social reconstruc-
tion). They present their own pseudo-synchronic slices
through performative social space which have the added
global
local
abstract	 concrete
	*-
time
Figure 4.2.1
design
history/
theory
post-rationalization
design
ideology/programme
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complexity of contrasting enfolded spaces the effects of
which are difficult to separate in time (Figure 4.2.1.)
RADICAL CHANGE
Radical
Humanism
Radical
Structuralism
Interpretive
Theory
Functionalist
Theory
REGULATION
The layering effect of social-construction/reconstruction. The retrospective analysis of materi-
al evidence (such as project documentation) tends to blur effects such as post-rationalization
between any pseudo-synchronic slice that shows a 'moment' in the social construction of a
design and one that shows its social reconstruction. What links these moments is the docu-
mentary (material) evidence that reaches the analyst.
5. abstract-concrete
6. subjective-objective
7. regulation-radical change
8. width
9. height 'y'
10. depth 'z'
In design philosophy:
(a) dimensions 1, 6 & 7 define a
The paradoxical nature of this problem must be accepted.
At the first level, as participant in the design
situation, a pragmatic approach may be adopted. The
configurations of energy and material that succumb to
direct manipulation may be regarded as cartesian raffles,
as three-dimensional materialities present to human
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performative discursive space of
ideologically committed commu-
nicative action; and
(b) dimensions 1, 2 & 3 define a
performative social space of
pragmatic communicative
action.
In the design process:
-dimensions 1, 4 & 5 define a
performative documentary space
of pseudo-synchronic 'moments'
in design.
In the design programme.
(a) dimensions 4 & 5 define the
documentary space of the auto-
graphic product; and
(b) dimensions 1, 2 & 3 define a
performative social space of
pragmatic communicative action
identical to that in design philos-
ophy (b above: only the contrast-
ing enfolded spaces determine
that phenomena and patterns of
differentiation will appear differ-
ent).
In the designed object:
(a) dimensions 8, 9 & 10 define
the `real' physical space of the
material object, and
(b) dimensions 1, 2 & 3 define
the `ideal' space of the socially
constructed object as design
(once again this identical to the
other socio-temporal spaces to be
found in design philosophy (b)
and in the design programme
(b).)
8. ... the actor network should
not ... be confused with a network
linking in some predictable lash -
ion elements that are perfectly
well defined and stable ... An
actor network is simultaneously
an actor whose activity is net -
working heterogeneous elements
and a network that is able to
redefine and transform what it is
made of
CALL ON, Michel. "Society in the
Making: The Study of
Technology as a Tool for
actors but as temporal zeros that are therefore impotent in
the negotiation of potentiality: those that do not, as
integral aspects of human actors under whose shaping
power they may be subsumed.
At the second level, as dislocated observer, as analyst,
critic or historian, a socio-cultural/technical approach to
the reconstruction presents the broadest possibility for
interpretation and reflective practice. The paradox can not
be dissipated but phenomena that appear to be associated
with the different levels - social construction and social
reconstruction - are at least equally likely to be uncovered
and therefore will constantly pose the problem of accom-
modation in the critical discourse.
In this way a contingent humanistic manoeuvre
allows some sense to be made of the notion of 'identical'
performative social spaces in different aspects of design.
The key to this lies in the communicative nature of perfor-
mative and productive activity in design. Communicativity
depends upon the contingent production of rationale,
which by definition must have a basis in ideology, in
beliefs and values that are paradigmatically locatable.
Discourse in general is similarly constrained: even if the
incommensurable are held in tension, in postmodern
fashion, the very idea of incommensurability relies upon
differentiated paradigmatic space for its meaning.
...attempts to abandon paradigm incommensurability lead,
apparently inexorably, towards epistemological authoritarianism.
The contribution that the paradigm model made was to provide a
legitimate channel of communication and development for beliefs
systems which do not accord with the dominant ones.9
Ideologies, therefore, need to be made explicit, differences
located as the sites of 'conversation' and 'interaction', as
interfaces, as intervals. Ideological conversation and
9. JACKSON, N. & P.
CARTER "In Defence of
Paradigm Incommensurability",
School of Management Working
Paper HUSM/PC/2, University
of Hull. pp.31 & 32.
10. RORTY, Richard.
Contingency, Irony, and
Solidarity. Cambridge
University Press, 1989.
This experience is that of the
'liberal ironise who accepts that
the working out of private inter-
ests and of public obligations can
not be subsumed under one final
vocabulary but that they can be
combined in life. Solidarity is
something which must be creat-
ed and expanded as an act of
imagination: it is not something
we will 'discover' when we
understand something essential-
ly human in us all.
11. By the time an exhibition has
been built and opened, many
people have been involved ...
1 curator, 2 designer, 3 editor, 4
coordinator, 5 graphic designer,
6 lighting designer, 7 production
manager, 8 joiners, 9 painters,
10 electricians, 11 security advis -
er, 12 warders, 13 conservator,
14 lecturer, 15 publisher, 16 pho -
tographer, 17 printers, 18 sales
people, 19 :rreparator'.
HALL, 1987, pp.22-3.
12. DEAN, David. Museum
Exhibition: Theory and Practice.
Routledge, 1994. pp.11-2.
Sociological Analysis", pp.83-
103. in BIJKER et al, 1987. p.93.
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accommodation need to be meshed into the programme,
meshed into its performative social space as an aspect of
pragmatic communicative action, and into its documentary
space in the form of 'rationale'. Such tensions as inevitably
exist between differently committed practitioners, need to
be in the open and tested again and again against the
requirement for performative and productive communica-
tive activity. In this situation, of forging a shared project, a
pragmatic instinct will prevail. This is not an individualis-
tic, self-censoring, pragmatism that suppresses commit-
ment and breaks allegiances for the sake of progress,
which conjures up an experience of dislocation and pain
that the existentialists were all too conscious could charac-
terize the condition of modernity. It is a new kind of
pragmatism that engages the certainty of identity and
knowledge only in moments that require individual
expertise and defers to the opportunities in explored differ-
ence, engages in a play of differance, in moments that
require solidarity. This invokes the contingency and irony
that Rorty proposes can characterize a positive experience
of the postmodern condition.'
Actor Network Construction of Museum Design Ideology
If one takes a familiar network of actors in museum
design, such as that described by Hall (1987),' a number
of observations can be made:
(1) The 'idea' for an exhibition may come from any of a
wide range of sources:
audience suggestions, board members or trustees, collections
management personnel, community leaders, curators, current
events, director, educators, staff and volunteers.12
Often the museum director or the head of department will have
recognised a need or discerned the merits of an idea, or
13. HALL, 1987, p.21.
14. ibid. p.22.
16. BELCHER, Michael.
"Communicating through muse-
um exhibitions" pp.649 -59. in
THOMPSON, John. M. A. (ed.)
Manual of Curatorship.
Butterworth/Museums
Association, second edition 1992.
p.655.
16. DEAN, 1994, p.14.
17. ibid. p.13.
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Government departments prompted perhaps by subject experts or
potential sponsors, or entrepreneurs will have fed in the idea
from outside.13
(2) The initial team involved at the inception of a project
will be small perhaps only two people, rarely more than a
handful. This is the team that shapes an idea and begins
to make explicit a project programme. At the outset Hall
includes the following roles: curator, editor, designer, and
coordinator,' Belcher: director (to initiate project), curator,
designer, conservator, educator/editor, and organizer/
manager,' and Dean: director (to set up planning team),
curator, educator, designer, and project manager.'
(3) Even at the beginning of a project, there are both
management-oriented and product-oriented issues to be
addressed:7 The issue of who is 'client' and who is
'designer' may appear to be contingent upon the
programme and the scale of the project. But in fact this is a
non-issue, the result of misappropriating terms devised for
legal clarity in commercial contexts: if the designer has to
form a special contract in order to engage in the project
then normally it is the museum authority that is the client
and the designer the provider of contracted services. In a
general 'performative' sense this legal contingency is, if not
irrelevant, then of secondary importance: in any specific
project it may affect the hierarchical positioning of the
designer, but the dynamic nature of the roles and relation-
ships mean that the character of various interfaces is of
primary importance. Dean's terminology is better at
capturing the relationship between various actors in that it
identifies roles which are different in type - a cluster of
productive roles and a separate co-ordinating role - and it
holds true whether the design, or any other role, is fulfilled
by specially contracted or by traditionally employed staff.
However, there are other ways of categorizing roles that set
18. Others may join the team for
a large project,- experts on conser -
vat ion, security, education, eval -
uation, publicity, and technical
advisers on the more specialised
aspects of the lighting, use of
computers and audio-visual pre -
sentat ion.
Hall, 1987, p.23.
19. ibid. p.22.
20. HUGHES, Thomas P. "The
Evolution of Large Technological
Systems" pp.61-82. in BIJKER
et al, 1987. p.77.
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up different structural expectations of the team. For
example, one might suggest that the appropriate role-types:
are strategist, advocate, facilitator, and maker. In such a
scheme which hat a particular individual wears will tend to
change depending upon the nature of the task in hand, and
the problem of dynamics comes down to maximizing the
variety and minimizing the number of hats in use.
(4) As a developing project reaches the point where signif-
icant resources must be committed, the team gets bigger, a
wide range of specialists get involved, communications
become intensive and detailed, the opportunities for things
to go wrong multiply, and design project management
becomes the centre to which all other activities relate.18
(5) The designer, in wrestling with the many conflicting
requirements of the programme, acts as a kind of "broker
between the other interests behind the project n. 19 In this
general sense, every designer plays an 'interpretive' role.
What is sometimes simplistically referred to as 'responding
to the brief', is often, even if not always consciously, a
context-shaping activity, in the socio-technical sense, as
well as a product-shaping activity. A constellation of others'
interests is represented or reconstructed, and repeatedly
reconstrued through the design process and recorded in the
programme documentation. An embedded, progressively
distorted, 'message' emerges, first in the autographic
product and ultimately, after the opportunities for anamor-
phosis that realization, production and customization
represent, in the designed object. Thus however imperfectly:
Durable physical artifacts project into the future the socially
constructed characteristics acquired in the past when they were
designed.'
This is an interpretive role which addresses the semiotics
of social and cultural values. It should not be confused
with that intentional notion of purposefully communicat-
New
Museology Museography
A
L
Designer
Curator
Educator	 Conservator
Project
Manager
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ing an explicit information content, which defines the more
obvious interpretive role that is expected of the exhibition
designer, of all communication designers.
These observations point to an initial picture of how
the ideological may be accommodated in museum design
activity. In Figure 4.2.2 the social space of pragmatic
communicative action allows that the roles defined in the
initial development team form a differentiated zone - an
actor network - in the midst of the wider social context. In
RADICAL CHANGE
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Radical
Humanism
/
Radical
Structuralism
-
0
uJ
—3
uJ
CO Interpretive Functionalist  co
Theory Theory
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symbolic interests	 material interests
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-J
0
0
intellectual concerns
Figure 4.2.2
SOCIAL DYNAMICS	 technical concerns
The pseudo-synchronic moment of museum design project inception. The enfolded paradig-
matic space allows ideological tensions to be pictured in the performative social space.
any pseudo-synchronic state of the actor network's trans-
formations, each role assumes a particular position in the
paradigmatic space of design ideology. However, if roles
are defined one way these ideological positions may appear
relatively stable, if another to be quite volatile.
21. / define postmodern as
incredulity toward metanarra -
tives. ... our incredulity is now
such that we no longer expect
salvation to rise from these
inconsistencies ...
LYOTARD, Jean-Francois.
[1979] The Postmodern
Condition: A Report on
Knowledge. Trans. Geoff
Bennington and Brian Massumi.
Manchester University Press,
1984. p.xxiv.
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For example, if roles are defined according to a system
of institutionally defined jobs - curator, designer, conserva-
tor, educator, project manager - then we must accept that,
although the conservator's ideological position may be a
fairly stable functionalist one, perhaps with leanings
towards radical structuralist interpretations of meaning
wherever historical or contextual knowledge impinges
directly upon the empirical knowledge of the conservatorial
object, the curator's ideological position may be far more
difficult to pin down. On the one hand, the traditional
curator, a believer in museographical norms enshrined in
professional codes, may be firmly associated with function-
alist notions and concerns - objective knowledge, order and
control of social and material conditions, established
protocol. On the other hand, the 'modern' curator, one
familiar with the new museology, may be loosely associated
with both radical structuralist and interpretive concerns.
He or she may believe that the shaping and directing of
museum aims and practice to worthwhile social purposes,
as determined by an objective critical analysis of current
conditions, ought to be attempted even though the inter-
pretation of current conditions is ultimately a question of
individual experience and is itself a culturally and socially
conditioned activity. Such tensions highlight the unresolv-
ability of museological concerns, and the resulting lack of
traditional normativity presents the curator with a daily
experience of the post-modern condition.'
Generic Roles and Ideological Stability
If roles are defined generically, via group dynamics for
example, a different set of ideological associations will
emerge in any pseudo-synchronic state of the actor
network (Figure 4.2.3.)
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Figure 4.2.3
The pseudo-synchronic moment of museum design project inception. The enfolded paradig-
matic space allows ideological tensions to be pictured in the performative social space.
Brunelli has suggested that the designer may adopt any of
four quite distinctive roles in the context of museum devel-
opment:
I. The Exhibitions Officer - the provider of cases, stands, etc. to
specific dimensions; the producer of labels, leaflets, catalogues, etc.
using text provided by others; and the provider of illustrations,
photographs, models, computer technology, lighting and other
specific expertise, who goes beyond performance specification. ...
2. The Planner Innovator - a designer involved at the
planning stage either a) before a brief exists to offer alternative
schemes to fit an established strategy or b) to discuss a brief in
such a way as to cause a change in what was required.
3. The Manager - a designer responsible for delegating work
and overseeing the implementation of a project within its concep -
tual framework, budget and progress from its early stages up to
completion.
22. BRUNELLI, Maria. The
Role of Designers in the
Management of Museums. Ph.D.
Thesis. Institute of Advanced
Studies, Manchester
Metropolitan University, 1993.
pp.255-6.
23. Theorists located within this
paradigm advocate a sociology of
radical change from an objec -
tivist standpoint. ... Radical
structuralism is committed to
radical change, emancipation,
and potentiality, in an analysis
which emphasises structural
conflict, modes of domination,
contradiction and deprivation. It
approaches these general con -
cerns from a standpoint which
tends to be realist, positivist,
determinist and nomothetic.
BURRELL, G. & G MORGAN.
Sociological Paradigms and
Organisational	 Analysis.
Heinemann Educational Books,
1979. p.33-4.
24. HILKE, D D. "What is an
audience advocate? A Position
Paper", unpublished, undated.
Also quoted in HOOPER-
GREENHILL, Eilean. Museums
and their Visitors. Routledge,
1994. On Hilke's consideration of
the audience avocate:
the staff member responsible
for promoting the needs of visi -
tors, in developing, reviewing
and revising exhibitions
she says of her conclusions:
"these are excellent guidelines"
[pp.178-9.]
25. The radical humanist para -
digm is defined by its concern to
develop a sociology of radical
change from a subjectivist stand -
point. Its approach to social sci -
ence has much in common with
that of the interpretive para -
digm, in that it views the social
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4.	 The Strategist - a designer engaged in the formulation of
new strategy or changes in existing strategy. 22
These roles may be compared with the role-types
suggested earlier (observation 3) strategist, advocate, facil-
itator, and maker. In reverse order: the designer as strate-
gist is almost self-explanatory, what is implied in the
generic term 'strategist' is that overall direction is deter-
mined and contradictions arising out of implementation
are resolved by the strategist. The strategist's role is
concerned with shaping the conditions for change and in
this sense the strategist is a natural radical structuralist.'
The designer as planner-innovator is, amongst other
things perhaps, an 'advocate'. The advocate presents partic-
ular ideas and represents particular interests, that are not
necessarily his or her own, that are relevant to the
situation, and that may not otherwise get a fair hearing.
Advocacy may be necessary either because the ideas and
interests come from outside the immediate environment or
because the party they concern is not present or competent
to make its own case.' There is an aspect of design
advocacy, therefore, which is visionary and concerns radical
change, and in this sense the advocate is a natural radical
humanist.' But there is also an aspect which is about
accounting for the richness and variety of human experi-
ence - what is 'other' than ourselves - and in this sense, the
paradigmatic sense, the advocate is a natural interpreter."
The designer as manager is a 'facilitator' in the sense
that the smooth progress of implementation is the central
concern and the organization and monitoring of resources
and processes to achieve some predetermined overall goal
are the main activities. The facilitator's role is concerned
with cause and effect - causing, by means that are
relatively reliable, effects that are relatively certain -
though with some of that concern to be sensitive to and
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world from a perspective which
tends to be nominalist, anti-posi -
tivist, voluntarist and ideograph -
ic. However, its frame of refer -
ence is committed to a view of
society which emphasises the
importance of overthrowing or
transcending the limitations of
existing social arrangements.
BURRELL & MORGAN, 1979.
p.32.
26. The interpretive paradigm is
informed by a concern to under -
stand ... the fundamental nature
of the social world at the level of
subjective experience ... within
the frame of reference of the par -
ticipant as opposed to the observ -
er of action. ... it is underwritten
by an involvement with issues
relating to the nature of the ski -
tus quo, social order, consensus,
social integration and cohesion
and actuality.
ibid. p.28 & 31.
27. The functionalist paradigm
... is a perspective which is high -
ly pragmatic in orientation, con -
cerned to understand society in a
way which generates knowledge
which can be put to use. It is
often problem-oriented in
approach, concerned to find
practical solutions to practical
problems. It is concerned with
the effective 'regulation' and con -
trol of social affairs.
ibid. p.26.
28. Topalian describes a 'fully-
fledged design project' as involv-
ing: conceptualization, interpre-
tation, formulation, and imple-
mentation. In a 'pair-of-hands'
assignment the designer's
involvement is focussed on the
'formulation':
of a solution to a tightly defined
problem and solution concept;
the client may actually dictate
responsive to social conditions that characterizes the
strategist's shaping role and the advocate's interpretive
role. The facilitator, one could say, is a natural functional-
ist but a rather soft one who has leanings towards both
radical structuralist and interpretive positions.'
The designer as Exhibitions Officer is a 'maker' in the
sense that the business of producing the exhibition is
dependent upon the maker getting practical things done.
This does not always mean that the designer as maker
actually handles construction materials, operates the
workshop machinery and fixes things together on site
(although at crucial moments it can) but it does mean that
production documents: working drawings, artwork, specifi-
cations, etc., quality control, and finishing processes are all
the designer's direct responsibility. The maker's role is
concerned with causes and effects that are more reliable
and more certain than those generally encountered in the
facilitator's organizing and monitoring role, and therefore
the maker is more clearly a natural functionalist.
In overall project terms the designer's role may
change little. What Topalian calls a 'pair-of-hands' project
involves the designer as 'maker' from the moment he or
she is engaged." Equally, the consultant designer,
especially on a larger project of this type, is likely to be
cast in the role of facilitator and be primarily concerned
with client liaison and with delegating, co-ordinating and
chasing design and production work. In either of these
cases room for ideological posturing is severely limited, in
the maker's case primarily by the consuming involvement
of the design process, and in the facilitator's case by the
almost irresistible demand for pragmatism that is the
normal result of occupying a nodal position constructed by
the actor network. However, in the case of the planner-
innovator, who is a design advocate and probably also an
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the form of solution, in which
case the designer's involvement
relates to the translation of the
solution in the client's mind into
physical reality - no more, no
less.
TOPALIAN, Alan. The Manage-
ment of Design Projects. Assoc-
iated Business Press, 1980. p.8.
29. op. cit., Topalian points out
that:
... on some occasions, clients will
value the fresh viewpoint design -
era can adopt when they are
allowed to seek out problems,
and designers may be involved
almost single-handed in the defi -
nition of problems right through
to the formulation of solutions.
Clearly the 'ideation' involved in
the interpretation of a practical
situation and the social-cultur-
al/technical context, and the con-
ceptualization of problem-solu-
tion definitions only succeeds if
articulated in terms of persua-
sive and unambiguous rationale.
Therefore, project inception is
unavoidably ideological - a func-
tion of competing discourses, of
language games, of politicized
rhetorics.
advocate for one or more other interests such as audience,
sponsor or technology, and the strategist, who is in effect
associated directly with the client's interests, the role is
likely to be short-lived and to be transformed by the actor
network rather rapidly into either that of facilitator or of
maker. Whilst the role of strategist lasts, for instance
during the inception of a new project, the scope, indeed the
necessity, for an ideological position is clear: in order to
establish an identity and a profile, gain political and insti-
tutional endorsements, and public and financial support, a
clear and consistent presentation of principles, purposes
and goals needs to be made with great conviction to a
variety of audiences.' Eqiinlly, during the relatively short
duration of the type of advocacy role the designer as
planner-innovator represents, an ideological position
emerges out of the presentation of a scheme or the revision
of a programme that clearly has the aim of influencing
subsequent strategy. The designer must make this ideolog-
ical position explicit simply to convince the client, or the
strategist of the moment, that the proposal is being made
with some appreciation of its wider social, cultural and
possibly technical implications.
Ideological Constellation and Generic Role Drift
The ideological associations of the designer form a constel-
lation in themselves. In Figure 4.2.4 three possible pseudo-
synchronic slices across the performative social space of the
design programme are layered onto each other: in effect the
dimension of time has been collapsed to produce a simpli-
fied view in which each actor appears frozen to a point. The
first slice shows the project inception. A designer recruited
very early on may be involved in shaping the original idea
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Figure 4.2.4
The performative social space of the museum design programme. The areas labelled 'incep-
tion', 'conception & development', and 'specification & production' represent three possible
pseudo-synchronic slices through the space.
and in formulating strategy, a role clearly associated with
the radical structuralist paradigm in design ideology. In the
second slice such a designer would be concerned initially
with the development and presentation of "alternative
schemes to fit an established strategy" and thus to act as a
design advocate, a role clearly associated with the radical
humanist and interpretive paradigms in design ideology.
On a larger project this designer would subsequently be
concerned to control the process of developing the 'concept
scheme' into a realizable design. This constitutes the facili-
tator role which is clearly associated with a 'soft' functional-
ist position near the centre of the paradigmatic space of
design ideology. On a smaller project, as the only designer
on the team, this designer may be involved in continued
advocacy drifting further and further towards the hard
largest
smallest
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functionalism of the maker's ideology as the design becomes
more and more clearly realizable. Finally, in the third slice
the designer becomes wholly concerned with the practicali-
ties of specification and production on a larger project
partly as facilitator, managing the makers, and partly (or
on a smaller project, wholly) as the principal maker.
From this pattern one can see that, as a project
progresses, there tends to be a 'drift' across the roles from
strategist to advocate to facilitator to maker (Figure 4.2.5.)
Strategist	 Advocate	 Facilitator	 Maker
symbolic interests	 material interests
intellectual concerns 	 SOCIAL DYNAMICS
	
technical concerns
Figure 4.2.5
The drift of generic roles adopted by the designer as a function
of project scale
The larger and more prestigious the project the more likely
the designer is to start at the strategist end of the scale and
the smaller and more low key the project the greater the
proportion of Ms/her time is taken up in the role of maker.
Programme Dynamics and Status Ambiguity
Successive slices through the performative space of the
design programme it seems may be related to a drift in the
designer's generic role. This drift presents a two-dimen-
sional movement in the designer's position in social space.
Not only do the social dynamics gradually become less
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30. ... "linguistic chauvinism" ...
can very easily incline us to sup -
pose that the best talkers, most
cogent language users among us,
are at the same time those who
most admirably show that cen -
tral human trait of rationality -
are in effect the best people.
HARRISON, Andrew. Making &
Thinking: A Study of Intelligent
Activities. Harvester Press,
1978. p.2.
focussed on symbolic interests and intellectual concerns
and increasingly dominated by material interests and
practical or technical concerns, social status is also affected.
For contingent and historical reasons society values those
who are able to apply intellectual abilities, literacy and
articulacy to social purposes more highly than those who
apply practical abilities, visual literacy and skilfullness."
There is a tendency, therefore, for the designer's and others'
relative status to be higher during moments when the role
of strategist is adopted and to be progressively lower as the
roles of advocate, facilitator and maker are adopted.
In some practical situations this can lead to a great
deal of confusion about the 'true' status of an individual.
One should remember that 'inception', 'conception & devel-
opment', and 'specification & production' are conventional
but arbitrary pseudo-synchronic slices through a performa-
tive social space. Aspects of project inception may happen
concurrently with, and some later than, aspects of project
conception and development. The 'blur' in any project, that
opens up the design process significantly, will take up a
very significant proportion of the 'performance' time, the
duration of the project (Figure 4.2.6.) The hierarchical
status of an individual, therefore, may change dynamically
in the course of a project and only give the appearance of
smooth transformation in retrospect, in the reconstruction
of pseudo-synchronic states. Looking again at Figure 4.2.4
one can see that, for example, the conservator may have an
important advocacy role during project inception advising
on the availability and suitability of collection items,
technical resources and physical space. This would consti-
tute a social status comparable with those of the designer,
the educator, and the project manager in the executive
project team. During conception and development the
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period of role reversals and recapitulations
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Figure 4.2.6
	 time
A sequence of pseudo-synchronic slices through the performance
 time of a design programme
showing the potentially substantial period during which activities across conventionally
defined project 'stages' may be happening concurrently. Aspects of what are thought of, in
conventional linear terms, as 'later' stages may in fact precede aspects of 'earlier' stages..
Such contingent messiness requires of the designer the ability to cope with frequent role
reversals and recapitulations. (Compare with figures 4.2.4 and 4.2.5.)
conservator may continue an advocacy role directed
towards the development of the design, but now alongside
subject expert, audience advocate, and contractor. And, in
the same figure, during specification and production of a
smaller project the conservator may have a highly skilled
productive role as a maker concerned with stabilizing
collection materials and preparing mounts and supports to
the 3-dimensional designer's specifications. On a larger
project this may be primarily a facilitator's role in respect
of the work of a conservation team perhaps including
museum sub-contractors. In either case the conservator is
assigned or expresses a status comparable with that of the
editor, the contractor, and the graphic and media
designers who at this stage are also involved in highly
skilled production work - illustration, artwork production
and the supervision of designer's sub-contractors such as
photographers and typographers.
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An aspect of any actor's existential angst therefore
can be knowing just where he or she stands in the contin-
gent hierarchy constructed by the actor network. And the
greater the range of generic roles undertaken by the actor,
and the more dynamic the actor network's transforma-
tions, the greater the potential for angst becomes. In these
terms the designer, one can appreciate, is a rather vulner-
able individual and the first section of the next chapter
(5.1) will attempt to focus on and situate the individual
particularly in relation to the space of the design process
and to the nature of the complexity with which this
engages. But, before that the last pairing of discursive
locations opens up another interval by exploring the
organizational quality of the museum in reflexive mode.
1. Museums Association, 1984.
2. The Museum Registration
Scheme operated by the area
museum councils on behalf of
the Museums and Galleries
Commission sets out a wide
range of criteria which take
their logic from the definition of
a museum.
3. The Jorvik Viking Centre in
York, which does not meet all of
the expected criteria in the
Museum Registration Scheme,
has nevertheless made a suc-
cessful application for registra-
tion.
4. The words 'musear and
`museality' do not appear in the
Oxford English Dictionary.
5. KAVANAGH, Gaynor.
"Museums in Partnership"
[pp.127-8] in HOOPER-GREEN-
HILL, Eilean. (ed.) Museum
Media Message, Routledge, 1996.
pp.124-34.
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4.3 Museality of Organizations
When is a Museum not a Museum?
Museums collect, document, preserve, research, exhibit
and interpret material evidence and associated informa-
tion for the public benefit.' This definition may be read as
inscribing the definitive operations of a museum in a code.
Adherence to the code therefore legitimizes the museum in
the social and political context. The code is the museum's
qualification: adherence to it the expression of a compe-
tence.' Were we to find this same expression of competence
elsewhere - in some organization other than what we think
of as a museum - we would be presented with a dilemma.
Either an organization we thought was not a museum is in
fact a museum, even if of a new sort, or, a code we thought
defined and legitimated only museums in fact has a
broader application and expresses a competence found not
only in museums as such but also in other organizations.'
We might conclude that some organizations have museum-
like qualities, a museal focus.
Defining the Museal
The term `museality' has found little favour in the URI
where it can be taken to imply a discredited belief in the
certainties of traditional museographic practices.
The deadening hand of the concept of 'museum worthiness' (or is
the ghastly word `museality' to be used here?) has got a fair
amount to answer for, including: partial and often tediously
repetitive collections, the omission of those objects - and therefore
histories - that fail to conform and the perpetuation of damaging
stereotypes.'
Museum worthiness however is not the key question. As
Communication
Process
Message
Document
Documentation
Process
Sign
Information
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6. MAROEVIb, Ivo. "The
Museum Message: Between the
Document and Information", in
HOOPER-GREENHILL, 1996.
pp.24-36.
Maroevie has shown in a structural-functional analysis of
museum communication based on Tudman, museality, as
the socially constructed quality that allows a museum
object to function, is easily implicated in a multidimen-
sional field of information, meaning, difference.' Further
than this, once the object as document has been so impli-
cated it can be shown that any notion of finality in the
process of communication must be abandoned, that the
presence of the document must be continually deferred,
distorted, distanced.
The visibility of this play of differance is somewhat
masked by the style of notation adopted by Maroevie.
Using this, radically different spatialities - the physical,
the social and the documentary - are each collapsed into a
single dimension and sheared in order to produce a rather
exotic virtual space of bridges between contributing
elements. In this way the 'semiotic' (Figure 4.3.1.) is
played off against the 'materialist' (Figure 4.3.2.) in a
hybrid structural-functional schema (Figure 4.3.3.)
Information
Process
Figure 4.3.1
The semiotic or structural sub-schema implicated in the
Tudman analysis of the museum object as used by Maroevid.
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Figure 4.3.2
The materialist or functional sub-schema implicated in the
Tudman analysis of the museum object as used by Maroevk.
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Figure 4.3.3
The Tuclman structural-functional analysis of the museum
object as used by Maroevié in which semiotic and materialist
sub-schemata are set off against each other. Parallel axes are in
effect sheared as indicated by the connecting dot-dash lines. The
Sign-Museum Object relation is indicated by the dotted line.
7. See above 2.0 Space and
Theory: Spatial Models. Ref:
LEFEBVRE, Henri. [1974] The
Production of Space. Trans.
Donald Nicholson-Smith. Basil
Blackwell, 1991. p.6.
I find this unhelpful and also in breach of Lefebvre's rule
regarding the need to account for any move from one
spatiality to another.' In place of the conflated structural-
functional analysis adopted by Maroevie I propose a multi-
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dimensional analysis in which the contributing physical,
social and documentary spatialities remain distinct. This
requires a symmetrical construction of schemata in which
the moves between one spatiality and another are
accounted for in the clear activation of each space in turn
by projection along a linear dimension of time.
In the first construction the museum object, as part of
a 'moveable cultural heritage', is construed as a document
of the physical/social 'reality' from which it is taken by the
museum. In materialist terms, as a document it has an
accumulated information content which may be 'read',
translated, reinscribed, etc. as a documentation process.
The focus on documentation constructs a pattern of
uncovered, masked and recovered information which
changes over time - this is the documentation process.
Invisible to this but contributing its specific form and
context are (1) a material physical object which is
embedded in the process as the sign and (2) the social
reality of the object which is embedded in the process as its
margin of uncertainty, its linguistic (in the broadest sense)
negotiation, its meaningfulness. Being operated on only as
a sign, the presence of the physical object is distanced and
distorted. Indeed, it will be repeatedly substituted for and
simulated in the reading-translating-reinscribing process.
And, as a contested object always involved in a movement
from one meaning context to another - a participation in
narratives that construct identity, social 'place' - its social
presence is similarly always deferred, distorted and
distanced from the documentary space (Figure 4.3.4.)
In the second construction the museum object, as part
of a socially contested arena of meaning is construed as the
`museal' object - an object which invokes the quality of
museality. Museality is a particular form of socially
constructed meaning that processes indefinitely through
Information content of
the object as document
projected forward in
time as the
documentation process
The object as
implied museality
(meaning of
musealia)
socially
constructed
meaning time
Physicality of the
object as a sign
Form and
characteristics of
musealia
Figure 4.3.4
The object as 'document'.
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the language games, power plays, and shaping activities of
the various individuals and groups in the museum environ-
ment. By focussing on `museality' a specific idea of socially
constructed meaning is being referred to, one which: (1) is
irredeemably bound up with the material culture; (2) is
dependent upon the removal (actual or symbolic) of the
material object from the 'real' world context in which it
was created and used, and; (3) is selective, reflexive and
radically conservative in its attitude towards the identity
of the object. In the social contest over meaning the physi-
cality and the information content of the object remain
invisible contributors, enfolded in the social space but
continually distorted, distanced and deferred in a play of
differance (Figure 4.3.5.)
The third schema constructs the ontic track of the
museum object as a physical material entity. This ontic
track is primarily characterized by a moment of radical
transition - that turning point at which the social context
of constructed meaning changes from one related to the
Information
content
of the
object as
document
The object as
implied museality
projected forward
in time as a social
construction of
meaning
Physicality of the
object as a sign
Form and
characteristics of
musealia
Figure 4.3.5
The object as 'implied museality'.
8. See above 3.2 Design:
Epistemological Object. Figure
3.2.7 The Production-consump-
tion model. And 3.3 Museum:
Manifestations.:
The process of selecting, preset .° -
ing and recycling certain kinds
of material culture and associat -
ed information ...justifies the
position given to the museum
institution in the Production-
consumption model.
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object's conception, creation, distribution, use and disposal
to one related to implied museality. 8 At this moment the
process of accumulating information in the object is quali-
tatively altered: in the 'real' world, the world outside the
museum, the process embodies in the object-as-sign the
physical traces of the life of the object - its form, iconicity,
inscription (with the marks of use and abuse as well as of a
more obvious 'linguistic' surplus) - whereas, in the
museum context these signs of life are overlaid with those
of a slow lingering death, a symbolic suspended animation,
the physical impress of the museum process. Any further
accumulation of information, therefore, is an embodiment
of implied museality, the development of the form and
physical characteristics of musealia (Figure 4.3.6.)
The museum context may be distinguished from the 'real-
world' context only in relative terms. The removal of the
material cultural object from one or another complex
location in the physical, social and documentary constella-
'Real-world'
ontic track
of the object
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Figure 4.3.6
The object as sign.
9. See above 3.1 Organization:
Simplification and Adequacy for
discussion of the practical
impossibility of the synchronic
moment.
tion of spatialities and its relocation in the realm of
musealia represents one, admittedly rather peculiar,
movement amongst many possible movements during the
'life' of the object. If, instead of regarding the difference of
the museum process as definitive, we regard its similarity
as of reflexive value then it becomes one of a class of
movements characterized by a complex relocation, a simul-
taneous discontinuity in several spatialities, and a rather
different complexion is placed on the process. What we are
interested in, as an exemplar of complex relocation, is the
moment of transition itself, the radical renegotiation of a
placement in physical, social and documentary spaces. This
is not a moment in the synchronic sense, neither is it an
event explicable in purely diachronic terms. The recon-
structable fields of meaning rather are the interfaces
between one state of being and another and are best visual-
ized as pseudo-synchronic slices through one or another
activated space.' Perhaps the most revealing is that of the
object as implied museality. If one imagines a differentia-
tion of the material cultural field, one that includes that
'Performance' of
constructing a
meaning
Pseudo-synchronic
slice through the
performative
social space
Information
content
of the
object as
document
time
The performative
social space of
socially
constructed
meaning
Physicality
of the
object as
a sign
Figure 4.3.7
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being created (design) and that received from the past (site-
specific and moveable cultural heritage), one may visualize
several layers of complex relocation each significantly
overlapping the next in a series of pseudo-synchronic slices
through a performative social space in which meaning is
continually (re)constructed (Figure 4.3.7.)
A series of pseudo-synchronic slices through the performative social space of meaning (re)con-
struction showing the object's movement through several complex locations.
In the end it is because the museum process normally
appears so definitive that it possesses a seminal organiza-
tional value. I will, therefore, introduce the term `museal'
to connote any organizational process of complex relocation
in which an 'object' becomes the site of socially constructed
meaning, is construed as a sign, and accumulates a special
information content related only to the extraordinary
organizational process.
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10. Clearly an organization
acquires accommodation, equip-
ment and various inputs to the
manufacturing or service process
as well as personnel. The princi-
ples outlined here of documenta-
tion, preservation, etc. apply in
much the same way to things as
to people. I focus here on person-
nel for no other reason than one
of clarity and in preparation for
a reflexive turn at the end of the
chapter - museums also have
personnel.
11. The idea of a 'market' has,
since the 1980s, become a com-
monplace in museum manage-
ment and development. See, for
example:
AMBROSE, Timothy & Sue
Runyard (eds.) Forward
Planning: a handbook of busi -
ness, corporate and development
planning for museums and gal -
leries. London: Routledge, 1991.
The museum's corporate or orga -
nizational objectives are drawn
up on the basis of the market
intelligence available to the
museum and on the basis of the
assessment of the museum's over -
all operation. [Ambrose, p.4.]
LEWIS, Peter. "Museums and
Marketing" in THOMPSON,
John. M. A. (ed.) Manual of
Curatorship. Butterworth/
Museums Association, 2nd edi-
tion 1992. pp.148-68. and
SILBERBERG, Ted. "The
Importance of Market and
Feasibility Analysis", in LORD,
Gail Dexter & Barry Lord (eds.)
The Manual of Museum
Planning. HMSO, 1991. pp.63-70.
12. The terms 'material' and
'culture' have a variety of mean-
ings in modern/postmodern dis-
course. I take my lead from the
following amongst other sources:
'Material' in material culture
The Museal Organization
A museum acquires collection and archive material: every
organization acquires people and things and information
about them.' In a museum the range and type of material
acquired is determined by a view of the purpose of the
museum. In this respect all organizations have a parallel
problem, one of recognizing a particular purpose and of
accumulating the material necessary to that purpose.
A particular aspect of or approach to material culture
is deemed to be the proper province of a museum by reason
of geography, patronage, cooperative agreement, competi-
tive space or cultural policy.' And it seeks to acquire and
to preserve both the 'material', the physical substance, of
that material culture and the 'culture', the collective
values and beliefs which it embodies and carries forward!'
All organizations are similarly identified and located
by what they do and how they do it, and recruit appropri-
ately qualified and skilled personnel and adequate
physical and other resources to sustain their activity. The
material and other resources may be transformed and
passed out of the system as products, by-products and
waste. But the human acquisitions, on the contrary, must
be 'preserved' indefinitely. By its continued existence and
functioning, it is the collective (collection?) that sustains
the organization's defining activity, its purpose, and the
identity that these project.
Once an item of moveable cultural heritage is made
part of a museum collection the process of preservation
and documentation continues indefinitely. Whatever
primary function the object performs from time to time -
specimen, document, display item, research object, conser-
vation object, etc. - the museum is bound to sustain the
object's movement through the museum process: it may
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typically refers to a broad but
usually not unrestricted range of
objects. It comprehends the class
of objects known as artefacts -
objects made or modified by
humans.
SCHLERETH, T J. "Material
Culture Studies: America 1876-
1976" [p.2] in SCHLERETH,
Thomas J. (ed.) Material Culture
Studies in America. Nashville:
American Association for State
and Local History, 1982. pp.1-76.
...Sapir's famous distinction
between a culture which embod -
ies `any socially inherited element
in the life of man' and one which
`refers to a rather conventional
ideal of individual refinement'.
SAPIR, E. Culture, Language
and Personality, University of
California Press, 1949. pp.79-80,
quoted in BAUMAN, Zygmunt.
Culture as Praxis. London:
Rout1edge & Kegan Paul, 1973.
p.2.
[Culture] ...denotes an historical -
ly transmitted pattern of mean -
ings embodied in symbols, a sys -
tern of inherited conceptions
expressed in symbolic forms by
means of which men communi -
cate, perpetuate, and develop
their knowledge about and atti -
tudes toward life.
GEERTZ, Clifford.	 The
Interpretation of Cultures. New
York: Basic Books, 1973. p.89.
`Culture' [is] now understood as
a concept which reveals
humankind's creative capacity.
AUSTIN-BROOS, Diane J.
"Introduction" [p.xx] in
AUSTIN-BROOS, Diane J. (ed.)
Creating Culture. Allen &
Unwin, 1987. pp.xix-xxxi.
I also accept the tenuous exis-
tence of the concept of the cul-
tural in our communication and
speed obsessed postmodern con-
dition in which:
...the Faustian, Promethean (per
not wilfully destroy or permanently dispose of the object.
An unexhibitable painting cannot be taken to the
municipal incinerator and burned: in one way or another it
must remain in public circulation.'
Similarly, the individual must be sustained within
the scope of the organization's purpose, perhaps to serve a
series of different functions, and the organization may not
neutralize or permanently dispose of personnel: an ineffi-
cient electrician cannot be taken out and shot!'
Preserving the material of a collection is an operation
focussed on preventing its physical deterioration, on
sustaining a viable condition. Such an operation relies
upon an understanding of the physics and chemistry of
material combinations and of the environment, and on a
wise and skilful application of practical techniques:5
Preserving the cultural is an operation with diverse possi-
bilities. For example, it may focus on the process of
documentation and have an encyclopaedic ideal or it may
focus on the process of interpretation and value narrative
coherence, purposeful communication, a comprehensible
message above comprehensive information:6
Every organization develops a notion of what
expertise is appropriate to its type and style of operation.
Preserving the material aspects of its operation focusses on
preserving the person as one of a network of actors in the
organizational context, on sustaining the viability of the
actor as an interactive and adaptable entity.' This
operation relies upon an understanding of the physiology
and psychology of the individual, an ergonomics,' and the
total dynamics of the environment, an energetics: 9
 One
might assume, therefore, that an organizational design
process should encompass and integrate both social and
physical spatial disciplines in a creative practice.'
Preserving the cultural, a corporate identity for
haps Oedipal) period of produc
tion and consumption gives way
to the `proteinic' era of networks,
to the narcissistic and protean
era of connections, contact, conti
guity, feedback and generalized
interface that goes with the uni -
verse of communication.
BAUDRILLARD, J. "The
Ecstasy of Communication"
[p.127] in FOSTER, Hal. (ed.)
Postmodern Culture. Pluto
Press, 1985. pp.126-34.
13. The disposal of collection
items is a most delicate issue for
museums. Difficult questions
regarding the status and poten-
tial of an item must be thorough-
ly considered by a museum
authority before a decision to
dispose of an item may be rati-
fied. An item may only be deac-
cessioned by transfer or sale to
another museum or to an appro-
priate charitable institution
such as a college or university. If
these methods fail some muse-
ums are legally permitted to sell
items to the public. However, in
practice this is a very risky busi-
ness invariably attracting pro-
fessional censure and sometimes
public condemnation.
14. Employment law prescribes
the circumstances and the proce-
dures for dismissal, redundancy
and retirement. It is ironic that
far greater efforts must be made
by a museum to place an item in
another public collection than
must be made by any industrial,
commercial or public service
organization to place dismissed
or redundant staff in subsequent
employment. In the museal per-
spective perhaps we should be
ashamed of the very concept of
'retirement'.
16. Although it is rather artifi-
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instance, is a multifaceted operation. Wally Olins draws
our attention to the scope of corporate identity.
... identity cannot simply be a slogan, a collection of phrases: it
must be visible, tangible and all-embracing.
Everything that the organization does must be an affirma -
tion of its identity.
The products ... buildings ... communication material [and]
... how the organization behaves.21
It encompasses not only the outwardly visible, overtly
visual, manifestations of an organization - its corporate
image - but also the communicative style and the sense of
community it generates largely as an internally experi-
enced condition.' This operation relies upon an under-
standing of visual language and the development of a
value-laden expression - an aesthetics - and the develop-
ment of a narrative identity - an ethnology, a history, a
mythology.' One might expect, therefore, that an organi-
zational design process would also encompass and
integrate creative visual practice and creative interpretive
practices in the generation, preservation and exploitation
of an archive."
Objectified in these ways the 'material' and the
'cultural' are simply subjected to instrumental processes
which give the impression of an unproblematic operational
complex. However, in some respects the nature of the
operation appropriate to a museum collection is highly
problematic and, if we view the museum as a whole, as an
actor network which includes both human and non-human
actors, the relationship between material and expertise
resists this functionalist drive. The interpretation put
upon collection material - of its value, its proper place in
the scheme of things, etc. - influences how it is treated in
the physical sense. To the museum conservator, the
material of a machine or a picture may normally mean the
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cial to talk of the conservation
process in isolation from the
holistic notion of curation, I am
merely reflecting the common
division of expertise in present
day museums. The conservator
has become, in the last forty
years or so, a highly qualified
specialist and recognized as such
within the 'professional' curator-
ial community.
16. Again, although this is a
rather artificial notion - it posits
a duality which in practice is
more a range of contingent pos-
sibilities - it is useful to note a
commonly felt divergence in
museum ethos. The ency-
clopaedic supranational profes-
sional neutrality upheld by such
institutions as the British
Museum is in tension with the
overtly educational, inspira-
tional, locally oriented and
socially committed stance taken
by institutions like the People's
Palace Museum in Glasgow.
17. See above 4.2 The Design of
Museum Design: Ideology,
Programme and Diffirance and
note 8.
The actor network is reducible
neither to an actor alone nor to a
network. Like networks it is corn -
posed of a series of heterogeneous
elements, animate and inani -
mate, that have been linked to
one another for a certain period
of time.
CALL ON, Michel. "Society in the
Making: The Study of
Technology as a Tool for
Sociological Analysis", [p.93] in
BIJKER, Weibe E., Thomas P.
HUGHES & Trevor PINCH. The
Social Construction of
Technological Systems. MIT
Press, 1987. pp.83-103.
18. Ergonomics has been defined
chemical compounds and their macrostructures which give
the object its unique physical form. However, there are
circumstances in which the mechanical function may be
deemed to be the 'material' of a machine and the image the
'material' of a picture rather than, in each case, the
substances of which it is made. Such judgements are
culturally contingent, determined by the values and beliefs
we wish to carry forward in our works rather than by those
contemporary with the object's genesis and past use, and
belonging to the engineer, the manufacturer, and the
operative, or to the artist, the patron, and the subject, or to
their respective societies.
In any organization there is a temptation to abstract
from the individual human actor a mechanistic definition
of function and an iconic purpose and to treat these as the
object of the organizational design process." Such
approaches ought to be seen as contingent and as less than
ideal but are often regarded as unavoidable, as the norm.
They are dangerous because they de-humanize the actor's
position and make more likely a slip into inauthentic
relations characterized by alienation and cruelty.' In an
actor network the human may not be privileged over the
non-human but this does not mean that the human may be
treated as non-human." If we may better understand
certain technologies as extensions of the body and of the
mind, and some of them as invested with an aspect of
collective rather than or as well as of individual life/being,
then the reverse is more the case. As, ultimately, there is
no certain way to draw a line between the human and the
non-human, perhaps we should treat all of the actors in
actor network as significantly human.'
These judgements may also be simply ones of expedi-
ency: if a museum collection item cannot be preserved as a
unique material complex, perhaps because component
as the scientific study of the rela -
tionship between man and his
working environment. In this
sense, the term environment is
taken to cover not only the ambi -
ent environment in which he may
work but also his tools and mate -
rials, his methods of work and
the organization of his work,
either as an individual or within
a working group. All these are
related to the nature of the man
himself; to his abilities, capaci -
ties and limitations.
MURRELL, K F H. Ergonomics:
Man and his Working
Environment. Chapman and
Hall, 1965. p.xiii.
An example of the focus on psy-
chological and organizational
compatibility and of an approach
opposed to the dominant mecha-
nistic determinism of industrial
ergonomics - "man and machine,
man as machine" - is provided in
JACKSON, N. & P. CARTER.
"The Ergonomics of Desire",
Personnel Review, 14:3, 1985.
pp.20-8.
19. Energetics as: "the total
energy relations and transfor-
mations of a system". LONG-
MAN DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE,
Longman, 1984. p.484.
20. But, this is not normally the
case: in theory and in practice,
interior design (architecture)
remain quite distinct from hard
and soft systems consultancy.
21. OLINS, Wally. Corporate
Identity: Making business strate -
gy visible through design.
Thames & Hudson, 1989. p.7.
22. If one accepts, given our
postmodern uncertainties, the
necessity of a cultural
hermeneutics, as does Geertz,
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chemicals or physical structures are inherently unstable,
then it may be possible to preserve it as a material
analogue, a model, a copy, or as a virtual object, as an
image, as digital information.'
Equally, if an individual cannot be sustained as a
viable actor in an organization then it may be necessary to
define tasks and jobs, responsibilities and roles, that
preserve a contingent functional need even if the individ-
ual or group upon which such a procedure is enacted is, as
a consequence, made redundant or destroyed. It is not an
uncommon feature in organizations for a 'post' defined by
the absence of a former worker (resigned, retired,
deceased, etc.) to remain vacant because a suitable
replacement individual is not found and for the group
surrounding the position to find imaginative ways of
absorbing its functional aspects and dissolving its iconic
purpose. Typically the post is then axed.
In the above the proposition is that any typical organiza-
tion may be shown to have a `museality'. By focussing on
museality we see organization in a new light: as a process
of collecting, of assembling things according to contingent
rules, for the purpose of preserving an essentially materi-
alist notion of culture. We see organization as reliant upon
a process of documentation, of extracting and recording
information about the objects in a collection, which
uniquely identifies and locates those objects in a scheme of
things. Research, the expansion of knowledge beyond that
intrinsic to the object, becomes inextricably bound up with
the process of documentation. As the social, political,
economic, functional and personal attributes of individuals
are revealed they are brought into an organizational nexus
of mutual surveillance and therefore of control: with or
without the enhancement of the new information tecluiolo-
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then what qualifies as local cul-
ture is an open question - what
is local? And how local is local?
Gee/42 seems to find acceptable
the notion of an expressed 'com-
munal sensibility' as qualifica-
tion enough when inscribed in a
specific system of signifiers that
presents "locally to locals a local
turn of mind".
GEERTZ, Clifford. Local
Knowledge. New York: Basic
Books, 1983. p.12.
Our initiation into a local cul-
ture could be said to involve not
only rites of passage, ritual
investments, a practical experi-
ence but also a 'turning' of the
mind.
23. There is an argument here
that the awareness that the indi-
vidual within an organization
may have of the visible and tan-
gible aspects of identity is quite
different in kind from that of the
less tangible aspects. It is only
when a person moves from one
company to another that he or
she fully realizes to what extent,
and in what ways, the behaviour
of one organization can differ
from that of another. Codes of
language, deference, gesture, and
protocol may all be distinctive.
24. In this respect the work of
corporate image designers paral-
lels that of corporate interior
designers in being quite distinc-
tive as a discipline. The differ-
ence in practice is that develop-
ment of the more prestigious cor-
porate identity programmes
tends to involve consultancies
able to bring both organizational
and visual expertise to bear on
analysis and on concept and
strategy development.
25. Foucault's studies of various
institutions reveals this central
gies, organization is the archetype of self-regulation, the
model of reflexive panopticism.'
Application of the panoptic principle to the museum
has in the past focussed very much on the effect of
creating a public watching over itself!' In this view, the
museum, as a place of public spectacle, is seen as a model
of self-regulating society. But perhaps this misses a
fundamental point which is that a museum, as an organi-
zation that recognizes and reflexively utilizes museality,
watches over itself - the museum, therefore, is a model of
self-regulating organization.
Under pressure of the panoptic principle, the
operation of preservative techniques moves quickly away
from a focus on the individual and takes on an over-
arching responsibility for the perpetuation of organiza-
tional life. Individuals become merely examples of a class
of objects. Conventional orders take over from the creative
possibilities of taxonomy - systems ossify, actors within
them become petrified, both fearful and immobile.'
The history of museum forms can be seen to reflect
the progress of organization?' The characterization above
of the tendency of a maturing organization to fossilize as
its operations become concerned with a general notion of
self-perpetuation connects with two ideas. (1) A conserva-
tive tendency in the museological notion of 'conservation'
"Conservators agree that ideally all treatments should be
reversible"?' And (2) a universal, teleological notion of
organization in modernity."
Up to this point the museal organization has been
discussed primarily in traditional `museographical' terms.
The conventional theme of museum process as: collect >
document > preserve > research > exhibit > interpret, and
the implication of an order of priority in these functions,
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theme in organization: bodies
and minds are constructed,
deformed, constrained and con-
trolled against the claims of
autonomy, identity, humanity.
What Lyotard defines as
...an energetic set-up which is
sometimes complex, of variable
plasticity, which structures a cer -
tamn type of behaviour in a cer -
lain type of contextual situation.
The stability of the set-up allows
the type of behaviour to be
repeated with a significant say -
ing of energy ...
is nothing other than this sup-
pression of the human. In these
terms what makes us human is
our creativity, the capacity for
'habit-breaking'.
Logos and Tech ne, or
Telegraphy" in LYOTARD, Jean-
Francois. [1988] The Inhuman:
Reflections on Time. Trans.
Geoffrey Bennington & Rachel
Bowlby. Polity Press, 1991.
pp.47-57.
26. The strategy of organization -
al coordination is usually to
minimize the human part to be
able to increase control and pre -
dictability of actions.
AHRNE, GOran. Social
Organizations: Interaction
inside, outside and between orga -
nizations, Sage Publications,
1994. p.36.
Identities may be safe and
'unproblematic' only inside a
secure social space: spacing and
identity-production are two
facets of the same process. But it
is precisely the great modern pro -
ject of a unified, managed and
controlled space which has today
come under such pressure.
As far as the prospects of safe -
guarding human lives against
cruelty ...are concerned .. If any -
thing does matter, it is ... the
has been used to outline a scheme that reflects a function-
alist conventionalism in organization. However, museogra-
phy has changed (see 3.3 Museum: Discourses above) and
much of the procedural prescriptiveness of the past, which
attempted to be objectivist, 'scientific' and value-free, is
now open to a fundamental questioning of foundations.
If this section has emphasized a `museographical'
view, primarily of the collecting, documenting and preserv-
ing aspects, of the museal organization, the next will
examine primarily the exhibiting and interpreting aspects
of the museal organization insofar as they reflect a new
museality - the new museology's focus on the necessity of
contingent self-definition and continual re-creation.
The New Museal Organization
In every museum we witness the genesis of a language, the
structuring of a vocabulary, the organization of a
grammar, the design of communicative acts. But this
linguistic operation only appears so linguistic in written
explication and in spoken exposition. This genesis, this
organization, this design is also pre-linguistic. All notion of
meaning and form is encompassed in the linguistic only by
privileging speech acts above those of making and of
imagining. And in equal senses we are witness to the
museum's artificiality and gravity in its factoring and
envisioning aspects in which spatiality may be actual or
illusory, material or pictorial, that is, sensorial, rather
than conceptual and intellectual.
The organization generally is no less the site of
productive differences, of burgeoning differentiation and
tension. In the material of this production a potentiality
exists for an infinite realization of unpredictable states -
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remoralization of human space.
BAUMAN,	 Zygmunt.
Postmodern Ethics. Blackwell,
1993. pp.234 & 239-40.
27. Debate about the unique-
ness of the human continues:
machines already extend the
body and the brain.
Discussions about technology -
its capacity, what it can and can -
not do, what it should and
should not do - are the reverse
side of the coin to debates on the
capacity, ability, and moral end -
dements of humans. Attempts to
determine the characteristics of
machines are simultaneously
claims about the characteristics
of nonmachines.
WOOLGAR, S. "Reconstructing
Man and Machine: A Note on
Sociological Critiques of
Cognitivism" [p.312] in BIJKER
et al, 1987. pp.311-28.
28. Perhaps the animism that
informs Japanese product design
is more than a Shinto hangover.
How long before machines share
our deepest psychical qualities?
...after a few years they might
develop their own emotional
responses - hate, love, fear,
anger, envy - so they built in a
fail-safe device ...a four-year life
span
The character Bryant briefing
the blade runner on the latest
generation of replicants
(androids) in the film: Blade
Runner, (Ridley Scott dir.)
Warner Brothers, 1982.
29. For example:
- nitrate film is inherently chem-
ically unstable and highly in-
flammable: the images are pre-
served by copying onto a modern
optical or digital medium;
- most rescue archaeology
destroys the bulk of the physical
intentionality, if it plays a part at all, plays the part of
governing, comforting myth. In the structural relations of
this production, therefore, the irrational underpins the
rational - physicality and immediacy characterize the
process of inscription (which becomes trivial) and inter-
minable narrative play characterizes the process of encryp-
tion (which becomes 'vital') literally providing 'the signs of
life'. Organizations that realize their museality in this new
spirit become flexible, able to reconstrue themselves at will.
In the museum great store is placed in the power of
spatial relations, literally in the ranks of shelves and cases
laid out and labelled in the space of the store and
metaphorically in taxonomies, iconographies and narra-
tives set out in the documentary spaces of the media. Each
spatiality refers back to a centre, a hub, which, though all
may be in motion around it, gives the appearance of
stability, certainty, immutability. This centre is the
measure of all things that may be spoken, made or visual-
ized. This centre is the humanity to which the human pays
automatic homage in the very act of being. Yet this 'centre'
is not a focus: it falls outside the consciousness that binds
linguistic, constructive and imaginative acts together.
Derrida speaks of "a centre which is not a centre" of an
'event' without location, of a `rupture'." In the museum
this rupture contradicts the history of museality, and yet
confirms its historicity. It speaks against a museality
conceived as a teleology, as a motion towards the grand
narrative, the crystallization of the sum of human
knowledge in a massive superstructure which is the perfect
mirror of the world (or its double). Yet it is always the
absence of a supplement, merely a sampling of the world
which shifts and plays in the space of museal contingency.
In the organizational microcosm physical space
provides an arena for instinctual display, a contest of
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evidence uncovered: data collect-
ed on site can be used to produce
a virtual 3-D model on computer
and with the aid of record pho-
tography and in-situ casts some
material can be physically repro-
duced in the museum.
30. GANDY, Oscar H. Jnr. The
Panoptic Sort: A Political
Economy of Personal
Information. Westview Press,
1993.
31. BENNETT, Tony. "The
Exhibitionary Complex." New
Formations. 1988/4, pp. 73-102.
and:
HOOPER-GREENHILL, Eilean.
Museums and the Shaping of
Knowledge. London: Routledge,
1992.
32. Under fear's unrelenting
pressure, the rational self takes
charge.
FLAM. Helena. "Fear, Loyalty
and Greedy Organizations"
[p.60] in FINEMAN, Stephen.
(Ed.) Emotion in Organizations.
Sage Publications, 1993. pp..58-
75.
33. See above: 3.3 Museum:
Ideology.
34. PYE, Elizabeth.
"Conservation and storage:
archaeological material", in
THOMPSON, Joint M. A. (ed.)
Manual of Curatorship.
Butterworth/Museums
Association, 1984. p.204.
35. See: HASSARD, John.
Sociology and Organization
Theory. Cambridge University
Press, 1993. On the foundations
of the modern orthodoxy:
Auguste Comte whose:
...method is the basis for develop -
ing a grand 'positive' scheme for
bodies, and for the controlling gaze in which all eroticism
is banished - id and superego collide - and yet neither
spectacle nor spectator (and each in realizing itself
becomes the other) need any longer be 'present' to the
other. Through the telematic power of communication
technologies a substitution for the physical, a simulation of
the transaction, and a fracture of structuring linear time
have constructed the necessity of an 'economy of signs and
space'. On the local level there is the possibility of
a new logic of place and practical will-formation [developed] on
the basis of decentralized data banks, interactive communication
systems and community-based multi-media centres [or] ...a kind
of Foucauldian power/knowledge dystopia ...in which even
moral and practical knowledge is transformed into cognitive and
technical systems which normalize and regulate what was previ -
ously private —37
and on the global level, in 'hollowed-out' nation states
which, because of their inability to control information
flows within their national boundaries, disappear between
`supranational or international bodies' and 'regional or
local states or a private sector', there is the possibility of "a
more localist and pluralist democracy" or a "nightmarish
dystopia" of "ungovernable wild zones next to highly disci-
plined tame zones, where each reinforces the other..."."
What is constructed in the organization is not straightfor-
wardly a singular purposeful and productive 'body' -
Lyotard's great Monad" - but a chameleon community in
which each element is able to act as either origin or relay,
and which is a sampling of the world that shifts and plays
in the space of a 'mused contingency. The museal is also
that economy of signs and space. Any organization may
display that chameleon-like adaptability which character-
izes the designer and the museum as creative collectives.'
'Collection' implies either selection or serendipity: in
the reconstruction of society
[p.16]; Herbert Spencer who
develops: "an evolutionary typol-
ogy of societies" [p.17]; and
Emile DurIcheim who believed
that "in time ...sociology will pro-
vide the rules of action for the
future" [p.14.]
36. DERRIDA, Jacques. [1967]
Writing and Difference. Trans.
Alan Bass. Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1978. p.279.
37. LASH, Scott. & John URRY.
Economies of Signs & Space.
Sage, 1994. p.324.
38. ibid. p.325.
39. LYOTARD, [1988] pp.64-5.
40. See above: 3.2 Design:
Design, Post-Design (and note
38) and 3.3 Museum: Institution.
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both the totalizing drive is subverted, the mirror a distort-
ing fragment, the imaginative double inseparable from its
source. The world is everything including its own reflec-
tions, including their own reflections, in an infinite regress
of deferred presences. Museality is the quality of all reflec-
tions that are caught in fragments of the reflected:
museality is the condition of reflexivity made concrete, the
past enfolded in the material of the present: it is the
structure of structuration, the history of historicization,
the culture of culturation, the image of imagination.
Beneath the articles of legislated museality (collect,
document, preserve, research, exhibit, interpret), which
attempt to be labels for objective procedure, we are
dealing with the covered, unrecovered, aspects of all
material organizations - their ironic presence to
themselves, the enigmatic quality of their identities, and
the paradoxical relations between their notions of change,
purpose, location and integrity. If we ask what ironic
presence the museum has to itself, we mean that which it
achieves through the communicative complex of collection
and media, the physical space of curation and the curated:
through exhibition. Exhibition is public play, a spectacle,
a space in which a ritual observance is enacted, the
material embodiment of cultural values is projected into
the space of a public watching over itself and thereby
called into play as an order of knowledge and power. As
an internal organizational conceit, a rhetorical
contrivance, exhibition achieves its status through a
combination of privileged location, authoritative style,
distorting form, contingent structure, symbolically
indeterminate material content and distracting (enter-
taining) surplus. Materiality is covered over in the
museum process and its unrecoverability ensured in the
process of exhibition which, whatever else it may be, is a
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process of fulfilling a present-day politicized agenda that
calls for commodity and inheritance to be assigned the
symbolic aspect of property and knowledge. But material-
ity is covered over in all organizations to the extent that
the collection of resources, human and otherwise, involves
a rupture. The acquisition is objectified in the documen-
tary process: its provenance frozen and its significance
changed. It becomes, at least symbolically, a possession, a
property, whose newly defined purpose binds it to the
organization and simultaneously suppresses its extra-
mural significance. The exhibitionary process of structur-
ing purposes therefore is also one of layering meaning and
of constructing (recreating) organizational integrity.
The enigma of museum identity in the postmodern
context is that the public face of the museum - the exhibi-
tion - not only can, but, must radically alter its form,
structure, material and content, and the very values and
beliefs it makes explicit in its play of differance, to sustain
the identity of the museum qua museum. And the more
interactively it is able to achieve its own repeated trans-
mutation the more the new museality is confirmed: this
museality is an interpretive potential, an unlimited power
of signification.
The organization's image is no mirage. It is an artifice
of ephemerality - it changes by zooms, pans, fades and cuts
and responds to the touch like interactive video , and it is
projected by the actor network that exploits its possibility
for imaginative transformation. The idea of structural
relations becomes a paradox as the space of organization is
defined as a dynamic, open-ended process of design, which
is, in generic terms, that endless play of differ ance
required to keep alive the possibility of meaning,
structure, and utility.
One of the key impetuses in new museology, as far as
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attitudes to collection are concerned, is the open-ended
search for new possibilities in the relations between
individual items. Polyvalency emerges as the characteristic
linguistic object of exhibition and interpretation: the notion
that an individual item or a contingent grouping of items
can serve several simultaneous semantic purposes, some of
which, rather than being prescribed, are offered as inter-
pretive possibilities. In the museum the implication is that
it is neither desirable nor actually possible to put a firm
boundary around the meanings that may be communicated
by a particular exhibit let alone by a whole exhibition.
In general the characteristic of museal organizations
is that the actor network is polyvalent. Therefore, it is
equally undesirable, in fact impossible, to clearly identify
what is inside and what outside. The museal organization
is a system of interfaces: boundaries are at its focus,
therefore, it has no centre, in a sense its 'integrity' cannot
be 'placed' . The museal organization only has customers,
clients, in so far as they become participants, collaborators,
actors in the actor network which is the projector of the
organization's succession of appearances. The unexpected
is expected, the unusual commonplace: the 'proper
business' of the museal organization is never stated except
in the fa knowledge that it may be contradicted by what
happens next. Rather than existing as a promotional basis,
a teleological normativity, it effectively remains unconsti-
tuted until catalysed and completed by a supplement
unique to each customer/client.
The process is identical in the museum: the exhibi-
tion visitor is presented with a layered complex of
meanings in a 'text' some of which are susceptible to a
direct linear reading, some of which are not. The latter
must be constructed rather than reconstructed: they
present themselves as unresolved possibilities, fragmen-
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tary and perhaps, on the surface, contradictory narratives
that can only be completed (closed) by a supplement
unique to each visitor or group.
The admission of this polyvalency allows the individ-
ual item many possible positions in the scheme of things,
and creates, alongside the polyvalency of all other individ-
ual items, many possible schemes. A symmetrical uncer-
tainty of identity and narrative is the result. To some
extent, therefore, all that one can do is to put things
together, with or without a strong rationale, and wait to
see what meanings arise, what purposes are served. Total
open-endedness is, of course, not possible. Regardless of
our attempts to eliminate them, we bring preconceptions
and personal projects to bear in any situation which
requires organization. But, at the end of the day, what
matters is that some degree of possibility is admitted that
ensures the occurrence of the unpredictable and makes
probable its utility. Collection is not a random process, but
neither can it be guided by a comprehensive specification
or qualification. The item acquired because it conforms to
a range of criteria set out in a collecting/recruitment
policy is not as a consequence circumscribed.
Documentation and research will reveal many qualities
other than those qualifying the item for inclusion in a
collection. It is these other qualities which ultimately take
the possibilities of a collection beyond the predictable,
which introduce a complexity and the scope for endless
reconfiguration in exhibition and reinterpretation. The
unorthodox configuration of individual items in a collec-
tion creates the narrative possibilities but in the process it
necessarily redefines and re-creates identity. It is not only
what the museal organization collects and what it reveals
through exhibition - the visible, tangible aspects of
identity - that are open to change, but the very processes
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of exhibition and interpretation themselves: identity is
also a question of how the organization chooses to behave
towards itself, for there is always a contingent directional-
ity in any interface, towards consumer and non-consumer
groups (visiting and non-visiting public), other organiza-
tions, and towards the physical space it occupies and the
material/culture under its care.
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5.0 Force Fields and Constellations
Complexity, Praxis and Interpretation
In museum-design-organization the intervals organization-
design, design-museum, and museum-organization
construct a fascinating realm of possibilities for the
postmodern condition. In this realm complexity is exhibited
in its most radical form: the epistemological, the conjunc-
tion of incommensurable problematics - psychical, social
and material. Action and theory are irredeemably bound
into a creative nexus which effectively dethrones the
sovereign rational subject and centres play at the bound-
aries between imagination and reason, vision and speech,
making and writing, inscribing and encrypting.
Explanation is freed from the telos of 'truth' and revealed as
the continuous creative process of negotiating and shaping
the world through our conversations and envisionings.
If our situation is characterized by complexity, incom-
mensurable frames of reference, and by the need to forge
narrative and identity out of our dealings in this
messiness, if difference, in the anthropological sense, is
necessary to life, then change is a Janus-faced project and
it is the challenge.
The process of globalization engages a superficiality of
change but with increasing speed. In this sense, the
putative homogenization of material culture should
diminish the resources available for transforming the world,
for creating new narratives and new identities. It should
lead to an implosion. Against this, however, the process of
differentiation, of localization, proceeds ever more slowly
into complex layered change in which the possibilities for
material culture become energized. This should lead to an
explosion. We travel in both directions simultaneously: our
location and speed, like those of the lonely electron, are
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governed by an uncertainty principle of sorts. Culture is
sustained only by continually putting itself at risk, by
changing its form and content, its material and meaning.
But, the extremes of the process of change do have to be
avoided: relapse into chaos or push complexity too far and
difference, perceivable pattern, meaning disappears.
In this chapter I draw out a range of constellations in
the preceding material to set up a thematic triad of force
fields. (1) The surfacing of complexity in the human
situation reflects most permanently in the material culture
and ultimately this is the process that defines the design-
erly and museal responses as ones which are characteristi-
cally human. The challenge of change is to engage the
museal and the designerly in a continuing play of
differance. This defines a praxis in which the material
cultural focus presents a simultaneity of psychical, social
and physical realities and, therefore, touches individual
and collective existence through every channel. (2) As an
engagement of the whole being in a process of preparing
for future well-being, design is a form of praxis not
opposed to but continuous with that similarly all
consuming process of connecting with the material past.
The praxis thus conceived as both designerly and museal
is both forward and backward projecting and yet its
moment is here and now. Museality must also be projected
forwards, a process achieved through design. And design
must connect with the past, a process achieved by the
museal. The moment in which we find ourselves is thus a
place identified by the cross flow of energies, the eclecti-
cism of our interests and concerns, and the ironism of our
actions. (3) We have the possibility of continuously trans-
forming any constructed order and any image of order, a
process which makes interpretation integral with action
and, therefore, both interminable. The question of inter-
255
pretation arises primarily because at the 'moment', at that
constant turning point between the backward and the
forward projecting energies, at that meeting point of the
material culture which has survived its present and that
which has yet to be realized, we have the possibility of
seeing an order in our situation and of acting upon the
meanings we thereby construct. Transformation is
immediately a process that can be applied to this project.
Any idea of organization is ultimately the comfort of the
meaningful, in a profound sense, of the 'familiar'. There is
magic in all of this, more than there is science or faith.
1. MAC QUARRIE, John.
Existentialism. New York: World
Publishing, 1972, p.l.
2. ibid. p.2 & 3.
3. ibid. p.4
4. LOWENTHAL, David. The
Past is a Foreign Country.
Cambridge University Press,
1985. p.412.
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5.1 Complexity and the Design Paradigm
Designer as Paradigmatic Existent
Design, as an arena of human knowledge and praxis, shares
with existentialism a key epistemological point of departure
and that is the discontinuous nature of our knowledge of the
world. We are limited by the possibilities of our own experi-
ence and at the same time bound to act upon what we know
however incomplete that knowledge may be. "In the existen-
tialist view there are always loose ends. Our experience and
our knowledge are always incomplete and fragmentary..." 1
The proposition that existentialism lacks any "common body
of doctrine" leads Macquan-ie to treat it "not as a 'philoso-
phy' but rather as a 'style of philosophizing'..." and this also
makes existentialism important in another respect: as a
pointer to methodological principles. The first principle
must be that the designer, like the existentialist, operates
"not with the reason only, but with the will, with the
feelings, with the flesh and with the bones, with the whole
soul and with the body." Whereas in the bulk of subjective
theory the human is, first and foremost, the 'thinking
subject', in existentialism and, as I maintain, in design the
existent is also "an initiator of action and a centre of
feeling"! Moreover he or she is also the creator of images, a
visionary, a point often understated or overlooked in
existential works. The distinguishing characteristic of
humans which is pointed up by this orientation to theory is
that of purposefully exercising choice in visualizing and
shaping the future: "It is the exercise of freedom and the
ability to shape the future that distinguishes man from all
the other beings that we know on earth"! And in placing
and identifying themselves in relation to the past: "...every
act we take, every plan we make, entail the past's more or
less conscious re-evaluation, revision, and recreation". 4 In a
5. ibid. Macquarrie cites, for
example, the 'near-existential-
ists' Martin Buber and Gabriel
Marcel as having been "pioneers
in the investigation of interper-
sonal relations".
6. Camus explores both the
fascist (ab)use of Nietzsche's
nihilism and the "secular
Jesuitism" of modern socialism
in The Rebel.
CAMUS, Albert. [1951] The
Rebel, trans. Anthony Bower,
Hamish Hamilton, 1953.
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fundamental sense, therefore, existentialism and design
hold important correlational attributes and, although the
picture cannot be completed by extrapolating from such a
limited range of ideas, we can pursue a certain aspect of
theory by manipulating and reinterpreting dimensions of
the model of museum-design-organization to help us to
visualize and to cope with the personal, the interpersonal
and the communal - all areas which have been explored
from an existential point of view.' The complexity of the
human situation surfaces in the breadth of the designerly
and museal responses.
Although the phenomenological, structural and
material problematics may not be synthesized in any
account, even the existentialist one framed here, this is not
a particular worry. The approach allows one to explore the
epistemological complex as a constellation of accounts which
one hopes may be adequate to one's practical purposes at
the end of the day, or at least which points in a hopeful
direction. What is clear is that the subjective focus on the
existent does not lead to a common body of knowledge nor
even to shared beliefs and values: the existentialist
approach is as capable of reaching a totalitarian as it is an
anarchistic interpretation of the individual's scope for
"freedom, decision and responsibility" with all of the impli-
cations these extreme possibilities hold for the political
sphere.' If we can see the following focus on the designer as
'paradigmatic existent' in the above light we can belay the
desire to grasp at an encompassing interpretation of any
sort in the hope of picturing the perceptual process involved.
The most revealing existentialist works explore the
tragic aspects of human existence: the tenet in such works
seems to be that by considering our failings and our failures
we learn more about ourselves and about our relationship
to the world than we do by tracing human teleology.
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The Moment of Design
7. ibid. p.29.
The immediate social context of a design provides the
individual designer with a range of uncertainties as to
status, behavioural and cultural norms, power relations,
and personal freedom. These define a worldly regime
against which the designer may have little option but to
react at a metaphysical level. The inevitability of this
response arises out of a contradiction that surfaces in the
idea of 'Design'. The professional sphere of design activity
is bounded by the legislated expectations of the institutions
- professional bodies administer their communities through
the imposition of ethical codes; determination of 'legiti-
mate' and 'criminal' practices is embodied in law;
procedure is conventionalized to facilitate communicative
and productive activity within and between organizations;
and various informal (and potentially vicious) sanctions
may be waged against those whose appearance, utterances,
or gestures offend the group or the powerful. Design is also
intimately connected to the broader humanistic concern for
purposeful and meaningful creative activity which is
generally implicit in the expectations projected by litera-
ture, material culture, and the media. Design is a contested
phenomenon. The designer is caught between cultural
reflections of faith in human creativity and its bureaucratic
instrumentalization. The tensions and counteractions of
liberatory and regulatory forces, therefore, are immanent
in Design, and their inescapability gives the designer good
cause to engage in, what Camus described as, 'metaphysi-
cal rebellion', a reaction, not "against the condition of his
state of slavery" but "against the human condition in
general": What is of interest here is not the reaction
catalysed by the context of a particular design, but rather,
the general condition that sets the 'right' of conscious
8. To keep quiet is to allow
yourself to believe that you have
no opinions, that you want
nothing ...
ibid. p.20.
9. See above 2.2 Social Space:
(concluding paragraph): the
ideas of the prophylactic, the
therapeutic, and the innova-
tional practical situation in:
GASPARSKI, W. "On the
General Theory (Praxiology) of
Design", Department of
Praxiology, Polish Academy of
Sciences, 1986?
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individuals to exercise their practical creative competence
in an increasingly complex and unsatisfactory world
against the administrative strictures of 'modern' society
which regulate when, how and why designerly interven-
tions may be made. The only alternatives to metaphysical
rebellion are acquiescence, silence and impotence, and the
deep feelings of resentment, alienation and guilt that
inevitably accompany such responses.' The existential
question is a bold one: is the designer to engage hopefully
in visionary projects or to be the slave of circumstance?
Being at the Turning Point
The first moment of design is that which marks the
beginning of dialogue. A dissatisfaction with the state of
things, however defined, becomes the locus of potentiality,
the pregnant pause, the point of fracture in material condi-
tions that demands the making of two world views.
Whether as a response to catastrophe or as mere whim, as
technological breakdown or as a shift of fashion, the
realization that something needs to be changed - even
though there may be some dispute as to what that
'something' is or even that there may be no real idea of
what 'change' may actually mean, only a general unease
about the current situation - calls for a different construc-
tion to be placed on the practical situation.' The situation
'as it is' must come to be understood in a new way if it is to
become amenable to intervention. In the first instance, the
drive to see the situation differently is formalized in
engaging the designer. The designer, whether as an
external agent brought in to the situation or as a latent
capacity of the existing actor network, is able to expand
the 'point of potentiality' into a full-blown 'arena of possi-
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10. ...the phenomenologist
refashions the given data of an
object - say a table - by freely
varying it in his imagination
...In so doing, the imaginer
becomes aware of all the possible
variations which the identical
phenomenon of the table may be
subjected to; and such an
awareness culminates in the
intuition of a general essence of
tableness.
KEARNEY, Richard. Poetics of
Imagining: from Husserl to
Lyotard. Harper Collins, 1991.
p.24.
bilities', to engage the visionary aspect of change, to
explore the play of differance - what Husserl calls the
process of 'free variation' in phenomenological investiga-
tion.' The process of constructing a view of the situation
'as it is' and of opening up the situation and seeing it 'as it
could be' engages the interpretive aspect characteristic of
identifying the museal - one selects a metonymic sample
from the multiple forms available and identifies a
metaphorical potential - and the imaginative aspect
characteristic of exploratory design thinking. But this
achievement is necessarily different to that implied by the
idea of engaging a process to intentionally change a
situation. There is a limit to the scope of our intentions in
any practical situation, a limit to their affectivity. It is
when we realize that intended outcomes are unstable or
occurring in unpredictable ways or failing to occur at all,
that we may conclude that it is the practical situation
itself, and not necessarily our knowledge and our ability to
apply it, that has failed. Change per se is no longer the
problem: change as an inherent quality of necessarily
dynamic practical situations may be managed. The
problem has become one of changing the arena of change
in order to establish a new pattern of persistent dynamics.
This kind of change can not be 'managed', in any straight-
forward sense, but rather has to be 'designed'. A concept of
what is to be changed and one of what change is to be
made are developed together as the complementary
aspects of a single design proposition and their difference
constitutes its meaning. 'What is to be changed' describes
an interpreted, to some extent arbitrarily delineated,
practical situation: being framed one way rather than
another, including some elements and not others, it is
socially constructed to coincide with a concept of 'what
change is to be made'. Rejection of one is automatically a
material culture to be changed visualized change to material culture
VISIONARY
RESPONSE
MUSEAL
RESPONSE
IOW-414. 	
Narrative
projection
Identity
projection
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rejection of the other. In a very direct way the projection of
a future identity depends upon a parallel projection of a
narrative past - 'direct' because the medium that embodies
the dependence and lends an infinite renewability to the
process is the material culture (Figure 5.1.1.)
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Figure 5.1.1
The museal response of retrospective narrative projection reconstructs the practical situation
to be changed in the same moment (the moment of design) that the visionary response of
imaginative identity projection constructs the design possibility. The reconstructed practical
situation, the moment of design and the visualized change are pseudo-synchronic slices
through the social space and to greater or lesser extent they overlap in time.
11. Lowenthal explains how we
know the past in terms of
memory, history and relics.
LOWENTHAL, 1985. pp.185-259.
The selectivity of all of the
contributing processes attenu-
ates the information content
imparting the mythic quality to
our guiding narratives.
JACKSON, N. & P. CARTER.
"The Attenuating Function of
Myth	 in	 Human
Understanding",	 Human
Relations, 37:7, pp.515-33. 1984.
it is precisely where memory
diverges most clearly from fact
that "imagination, symbolism
desire break in".
The task calls upon an artificially constructed evocation of
those fundamental human traits of (1) organizing the
future by making plans for change and (2) organizing the
past by making up stories to explain who we are and
where we came from. The former involves intervening in a
situation as if from outside, of successfully acting on a
situation without or despite inside knowledge of its
history, condition and dynamics. The latter involves a
selective remembering, a selective telling and/or writing
and a selective keeping of things which together make the
functional myths by which we live.' In this sense the
designer is always a kind of 'outsider' - the other within
12. WILSON, Colin. [1956] The
Outsider. 2nd edn. Pan Books,
1963. p.58.
13. 'Analysis' and 'conjecture'
being the opening gambits of
Systematic and Kuhnian
processes respectively. These
stand for the 'hard' and 'soft'
extremes of the methodological
spectrum. See: Figures 2.3.4 and
2.3.6 above.
14. Gary Withers, Creative
Director, Imagination quoted in
a video interview at The Tom
Peters Seminar (London, 1993.)
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PORTELLI, A. "The
Peculiarities of Oral History",
History Workshop Journal, 12,
pp.96-107. quoted in SAMUEL,
Raphael and Paul Thompson
(eds.) The Myths We Live By.
Routledge, 1990. p.7.
ourselves - and the influence of the outsider is profoundly
unsettling because it engages a compulsion to leap into the
unknown:
It is not enough to accept a concept of order and live by it; that is
cowardice, and such cowardice cannot result in freedom. Chaos
must be faced. Real order must be preceded by a descent into
chaos."
And the designer is also a kind of priest ...
In the sense that the effect either of analysis or of conjec-
ture is to bring into question, and ultimately to dismantle,
the internal relations that comprise the structure and
meaning of the familiar, Design is at first destructive.' This
redefining and reconstruing process involves loosening our
grip on reality. This is a fearful and potentially dangerous
exercise. The 'knowledge' it calls upon is no resort to hard
evidence, probability, or natural law: rather it is an act of
faith in one's own and in others' capabilities.
I think crazy people are all different ...but they all have one thing
in common: they can be creative ...you just have to give them
confidence. I think everybody has got it in them, you just have to
give them an environment, an atmosphere, in which you
encourage them to believe in themselves and they can go out and
achieve the impossible. ...I don't think more than once or twice
about the fact that they could or can't do it: they're there, I believe
they can do it, and so I assume they care
Not only does the designer experience the fear and
danger inherent in shaking the ground upon which a
practical situation rests, through the unpredictability of the
design process, the client and the participant user feel a
threat is posed to the world they know. In the face of such
uncertainty they rely upon institutionalized procedure to
protect the social fabric from being 'conceptually', and
perhaps 'actually', unravelled. Design is engaged but not
263
unreservedly: limits are placed on the scope and speed of
action and boundaries are set up and protected with all the
force that can be mustered. A museum may be radically
reorganized in the process of change, but it may not be
dissolved into something other than a museum - a recycling
plant, for instance. Even if a free-ranging design process
might identify the rationale for such a change, the possibility
of its specification and implementation is literally 'ruled' out.
The adventure is a free fall into confusion - a state of
doubt about the local pattern of forces that hold a practical
situation together as a comprehensible and functioning
environment. When our faith in the coincidence of outward
appearances with their material and social consequences is
shaken not only do we become disorientated we become
isolated. When the emotional continuity of perception and
objective knowledge is severed we suffer the existential
moment of angst and alienation. From the designer's point
of view such a moment is all consuming; detachment is not
an option. The most potent symbolic instance of this terror
is that of facing a blank sheet of paper whilst charged with
energy and devoid of vision. Practical reasoning, in the
Philosophical sense, offers no way out of such imaginative
paralysis. Only two paths are open: (1) a slavish expression
of conformity to precedent, preconception and prejudice
which is an admission of defeat, of subservience to the other,
of less than human quality, of a willingness to be subject to
instrumentalizing bureaucratic power; and (2) a defiant
refusal, a headlong dive into chaos, an intuitive outpouring
that defers any thought of establishing coherence, pattern,
structure, meaning. This amounts to an absolute act of faith
in ones own humanity - a momentary egoism of monumental
proportions in which the individual 'knows' that designerly
skill will ultimately prevail over the resulting chaos.
The late James Gardner, the internationally
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renowned museum and exhibition designer, calmly post-
rationalized his strategy for coping with the crucial
moment during the Evoluon project:
I will use well understood images as they come up in my mind,
but arrange them in unexpected contexts ... surprise focuses the
mind. It may even focus mine.15
15. GARDNER, James. James
Gardner: The Artful Designer.
(Pub. the author), 1993. p.315.
Euoluon is the Philips sponsored
science	 museum	 near
Eindhoven, Netherlands, opened
in 1976.
The strategy relies upon the designer's ability to withdraw
from the practical situation in which an attachment to the
existing world view holds sway. Although one comes to any
situation with ones preconceptions and prejudices intact
there is a need to suppress the inclination to give in to
them. It may not be possible to release completely, but
unless something of the vacuum they fill is faced then
nothing surprising, nothing potent, nothing of fearful poten-
tiality will ever be brought to the surface. The question here
is one of Being-first, of identifying with the moment
through the passion of the senses and through an intensity
of action. The ironic quality of Being-first is apparent in the
implied contradiction between the ideas of 'conscious' and
'self-conscious' states of Being. In the intensity of imagina-
tive involvement one is most fully conscious because most
fully immersed in the dynamics of the moment. When all
the senses are engaged, when one acts "with the whole soul
and with the whole body" one is most alive and yet in that
very moment one is least conscious of the self. Self-
consciousness implies a distance from the actualities of
existence, a rationalized separation of the acting self and
the thinking self, of 'existence' and 'essence'. Self-conscious-
ness is entirely missing in the existential idea of existence.
Sartre emphasizes the precedence of this idea of existence
over that of knowing-consciousness by saying that:
... consciousness is the knowing being in his capacity as being
and not as being known. ... Of course consciousness can know
and know itself. But it is in itself something other than a
16. SARTRE, Jean-Paul. [1943]
Being and Nothingness. Trans.
Hazel E. Barnes. Methuen,
1958. Routledge paperback edn.
1991, pp.xxvii & xxix.
17. See above 3.1 Organization:
Boundary. refs: COOPER, R.
"Organization/Disorganization"
Social Science Information.
SAGE, 25, 2, 1986, pp.299-335.
and EHRENZWEIG, Anton. The
Hidden Order of Art, Weidenfeld
& Nicholson, London, 1967.
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knowledge turned back upon itself
The immediate consciousness which I have of perceiving does not
permit me either to judge or to will or to be ashamed. It does not
know my perception, does not posit it; all that there is of
intention in my actual consciousness is directed toward the
outside, toward the world.16
In the moment of designing one has an immediate
consciousness only of the object of designing, one does not
know oneself as designing. In fact, such a self-consciousness
would defeat the object of designing by reducing the activity
to one distanced from the actuality of the situation by a
reflective practical rationality. It is this distancing which is
able to paralyse the imaginative faculty by allowing the
space for feelings of self-doubt, anxiety, fear and guilt.
There is then a radical sense in which the reconstruc-
tion of reality is a creative rather than a re-creative
process. And at this point we can return to the problem of
the boundary, which, as the site of difference, is the
generator of meaning and, in its eternal renegotiability,
the space of the play of differance, and relate this to the
situating, in cognitive terms, of the designer.
Boundary as generator
As noted earlier, Cooper succumbs too easily to the gestalt
fallacy which is questioned by Ehrensweig in The Hidden
Order of Art.' The division between terms in the process of
differentiation indeed generates, without privilege, both
system and environment, which are reversible in position
analytically. However, this process is symmetrically opposed
to the dedifferentiating view that must be adopted later in
the larger design process. Once the focussed attention has
encompassed both figures of system/environment and
environment/system the realization of boundary-as-
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generator closes off this to and fro activity and, to facilitate
the creative process of boundary manipulation, a process of
intellectually achieved release must take place. This intellec-
tual release is experienced as a process of dedifferentiation.
In it, the gestalt reintegrates with the boundary in place but
unfocussed to a degree that brings system/boundary/environ-
ment into syncretism. The sustained condition of unfocussed
attention allows the dedifferentiated field to be held in view
whilst changes are wrought on previously determined
elements such as boundary features. Whilst, during the
manipulative process, the detailed local effects cannot be
focussed and thus analytically evaluated the impact on
system/environment and environment/system relationships
can be viewed 'holistically' as a gestalt shift.
In the design process, therefore, what is required is
the development of an intellectual discipline and an imagi-
native skill that facilitates development of designs through
alternating differentiating processes, which involve
focussing attention, description, structuring, analysis and
evaluation, and dedifferentiating processes, which involve
releasing attention, boundary blurring, disintegration and
intuitive exploration (Figure 5.1.2.)
RATIONAL SELF-CONSCIOUS
CONSCIOUS BEING-FIRST
Figure 5.1.2
Alternating processes of differentiation and dedifferentiation in
the design process experienced as the focussed attention of the
rational self-conscious and the unfocussed attention of the con-
scious Being-first respectively.
18. In Eco's terms, this consti-
tutes the genesis of an infinite
semiosis.
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It is this movement in and out of these differentiating and
dedifferentiating modes that, from an existential view
point, constitutes the design process. The necessity of this
movement in the design process becomes, in an interpretive
sense, 'rational', that is 'reasonable', when we observe that
the manipulation or reconstruing of one difference within a
system inevitably sends shock waves throughout a
structure infecting a larger or smaller proportion of other
differences with a change factor.' Without a dedifferentiat-
ing mode the complexities of detailed change rapidly
overwhelm the existent's (human actor's) field of view with
the appearance of catastrophic disintegration of established
(familiar) structure. With it, focussed attention is resisted,
local effects suppressed in importance, and shifting
patterns grasped as a whole. Redescription and restructur-
ing are postponed until that moment when relative gestalt
stability returns: redifferentiation is then begun generally
by working from the larger structures down to the smaller
more localized ones. Thus, radical change becomes, if not
intellectually then at least emotionally and perceptually,
manageable. In addition, existential notions of 'rational
self-conscious' and 'conscious Being-first' can be associated
with the differentiating and the dedifferentiating modes of
attention respectively - the rational self-conscious separates
subject from object, as well as figure from ground, and
system from boundary and from environment whereas
conscious Being-first entails an identification of subject
with object and a blurring of the field of figure/ground, and
of system/boundary/environment (Figure 5.1.3.)
The ideas which Ehrenzweig explores in relation to
visual art might seem at first sight not to apply to the
general case of practical thought, particularly that which
is normally portrayed as purely linguistic in content. But
visual thinking is far more prevalent than is credited by
Dominant
Psychological functions
Figure 5.1.3
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Mode of attention
Subject-Object relation
Meaning production
Cognitive status
Cognitive processes
RATIONAL
SELF-CONSCIOUS
CONSCIOUS
BEING-FIRST
Differentiation
Separation from
Pattern of difference
Thinking-about-doing
Description,
structuring, analysis,
evaluation ...
Thinking - feeling
Dedifferentiation
Identification with
Play of differance
Thinking-in-doing
Boundary blurring,
imagining,
intuitive exploration
Intuition - sensation
Contrasting characteristics of rational self-conscious and con-
scious Being-first experience of the design process.
19. ARNHEIM, Rudolf. Visual
Thinking. Faber & Faber, 1969.
the dominant cultures of philosophy, politics and literature
(it serves their power plays to raise the linguistic to a
privileged position), indeed, the visual comes before the
linguistic and interpenetrates every aspect of its function-
ing; that is, the linguistic is, in a radical sense, cognitively
subservient to the visual. This can be argued strongly for
practical thinking, and weakly, but none-the-less, persua-
sively for theoretical thinking.'
When viewing the object of design as a linguistic
phenomenon, it is important to recognise that the implicitly
static view of the system that use of the Saussurian term
'difference' implies is a deliberate faux pas, the point is that
the use of the Derridian term Vifferance' is contrasted with
the previous term in a new way in relation to the outline of
design process. In the differentiating mode differences are
apparent and acted upon: in the dedifferentiating mode all
differences are deferred and therefore a play of differance is
engaged. There is an important sense in which the self-
conscious, differentiating mode of attention is one which
deals in expressible terms, in the illusion of stable language.
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It is in this mode that one can think about what one is going
to do and about what one has done: to the extent that one is
aware of a present - a pseudo-synchronic 'moment' - one can
even think about what one is doing and, in Jungian terms,
the flow of libido is inwards: an introversion or regression is
entailed. Equally, there is a parallel sense in which the
dedifferentiating mode, which involves a release of
conscious attention to differences, is one that deals in the
inexpressible, in that which cannot be said but can be
shown in the doing, in the possibility of a future meaning
which is, at the moment of action, unself-consciously
deferred. It is in this mode that one thinks in doing, that
one becomes at one with the moment, fully immersed in the
practical situation and the outward flow of libido constitutes
a moment of extraversion or progression (Figure 5.1.4.)
play of differance	 pattern of differences
CONSCIOUS
BEING-FIRST
Dedifferentiating
mode Thinking - in - doing
RATIONAL
SELF-CONSCIOUS
Differentiating
mode
Thinking - about - doing
time
Figure 5.1.4
Track of the design process as a linguistic construction of alternating play of diNrance, in
which meaning is deferred, and pattern of differences, in which a pseudo-synchronic state of
meaning is realized.
The background-foreground metaphor can also be used to
clarify the movement back and forth between difference
and diffErance in the design process.
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5.2 Model Transformations
Organizational Perversion, Subversion, Inversion
Between actors in the organizational actor-network a
radical potential is apparent in the moment of design. But
this potential is not always realized outside of these
moments, even as one that is latent. The speed and force of
bureaucratic actions may be such as to cover over the
counteracting tensions and contradictory positions that
create the space for interpersonal spontaneity which is so
essential for growth and change.
Organizations that realize a growing discrepancy
between the bureaucratic drive for 'efficiency' and the
distributed interest in 'effectiveness' may uncover this
radical potential. If they do not, they become perverse,
dominated by the pursuit of an economy of means which
become ends in themselves. In the organizational context,
the ossification of programmatic means (documentary
actions) inevitably leads to a narrowing of prescribed
concerns, an increase in the range of proscribed activity, a
general frustration of human interests (Figure 5.2.1.)
symbolic interests	 material interests CR
...."	
intellectual concerns	 SOCIAL DYNAMICS	 technical concerns
Figure 5.2.1
A performative social space in which defmed zones representing narrow concerns are bureau-
cratically maintained, locations kept distinct and channels of communication prescribed.
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Such organizational inertia may only be sustained by a
conservative and essentially inhuman regime, one founded
on the perpetuation of differences.
Where human interests are not being accommodated
there will be an inevitable reaction directed towards the
creation of alternative space. Such activity is subversive.
Working below an organization's threshold of bureau-
cratic control, in its procedural and documentary inter-
stices, an actor network will tend to redifferentiate the
organizational space, to develop supplementary inter-
faces to support clandestine exchange, to engage the
outlawed realm of uncertainty that is the play of
diffërance. Such inventions may be the result of a limited
process which quickly subsides to allow their normaliza-
tion, their formal or informal incorporation into the
bureaucratic framework (Figure 5.2.2.)
symbolic interests
intellectual concerns	 SOCIAL DYNAMICS
Figure 5.2.2
material interests
technical concerns
A performative social space in which the inventions of a limited process of organizational sub-
version are normalized by the realignment of predefined zones of concern. Ambiguous loca-
tions are given distinct identity and new channels of communication inscribed.
But taken to the extreme and allowed to multiply and to
work upon themselves, they lead to an unstoppable
subversion of bureaucratic norms and the realization of
mutable organizational space (Figure 5.2.3.)
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symbolic interests	 material interests
intellectual concerns 	 SOCIAL DYNAMICS	 technical concerns
Figure 5.2.3
A performative social space in which overlapping zones are contingently defined by distrib-
uted concerns, locations are interrelated and channels of communication polyvalent.
In this unstable condition the mechanisms of control and
change suffer an inversion and the organization puts itself
at risk, it becomes chimeric, both dangerous and endan-
gered. We should remember that few mutations are benefi-
cial to the organism. On the other hand, successful organi-
zational inversion may have peculiar consequences.
If we consider the mechanisms of control and change
in non-inverted organizations to be the product of contin-
gently defined administrative and creative collectives
respectively, then the moment of design describes the
point of inversion.
Creative and Administrative Collectives
The collective concern for reinterpreting and restructuring
the material of the organization, its heterogeneous actors,
may be objectified in the construction of a creative collec-
tive. Equally, the collective concern for documenting and
preserving that material may be objectified in the construc-
tion of an administrative collective. These constructions do
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not have any lasting, normative value - I would not wish to
suggest an orthodoxy of creative and administrative collec-
tives - but, as a heuristic device they facilitate a focus on
those processes which define the museal quality of material
acquired and processed by an organization and the
designed quality of that material as it is shaped and
projected forward as a functional, meaningful complex.
The non-inverted organization pursues this balance of
documentary and creative processes within a framework of
normalized, perfectible operations which exactly equate to
the museographical tradition. However, just as the recent
historic transformation of museum organization, which is
reflected in the moment of overturning the museographical
tradition in favour of a museological indeterminacy, shows
museums to be working towards an integration of
functional collectives, organizational inversion represents,
not a simple reversal of functions, a festival of fools, but
something altogether more unsettling.
As the administrative collective adopts a design-led
strategy and the creative collective assumes a process
documentation-led strategy, a dynamic network of heteroge-
neous management-design actors is brought into play which
is thereby imbued with peculiar mutational capabilities.
The process we see operating in institutions such as
the National Maritime Museum in the 1990s involves
certain preconditions. First, the individual actor's
autonomy and identity has been formally 'valued' through
what might be termed 'existential' and 'functional' induc-
tions. And second, coordinated multiple activities, which
characterize the hierarchical administered organization,
and surface interactivity, which characterizes the flat
networked organization, are both dissolved.
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The Methodologies of Messiness
The existential induction
'Becoming known' is a museal process which involves
documentation of the actor as formal acknowledgement of
acquisition by the organization." Labelling, in the simple
sense of attaching an identifying tag, is avoided by submit-
ting the 'object' to a process of connoisseurship. Acting in a
holistic 'curatorial' fashion, the organization must become
acquainted with the individual through an extended or
repeated act of direct interaction which aims to reveal the
many 'qualities' of the individual - intellectual, biographi-
cal, physiological, emotional, etc. The object, rather than
being subject to a prescribed and definitive act of labelling
is thereby embraced by an open-ended process of interpre-
tation and reconstruction
The functional induction
1. 'Acquisition' here has a
useful dual meaning: gaining
physical possession of (particu-
larly to advantage) and gaining
a visual grasp on.
'Proving roles' is an open organizational process which
involves a series of, initially informal, engagements with a
range of simulated and actual creative and administrative
tasks. Pigeon-holing' is similarly avoided. The 'subject'
engages in an initially unself-conscious but increasingly
conversational and reflexive process of self-re-creation and
self-redefinition. This induction is a broad-based form of
initial training which achieves two main objectives: to
familiarize the individual actor with the organization (and
its disorganizational possibilities) and to evaluate the
actor's immediate and future potential in terms of various
explicitly and implicitly sanctioned modes of activity
within the museum/organization - including that of
creative counteraction.
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Dissolved Structural Polarities
The creative and administrative collectives form two cores
in the museal organization which may appear both: hard
edged, clearly structured and definitive; and soft edged,
amorphous, overlapping, and contingent.
The appearance of the collectives depends upon the
viewpoint of the observer. From the outside they appear to
be characterized by the former qualities, but they are visible
only as abstractions - in documentation, on staff rosters, in
accounts, on databases, etc., that is, as virtual structures.
The deeper the observer penetrates into the organization
the richer, more organic, and more interconnected the
collectives become. The fully embedded actor no longer sees
two distinct collectives at the heart of the organization but
rather sees a single constellation of myriad actors - both
human and non-human - held in dynamic equilibrium by an
invisible force field of creative and administrative motives
in which, to some degree, every actor shares. The museal
organization, in the new museological sense, is character-
ized by its deep interactivity, the independent collaborative
action of its actors in which ideological reflexivity is invoked
as the guarantor of effectiveness, a process that defines a
museal 'management-design.'
This 'management-design' is both design informed by
management and management informed by design and it
works towards a sustained, integrated approach to organi-
zational growth and change.
This statement concerns 'design' in all of the four
senses invoked in this paper:
• as a quality of the 'designed' product in which the
normative physical reality of the designed object is
revealed or recovered in an active social space of produc-
tion and consumption,
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• as the programme in context in which the normative
documentary reality of the object of design is revealed or
recovered in an active social space of design performance,
• as the process of radical change in material conditions in
which the spatialities constructing the programme are
reversed and the (psycho-)social reality emerges in the
documentary spatiality of autographic productions, and
• as the philosophy of 'ironic activism' in which the
normative ideological realities of design thinking are
revealed or recovered in an active social space of
pragmatic communicative action.
And it concerns 'management' in spatially complementary
senses:
• as resource procurement and distribution which
constructs a physical reality which may be mapped in
architectural and geographical terms. But this physical
reality is only revealed or recovered in the socially
constructed processes that define the organization's
material dynamics. The movement and transformation
of resources achieves social purposes by social means,
• as policy development which, in contrast, ostensibly
constructs social purposes but only in the sense of an
expressed, an actually or virtually documented, reality
which is revealed or recovered through the performance
of a creative cycle, an organizational design,
• as procedural administration which secures an account-
able pattern of performances through the construction of
documentary products, and
• as the philosophy of collective pragmatism which
motivates and legitimates the mutual accommodation of
heterogeneous actors' reflexive performances, a continu-
ous process of reinterpretation and reconstruction which
2. COOPER, Robert.
"Organization/Disorganization"
Social Science Information.
SAGE, 25, 2, 1986, pp.299-335.
3. See above: consideration of
the constitutive spaces of 'prod-
uct', 'programme', 'process' and
'philosophy' in design in 4.1
Organization of Design.
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establishes designerly action as a (post-)organizational
paradigm.
What the equation of design, in its generic sense, with
organizational change and growth does is invoke the
deconstructive account of organization as a normative
concept.' Cooper has said that:
... at the level of what we might call the infrastructure, we
discover an intrinsic undecidability which can only be
'organized' or 'systematized' through an external force that is
wholly foreign to it. It is this level which is resistant to order and
organization and which we call 'disorganization' ...2
Designerly action foregrounds epistemological complexity
as a necessary condition in which to proceed and, whatever
else it does, deals with the embeddedness of heterogeneous
actors and their immanent relations at an infrastructural
level. It also posits the perpetual deferral of realized
structure and meaning, the reality of a 'state' of becoming.
In an important sense, therefore, organization does not
exist except as the 'project' of disorganization and vice
versa. Organization, as an encounter with epistemologi-
cally complex realities, is simultaneously disorganization.
The organization/disorganization coupling may seem
to sound a note of despair, the impossibility of established
differences, of certain meanings. However, the designerly
approach offers a strategic solution to this apparent
negativity. The context of praxis which 'management-
design' envisions operates on a meta-theoretical level. In
the organization of design,' a protocol is established, at
this meta-theoretical level, for the transitions between
physical, social, documentary and paradigmatic spatiali-
ties, a eclectic holism. The reflexivity of design reveals the
simultaneity of an organization's projected futures and
interpreted pasts and the absence of any logical connection
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between them. Therefore, it points to the moment of design
as the crucial focus of attention, the site of ironic activism.
In characterizing management-design praxis as
entailing an eclectic holism and an ironic activism, our
guilt in realizing the inadequacy of logocentric culture - its
myth of rational explanation - is replaced by a joy in re-
engaging with the sensual and visionary aspects of our
being. These bring a rehumanized confidence into play in
which one 'knows' how to cope, how to change things for
the better, how to collaborate hopefully, without the
burden of a search for, or recapitulation of explanation,
the Logos.
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6.0 Summary and Conclusions
1. MORGAN, Gareth. Images
of Organization. Sage
Publications, 1986.
Summary
The following summary highlights the key points in the
model argument as it progresses from notions of spatiality
through consideration of the locations organization,
design, museum, and the intervals organization-design,
design-museum, museum-organization.
Spatiality
Amongst the metaphors commonly utilized to aid a visual-
ization of organization, the spatial metaphor stands in
contrast to others in proposing a concrete conception of
abstract relations which is not bound to a particular repre-
sentational image.' A spatial model realizes a graphic or
three-dimensional physical frame for a system of signs and
thereby facilitates a simultaneity and a holism which in
the linguistic realm of the narrative, the mythic, may only
be cognitively grasped. The model is both a perceptual and
cognitive tool it constructs visible relations and effects by
playing off dimensions of possibility against each other. It
becomes a radical device, in epistemological terms, by
redressing a cultural situation in which the written and
the spoken have been privileged over the visualized and
the experiential in the contest of knowledges.
It may be argued that beyond the realm of three-
dimensional physical reality, modelling becomes solipsistic
in the extreme. But, to do so one must make the assump-
tion that there is an uncontested spatio-temporal
formation of physical space. This is not the case. The
principal consequence of the theories of relativity and
quantum mechanics for modern physics has been the once-
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and-for-all dislocation of the possibility of perceptual and
'rational' correspondence. It seems that physical space is
multidimensional and that this multidimensionality is a
contingent construct. We may conclude, therefore, that all
modelling, whether constructing a realm of physical
spatial phenomena or something other than 'hard'
material reality, even the most exotic of psycho-social
realities, is subject to the same disintegration of Cartesian
duality and the same contest of spatial formations.
In an important sense, therefore, spatial models,
whatever 'reality' they purport to visualize, have an
common ontological status and it is only in the epistemologi-
cal sense that their significance separates or connects them.
As design refers simultaneously to particular kinds of
artefacts and objects, individual acts and social processes,
documents and drawings, and embodied values and
expressed beliefs, the spatial formations considered appro-
priate to modelling design are 'physical', 'social', documen-
tary' and 'paradigmatic' respectively.
Physical Space
2. VELMANS, Max. Physical,
Psychological and Virtual
Realities', conference preprints,
Embodied Knowledge and
Virtual Space, Goldsmiths
College, London, 1995.
The discussion of the relation between the designed object
and the design drawing illuminates the paradoxical nature
of physical spatiality. The design drawing itself is a
physical object, a marked piece of paper. What significance
it has is constructed in the process of perceptual projec-
tion.' In this process attention is paid to the documentary
simulation and manipulation of perceptual qualities. We
learn to see thing as they are by requiring of our percep-
tual accomplishment the confirmation that objects occupy
their judged location in space. In design drawing we apply
this sensibility to the visualization of inventively imagined
objects. We simulate our own perceptual processes in order
3. See above, figures 2.1.9-11
4. HOFSTEDE, Geert.
Cultures and Organizations:
Intercultural Cooperation and its
Importance for Survival;
Software of the Mind. McGraw-
Hill, 1991.
BOURDIEU, Pierre. [1979]
Distinction: A Social Critique of
the Judgement of Taste. Trans.
Richard Nice. Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1984.
LEFEBVRE, Henri. [1974]
The Production of Space. Trans.
Donald Nicholson-Smith. Basil
Blackwell, 1991.
BOCOCK, Robert. Sigmund
Freud. Ellis Horwood, 1983.
JUNG, C G. Psychological
Types. Trans. H Godwin Baynes.
Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner,
1926.
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to construct reality. This insight has a consequence for the
ways in which we may visualize physical space. We may
distinguish between realist, dualist and pluralist formula-
tions using identical model elements and simply varying
the relations between them.'
Social Space
Crucial to conceptions of social space is a topological quality,
a focus on perceived spatial relations which are independent
of absolute notions of position and distance. The speed, force
and rapidity of reciprocal communicative acts across the
space of a system defines the spatial relations between its
'actors'. The visualization of social space, therefore, requires
the playing off of dimensions that re-present particular
patterns and transformations in communicative activity.
In Parsonian terms, the possibilities of social space
extend to three levels - culture system, social system and
personality system. The ideas of Hofstede, Bourdieu,
Lefebvre, Freud and Jung are chosen to relate a particular
constellation of concepts to the breadth of this 'social
cosmology'. 4 The irresolvable tensions between them do not
invalidate the procedure, quite the reverse, they liberate a
potential for a reflexive constructive mapping activity.
In working through the plurality of dimensions
invoked in the five bodies of social theory the task is to
choose ground upon which to construct 'useful', if contin-
gent, subspaces.
Freudian and Jungian notions may be used to modify,
in the direction of personality system, the dimensions
suggested by Hofstede, Bourdieu and Lefebvre. Hofstede
touches on emotional, political, behavioural, perceptual and
cognitive aspects of a group's cultural place. Bourdieu
connects the materiality of relations to the more ironic
282
aspects of post-industrial social behaviour. Lefebvre loosens
the attachment of any scheme to either the material or the
non-material by invoking the continuous spectrum of possi-
bilities for exchange, interaction, communication.
If one attempts a little violence to Hofstede's concepts
by lifting them out of their original empirical quantitative
context and placing them into an interpretive and essen-
tially qualitative scheme, their epistemological status is
apparently ruined. The possibility of reconstruction only
exists in the sense that the consideration of small-scale
social groups in the museum design organization context
may identify significant areas of commonality in behaviour
and belief. Dependence relations, forms of self and group
identification, gender expression and tolerance of uncer-
tainty are amenable to such re-formation particularly in
the light of Freudian considerations. For example, gender
expression becomes a realm of creative possibility powered
by unconscious drives, and the tolerance of uncertainty
becomes directly related to the capacity for alternate
exercise of imagination and reason. Bourdieu's reference to
levels of acquired economic and cultural capital can
usefully qualify the local construction of dependence
relations and the expression of collectivism particularly as
a political gambit. The more concrete interpretation of
Lefebvre's key ideas - 'exchange' as a measure of practical
involvement, 'language' as a measure of difference in final
vocabulary, 'signs' as a measure of documentary visibility,
and 'equivalences' and 'reciprocities' as measures of
functional complementarity - have clear connections with
the above level of constructive possibility. Jung's ideas
generate the potential for opening up an enormous depth
in any model of social space. By extending several dimen-
sions in which to track the progressive and regressive
flows of libido, the realm of the unconscious is made as
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visible as that of the conscious and many non-rational
aspects of individual and interpersonal behaviour may be
(re)presented or (re)constructed. In particular, the Jungian
notion of the collective unconscious may be mapped into a
subspace that accommodates conscious identification of the
self and with the group to recover the possibilities of a non-
rational psychic heritage.
To distil out of the range of dimensional possibilities
enumerated in the text, the handful that would permit an
adequate demonstration of museum design organization
modelling required a recourse to the existential idea of
'Being' and in particular, Heidegger's adoption of the Da-
sein (the `being-there'). Interests, attitudes, concerns and
demeanour emerge as the key terms of an account of
being-in-the-world. In the postmodern world the contest
between the symbolic and the material aspects of our
involvements entails not a choice between opposing terms
but an accommodation of the tensions between them.
Demeanour implies a conversation of gesture,
attitude an ideology of gesture both notions skirt the
central theme of involvement with which museum design
organization (the design facet in particular) invites us to
engage. Interests and concerns, on the other hand, focus
specifically on intellectual and emotional engagement, on
personal and social values, and on the organizational
processes of constructing ourselves and others as objects.
Demeanour and attitude imply habit, routine and
predisposition which construct a social dimension charac-
terized by static qualities, a dimension of social status.
Interests and concerns are opposed to this. Freedom of
movement is the characteristic quality of the social
dimension they construct, a dimension of social dynamics.
Setting off these contingently defined dimensions of social
status and social dynamics and adding a time line as a
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third dimension creates a generic social space open to all
the forms of elaboration and transformation suggested by
the application of dimensions identified in the work of
Hofstede, Bourdieu, Lefebvre, Freud and Jung.
Documentary Space
6. BRYSON, Norman., Michael
Ann HOLLY & Keith MOXEY
(eds.) Visual Theory. Polity
Press, 1991. p.246.
The design drawing operates in the interstices between
physical, social and psychological phenomena. The space of
the design drawing is a peculiar example of the subjunc-
tive space in which 'real things may be substituted for the
absent'. 6
 However, the 'real' thing to which the design
drawing, the design construct, refers is an imagined future
possibility, a deferred presence. The implied play of
differance entailed in the production of the design
construct is thus a process of semiosis. The terms 'substi-
tution', 'simulation' and 'simulacrum' come into play.
In the design construct the substitution is for a mere
possibility.
The design construct entails simulation not in the
sense of direct identification with the physical object but
rather with an object of linguistic and visual speculation
which is at one remove from the physical. The design
construct is characteristically perceptual and cognitive
rather than material and sensual.
In the design construct, furthermore, substitution is
immediately transcended. A parallel reality is invoked, a
simulacrum. The simulacrum constructs its own semiotic
space (a documentary spatiality), proclaims its own
identity, and claims its own place in the material culture.
However diverse it may be in physical form, the
material of the design construct is its linguistic formation.
This process entails a relation between any particular
document and the object of design which betrays a
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cognitive style, on the one hand, and a perceptual compass,
on the other. It rests in the elements of signification and
evocation, a simulacrity which we believe to be substantial
and seminal. Documentary 'form' is the touchstone in this
respect, a taxonomy of documentary products reflecting
different kinds of skilful communicative activity - generic
terms might be: writing, drawing, modelling, recording,
and performing. The process of linguistic formation also
attaches a concreteness to the signifying/evoking material
of the document in which what is present to the mind is
treated as actually present. This attends to documentary
content suggesting either a further taxonomy, categories of
information in a design project - conceptual, program-
matic, contextual, ideological, contractual, etc. - , or an
abstract measure of the scope of the content acquired in
any moment in the design process from the local, the
smallest relevant detail, to the global, the holistic.
Paradigmatic Space
The designer acting as a designer is not ordinarily engaged
in theoretical discourse. The values and beliefs of the
designer, where they emerge at all, normally do so in
everyday speech and in working documents intended to be
anything but 'philosophical'. But, such linguistic perfor-
mance cannot help but be ideological, that is, culturally
embedded. It is generally based on subjective and experi-
ential knowledge and, therefore, surfaces in the products
of the designing activity without the reasoned lineage we
would regard as necessary to theoretical (philosophical)
discourse. There is good reason for this state of affairs.
Designers find themselves in situations characterised by
epistemological complexity - an array of incompatible
understandings interests and qualities in which there is
6. GOULDNER, A W. The
Coming Crisis of Western
Sociology. Heinemann, 1970.
7. ATKINSON, D. Orthodox
Consensus and Radical
Alternative. Heinemann, 1972.
8. FRIEDRICHS, R. A
Sociology of Sociology. New
York: Free Press, 1970.
9. DENISOFF, R. et al
Theories and Paradigms in
Contemporary Sociology. New
York: Peacock, 1974.
10. EFFRAT,	 A.	 (ed.)
Perspectives in Political
Sociology. New York: Bobbs-
Merrill, 1973.
11. BURRELL, Gibson. &
Gareth MORGAN. Sociological
Paradigms and Organisational
Analysis. Heinemann
Educational Books, 1979.
12. HASSARD, John. Sociology
and Organization Theory.
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too little information and time to employ purely rational
means to decide on and devise plans for desirable change.
Designers make ontological propositions when they
design and they embody a 'world view' in the presentation
of what they design. Ironically, the values and beliefs
embedded in what is presented may contradict those
implied in the narrative means of the presentation. This
ironic potential arises out of the complex of spatialities
entailed in design. For example, the physical form and the
linguistic content of the design document are convention-
ally but not logically connected.
In each sphere of design- product, programme,
process - there is the possibility of a separately active
ideological space. A moment in the `ontic' track of a
designed object, a narrative turn in a design document, a
particular social interaction in the design process, each
embodies a contingent ideological position. The paradig-
matic space is enfolded in the physical, documentary and
social spaces in which design is (re)constructed.
These instances of independently deferred, distorted
and distanced paradigmatic space are, in turn, indepen-
dent of the active philosophical space in which the
designer might choose to carve out a theoretical position.
In abstracting general rules about knowledge from
specific physical, social and psychological instances,
theorizing enfolds these spatialities into a chosen location
in paradigmatic space.
A range of paradigm models have been proposed since
1970 - Gouldner," AtIdnson, 7 Friedrichs,' Denisoff," Effrati°
and Burrell and Morgan'. Approaching Hassard's analysis
critically,' I conclude that Burrell and Morgan's map of
two-dimensional sociological paradigms provides the best
visualization on three scores. (1) The scheme is clear-cut,
based on independent pairs of indices it maximizes the
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value of paradigm as 'location'. (2) Insofar as praxis, in the
museum design organization context, is socially
constructed such a paradigmatic scheme applies directly.
(3) Since the demise of a functionalist museography, each
of the particular practices involved in museum design
organization is more or less open to the variety of metathe-
oretical assumptions and constructs an identical space of
paradigmatic possibilities.
The postmodern condition casts as a boon what was
once regarded as a trivializing quirk, the kind of open
interdisciplinarity that characterizes design and the new
museology. Both practices occupy the borderlines of a
variety of other disciplines, both are carving out distinctive
ground of their own, both are becoming reflexive and
particularly adept at dealing with incommensurable
systems of ideas.
The Burrell and Morgan map is, therefore, one to be
used as a way of locating where one is but also as a tool for
navigating open territory. In these terms this study began
with certain inclinations - nominalist, anti-positivist,
voluntarist and ideographic - but then took off at such a
speed as to collapse their locating power. If this is
regarded as a process of dissolving the classical dualities
then it is so only in an ironic sense, only as long as one
keeps moving at speed, fixing on nothing, accommodating
everything in an ironic activism. Recent philosophical
debate amply reflects the experience of design and new
museology as an ironic activism. As the defining terms of
theoretical endeavour - nominalism/realism, anti-
positivism/positivism, voluntarism/determinism,
ideographic/nomothetic - have become confused in a self-
reflexive, self-contradictory discourse, a meta-theoretical
level of thinking has emerged which is pragmatic, ironic
and embodied in new post-Philosophical practices.
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Organization
Spatiality is the key metaphor in the project of modelling.
This connects directly with the visual possibilities implicit
in the task of producing a useful tool for praxis, one which
goes beyond the conventional narrative emphasis apparent
in qualitative analysis.
The contingent definition of interfaces is the key to
initiating the organizational process. The differentiation of
the space of possibility leads to the play of differance and
the cycle of dedifferentiation-redifferentiation that
generates the moments of change.
A model simplifies in a way that parallels the attenu-
ation of complexity apparent in the myth. As a primarily
visual construct, however, the model is better able to
preserve the quality of dynamism which is crucial in
praxis. Openness to intervention is generally missing in
narrative which rather is propelled towards closure. The
pseudo-synchronic 'slice' becomes a necessary artifice of
the constructive and reconstructive processes that charac-
terize the practitioner's interventions.'
Design
13. See above: 3.1 Organization
Simplification and adequacy,
and Figure 3.1.5.
There is heuristic value in defining 'design' as a character-
istic human trait and not as a quality of things. The
conceptual constellation which is design has ontological
and epistemological objects. The ontological object
construes design as the things of order', the material
culture, which emphasizes human agency in actively
constructing and interpretively reconstructing a pattern or
order to things. The epistemological object construes it as
one of 'knowledge in practice', praxis.
However, one must differentiate between the generic
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human trait to which the term 'design' refers and the insti-
tutionalized professional practice of design. In this thesis,
following Rorty's argument in relation to 'philosophy' and
'Philosophy', the latter is referred to as 'Design' with a
capital 'D'.14
The linearity of the design process is a myth which
has outlived its usefulness. For one, design picks up where
purely rational means leave off. That is, design comes into
its own in dealing with epistemologically complex objects -
ones in which contradictory/counteracting orders of
knowledge necessitate non-rational, non-linear approaches
that respond to the 'moment' and the material at hand.
The methodology movement of the 1960s, 70s and 80s
largely failed because of the temptation of epistemological
reductionism. The point of this thesis is to propose that, in
a focus on process that admits dynamic qualities in the
design context, the pseudo-synchronic nature of any
(re)construction potentially liberates the visualization of
design from linearity and, therefore, that a more adequate
model is possible.
Museum
14. See above: 3.2 Design:
'design' and 'Design', and 2.4
Paradigmatic Space, note 31.
The museum provides a microcosm of organizational
complexity and process which embrace material, social and
epistemological objects and concerns. This is evidenced in
the genealogy of museum forms in which each historic
formation persist as one of many constitutive layers in the
postmodern museum.
Using Walker's production-consumption model of the
field of design history, it can be shown that potentially the
museum 'mirrors' its every facet. The museum can also be
shown to behave as a 'chameleon' organization, and the
curator, like the designer, as a 'chameleon' practitioner.
16. FOUCAULT, Michel. [1963]
The Birth of the Clinic. Trans. A
M Sheridan. Tavistock, 1973.
p.9. See above 4.1 Organization
of Design: Foucault's Spatial
Framework.
16. LEFEBVRE, Henri. [1974]
The Production of Space. Trans.
Donald Nicholson-Smith. Basil
Blackwell, 1991. See above 4.1
Organization of Design:
Spatiality in Discourse, which
explains the necessity of
accounting for shifts in spatiali-
ty entailed in rhetorical and logi-
cal turns.
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Peculiar paradoxes surround the situation of the
museologically-oriented curator. It is ironic that the
curator in the small museum is required to be a generalist
and is largely unable to spend time working directly with
the collection, a task which may be undertaken, under the
'curator's' supervision, by ostensibly un(der)qualified
volunteers. In the larger museum, the situation is also
increasingly at odds with the traditional notion of curator-
ship. The specialist is likely to be largely a facilitator of
other's (museum users rather than employees) work rather
than a practitioner.
Curatorship, as an interdisciplinary professional
practice, has either accumulated other practices or has
fragmented into specialisms depending upon one's perspec-
tive on recent professional development. Whichever view
one takes, the disintegration of museographical holism and
its former certainties is undeniable. The new museological
approach, which requires the practitioner to question the
nature of the museum and to continually reconstruct its
forms and practices, has given birth to the reflexive
(situated, self-consciously critical) practitioner ultimately
focussed on process-shaping, context-shaping, theory-
shaping, that is, in the broadest sense, organizational
design activity.
Organization of Design
The Foucauldian notion of the 'gaze' implies four orders of
spatiality in design - the physical, social, documentary and
paradigmatic - and draws attention to the transitions
between them." These transitions can be taken to describe
the transformation of knowledge by stages from the
concrete and tangible to the abstract and purely
linguistic.' They also entail a shift in modes of perception
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17. See above 2.4 Paradigmatic
Space: The Absence of a
Discourse and note 45.
and cognition from that immanent in acting, i.e. thinking-
in-doing, to that which is analytical and abstract, i.e.
thinking-about-doing.'
The central formation of design derives from the
transitions between physical, social, documentary and
paradigmatic spatialities. The four 'P's, product,
programme, process, and philosophy are referred to as:
• Product: (1) the designed object - the thing, place,
message, system which is the end product of the design
process; (2) the object as design, a material cultural
object (re)constructed through discourse
• Programme: the object of design - the design context,
the problem-solution relation (design idea), and the
performance of communicative actions circumscribed by
a system of documentation
• Process: (1) the activity of designing as experienced - a
way of designing peculiar to a designer, a type of
designer or group of designers, (2) a model providing an
ideal visualization of or prescription for a way of
designing
• Philosophy: (1) the rationale for a particular design
and/or way of designing; (2) a set of beliefs and values,
or guiding principles about design and/or designing in
general
Figure 4.1.12 (p. 211) shows a spatial framework for
design which encompasses all of the identified design
phenomena, and clearly delineates the spatial transitions
entailed in their (re)construction.
Design of Museum Design
Design is implicated in every aspect of the multidiscipli-
nary environment. It both shapes and is shaped by the
organizational context. The actor-network concept is
18. BRUNELLI, Maria. The
Role of Designers in the
Management of Museums, Ph.D.
Thesis, Institute of Advanced
Studies, Manchester
Metropolitan University, 1993.
See above: 4.2 The Design of
Museum Design: Generic Roles
and Ideological Stability.
19. A museum is an institution
that collects, documents, pre -
serves, exhibits and interprets
material evidence and associated
information for the public bene -
fit. Museums Association, 1984.
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useful because it accounts for this reflexive condition and
the combinations of human and non-human elements
that comprise coherent actors in any organization. The
programmatic activity in an organization and the ideolog-
ical basis of its design act to continually redefine hetero-
geneous actors.
This is necessarily an interpretive point. Analyses of
actor-network dynamics in the design/organization context
have only documentary evidence to work on in respect of
the tracing of ideological play. Therefore, they may only be
reconstructed and the process is necessarily reflexive. The
paradox of the situation must be accepted: there is no
logical connection between the organizational future
towards which the play of design ideology directs itself in
practice and the organizational past to which any evalua-
tion of ideological manoeuvres must refer.
To make ideological positions and dynamics clear in
analysis, it is better to define generic roles, e.g. strategist,
advocate, facilitator and maker, than to rely on contingent
context-specific role definitions, i.e. in the museum the
traditional museographically defined roles of curator,
educator, project manager, conservator, designer, etc. This
proposition compares favourably with Brunelli's findings.'
Using this method it is possible to visuRlize 'role drift'
as a function of project type/scale and to problematize the
ambiguity of the practitioner's status by relating the idea
of generic role drift to the pseudo-synchrony of contin-
gently defined stages or phases in the design process.
Museality of Organizations
The institutional definition of a museum inscribes its
definitive operations in a legitimating code.' However, it
is not only museums that adhere to such a code. There is a
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`musear quality to many organizations, a socially
constructed field of information, meaning, difference that
allows its 'actors' to function as communicative objects.
Any organizational process of complex relocation - reloca-
tion in physical, social and documentary spatial terms - in
which an 'object' (i.e. actor in the actor network) becomes
the site of socially constructed meaning, is construed as a
sign, and accumulates a special information content
related only to the extraordinary organizational process.
Any such process may be connoted by the term 'mused.
The museal organization acquires personnel which
take on the qualities of the museal object. They are
(re)constructed as material/informational objects, impli-
cated in complex contingent constructs that combine
particular human characteristics with other non-human
ones to form heterogeneous actors." These actors, like
museum exhibits, which combine collection item, interpre-
tive materials and particular processes of interaction with
the museum visitor/user, may be rather temporary
constructs, always open to radical reconstruction. However,
the human component, as organizational object, like its
museum equivalent, the collection item, must be carefully
documented and preserved. The human is the characteris-
tic material of the museal organization and has a value
rooted in the nature of its relocation from the wider social
sphere to a contingent position within the organization.
This view of the human as organizational object
reflects the museographical priority of the processes of
collecting, documenting, preserving and researching above
those of exhibiting and interpreting. This constitutes a
functionalist conventionalism in organization. However,
the new museology has changed the procedural prescrip-
20. See above: 4.2 The Design of tiveness implied in the traditional view. The new
Museum Design: Ideology,
Programme and Differance, note 8. museology focusses attention on the necessity of contingent
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self-definition and continual re-creation. In the new museal
organization the linguistic dimension is brought to the fore.
It becomes radically renegotiable and makes the museum,
the museal organization in general, the site of a continual
semiosis with the potential to realize an infinite variety of
unpredictable states. In this, intentionality serves as a
comforting myth, a post-rationalization. Organizations that
realize their museality in this new spirit become flexible,
able to reconstrue themselves at will.
An organization is museal in as much as it is entails a
sampling of the world in which spatial relations are
inscribed that substitute for what is absent and where this
process is interminable, an 'economy of signs and space'.
Such organizations are not singular and purposeful in any
straightforward sense. They display a chameleon-like
adaptability in which each actor is able to exercise a
dynamic, creative reflexivity. They construct an ironic
presence to themselves which they achieve through the
communicative complex of organizational actors (collec-
tion) and forms of mediation(media). They become exhibi-
tionary in character, a spectacle in which an order of
knowledge and power is called into play by the organiza-
tion of a universal panoptic ritual. But at the same time,
this process continually changes the form, material and
content of the organizational 'display'. Only through
achieving repeated transmutation can the organization
sustain its 'identity'. It may seem paradoxical, but, organi-
zational identity can never be fixed and singular, rather it
is always the result of keeping alive the possibility of
meaning, structure and utility.
The museal organization only has clients insofar as
they become participants, collaborators in the organiza-
tion's projects. Just as the visitor's active participation is
required to construct a particular narrative out of the
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myriad possibilities immanent in the (non-linear) exhibi-
tion 'text', the proper business of the museal organization
effectively remains unconstituted until catalysed and
completed by a supplement unique to each client. Although
this organizational situation is never completely open-
ended, it should produce a facility for expecting the
unexpected and ensuring a high probability of success. The
reflexive aspect of the museal organization makes it alive
to its own processes as well as to the contingent nature of
the interfaces it constructs with the outside world.
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6.1 General Theory
Contingency, Praxis and Sanity
The radical uncertainty of our condition as engaged beings
is amply reflected in the discourses that (circum)navigate
museum design organization. The practical situations that
give rise to design activity can not be separated out from
the design activity itself: the programmatic aspects of
design are immediately reflexive and arbitrarily delin-
eated. The design process engages not with some objective
reality but with a complex of physical, documentary,
psycho-social and paradigmatic interests and concerns
which, at least in part, arise out of the contingent manoeu-
vres of the process itself: in this sense design is necessarily
embedded and functionally unredeemable.
It may appear that 'design' becomes a trivial concept if one
insists too much on its all-embracing scope and its
thorough embeddedness in any practical situation.
However, this would be to deny the undecidability of
design itself. Where spontaneous direct action ends and
planning for future action begins is not a question that can
be answered without paradoxical implications.
The necessity of an account that subjectifies subject-
other-than-subject relations is inherent in any modelling of
a constellation such as museum•design•organization.
Firstly, the decentred human subject is embroiled in
actor-network machinations to which unique authorship is
impossible to assign and which are profoundly ambiguous
in their purpose. Rational behaviour becomes a question of
post-rationalization - when one is required to, one becomes
wise after the fact and, in the process of wising-up,
serendipity may be covered up as easily as may the failure
of established protocol.
1. JONES, J. Christopher.
Designing Designing.
Architecture Design and
Technology Press, 1991 (previ-
ously published as Essays in
Design. John Wiley & Sons,
1984.)
2. MITCHELL, C Thomas.
Redefining Designing: From
Form to Experience. New York:
Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1993.
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Secondly, there can be no simple recourse to some
notion of 'collective responsibility'. The collectivity, where
it exists, changes its constituency as a function of the
process in which it is constituted and, furthermore, it
admits non-human and exotic hybrid entities as a matter
of course. If one sees certain tools - cognitive and percep-
tual aids, cybernetic constructs - as extensions of
ourselves, embodiments of knowledges, skills and values,
one must also see them as transfusional. Very quickly they
gain the power to blur the identities of our collectivities
and to diffuse (de-fuse) the possibility of clear responsibil-
ity. Responsibility, as such, may become an abstract, post-
rational, conventional assignment that has little to do with
practical, political or ethical considerations.
The upshot is a reflexive formation of a radical sort,
one which is multidimensional and in-formational. That is
to say, the idea of praxis, which posits mutually informing
theory and practical action, is transformed once one accepts
the invisible transitions between present action and
deferred action implicit in the idea of design. Design is a
meta-praxis, a praxis engaged at a deeper level in the
formation of praxes. By implication, therefore, the reflexiv-
ity of design is a peculiarly valuable one. It's apparently
quixotic pretensions surface in the work of J C Jones
(Designing Designing)' and C T Mitchell (Redefining
Designing) 2 , it's mercurial quality I hope may be
tracked/traced following the modelling project of this thesis.
Constellation as the Generator of Meta-praxis
'Museum design organization' implies an object of
discourse, Museum •Design o Organization' a constellation
of discourses. If the tension between these objectifications
3. ROR TY, Richard.
Contingency, Irony, and
Solidarity. Cambridge
University Press, 1989, p.94.
4. GIBSON, William.
Neuromancer. Victor Gollancz,
1984.
6. MATTHEWS, Geoff.
"Invasion of the Body Snatchers:
Architecture and Virtual Space",
Culture Theory Criticism
Occasional Papers, University of
Humberside, 1994.
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discloses anything it is the fact that the virtual spatialities
of the linguistic, the psycho-social, and the paradigmatic
are the larger part of any reality we may feel or feel we
know. The future, in a sense, has already arrived.
Rorty entreats us to accept as mentors the ethnogra-
phers and novelists who, "specialize in thick description of
the private and idiosyncratic". 3 It seems to me that
William Gibson has captured most vividly the exotic multi-
dimensional actuality of the kind of 'construct' museum
design organization represents.' In Neuromancer the
expert 'console man' or 'cyberspace cowboy' is able to
navigate freely through the virtual realities that
represent, in a visible time-space simulation, the complexi-
ties of information structures in cyberspace and animate
the more or less ephemeral entities constructed by their
dynamic interplay. Whether a corporation or an artificial
intelligence, an entity whose reality is largely or wholly
non-physical has an identity and a presence ultimately
more powerful and more 'real' than a building or a body
can ever be. Though unaided by any virtual reality, the
exploration of spatialities and the modelling of museum
design organization exemplifies the invasion of familiar, if
illusory, Cartesian reality by multiple simulations of its
phenomena.' This invasion, which has accelerated
enormously since computers started talking to each other,
makes the creation of a new class of 'tools' a priority. We
urgently need conceptual and navigational aids upon
which we can rely as we consciously venture into a
mediated, dynamic, multidimensional, 'wired-up' world.
The museum's most powerful presence is no longer
expressed in the physicality of its collections and their
arrangement in particular orders in specific architectural
spaces in specific geographical locations. It is expressed in
multidimensional actor-network relations, in the cyber-
6. HOOPER-GREENHILL,
Eilean. Museums and the
Shaping of Knowledge. London:
Routledge, 1992.
7. SILVERSTONE, Roger. 'The
Medium is the Museum: on
objects and logics in times and
spaces', in MILES, Roger S &
Lauro Zavala. (eds.) Towards the
Museum of the Future: New
European	 Perspectives.
Routledge, 1994. pp.161-76.
Both these media [videos and
interactives], once incorporated
into the museum, blur the
boundaries	 between	 the
museum's private space and the
public world, a boundary which
was pretty well held when both
objects and visitors had to cross
the same threshold. But they also
blur the boundaries between the
individual's private space and
the public space of the museum
... (pp.172-3)
8. See above: 4.3 The
Museality of Organization.
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netic orders of its information structures which are distrib-
uted across physical, documentary, psycho-social and
virtual spaces. The familiar codes of embodied knowledge
with which we expect to decipher the museal assemblage
of material culture have become inadequate. The museum
continues to exist but it also begins to disappear. The
defining boundaries of the museum which were once so
concrete and certain - the collection, the archive, the
curatorial body, the building - have partially dissolved.'
The museum has expanded, become porous and mobile,
and has submitted to varied forms of colonization, assimi-
lation and simulation.' It has become impossible to retain
a grasp on the idea of the museum without invoking one or
another constellation of equally contested complex
phenomena. The constellation forms a matrix capable of
giving birth to new constructs and experiences: it recog-
nizes the periphery as the site of action and meaning. This
is the value of Museum •Design •Organization: it sustains
the dynamic intervals that surround a now uncertain core.
Design, Organization and Control
The museal quality of organizations becomes apparent.'
Put simply, I am proposing that all such organizations
ought to be continually transformed, from the bottom up,
by multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary creative
practices. These creative practices are 'active' rather than
'reactive' and 'ironic' in the sense that they play off 'official'
representations of organization and function against
contingent ones operated by the practitioners themselves.
They recognize and actively engage in processes of socially
constructing organization, meaning and material products
which have a praldological rigour that may or may not be
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9. STEPHENSON, Neal. Snow
Crash. Bantam Books, 1992.
The virus is a self-replicating,
spontaneously mutating, micro-
organism containing genetic
material. It is able to penetrate
the cells of a living organism and
to alter the way they function.
Once a virus has been intro-
duced it never completely disap-
pears. Once suppressed it may
lay dormant for long periods
until spontaneous mutation
triggers replication and spread.
The virus is disruptive. It causes
illness and disease that affect a
whole organism and may infect a
whole population. However,
whatever the short-term cost,
the process is essential to
survival. It promotes a respon-
sive, robust immune system. The
genetic response is to produce
antibodies specific to each
mutation of each virus. These
accumulate in the host to consti-
tute a contingent regime of
organization and control.
admitted by 'official' representations of what is going on in
the organization and how it is structured. However far the
process of organizational representation goes in attempt-
ing to stabilize structure and function into a model of
control, creative practices of this sort continuously
undermine this will to control through a counter process of
dynamic interactivity.
The organization's will to stabilize and control itself -
to fix a global image of itself - ostensively aimed at
assuring efficiency and therefore survival, has the effect of
rigidifying structure and suppressing responsiveness to
environmental change. As environmental change appears
to be inevitable, any fixed organizational arrangement can,
at best, only achieve temporary success. Counteracting
practices within the organization, a realm of communica-
tive interactivity contingently concerned with localised
effectiveness, have the effect of loosening structure and
heightening responsiveness to environmental change.
The irony of the situation is plain: efforts to fix
structure and control activity stimulate unwanted counter-
actions which, when successful, ensure the survival of the
organization during periods of environmental upheaval.
Equally, unfettered internal creativity is inefficient and
destabilizing, and stimulates the imposition of unwanted
structure and controls which, when successful, ensure the
survival of the organization during periods of environmen-
tal stability. From either point of view, therefore, it is
possible to assert that the enemy within is necessary to
every living organization.
A useful metaphor here is that of the virus. In the
novel Snow Crash Neal Stephenson explores the proposition
that there is a far deeper connection between the digital
and the biological worlds than we may realize.' So much so,
that they may be susceptible to the same viral infections.
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10. The metaphor of the Hox
gene has been proposed by Paul
Hekkert to differentiate between
design which is radical and
innovatory, which establishes
new archetypes, and design
which is extrapolatory, which
plays out the potential of an
existing archetype. I find this
unsatisfactory for two reasons:
(1) most design is neither one
nor the other but somewhere
between the two, and (2) too
much emphasis is given to an
objective notion of design, and
particularly to designed objects
and intentional acts, and too
little to programmatic, proce-
dural and philosophical aspects
of design. The virus seems more
immediately ambivalent and
polyvalent.
HEICKERT, Paul. he Designer
as a 'lox Gene': The Origin and
Impact of Vision in the
Evolution of Design", in
Doctorates in Design and
Architecture, EAAE Conference
Book, Delft University of
Technology, 1996. pp-81-2.
He describes a long-lost Ur-language which reaches down to
the primitive structures of the brain and affects their
operation directly. It is the biological equivalent of binary
code in the programming of computers. A single informa-
tional virus coded variously in the monosyllabic Ur-
language and in raw binary form can cause the same effect
in the human brain and in the computer - an irretrievable
breakdown known as 'snow crash'. In effect the virus strips
out all of the higher levels of programming and returns the
brain/computer to a primitive state, an unstructured state
in which it is susceptible to radical reprogramming.
Design is such an informational virus. It is able to
infect several different spatialities simultaneously. Its effect
is to open up a situation to radical reprogramming. It affects
whole organizations and populations, and it mutates.'
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6.2 Museum Design
Discipline Specific Conclusions
An idea of modelling can be expressed in one sentence.
Modelling is a process of discerning, examining and proposing a
constellation of elements which illustrates a possibility.'
Specifically this project set out to illustrate the possibility
of a museum design that is 'effective' in a profound praxio-
logical sense, one which is: (1) radically creative in its
approach to, and treats as interdependent and interpene-
trating, the problems of organization, communication and
action, and (2) humanistic, and develops its humanistic
qualities through an ironic activism which is quite opposed
in theory and in practice to the institutionalized conser-
vatism engendered both by traditional museography and
by material object oriented design.
The conclusions for general theory point up the
necessity of a reflexive condition that affects each actor in
the museum design organization actor network and
amounts to a limited mandate for anarchic, that is, anti-
organizational, communicative activity. The ironic quality
of this localized drive for effectiveness is that, in disrupt-
ing organizational efforts to impose a global image and a
rational order whose aim is general efficiency, longer term
survival is made more, not less, likely. The 'design' virus, it
is argued, reinforces the organization's immune system,
that is, makes it a dynamic, change-dependent, innovative
and responsive organization.
Hierarchy as a Communicative Artifice1. POTTER, Norman. Models
and Constructs: Margin Notes to
a Design Culture. Hyphen Press,
1990, p.10. The above proposition raises a socio-ecological argument
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2. Museums Documentation
Association (MDA) see above: 3.3
Museum, note 12.
against the idea of hierarchy. Far from being a natural
phenomenon it could be argued from this point of view that
it is only a metaphor, a way of visualising a transient
quality that appears from time to time in dynamic organi-
zations, part of an essentially mechanistic organizational
myth which, perhaps, has outlived its usefulness.
Traditional museography tends to focus on the history
and mechanics of collecting and preserving material
culture, a focus which has made good use of static hierar-
chical models of organization. For example, the Victorian
ideal of a universal, closed system of classification persists
in certain areas of the museum process. Terminology
control in collection documentation continues to exercise
curatorial teams in national and other large museums, and
systems specialists in organizations such as the Museum
Documentation Association, not because workable or
adequate collection documentation activities have not been
established, but because the universalization and closure
of these activities remains a goal.'
This is not to say that hierarchical models still
dominate the field, in many areas of the museum process
they have been superseded by non-hierarchical ones. For
example, until recently educational and interpretive activi-
ties, including exhibition, were based on an essentially
linear communication model which placed the curator at
the top, the mediator (educator, exhibit) in the middle, and
the visitor at the bottom. The belief underpinning this
model was that the curator gathers information and creates
messages some, ideally all, of which filter down through the
museum communication system to the receptive visitor.
(Figure 6.2.1) This model, which implied all power to be in
the hands of the curator, poor communication to be the
mediator's fault, and regarded the visitor as an inessential
and totally passive beneficiary of the system, has been
Author/message
relation
Audience/message
relation
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SENDER	 MESSAGE	 RECEIVER
(Curator)
	
(Exhibit)	 (Visitor)
Figure 6.2.1
The traditional three-unit model of communication.3
rightly discredited. More recent models lay emphasis on the
participative role each actor in the system plays in shaping
and interpreting messages and the interactive nature of the
communication process. (Fig. 6.2.2)
questions	 questions
Transaction
3. Quoted without source by
McMANUS, Paulette, 'Making
Sense	 of Exhibits' in
KAVANAGH, Gaynor. (ed.)
Museum Languages. Leicester
University Press, 1991. pp.35-
46. An alternative generic linear
communications model is
provided by HOOPER-
GREENHILL, E. 'A new commu-
nication model for museums' in
the same volume, pp.49-61.
(from CAMERON, D. 'A
transmitter —> medium —> receiver
viewpoint: the museum as a
communication system and
implications for museum
education', Curator, no. 11
(1968) 33-40.)
4. Op cit. (SLESS, D. Learning
and Visual Communication,
London: Croom Helm, and New
York Jahn Wiley, 1981.)
Figure 6.2.2
Communication process (Paulette McManus, after Sless, 1981).4
One may speculate that the field of museum communica-
tion has been affected by the new museology and that the
field of museum documentation, particularly the hard-
systems end of it, has not. It is unlikely to be as clear cut
as this, but the idea is worth pursuing.
Traditional museography tends to defer indefinitely
the political and socio-cultural dimensions of its object. To
get anywhere with the complex detail of technical and
academic activities its discourse tends to be one of pragma-
tism and scientific discipline. The institutional context is
therefore accepted as the status quo and this is not open to
question unless some crisis becomes evident. Mark O'Neill
captures this introspective turn in the following way:
5. O'NEILL, Mark. "After the
artefact: Internal and external
relations in museums." in The
Museums Profession. Gaynor
Kavanagh (Ed.) Leicester
University Press, 1991. pp. 27-
36 (p.28.)
6. LYOTARD, Jean-Francois.
[1979] The Postmodern
Condition: A Report on
Knowledge. Trans. Geoff
Bennington & Brian Massumi.
Manchester University Press,
1984.
7. CAPRA, Fritjof. The
Turning Point: Science, Society
and the Rising Culture. USA:
Simon & Schuster, 1982.
GEERTZ, Clifford. Local
Knowledge. New York: Basic
Books, 1983.
RORTY, Richard. Philosophy
and the Mirror of Nature. Basil
Blackwell, 1980.
8. FEYERABEND, Paul. [1975]
Against Method. Revised Ed.
London: Verso, 1988.
305
... museums are examples of that extension of human capacity
through organization called bureaucracies ... usually started by
people for a very specific purpose. Often such organizations then
establish a life and purposes of their own ... based on the tradi -
tions which develop within the organization and give priority to
the needs of staff and their interaction with each other ...5
As long as the investigation and prescription of practice
appears to be progressing towards better technical and
professional standards everything is hunky-dory.
However, a crisis of momentous proportions is
affecting museums. First and foremost this crisis is one of
knowledge,' if one thinks of philosophy as a river, a
channel which supplies consistent fresh outlooks and takes
problematic and messy ones away. Then it is a river which
has burst its banks. The systematizing of knowledge,
undertaken in the name of the Enlightenment, appears to
be a project which has failed. It seems that knowledge is
historically and geographically contingent, at least it is not
possible to make much of it otherwise for very long.' Even
the objectivity of science, which was supposed to be
guaranteed through the careful design of its methods, has
become subject to relativistic doubt.' Mainstream philoso-
phy has, in a sense, lost much of its job and, increasingly,
every practice that would once have deferred the problem-
atic aspects of its formulation and authority to philosophy
is instead facing them head on.
Museums are concerned with knowledge of particular
sorts - those which can be derived from a consideration of
material culture. However, to proceed, the museum
engages in a process which takes material out of its natural
context in the real world. To a great extent this breaks a
dynamic network of relations to people, places, events and
things, in the past, and an immanent present and future.
Instantaneously, the process radically alters the nature of
the material it is designed to preserve and study. What is
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preserved and made available for study is often only some
limited physical aspect of the original material in which
only problematic traces of its cultural past and potential
can be discerned. What begins to happen is that a new
context, a new network of relations, is established, one
which is, to all intents and purposes, limited by the
perceived boundaries of the museum system.' One can see
the ironic quality inherent in the traditional idea of a
museum - the museum process counteracts the conditions
which might be preferred for creating knowledge of
material culture, and yet, as we know, a museum can work
no other way without losing its current defining polities.
There is a parallel here with a fundamental problem
in particle physics. The process of observing atomic
particles affects the behaviour and the nature of what is
observed, the only way to understand what is going on,
therefore, is to regard the observer as part of the system.
We begin to come to a similar conclusion in relation to the
museum object. The process of studying material culture
affects the possibilities for interpretation, if one is to
understand what is going on one must account for one's
own participation in the formation of cultural objects. This
conclusion brings to the fore, as contingent practical
considerations rather than as separable philosophical
problems, the issues of (1) `museality':
9. PEARCE, Susan M.
Museums, Objects and
Collections: A Cultural Study.
Leicester University Press, 1992.
10. VERGO, Peter. (Ed.) The
New Museology. Reaktion Books,
1989, p.2.
In the acquisition of material of what ever kind, let alone in ...
making it publicly accessible, museums make certain choices
determined by judgements as to value, significance or monetary
worth, judgements which may derive in part from the system of
values peculiar to the institution itself, but which in a more
profound sense are also rooted in our education, our upbringing,
our prejudices.'°
(2) 'aesthetics';
Whether we like it or not, every acquisition (and indeed
11. ibid pp.2-3.
12. ibid p.3.
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disposal), every juxtaposition or arrangement of an object or
work of art, together with other objects or works of art, within the
context of a temporary exhibition or museum display means
placing a certain construction upon history, be it the history of
the distant or more recent past, of our own culture or someone
else's, of mankind in general or a particular aspect of human
endeavour."
and (3) Interpretation';
Beyond the captions, the information panels, [all of the media
forms used in an exhibition,] the accompanying catalogue, the
press handout, there is a subtext comprising innumerable
diverse, often contradictory strands, woven from the wishes and
ambitions, the intellectual or political or social or educational
aspirations and preconceptions of the museum director, the
curator, the scholar, the designer, the sponsor - to say nothing of
the society, the political or social or educational system which
nurtured all these people and in so doing left its stamp upon
them. Such considerations, rather than, say, the administration
of museums, their methods and techniques of conservation, their
financial well-being, their success or neglect in the eyes of the
public, are the subject matter of the new museology. 12
This view of the museum practitioner's working situation
as inescapably theory-laden is relatively new. Because, as
we can see, it has arisen out of a crisis in the condition of
knowledge, those most closely involved in its creation and
communication in the museum context have been most
affected and affected first. On the other hand, those
involved in the technical, and often less visible, aspects of
the more public activities have been least affected or
affected only latterly. Amongst these we can include, not
only those allowed to specialise in system design and
implementation for collection documentation, but also
those involved in devising and executing conservation and
security operations.
Exhibition and museum designers occupy a middle
position, no longer so commonly isolated from the interpre-
tive dimension of public communications, often they must
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act as a broker not only between the curator as client
representative and the contractor but increasingly
between other members of the museum's exhibition team,
which may now include curator, educator, audience
advocate, and conservator as well as the designer and
whose agendas and experiences may differ but whose
practice - input to a project - may overlap considerably.
A peculiar spectrum of concerns and interests is
assembled in the museum which is poorly served by a
purely instrumental, regulatory approach to organization.
As the museum organization may be seen as an exemplary
`museal' organization, the processes of exhibition and
interpretation are characteristic not just of the public
interface but of the whole organizational infrastructure.
The museum may be 'bureaucratic' but it is so in the
special sense of accommodating the inescapably subversive
dimension of the design-centred museum process. Because
this embodies an engagement with the complexity of the
museum environment, because the museality of human
actors in the museum organization is brought into play in
the exhibitionary construction of a contingent actor
network, it constitutes a reflexive praxis that responds
directly to the postmodern crisis in knowledge.
Profession v Professionalism
It is clear, then, that there is a strand in recent museology
that questions the status quo in a rather fundamental
way. In describing where museums have come from, it
refers to unreconstructed practitioners as exemplifying the
worst characteristics of bureaucracies:
The taxonomy of art history and the excavation record feel, well,
authentically authentic. Being on the inside of an institution
13. O'NEILL, 1991, p.29.
14. See Neil Cossons,
Presidential Address, Museums
Journal, Dec. 1982.
15. SOLA, Tomislav. "Museum
professionals: the endangered
species." in BOYLAN, Patrick
(ed.) Museums 2000: Politics,
People, Professionals and Profit.
Museums Association/Routledge,
1992. pp.101-13 (pp. 108-12.)
16. ibid. p.108.
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with this way of thinking - what one might call museum culture -
feels normal and secure.
... Collecting and cataloguing artefacts, as if it were an end
in itself, is the kind of Kafkaesque function at which bureaucra -
cies excel."
At the same time, in describing their potentially liberatory
move into reflexive practice, it warns against a blind head-
long drive to form a profession. Neil Cossons, a former
president of the Museums Association, has described
himself as somebody "with a deep suspicion of professions
but an overwhelming admiration for professionalism"?'
And, although strongly in favour of a single heritage care
profession, Tomislav Sola, an internationally renowned
museologist, has spoken of the radical upheaval in theory
that must follow from recent innovations in practice if such
a profession is to be formed. Even so, he recognized that it
will contain a "dramatic dichotomy" and therefore a "latent
disunity" in accommodating such fundamentally different
museum functions as conservation and communication.'
It seems that a diverse range of museum profession-
als and museologists alike are increasingly dissatisfied
with the bureaucratized, inward-looking actuality of many
museums that appear to be suffering a 'tyranny of the
object,' a domination by the practical and financial difficul-
ties of caring for collections. These museums seem
uncertain of their direction in the face of a transformation
in relations between museums and society which has taken
the form of a shift from: "... institution to action, from
product to process, from object to information, concept and
idea, from education to communication .••" 16 They are
seeking a new cornerstone upon which to build a self-
aware and self-respecting profession that knows where it is
going and why. The process seems to hinge on a number of
issues: counteracting the bureaucratization of the
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museum, liberating the curator from a mechanized future,
unifying the increasing diversity of museum professionals,
and reconnecting the museum to the wider social arena.
In modelling museum design organization the most
promising avenue of development is opened up. Continual
reconstitution of the museal actor-network necessarily
implies a reflexive organization, but of a peculiarly
valuable type, a creative organization, a desigrierly organi-
zation, one that deals holistically with communicative
complexity, with the word-image-artefact-act complex and
its context. And the participative human actor at the core
of this contingent network of heterogeneous actors is,
therefore, by definition, against certain defining features of
a profession. He/she is against its exclusivity, its prescrip-
tion of systematized disinterested behaviour, its institu-
tionalizing process, and its monolithic model of knowledge
and power. Neil Cossons' instincts, in these respects are
laudable. What the focus on professionalism is meant to
emphasize is the individual's attitude and demeanour as
opposed to a set of concerns and interests which are collec-
tively defined, preserved and defended. What Cossons
admires about professionalism is the ethical and aesthetic
stance that it entails, the duty of care, the sense of social
responsibility, the accumulation and sharing of knowledge,
the belief in high standards of personal conduct and value
judgement, and the concern for quality of life.
To summarize, the organization of material, interpretations
and human actors is a dynamic interactive process open to
radical shifts and conflicts of underlying principles. Over
time this has the effect of creating a constellation of
practical fields which is effective and reflects the appar-
ently necessary coexistence of incommensurable paradigms.
The principles held to be foundational to each of the
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main areas of activity may normally be expected to be, if
not contradictory, then at least conflicting or counteracting.
We often couch our discourse in words that avoid contradic-
tion but this cannot hide, neither can it stand in place of,
activity that plays out conflict or is a game of counterac-
tions. The handling of these conflicts or counteracting
tendencies between, for example, interpretive flexibility in
curatorial research, technical determinism in conservation
science, and visionary indeterminacy in exhibition design,
is what lends a particular quality of dynamic complexity to
the organization of the museum. Simultaneously, it makes
individual 'professionalism' productive and collective
profession-making counterproductive.
One can say that the domination of traditional museum
organization by a museography, an hermetic culture of
curatorship, was a denial of potential and an unnecessary
limitation on effectiveness. This is a humanistic as well as
praxiological point.
What ought to happen in museums is that all of the
power plays potentially arising from the full range of disci-
plines involved in museum activity be liberated to take
their place in a constantly evolving dynamic organization.
Perhaps one cannot compromise between the incommensu-
rable but one can and ought to allow them to show as objec-
tified propositions in open conflict/counteraction/ conversa-
tion, to show as a constellation of temporary constructs,
open to change, open to interventionism on the part of all
of the human actors involved in the museum process.
This proposes that the boundary of the museum
organization is not a certain one and that the museum
professional is bound to engage the visitor and the other,
the user and the non-user, in some sense, at some time, as
matter of necessity in respect of the continuation of the
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museum. As a network of heterogeneous actors, a museum
organization is involved in shaping, just as much as it is
shaped by, its actual and potential audiences and its
political and economic context.
The overtones of this are (1) ecological, a particular
belief in the self-organizing powers of complex communi-
ties and (2) anarchic, museum activity is political activism
of a profoundly subversive and polyvalent kind.
The Reconstruction of Museum Design
In 'designed object' terms, the conventional focus of
museum design is the exhibition or the museum building,
but, if one is to consider what one means by the idea of
'museum design', this provides an inadequate starting
point. Museum design is dependent upon the program-
matic implications of the museum which have the
potential to construct a much wider range of designed
objects than these conventional products.
A museum is not a building. It is not an exhibition. It
is a complex organization understood via a range of more
or less contentious and ambiguous sociocultural and
sociotechnical interpretations. Even the apparently
neutral 'official' definition of a museum can be read as
deeply imbued with positivistic, realist notions.
A museum is an institution which collects, documents,
preserves, exhibits and interprets material evidence and
associated information for the public benefit!'
The ideology of a separately existing material reality
subject to processes of objectification, control and disci-
pline, cultural domination and surveillance is embedded in
17. Museums Association, 1984. the very language of definitions promulgated by museum
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professionals, the institutions and the machinery of legal
and political control.
• to collect: acquire, possess and take control of ...
• to document: claim and enforce the privileges of
ownership, define in terms of institutional imperatives
and processes, alienate, objectify, remake identity and
meaning in terms controlled by an academic elite ...
• to preserve: to take out of natural time, the cyclical or
spiral time associated with living social and ecological
processes, and place in artificial linear time where age
has nothing to do with the imprint of life and use, and
everything to do with very, very slow chemical reactions ...
• to exhibit: to present for public inspection objects
reduced to the condition of visible sign or action at the
service of the institution and particularly the purpose of
displaying the power of the institution over knowledges,
identities and narratives: "... the provision of object
lessons in power - the power to command and arrange
things and bodies for public display ••." "
• to interpret: to confirm the institution's power over
knowledges, identities and narratives through the
reinforcing of historical and scientific codes, the surveil-
lance of communicative environments, and the limiting
of visitor experience:
Public museums instituted an order of things that was meant
to last. In doing so, they provided the modern state with a
deep and continuous ideological backdrop ..."
... the exhibition transformed the many-headed mob into an
ordered crowd, a part of the spectacle and a sight of pleasure
in itself.2°
18. BENNETT, 1988, p.76.
Having deconstructed the museum definition in this way
19. ibid, p.93.	 to reveal its ideological pedigree, we can begin to subvert
20. ibid, p.86.	 each fragment in the attempt to liberate other possibi/i-
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ties. However, this subversion is not just a question of
words, it means doing things and making things in deliber-
ately counteractive ways.
The friction between factions in the day-to-day,
contingent, engagement with the museum process has very
little to do with the assumed over-arching power of this
'official' reality. It represents a living process of socially
constructing the museum, it reflects sometimes but just as
often blurs, the artificially fixed image of a museum
presented in unforgettable forms of words. If we were to
favour a structuralist orthodoxy we might be deconstruct-
ing the following:
A museum is a cultural organization created by the trans-
portation of social objects and their material possibilities
through time.
if a radical humanist one, the following:
A museum is the slaughterhouse of certainty, the ultimate
junk yard and the birthplace of mythologies and identities.
This process is the essential 'museum design process.' Its
tools and techniques are not just those of the exhibition
designer or the museum architect, but, it is from an experi-
mental, exploratory attitude inherent in all creative design
practice that the broader range of museum actors must
take their cue.
To quote Neal Potter, somewhat out of context:
"Technology is just technology - if you want to change
people's perception ... the human touch is needed." 21 This
idealizes the 'designer.' Neal Potter's example is an encour-
aging one, but many other designers and architects are
unable to exercise to the full their creative abilities,
express the liberatory potential of their discipline, win the
confidence of their sponsors and clients, and create the
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space for radical intervention and innovation, which is a
quality only of a design that is deeply interactive with its
social and physical context.
We need to take this idea of the ideal designer apart
also.
Architects profess a deeply social dimension to their
discipline, but, in their work, they often fail to move
beyond a conception of society as a timeless generality.
What matters at every level of design - the social context of
end-user and the social context of designer-client-contrac-
tor team - is the unavoidable impact of human interactiv-
ity. Architects/designers design buildings and spaces to
house and facilitate it, and they work in ways which
depend upon it. 'Designed object', 'design programme' and
'design process' are all fundamentally concerned with the
problem of human interactivity. In many more cases,
'design philosophy' should also centre on this problematic;
not so much the socio-political, which is where much archi-
tectural philosophy begins and ends, but more the psycho-
ecological. We have to begin to realize simultaneous
qualities of scale and complexity in every design situation -
the between-people, the person-and-environment, and the
whole-environment qualities.
The notion of a 'creative organization' connects with
the idea of socially constructed realities. The museum self-
consciously creates a narrative-based reality in its collec-
tions and in the interface between those collections and the
public. It constructs spaces - literally in exhibitions,
metaphorically in its educational and research activities -
in which interpretations of the world, or parts of it, are
made explicit. In one sense the material and the narrative
are not 'in' the world, they are 'of' it; in another sense,
however, the material and the narrative are brought into
the world by the exhibition and publishing processes.
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What it is and what it is about cannot be separated.
The exhibition in particular has this ambiguous status
evidenced by the difficulty popular critics and journalists
have in talking and writing about exhibitions. Normally
they focus their attention on the individual material
objects that are 'displayed': the selection of, and qualities
possessed by, these collection items receive a great deal of
attention. In contrast, the exhibition structure and form as
a whole, as a piece of communication, tends to receive little
attention. In this respect writers about exhibition have
something important to learn from the organizational
literature which includes its biographies and ethnogra-
phies, but also its structural, cultural and economic
analyses, just as it includes its practice manuals as well as
its underpinning theories. To place a designerly accent on
its scope, it is critical as well as descriptive, ranges across
the spectrum from local detail to global context, and more
commonly extends its focus beyond product and process to
embrace programme and philosophy/ideology.
The possibility and, ultimately, the priority of a realm
of discourse that engages the socially constructive aspects
of the exhibition is ready for disclosure in the literature of
exhibition criticism. Dis-closure is the key: the deliberate
attention-giving process of deferring the kind of conceptual
'closure' entailed in materialist, functionalist discourse
characteristic of the focus on material content and rational
process in traditional exhibition criticism. Once the object
of discourse is opened up to embrace the actor-network, in
which the human, the material and the linguistic - the
moral, the physical/mechanistic/descriptive, the
symbolic/virtual/interpretive - are regarded as equal in
analysis, the certainties underpinning the objective view
point disappear and the illusion of achievable closure, final
knowledge, is shattered. No mean thing ...the most positive
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achievement we may aspire to, after all, is to have kept the
conversation going, to have identified, explored and negoti-
ated a fresh interpretation, a more adequate understand-
ing. If 'science' means anything it means knowledge at the
leading edge of a continuing process. One must strive, as
the surfer strives, to ride before the biggest wave.
1. An earlier version of this
section was presented as a paper
entitled 'Why we need a research
culture in design', at the EAAE
conference 'Doctorates in Design
and Architecture' Delft
University of Technology, 7-10
February, 1996.
2. HILLS, Sir Graham. 'A
Renaissance in Design
Education', in MYERSON,
Jeremy. (Ed.) Design
Renaissance Selected papers
from the International Design
Congress, Glasgow, 1993. Open
Eye/CSD, 1994.
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6.3 New Directions'
Design Research: A New Context
The movement in design research, signalled by the recent
expansion of postgraduate activity in the new universities
(former polytechnics) in the UK, is toward designers'
interests and concerns. For too long the field of design
research has been dominated by the interests of those
outside the design discipline. Justifiably, design has been
called merely an activity, not a true profession.' The main
complaint being that design has no established body of
knowledge and no research culture with which it may be
enriched, renewed and sustained. This situation, however,
is changing. The activity of designerly enquiry is a novel
interdisciplinary research methodology which is being
developed by those have the most to gain, the academics
and practitioners who work together in the graduate design
departments of the new (and some of the older) universi-
ties. As one might expect, the research agenda is a reflexive
one - given the designer's postmodern condition the design
of designing is an inescapable issue - but, whereas those
outside of the design discipline have taken design
phenomena as their object of enquiry, designers take theirs
to be the complex of possibilities presented by the world. In
the future, therefore, designers will tend to lead design
research programmes which have at their core a process of
designerly enquiry and it is they who will determine the
scope of design research and which other disciplinary
approaches are brought to bear on its objects of enquiry.
Sociologists and others may continue to find design a
peculiar and fascinating object of enquiry but in the future
such researches may not claim to comprise the substance of
design research merely its necessary supplement.
3. The contents of Design
Studies, until recently the only
refereed design research journal,
is almost exclusively research
into design. Practicing designers
rarely contribute unless as
design academics.
4. POTTER, Norman. (1969)
What is a designer: things.
places. messages, London: Studio
Vista.
319
Changing Design Research
There is a need to reclaim design research for designers. Too
much design research has been conducted by technologists,
systems practitioners, historians, psychologists, sociologists,
anthropologists, organization and management theorists.
Too much design research has been research into design.
Too little design research has been research conducted by
designers doing what they do best - designing.'
Design is distinctive, it is concerned with how things
could or ought to be. It has, therefore, the greatest
potential for a worthwhile influence on political, economic
and cultural realities. Unlike craft, design addresses
radical material change: unlike art it must address the
interests of others. Bound into the very notion of design is
the necessity of an engagement with the complexity of the
human situation in the world. Design is not only a great
orchestrater of knowledges, it constructs its own peculiarly
polyvalent knowledge which makes visible and realizable
the possibility of change.
In design we have a peculiar problem: generally
design does not communicate anything important through
its end products. The things, places, messages' and
systems which are the outcomes of implementing designs
normally are not readily interpretable as generalized
knowledge. Generally speaking, designed objects are poor
vehicles for the communication of useful information about
the world, even to most designers never mind to politi-
cians, executives, technologists, and academics. The
knowledge that is embodied in a designed object forms only
the tip of a potential iceberg of insight. To recover what is
beneath the inscrutable surface of the designed object one
must allow the design process itself to speak and in the
same operation one must facilitate the recovery of the
5. BAUMAN, Zygmunt.
Culture as Praxis. London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973.
6. For example: The Car
Programme: 52 Months to Job
One or How they Designed the
Ford Sierra, Boilerhouse
Exhibition, Victoria & Albert
Museum, 1982.
7. For example: BRAWNE,
Michael. (1992) From Idea to
Building, Butterworth-
Heinemann.
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programmatic and philosophical dimensions of design. This
requirement involves a sea change in the way that design
as a practice is viewed by its practitioners. It requires the
acquisition of a research orientation during training - an
early initiation into a discipline-specific research culture.
Developing a Research Culture
Culture is not a straightforward concept as anyone who has
encountered Zygmunt Bauman's analysis will know.' But
certain aspects of the designer's experience, in existential
as much as in social terms, reveal the fragmentation and
uncertainty of the practitioner's condition. Design
knowledge, as expressed competencies, is hard won. A
succession of master-apprentice relationships is the making
of most designers whilst for some a more isolated struggle
set against the background of an unforeseeable succession
of design opportunities characterizes their personal devel-
opment. Traditionally little comes to the designer by way of
an openly accessible accumulation of design knowledge.
Designers have tended to avoid recording the intricate
relationship between the design process and its outcomes
and reflecting upon the experience of designing in terms of
the knowledge it generates of the world. Only infrequently
are means sought to produce a transferable knowledge -
that rare exhibition that tells the story of a design project,'
that rare publication that systematizes the knowledge of
extensive experience.' Most design knowledge dies with the
designer. Only when designers believe in and value - and
practice as a duty - the systematic documentation and
evaluation of designing will things change.
What has already changed is that through the recent
proliferation of postgraduate design courses and the
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address of conferences such as: Design Renaissance
(Glasgow 1993), Embodied Knowledge and Virtual Space
(London 1995), 4-D Dynamics (Leicester, 1995), and
Doctorates in Design (Delft, 1996) expectations have been
raised, and numerous groups in universities and in profes-
sional practice have begun developing methodologies and
establishing values for the future of design as a research
practice. Dean Hawkes refers to Lord Esher, former
President of the Royal Institute of British Architects, who
chastised the profession, and in particular its academic
members, for allowing themselves to be enchanted by the siren
attractions of other disciplines ...[a] state he characterised as 'the
flight to the periphery'.8
Now, the return to the centre in architectural design
research is underway. Architectural Research Quarterly
published Hawkes' paper in its first issue in 1995: it is the
only refereed journal in the field. Other fields of design are
served by Co-Design, another new journal with a refereed
section. Design Studies, which has been published since
1979, has been dominated by the periphery. Perhaps this
will change, it needs to: the study of design from a variety
of disciplinary perspectives is not the same as the study of
possibilities for change from the perspective of design.
Knowledge and Power in Design Research
Designers are the natural torch bearers for interdiscipli-
narity. As this study makes visible in its hyperspatial
modelling of museum design organization, design
addresses the complexity of the human condition because
it requires a simultaneous attention to social, psychologi-
cal, aesthetic, political, ethical as well as technical diffi-
culty. In analytical terms it resists reductionism and
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pursues the accommodation of difference. It is, therefore, a
hopeful resource in the postmodern boom of interdiscipli-
nary research. To make this a reality, however, designers
need to be at the core of a research culture, able to decide
who is admitted to design research programmes and who
not. This provides the only hope of organizing in the face of
already powerful research-based cultures in the sciences
and the humanities.
The continued health and influence of the design disci-
pline requires the establishment of a position of strength in
relation to disciplines such as management, economics,
social science, planning, engineering, etc. each of which
derives its credibility with the policy makers, if not always
its efficacy in practice, from rigorous and well presented
research. Design was born with and developed as a
necessary adjunct to industrialization. In the post-industrial
era, the so-called information age, a discipline which cannot
renew itself in a radical sense and articulate the relevance
of that process will surely become extinct. Therefore,
although 'new knowledge' is, one hopes, the outcome of
research, the main reason for developing and continuing in
a particular research culture is to share in the influence
one's discipline gains over the direction of human affairs. In
this sense the development of a research culture is not
primarily about advancing knowledge, it is about power.
Research Agendas
In the new context the agendas of design research arise
out of the address of different groups to certain key issues
in developing a research methodology:
• formulation of viable research proposals
• organization and monitoring procedures
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• quality and breadth of documentation
• aims and methods of analysis
• forms of presentation
• critical feedback
Formulation of viable research proposals
In 1995 Bruce Archer set out the criteria that define valid
research in any field.' Applying these specifically to what
he originally called 'designerly enquiry' 10 produces a
checklist against which one might evaluate the validity of
a research project that centres on 'core' design research
methods, i.e.:
As a form of applied research the project will:
• employ design methods, techniques, procedures - a design
process - that are planned, documented, transparent and
open to explanation and interpretation;
• formulate and address explicit questions about possibilities for
change in an actual or envisaged practical situations;
• identify specific objects of design through the development of
a design programme;
• produce design outcomes, supported by explanation and/or
interpretation, that constitute new knowledge; and
• employ forms, methods and techniques of exposition that
communicate an intelligible content to appropriate
audiences.
As action research, it will, in addition:
9. ARCHER, Bruce. (1996) 'The
nature of research', CoDesign,
01.02.03-95. p.6.
10. ARCHER, Bruce. (1981) 'A
view of the nature of design
research' in JACQUES, Robin.
& James A. Powell. (eds.)
Design: Science: Method.
Westbury House, pp.30-47.
• engage in a 'real world' practical situation;
• entail collaboration with individuals and groups whose experi-
ence forms the (or one of the) objects of design; and
• include an overarching aim to produce results that feed into
more broadly formulated applied research.
These general guidelines, however, must be seen in the
light of a complexity inherent in the formulation of any
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object of design. The subject is embedded and simultane-
ously deconstructed, made non-discreet as an entity.
11. POTTER, Norman. Models
and Constructs: Margin Notes to
a Design Culture. Hyphen Press,
1990.
As this project in modelling museum design organization
reveals the complex of spatialities constitutes an unstable
grounding which one may not escape. In a proactive but
profoundly ironic gesture a model has been constructed as
if the reflective practice of visualization it entails need
only gaze upon the actuality, ontically referenced or
imagined, of the physical, the social, the individual, and
the encrypted. But, this is only an as if The gesture is a
designerly manoeuvre. The clearest implication for a
decentred view of the human actor, of a holistic view of
actor networks, is that the categories of the physical, the
social, the individual, the encrypted have themselves to be
compromised. As infinitely fragmented, reconfigurable
entities, the actors of whom we speak are neither
machines, nor signs, nor bodies plain and simple. They can
never be the normative collectivities of components implied
by modernity. Since the dominant mode of rationality, the
Telos, is a myth that has been exploded - a comforting
mirage, a discomforting chimera - we have come to believe
that there are only consensual illusions - hyper-realities or
virtual realities? - the most enduring of which is the vision
of a receding past. Our arrogant chauvinism has us
staggering backwards into bedlam.
The designerly gesture may be ironic but it is
necessary. To paraphrase Norman Potter, the value of a
model is in its rendition of a possibility.' But, by making
visible a complex of functions, bodies, mechanisms, signs,
collectivities, etc. operating in museum design organiza-
tion one immediately invites the dedifferentiation of its
apparently definitive contents. Because complexity, as
defined here, imposes interminable reflexivity, it is not the
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particular model one constructs that matters but the
process of modelling itself. From within what is modelled,
human perceptions appear to provide a frame of reference
but from without, something more radical and immanent
is implied - a new ontology.
The invasion of the space of the body, the space of
bodies, by the spaces of the virtual, the virtualities of
cyberspace, presents the possibility of new hybrid entities
and their dynamic interplay in a fused and fluid multidi-
mensional cyber-reality. An intimation of the new ontology
is already present.
The curator is being fragmented into a complex of
specialist functions: collecting, researching, collection
managing, conserving, exhibiting, designing, guarding,
interpreting, administrating, etc. We can no longer
straightforwardly centre our critical gaze on the profes-
sional individual, an indivisible human actor, rather we
must scatter our attention across the museum design
organization complex to perceive in a pattern of activity an
idealized, simulated, reconstructed curatorial role.
Under the structuring power of a taxonomy, museum
collections were conventionally discreet. They are being
fused with archives to form an informatic-material
complex whose structure is contingent, fluid, cyberneti-
cally determined.
The boundaries defining the designer and the conser-
vator are being eroded. Professional identities are being
blurred as each embodies aspects of curatorial knowledge
and power in an organizational presence extended by a
common aura of computer-mediated intelligence.
Security staff and various surveillance technologies
are being enmeshed in the processes of public relations and
communication and the resulting hybrid forms embedded
in the fabric of buildings, spaces and exhibits - CCTV
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becomes exhibit, educator becomes intelligence gatherer,
guard becomes interpreter, interpreter becomes exhibit
component, exhibit becomes building component, etc.
No traditional function or entity remains untouched
by the emergence of ironic dissembling virtualities. The
new entities construct a greater number of interfaces than
their precursors, have more permeable and mobile bound-
aries, and therefore, more readily interchange and
transform their contents. Moreover, the principle applies at
a meta-level. The museal complex is one of a range of
compromised institutions participating in a global contest
of faculties - the museum boundary extends beyond the
walls of its building into the urban environment, beyond
the system of its taxonomies into the narratives of
existence, beyond the material of its collections into the
conservable heritage, beyond the interpretive act of exhibi-
tion into the realm of media production and telecommunica-
tion, etc. The museum is being fragmented - geographically
and cybernetically dispersed - and it increasingly shares
the marginal elements that construct its shifting identity
with a range of heterogeneous complexes - consultancy and
facility services, urban development, tourism and leisure
promotion, environmental conservation, etc. may all extend
beyond the requirements of purely museological rationale.
The formulation of viable research proposals in the design
field must encounter the radical uncertainty inherent in
the postmodern, post-structural future of possibilities. The
implications, in general terms, for developing designing as
a research methodology are paradoxical. The checklist
developed from Bruce Archer's list of criteria for what
qualifies as research is problematic in every aspect.
The requirement that the design methods,
techniques, procedures employed are 'planned' requires us
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to define the notion of planning in an unorthodox way. We
rid the notion of establishing goals, policies, procedures of
its teleological overtones - the implication that planning
must happen in advance of and have a straightforward
intentional relation to implementation. Planning becomes
a type of activity distinguished from others in the
design/research process by its cognitive style and its
characteristic products rather than by its temporal
position in a sequence or cycle of activities.
The requirement that the design methods, etc.
employed are 'transparent and open to explanation and
interpretation' requires us to qualify the implied rational-
ity of procedural analysis. The design process admits the
non-rational as a consequence of the shift in and out of
contrasting cognitive styles. Whilst engaged in self-
conscious activities, characterized as 'thinking about
design', rational procedures of selecting and evaluating
techniques may be entailed. In these moments of the
design process a subject-object relation is constructed: the
material upon which the designer may act is differentiated
out in an analytic sense. However, whilst engaged in
unself-conscious activities characterized as thinking in
designing non-rational procedures prevail. In these
moments the designer is immersed in the work and
constructs a de-differentiated identification with the
material of the design. The implication for the demand
that methods, techniques, procedures are transparent is
compromised. The designer, as reflective practitioner, is
faced with the task of placing an epistemologically
coherent construction upon events of which memory and
formal documentation provide an incomplete picture. A
messiness born of epistemological discontinuity is tidied up
in retrospect and 'explanation and interpretation' are
therefore collapsed into a process of postrationalization.
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The outside observer of events in the design process is
equally faced with evidence of the behaviours of the
designer and the products of the designing activity which
may fail, at first sight, to hang together. Only in retro-
spect, as a result of an attenuating process of postrational-
ization, may the apparent discontinuities and complexities
of the design process be made to make sense.
Postrationalization is therefore defined as the characteris-
tic of any explanatory narrative of design process. This
means that such explanation necessarily has mythic
qualities and is ideological and contingent.
The kind of questions that the procedures of design-
erly enquiry best address also pose paradoxical, reflexive
problems. The characteristic 'what if ...?' starting point in
design leads to an opening up of two fields, a bifurcation of
the practical situation into an object of design (the program-
matic/ideological arena) and a design project (the
process/product arena) - in classical functionalist terms, the
problem definition and the solution definition. As a neces-
sarily holistic activity design proceeds to explore the spaces
of ideology and process and to develop programme and
product in parallel. At some point, prescribed by contingent
circumstance, a realizable possibility for material change is
made to crystalize out of the design complex (matrix) via a
more or less self-conscious, synthetic process of design
communication. Only at this point do the problem definition
and the solution definition become focussed, do the precise
nature of the question that has been addressed and the
consequences that have been embodied in an 'answer', a
realizable possibility, become 'explicit'.
The form of research proposal appropriate to the core
area of design research is, for the above reasons, unlikely
to be conventional. First, rather than demonstrating the
potential of a specified methodology to produce a particular
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12. See DUFFY, Frank. (Key
note speech) in Doctorates in
Design and Architecture, confer-
ence book, EAAE/Delft
University of Technology, 1996.
form of new knowledge, I believe it should demonstrate the
potential of' a particular point of departure to open up an
appropriate arena of possibilities. Second, given the diffi-
culty any proposal will have in fulfilling normal research
funding criteria the destination of any proposal is unlikely
to be one of the existing research funding councils. There
may be some scope in the approach taken by the indepen-
dent foundations, but my suspicion is that the multi-client
consultant arrangement, typical of the projects undertaken
by the architectural/research practice DEGW, offers the
greatest scope in the immediate future.12
Organization and monitoring procedures
The nature of the 'project' in designerly enquiry does not
lend itself to a detailed procedural pre-programming.
Rather the process of designerly enquiry itself generates
the immanent possibilities for action. Thinking in doing
becomes a traceable phenomenon via the embedded and
reflexive documentary activity which embraces the produc-
tion of the design products - plans, visuals, models, story-
boards, etc. - and the production of programmatic informa-
tion. In the intersubjective arena of the design team, in the
broadest sense of all those creatively involved in the
shaping of the design situation, the means of communica-
tion are simultaneously the means of creative transaction,
the substance of a process of social construction. The possi-
bility of an organizational and monitoring construct exists
in the moment of semiosis, a pseudosynchronic slice
through the social space of the design which is perpetually
deferred and may only be reconstructed in an evaluative
process of postrationalization.
The relativism upon which this existential notion of
the 'moment of semiosis' appears to depend is countered at
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the metalevel of enfolded spatialities. Only by committing
the 'perfect paralogism', against which Lefebvre warns us,
do we confuse the logics of the documentary activity with
those of the social matrix and with those of the material
realization of a design and of the design's philosophical
formations. The charge of relativism loses its bite once we
admit the epistemological complexity proper to design:
relativism requires a commensurability of terms that
cannot survive the discontinuities of navigating radically
different spatialities.
In reclaiming design research for designers one is not
eliminating the grounded approaches typical of established
sociological paradigms. Ethnomethodology, for example,
remains viable and open to reinterpretation in terms of the
designer's modus operandi. However, what the designer is
doing in adopting an ettmomethodological mode of enquiry,
perhaps to develop an 'insider's' understanding of the
context of the design, is bracketing other activities, cogni-
tively and temporally, in order to introduce conscious
analysis into work which is felt to be lacking on an uncon-
scious level. In this case thinking about the design from a
participatory perspective temporarily replaces thinking in
designing which is essentially egotistical, that is, fully
immersed in the material of the design, in an attempt to
counter a feeling that, at a particular moment, something
is wrong with the 'fit' of the design product to its
programme. Such an activity is therefore motivated by a
perceptual response to the material of the design, its
contingent documentary products, and it is purely instru-
mental. Desiperly enquiry pursues a goal other than the
explanation which might arise from a social-scientific
enquiry: it seeks to produce realizable possibilities rather
than an explanation or interpretation of existing
phenomena. The design project is literally a 'project', an
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imaginative construct that points forward to a possibility.
It, therefore, resists the constraint of epistemological
closure which is entailed in any 'rational' explanation that
points to a probability.
Breadth and quality of documentation
The museum design organization model developed here
prompts, at every turn, an attention to product,
programme, process and philosophy - the 4Ps of design.
The central concern, in developing core design research
methodology, is with the production of an externalized,
visible documentary product in which the ontic possibilities
and the epistemological complexity of the design are amply
recorded. The spatialities explored in constructing a
holistic modelling of design include a proper account of the
relations between the psycho-social dimensions of design-
erly and interpretive activity and the formal and documen-
tary dimensions of the various products upon which must
be based analysis and evaluation. Therefore, it is possible
to articulate the criteria for quality in the material of
research documentation by reference to the appropriate
epistemological sphere. For example, a design process
model based on the playing off of techniques, methods and
media against the scope of cognitive attention to the design
(from the smallest relevant detail to the global) can be used
to map, track and navigate the design process as experi-
enced, to compare with ideal prescription for the design
process, to make visible any deficiencies in documentation
early in the process, and to provide a frame of reference
against which to post-rationalize the deferred, distorted
and distanced psycho-social dimensions of the design.
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Aims and methods of analysis
A particular realm of possibilities for change in material
conditions and the criteria defining success emerge simulta-
neously out of the design matrix. Reflexivity is immanent in
design research methodology and imposes the need for
rigorous iterative procedures of exposition, review and
refinement of, what may be thought of as the 'sense-making'
aspect of designing. In dealing with complexity, designing
does not involve a straightforward, self-conscious process of
interpreting given signs and texts. Rather, the activity
involves a repeated dedifferentiation and redifferentiation
of the space of signs and texts. This is a process that is both
creative and interpretive, involves both conscious and self-
conscious modes of attention, and, therefore, constructs and
reconstructs the material of the world so that they literally
make sense. Designing makes visible and sensible and
realizable the possibilities for change in material condi-
tions: as research, it also makes itself visible, sensible and
realizable, and thereby open to critical attention.
Forms of presentation
13. In particular: Centre for
Research in Art and Design
(CRiAD), Grays School of Art,
The Robert Gordon University;
the Royal College of Art; the
University of Central England;
and the University of
Sunderland.
A great deal of experimentation has been undertaken in
recent times to explore and evaluate a range of presentation
formats for art and design research.' The possibilities that
have already emerged include the traditional forms of
written academic exposition - progress report, working
paper, conference paper, journal paper, book chapter, book -
forms involving time-based presentation - video, CAD
animation, multimedia publication - the traditional forms of
artistic exposition - exhibition, performance, documentary
production, catalogue annotation, essay - and various
14. Times Higher Education
Supplement, Multimedia
Features, 12 April 1996. p.vi.
15. MORGAN, John S.
"Conceptual Kiosks: New
Information Environments" in
4D Dynamics: Proceedings of the
Design Research Society
Conference held in Leicester 21
September 1995. Compiled by
Alec ROBERTSON, De Montfort
University/Design Research
Society, 1995.
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innovative combinations of the three types of exposition.
The particular form or combination of forms of exposition
employed in a specific design research project may need to
be innovative. Ultimately, what matters is that the
research is communicated unambiguously and persuasively,
is open to detailed analysis and critical evaluation, and is in
a form appropriate to its information content and intended
audience, and suitable for archive storage and retrieval.
Critical feedback
Traditionally the avenues of critical feedback on research
include the seminar and the academic journal. Although
these remain important channels also for design research,
there are others that have a, perhaps, crucial role to play in
the future. The distribution of research via the internet
offers the potential for a rapid two-way process: in text-
based form this is already commonplace. However, with
projects such as the three-dimensional virtual museum
currently under development in the Tel Aviv University's
Knowledge Technology Lab,' and the 'Conceptual Kiosks'
developed by John Morgan at Auburn University,
Alabama,' the beginnings of a new possibility is evident.
The virtual, four-dimensional exposition becomes available
to interactive development and critique. In effect, the tradi-
tional artistic forms of exposition - the exhibition and its
textual supplements, the catalogue and the essay - are
made available indefinitely and at a distance. But, more
than this, they are integrated in the multimedia format and
easily made archivable on optical disk.
Coda
Design is in the marketplace of ideas: "No theory today
16. ADORNO, Theodor. [1966]
Negative Dialectics. Trans. E B
Ashton. London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1973. p.4.
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escapes the marketplace. Each one is offered as a possibil-
ity among competing opinions".' Without its own core of
powerful, intellectual leaders active in investigating
through design the direction of future material culture and
committed to articulating, communicating and advocating
design knowledge, design will suffer technological and
political instrumentalization, extra-disciplinary mytholo-
gizing, and perhaps oblivion.
This project is in at the beginning of a long-term
collaborative project which aims to pull the design disci-
pline up by its boot straps. If we sustain our postgraduate
students in a newly invigorated research environment and
help them to develop ways of designing and communicat-
ing that command the serious attention of others, we can
look forward to a future in which designers have a
commensurate share in the exercise of power.
Artwork
Briefing Process
Design Brief
Design Process
Design Programme
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GLOSSARY
Illustration, photography, typography or three-dimensional materi-
al, or any combination of these used as an original image and pre-
sented with specifications for graphic reproduction.
A dialogue between client and designer which produces a progres-
sively more adequate or detailed design brief.
A document defining the nature of a specific design project - an ini-
tial brief may be a short general definition, a final brief may
include: context of the project; overall aims and objectives; physical,
human and financial resources available; organization and
timescale; detailed functional requirements; performance criteria;
etc. (see: Design Programme) 'Brief' is the common British term.
Design Concept	 A design idea which has been visualized and therefore given poten-
tially realizable visual and material qualities.
Design Contract
Design Idea
A contract between the designer and the client.
1. A transcendent design archetype. 2. An intention for a design
which exists in the mind and may be expressed in words.
Design Philosophy	 1. The theory or principles underpinning design activity. 2. An
explicit system of values and beliefs about the nature and meaning
of design in general.
Design Rationale
1. An ideal or generic model of design activity (used as a conceptual
tool). 2. A particular way of conducting design activity.
The object of design: the practical situation, the design idea or
design problem, and the design process encompassed by a system of
documentary procedures (see: Design Brief) 'programme' is the
common American term.
1. The designer's way of explaining the what? when? how? and,
most importantly, the why? of designing. 2. A systematic written
justification for a particular design.
Designed Object
	 The end product of the design process: the thing, place, message,
system that results from the implementation of the design.
Display
Exhibit
1. A general term which can refer to an individual exhibit, groups
of exhibits or an entire exhibition.' 2. An organized arrangement of
artefacts and/or information.
1. A single unit within an exhibition ... 1 2. Any organized combina-
tion of artefact(s), information in graphic, typographic and audiovi-
sual form, supporting structure, and enclosure or housing, which is
designed to communicate.
Mock-up
Mood-board
336
Exhibition	 Any organized assemblage of exhibits which is designed to serve an
overall purpose or present a theme or narrative.
Interpretive Scheme The information structure or narrative/thematic framework and
the system of collection organization used to guide the design of
museum communications, particularly: exhibits, exhibitions, educa-
tional programmes, publications and publicity.2
A roughly constructed approximation to a finished exhibit, usually
produced for purposes of evaluation ...1
Any assemblage of images, materials and/or objects mounted on a
board to convey an abstract notion of the ambience, style, feel,
mood, etc. of an interior, place, exhibit - usually produced early in
the design process as a visual reference/aide-memoire.
Object of Design	 see: Design Programme
Specifications	 Details of dimensions, materials, methods of production, finishes,
etc. required to produce and install an exhibit or exhibition.
Specifications are annotated on the artwork or working drawings,
as appropriate. In complex work they are also normally produced as
a written document.
Story-board 1. A series of key images for a proposed exhibit, etc. with copy and
directions beneath.' 2. The technique of explaining a sequence of
events, images or views in an audiovisual presentation, exhibit or
exhibition using a series of captioned visuals.
Visual	 A perspective drawing or a plan of the basic elements of a design' -
usually rendered in tone or colour.
Visualization	 The process of externalizing ideas and making them visually com-
prehensible to others.
Working drawings	 A series of drawings produced to communicate exhibit construction
and installation to an exhibition contractor
1. MILES, Roger S. et al. The
Design of Educational Exhibits.
Unwin Hyman, 1982.
2. MATTHEWS, Geoff.
Museums and Art Galleries: A
Design and Development Guide.
Butterworth Architecture, 1991.
337
Appendices
A.1
	 Notation
A2	 Museum Staffing
A
	
B C
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A.1 - Notation
The system of notation used throughout this
thesis is designed to reflect each of the
following criteria (see 3.1 Organization): use
in analysis and design; clear visualization of
interval and space; and flexibility in juxta-
posing dimensions however they may be
1	
Type A: two limits.
1	
	
ND-
Type B: one limit and one extension to infinity
Type C: two extensions to infinity
Figure A.1.1
One-dimensional schemata
characterized: i.e. scale (proportion/speed),
scope (range/distance), series (sequence/
cycle), or spectrum (band/continuum). Below
are set out the schemata for notating one-
dimensionality (Figure A.1.1) and two-
dimensionality (Figure A.1.2.)
Although it would be possible to render
the three-dimensional schemata quite
clearly using a conventional projection such
as oblique, isometric or perspective. I have
assumed that in principle the system of
notation can be understood from the one and
two-dimensional schemata and a single
example of three-dimensional notation
(Figure A.1.3.)
A	 B
	
B
A
Type A-A: Region
	 A
Type A-B: Stretch	 Type B-B: Quarter
C
Type A-C: Tract
	
Type B-C: Section	 Type C-C: Plane
Figure A.1.2
Two-dimensional schemata
Type A-A-A: Enclosure
Figure A.1.3
Example three-dimensional schema (oblique
projection)
•
• •
• • •
• • • •
• • • • •
Figure A.1.4
Calculating the number of types of schemata
at a particular level of dimensionality.
1. Manpower
Nationals
Local Authority
Others
Services	 All
4341 277 129 65 4812
3728 934 1646 938 7246
1976 1267 7562 1203 12,008
10,045 2478 9337 2206 24,066
(N)
77
525
618
1220
Full-time Part-time Volunteer MSC	 Total
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11111111PPS
	
number of
triangle sum	 dimensionality schemata  
A
project ultimately demands a dimensionality
higher than three in any case I have
generally resorted to the style of graphic
series mapping techniques demonstrated in
Hofstede's work and referred to above (3.1.)
0	 1
1	 3
2	 6
3	 10
4	 15
5	 21
6	 28The number of schemata for each level of • • • • •	 •
dimensionality follows the triangle
summation rule (Figure A.1.4). Although
computer software does exist for visual
virtual modelling in three-dimensions, none
is intended for this application. As the
A2 - Museum Staffing
This analysis is based on "Staffing Profiles - Overview" in
PRINCE & HIGGINS-McLOUGHLIN, 1987. pp.78-80. and Figure
4.2 "Proportion of total full-time staff employed in each activity,
by type of museum", p.81. (See above: 2.3 Museum, note 50.)
Commission - qualified but long-
term unemployed people
engaged on special projects. The
scheme was terminated by the
Government in 199?
Figure A.2.1
Numbers of full-time, part-time, volunteer and MSC' staff by
type of museum.
Nationals
Local Authority
Others
All
Figure A.2.2
Nationals
Local Authority
Others
All
Figure A.2.3
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Full-time Part-time Volunteer MSC	 Total
90.22 5.75 2.68 1.35 100
51.45 12.89 22.71 12.95 100
16.45 10.55 62.98 10.02 100
41.74 10.30 38.80 9.16 100
Percentage of full-time, part-time, volunteer and MSC staff by
type of museum.
Full-time Part-time Volunteer MSC 	 Total
56.38 3.60 1.67 0.84 62.49
7.10 1.78 3.13 1.79 13.80
3.20 2.05 12.24 1.94 19.43
8.23 2.03 7.65 1.81 19.73
2. These figures derive from
the answers to a different sec-
tion of the original Museums
Database questionnaire and are
therefore based on a different
response rate to those in Figures
A.2.1-3.
Mean numbers of full-time, part-time, volunteer and MSC staff
in a museum, by type of museum.
%(2) mean number
9.9 5.58
19.6 1.39
11.1 0.35
15.0 1.23
Figure A.2.4
Full-time staff employed in curatorship by type of museum.
Nationals
Local Authority
Others
All
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